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Abstract 
This thesis examines the intersect of institutions and ideas during crisis. It suggests to synthesise 
institutional and ideational theories of change and stability in pragmatic empirical research inspired 
by classics of comparative politics. It emphasises a specific set of institutional parameters: Open or 
closed bureaucratic structures understood along three analytical dimensions: capacity of state, 
negotiation style and basis of expertise. These affect the way in which policy ideas can be utilized 
by experts. The ideational dimension is considered along three distinct aspects of policy ideas: 
overarching ideas, instrumental ideas and settings of ideas. The empirical contribution of the thesis 
is an examination of energy policy ideas of public experts in energy policy in the United Kingdom 
and France around the first oil crisis. The two cases represent diverse cases of variation on the 
causal factor of bureaucratic structures where the United Kingdom represents an open bureaucratic 
structure and France represents a closed bureaucratic structure. The findings of the investigation 
emphasise that ideas matter, but that different institutional contexts affect the ability of expert actors 
to form coalitions around different policy ideas. In the French case, this allowed the EDF to form 
ideational coalitions with shifting expert groups whereas the United Kingdom required political 
intervention to break the gridlock and status quo dynamics among multiple expert groups. 
Therefore, there is considerable insight in examining how ideas matter in a well-specified 
institutional context. In synthesising these two dimensions of policy change, the thesis highlights 
the institutional conditions for actor coalitions to form around ideas and the conditioning role the 
institutional environment can have for status quo policy dynamics. Furthermore, the analysis sheds 
light on how the role of ideas for policy during crisis may be understood as incremental and 
piecemeal logic rather than the erstwhile dominance of paradigmatic or punctuated shifts. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Puzzle 
1.1 Introduction 
Looking at today’s international political landscape the relevance of examining crises is readily 
apparent. This introduction is written in the autumn of 2020 in a period where several countries are 
still under lockdown due to the pandemic of covid-19. At the time of writing almost 40 million 
people are estimated to have contracted the virus and more than 1.1 million have died (COVID-19 
Map n.d.).  With this backdrop, the relevance of studying international crises as a phenomenon 
becomes all the more apparent when situated within one. Of course, crises are not something new. It 
seems only a short time ago that economists were warning of the risk of a renewed recession 
essentially borne out of recurring problems resulting from the financial crisis of 2008. That is not to 
mention the refugee crisis, which highlighted human suffering brought about by disparities in 
wealth and safety across the globe as well as the problems associated with finding common political 
solutions to sudden shifts in migratory flows especially to the EU. Finally, the question of the crisis 
of mother earth in relation to problems associated with the man-made effects of global warming and 
the follow-effects that reaching the threshold of 1.5°C global average before 2050 has meant an 
ongoing sense of crisis for several years in much of political discourse (Masson-Delmotte et al. 
2018). This is of course not an exhaustive list, and indeed, we may hear the word “crisis” invoked 
often in our everyday life for different reasons by different people and with, arguably, different 
degrees of severity.  
Antonio Gramsci famously defined a crisis as the interregnum where the old is dying and the new 
cannot yet be born (Gramsci 1999, 276)1. Crisis, in this way, becomes a concept, in part, of the 
casting into doubt or dethroning of existing dominant ideas or institutions without a clear 
alternative. Importantly, though, it is this opening of the interregnum where new realities may be 
constructed. This highlights the inherent political nature of a crisis. Its invocation serves to bring 
into flux the known and introduce an element of uncertainty into an otherwise (tacitly assumed) 
calculable and stable – in the sense of predictable - future. In that sense, the collective agreement 
                                                 
1 For Gramsci it was this was manifest as the disconnect between leading capacity of ruling classes with their ideological support – in which case they 
simply become dominant through the use of coercive force (Gramsci 1999, 276, 1999, 55). For a longer exposé on the nature of crisis, see (Koselleck 
and Richter 2006). 
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that an event is a crisis also acts retroactively in delineating the predicted from the unpredicted, or 
the normal from the unique. 
That such momentous events can have restructuring effects on actors, resources and policies may 
seem a borderline trivial observation. Even when confining our focus to policy change during 
economic crisis, such a focus is not really state of the art. Already in 1986 examinations of 
economic crisis, as “‘major downturn(s)’ in the business cycle which rearrange the ‘placement of 
social actors in the economy and shape subsequent policy choices” made this connection between 
crisis events and policy change (Gourevitch 1986, 20–21). As Gramsci’s definition implies, as 
Gourevitch would probably agree and as the responses to the above-mentioned crises tell us, a 
common crisis does not imply a commonality in the solutions applied. In an attempt to disassemble 
the, otherwise assumed, automaticity of the link between crisis and response, the social sciences 
have long tried to understand why countries react differently to similar stimuli. Some parts of the 
literature have emphasised the role of structural conditions to explain why countries or people react 
the way they do to a crisis. Recent scholarship on ideas has emphasised the importance of what 
people think to understand how they react to a crisis (Blyth 2013a, 2013b; Carstensen 2015; Clift 
2012; Hay 1996, 1999; Matthijs and McNamara 2015; Moschella and Tsingou 2013; Schmidt 
2016). Crisis provides an opportune moment for the historical study of the shaping of political 
ideas. By focusing on crisis, it becomes more likely to observe changes in political ideas and trace 
how these changes formed.  
Such mechanisms of interaction between actors and environment can only be studied with a certain 
temporal separation (Gaddis 2002, 61–62; Hay 2002, 124). The dynamics of ideas have to a large 
extent been studied in the setting of crisis. Much of the focus of this research agenda has been in 
highlighting the significance of political ideas in their own right in contrast to earlier material 
explanations of policy outcomes (Blyth 1997, 2002; Campbell 2002; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; 
Gofas and Hay 2012; Hall 1989, 1993; Hay 1996; Parsons 2003; Schmidt 2002b). As such, the 
development within constructivist institutionalism and discursive institutionalism of “ideas matter” 
is to say that ideas matter in themselves and beyond their material reflection or foundation often 
emphasised in rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993; Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 2015; North 1990; Pierson 2000, 2004; Shepsle 1989; 
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Streeck and Thelen 2005; Weingast 1998)2. However, this forceful move from materiality to the 
focus of ideas might itself have neglected the complex relationship existing between ideas and the 
material structure in which they exist. For instance, Mark Blyth’s exploration of the dynamics of 
ideas in Great Transformations (Blyth 2002) is exactly a study of the embeddedness of ideas in 
structures of material resources. This study succeeded in suggesting material resources as decisive 
for idea formation. However, the study of the configuration of state institutions and their effect on 
ideas is still underexplored. Thus, this thesis aims to resituate the study of ideas in emphasising the 
interplay between ideas and materiality by exploring the effects of state institutions (as 
bureaucracies) on the formation of political ideas. 
To understand these complexities I suggest contribute to the further illumination of this relationship 
using a comparative research design that leans heavily on historical archive material from the 
historical period surrounding the first oil crisis, in an attempt to examine the mechanisms that link 
configurations of material institutions as bureaucratic structures to certain policy ideas among 
governmental elites and decision-makers. This period is chosen as the object of study because it 
provided a crisis or similar external shock, thus similar crisis conditions, to many affected countries. 
The cases explored in this investigation are United Kingdom and France. They are prime candidates 
for such an examination for several reasons. Firstly, because they have similar simple-polity 
structures where political authority is centred on the national government as opposed to dispersed 
among several authorities (Schmidt 2007, 13). Secondly, they share the characteristic of choosing 
national policy solutions rather than international coordination, say, through the European 
Community, in the wake of the later dubbed ‘Oil Crisis’. Despite these similarities the two countries 
opted for markedly different policies in response to the similar conditions provided by the crisis; 
both in terms of content of policies but also reflecting different trajectories. These two 
characteristics mean that crisis interpretations are likely to be present among governmental elites 
and their actions are – at least formally – set outside a broader set of international interaction of 
explanations.  
Thus, this thesis has an overarching theoretical puzzle of how material structures, such as 
bureaucratic structures, influence the ability of policy ideas of some experts to become dominant in 
                                                 
2 One may reasonably argue this critique of historical institutionalism is perhaps more applicable to newer renditions of the framework rather than the 
original statement of (Steinmo and Thelen 1992). For a version of this argument, see (Hay 2008) or (Schmidt 2010a). We will return to the potential 
intersects between historical institutionalism and the study of ideas, later. 
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energy policy. The choice of exploring this in relation to the handling of the oil crisis of 1973 in the 
United Kingdom and France embeds the study in the broader question of why countries react 
differently to a common international crisis. The chosen path through which the analysis does so is 
by exploring ideational developments within explicitly formulated dimensions of material 
structures. Before establishing these aspects of the theoretical puzzle, I will briefly sketch the 
chapter outline of the thesis. 
1.2 Chapter Outline 
The remainder of chapter 1 situates the puzzle of the thesis in the historical context of the first oil 
crisis and the sensitivity of the United Kingdom and France to the disruptions it brought about. 
Then, it highlights some of the broader insights that may be gained from examining the oil crisis 
before it briefly sets out the argument of the thesis and the research questions it attempts to answer. 
Chapter 2 situates the thesis in the broader literature on comparative politics and specifically in the 
discussions of neo-institutionalist theories of the dynamics of change and continuity. It argues for a 
renewed appreciation for the potential insights from combining historical institutionalist and 
ideational approaches in studying policy change and draws on a classic of comparative politics to 
remind us this synergy is possible. Having situated the thesis in the literature, chapter 3 sets out the 
theoretical framework used in the analyses. It specifies the causal factor of bureaucratic structure as 
a subset of institutional variation relevant to the role of expertise and the outcome factor of policy 
ideas among experts. Chapter 4 sets out the methods and data sources of the thesis. It delves into the 
case selection logic and argues for the combination of process tracing methods with a comparative 
analytical approach. It then describes the empirical archive material that was collected and used for 
the analyses.  
The two following chapters are the analyses of the two cases. Each analysis follows to broad steps. 
Chapter 5 analyses the bureaucratic structure and policy ideas among experts in the United 
Kingdom. The first step of the analysis establishes the open nature of the bureaucratic structure. The 
second step then examines the policy ideas among experts within context of this specific 
bureaucratic structure. For pedagogical reasons this step of the analysis is separated into two parts 
representing the policy ideas in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom before and after 
the crisis. Chapter 6 proceeds to analyse the French case according to a similar structure. The first 
step establishes the closed bureaucratic structure of France. The second step analyses the policy 
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ideas among experts in energy policy within this institutional context. Chapter 7 concludes on the 
thesis by setting the broader goals and research questions in relation to the individual findings the 
analysis of each case and compares the contributions they bring to the literature by indicating which 
general insights we might draw from these specific findings. Finally, the chapter attempts to hint at 
how future research might benefit from the findings of this thesis and how a closer analytical 
attention to the connection between institutions and ideas can be used to enrich our understanding 
of other phenomena in modern society. Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are the references to used archive 
material and literature, respectively. 
1.3 The Puzzle 
1.3.1 International economic crisis and domestic effects 
The period treated sits against the backdrop of international economic crisis and the waning of the 
golden age of embedded liberalism. In the early 1970s, the historical compromise forged between 
countries on the back of the disasters of the Great Depression and the Nazi and fascist experiences 
of the Second World War was in the process of being undermined. The conflicts in the Middle East, 
the oil shocks of the early 1970s, the de-facto dissolving of the Bretton woods system of pegged 
exchange rates (when dollar stopped being an anchor) marked a shift. The previously stable 
compromise of the managed economy was in trouble. At the same time, increasing international 
cooperation in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the expansion of the European 
Community meant that the world was significantly different from when the blueprint of the 
managed international economy was stuck onto paper. Concurrent with the downturn in the 
economic business cycle came re-configuration of traditional party-political lines and a host of new 
parties emerged across Europe as the Trente Glorioueses of the post-World War 2 came to a halt. 
That the oil crisis of the early 1970s had many facets is therefore no surprise. What is interesting is 
how and why countries reacted differently in the context of these shifts.  
In the broader literature on comparative political economy, this period has been extensively studied 
in no small part by neo-institutionalist scholars (Hall and Taylor 1996). In more recent literatures, 
the positioning has been characterised by a division between existing studies that emphasise 
material factors in the explanation of outcomes and those that instead emphasise constructivist 
perspectives of ideational dynamics and the power of ideas to explain outcomes (Abdelal, Blyth, 
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and Parsons 2010; Béland and Cox 2011). These literatures, as we shall see in more detail in the 
following chapter, have furthered our understanding of politics in ways that allows research to close 
in on the drivers of agency and why actors do what they do. But how do they interact? In 
emphasising the necessary demarcation and boundary setting of this literature with reference to 
more material perspectives, the ideational literature has neglected to actively integrate how material 
and ideational factors interact. Indeed, we know that ideas do not exist in a vacuum (Risse-Kappen 
1994). From classics of the literature we also know that coalitions that support policy change or 
inertia depend on a multitude of factors (ideational and material) (Gourevitch 1986). How do 
material and ideational factors specifically interact in conditioning policy outcomes? In the case of 
the role of expertise in politics, the role of existing institutional structures for the role of ideas in 
politics is often implicitly, but rarely explicitly incorporated as part of the puzzle. How do we 
integrate material and ideational factors in explaining the dominant policy ideas of experts? Social 
reality is complex, and thus one quickly risks over-specifying an explanation.  
If the broader puzzle is about how countries react differently to external stimuli, the broadest 
analytical category has to refer to a domain of politics no larger than a country since these are, 
ultimately, what are compared. However, which material institutions should one focus on? The two 
cases of United Kingdom and France display a puzzling empirical development. They represent a 
particular subset of cases with different outcomes in policy response to the oil crisis of 1973. For 
instance, this is despite showing similar reluctance of cooperation after attempts to coordinate at the 
supra-national level of the European Community - which the United Kingdom had just joined. This 
does not mean that international dimension is irrelevant, of course. While scholars may debate the 
properties of economic crisis, there should be little disagreement that in an interdependent world 
these properties are operational at an international level (Gourevitch 1978, 1986). This means that 
the characteristics of international crisis are expected to have effects on domestic levels of policy-
making by linking domestic struggles over policy responses to crisis with wider international 
economic trends. One of the advantages of the two cases of France and the United Kingdom in the 
early 1970s and the supply-shock and price-hike on crude oil due to actions by the OPEC alliance, 
is that the countries in question chose not to cooperate following attempts at regional level-solutions 
forwarded at the level of the European community. The cases therefore allow a level of control over 
direct formal decision-making in response to the economic crisis from supra-national level 
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institutional structures. These differences are therefore likely to be located at a domestic level of the 
two countries. 
The many facets of intersecting historical developments in this period means that the oil crisis 
needed to be understood by those required to act upon it. In modern governments, experts exist 
within different policy areas who aid in defining and ascribing meaning to a given problem. 
Through their ideas of what the country should do to counteract the crisis a policy solution is found. 
However, which experts prevail? Is it inherently a question of the idea itself, or does it rely on other 
factors?  
Answering this question requires more than analysing the ideas of different experts, but also how 
they achieve broader support. Moreover, it raises the question of what determines the support of an 
idea. This is as much a question of the context within which an idea can be translated into power 
through support. From a theoretical point of view, the study of the oil crisis allows the analysis to 
study the way in which domestic institutions interact with idea-driven agency in a context of 
uncertainty. The fact that the analysis is diachronic across several years means that the analysis can 
also potentially illustrate shifts (or not) in ideational change dynamics across “normal” and “crisis” 
times, and the extent to which crises responses rely on existing ideas and to what extent institutional 
contexts interact with these dynamics. The thesis thus attempts to grapple with the broader 
theoretical puzzle of the interaction between material structures and the drivers of agency. The two 
cases are useful for such an analytical endeavour because they vary according to the institutional 
context within which policy ideas are forwarded by experts. The puzzle of how institutional context 
and ideas interact to condition different policy ideas of experts can be illustrated by examining the 
bureaucratic structures and the policy ideas among experts in the two countries. Thus, this thesis has 
an overarching theoretical puzzle of how material structures, such as bureaucratic structures, 
influence the ability of policy ideas of some experts to become dominant in energy policy.  
1.3.2 The effects of the oil crisis. 
It would be an understatement to say oil has been important as a source of energy and a material 
basis for western economic growth – indeed they sometimes seem to be in a vicious relationship 
(Thompson 2017, chap. 4). It is the largest source of energy supply for the world and despite 
developments in electrification of transportation, a large majority of energy for transportation still 
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relies on oil (BP Energy Outlook 2019, 45). With that in mind, it might be useful to examine a few 
details of the dependence on foreign oil in the two cases.  
Before the first oil crisis the supply of oil was generally ensured on the back of a rather mercantilist 
system of trading schemes between major Western oil companies, who bought concessions to 
extract and refine crude oil from oil-exporting countries. In addition, several state-agreements 
existed between importer-countries and exporter-countries. All of this meant, that most of the oil-
trading on a global scale was done through long-term bilateral contracts (Goldthau et al. 2010, 3).  
A number of interrelated factors triggered the oil crisis of the early 1970s. The crisis followed from 
the fourth Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 with a few caveats. For instance, one should not 
underestimate the pre-existing debates on pricing structure and the tight market for oil-demand that 
acted as conditions to increase the leverage of oil producers beyond the members of OAPEC with a 
direct stake in the military conflict (Venn 2002, 8–9). Concerns over conditionality of the origin of 
the crisis aside, we may somewhat simplified consider the crisis as triggered when the Arab section 
of oil producers (loosely organized under OAPEC) embargoed oil shipments to United States and 
the Netherlands. Other countries were allowed to import oil on the basis of support for the Arab 
position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most members of OAPEC reduced total oil exports so that 
countries under the embargo were not able to import oil from other members of OAPEC, a cutback 
which were to increase by 5% per month until demands were met.  
These events combined to allow OPEC (Arab oil producers as well as countries like Nigeria, Iran 
and Venezuela) to raise oil prices around 400% in a very short amount of time (Lindberg 1977, 47). 
The combination of an explicit act of first embargo and then cutback in oil exports for achieving 
political goals in the Israeli-Arab world constitutes what became termed “the oil weapon” (Licklider 
1988, 206). Several factors intersected to make this a crucial time. One obvious factor was the 
difficulty consumer-countries had with replacing oil supplies that were lost during the embargo and 
general costs associated with the price-increases that followed in the cutbacks. Moreover, the 
general stability of the Persian Gulf was in question in this period with the Arab-Israeli conflict 
having resulted in several military conflicts in the period beyond the Yom-Kippur War that 
prompted the embargo. To make matters worse, the decreasing domestic oil production in the 
United States a few years earlier led U.S. President Nixon to remove import quotas on oil, which 
had previously buffered some of the US demand for global oil (Goldthau et al. 2010, 3). All of these 
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factors combined make up the difficult situation that hit importer-countries, in particular Western 
Europe. 
1.3.2.1 Import dependence and Oil 
A common denominator of energy consumption after the second world war is that of a shift toward 
oil and natural gas instead of relying on coal - an observation which holds for both United States 
and Western Europe (and to some extent, Japan)(Kohl 1982). During the early 1950s, the then 
nascent European Community was broadly self-sufficient with energy. The original-six EC 
members supplied 90% of their energy demand with domestic coal resources and other sources, of 
which the former made up around 70%. Only around 10% of total energy consumption was made 
up of imported oil. The year before the oil embargo of 1973, this number was 60% on average 
(Kohl 1982, 81–82).  While the absolute level of import dependence varied between Western 
European countries, they shared the common dependence on energy imports, especially compared 
to the United States3. This import dependence underscored a common interest in reducing demand 
pressures on the international oil market for their potential disruptive effects to national economies 
(Ikenberry 1986, 106). Therefore, there was ample room for governments, especially in Western 
Europe, to declare similar energy security goals against the use of the “oil weapon” by OPEC 
(Goldthau et al. 2010; Goldthau and Witte 2011). 
To understand the impact of sudden supply-shocks to the two countries in question, we need to look 
at the specifics of their energy demand, that is, the distribution and dependency of energy 
consumption.  
                                                 
3 The one exception being the Netherlands, who at the time had large quantities of natural gas available and thus their oil dependence does not as 
easily translate from import-export balances of energy. 
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Figure 1 Net energy imports as percentage of total energy use (World Bank n.d.) 
Net imports of energy as percentage of total energy consumption4 gives us an idea of the 
dependency of the United Kingdom and France of imports of foreign energy – and hence – their 
world market prices of said energy. This gives us a proxy for the vulnerability of the two countries 
to instabilities in world supply of energy, at a general level. Of the two countries examined, France 
has continually been at a higher level of import-dependence compared to the United Kingdom in the 
period from 1960 to 1990. The extremes vary from around 42.8% in the early 1960s to a highpoint 
of 76.6% in 1976. In the entire period, France has been dependent on imports from other countries 
and we can observe a sharp reduction in imported energy around 1980. By comparison, the United 
Kingdom has been generally less dependent on energy imports over the period. Net imports of 
energy peak at 51.9% in 1972 from a low-point of 27.8% in 1960. Similar to France, the highest 
import share is recorded after the first oil crisis, and similar to France again, the drop from the high-
point occurs a few years after this point with a shift from an otherwise stabilized level, only at a 
lower level in the low 50% by comparison to the mid-75s in France. In the United Kingdom we 
begin to see the drop in energy imports around 1974 onwards.  
                                                 
4 “Net energy imports are estimated as energy use less production, both measured in oil equivalents. A negative value indicates that the country is a 
net exporter. Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production plus 
imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport.” (indicator EG.IMP.CONS.ZS, 
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Three relevant differences can therefore be discerned. The general level of dependency is high for 
both countries, but France has a continually higher net-import of energy than the UK in the period 
from 1960 to 1990. Both countries experience rather sudden downshifts in import of energy imports 
after imports stabilize over a couple of years, but they do so at different points in time, where the 
import drops earlier and faster than France. Moreover, we can observe an actual negative import, 
that is, export of energy from the United Kingdom to other countries from 1980 onwards, although 
nearing an equilibrium toward the end of the period. The general picture we gain from this is that 
over the period examined both countries managed to reduce their dependency on imported energy 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. In the case of the United Kingdom, the import balances were 
turned away from dependency on imported energy more quickly than that of France. From 1980 
onwards the United Kingdom was a net exporter of energy. 
To understand the dependency the two countries experienced on the primary energy commodity in 
question during the first oil crisis, we can look at oil as a percentage of total energy consumption. 
This allows us to establish the size of dependency of the two countries on oil. 
 
Figure 2 Oil as percentage of total energy consumption (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2014 n.d.) 
From figure 2 it becomes evident that oil as share of total energy consumption was of a 
considerable size, increasing through the examined period from 1965 onwards until the period 
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previous chart on import dependence, we again see that France tops the chart with around 10%-
point higher share of total energy consumption deriving from oil in 1965 compared to the United 
Kingdom. This difference increases to 20%-points in 1973. While France is more reliant on oil for 
domestic energy consumption, it is also a fact that both economies rely heavily on oil for their 
energy needs. This is consistent with the broader picture in Europe where the year before the oil 
crisis, in 1972, the percentage of gross oil imported was 99% for Western Europe, as a whole, and 
80,4% of which came from North Africa or the Middle East (Kohl 1982, 83). Dependency on oil 
imports increased up to and through the oil embargo of 1973 from relatively minor levels in the 
early 1950s to more than half of total energy consumption. Moreover, a  great majority of this oil 
dependency was on oil imported from the Middle East, and Western Europe was therefore in a 
particularly sensitive position vis-à-vis sudden price shocks.  
From this brief overview of the dependence structure of France and the United Kingdom, we learn 
that both countries were extremely dependent on foreign imports of energy to satiate national 
demand, and fluctuations to this demand or prices would therefore have a serious effect on both 
countries in economic and social terms. Moreover, the share of oil in this import structure is 
between 40%-55% at their lowest point before the oil crisis in the autumn of 1973. The scale of the 
problem is thus illustrated. However, why would we then examine the role of domestic institutions 
and expertise in this regard? To answer this, we need to turn to some of the reasons why the 
theoretical puzzle of this thesis can be illuminating several aspects of existing scholarship. 
1.3.3 Insights and contributions of examining the oil crisis 
The theoretical puzzle is embedded in this broader question of the differing policy responses to 
similar stimulus. More specifically, it emphasises how bureaucratic structures can influence 
ideational development and how bureaucratic structures influence national political action through 
conditioning ideas of experts. Existing studies have emphasised the domestic structures in 
understanding how crisis responses map on to particular policy fields - especially in economic 
policy (Gourevitch 1986; Katzenstein 1978; Simmons 1997). Where more recent approaches have 
emphasised the ideational drivers of agency to understand why specific choices are made among 
alternatives (Blyth 2002), more work can still be done on the systematic interrelationship between 
institutions as both constraining and empowering to agency driven by ideas (A. Baker 2015; 
Moschella 2015; Moschella and Tsingou 2013). This can lead the literature towards other modes of 
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dynamics of ideational change (Carstensen 2011a; Carstensen and Matthijs 2018), but also open the 
question of how crisis responses can vary with the institutional structures that surround the given 
policy field.  
In dealing with a policy sector that has direct implications for both households and GDP-growth 
more generally, this also speaks to the nature of state-market relations with France following a more 
state-centred approach to energy policy as opposed to the more market-oriented approach of the 
United Kingdom (Keay 2016, 248). More broadly, given the current and increasing importance of 
transformation of energy sectors to more carbon-neutral production, the findings of studies that 
examine the intersect between institutional contexts and agency in the role of policy ideas should be 
a worthwhile endeavour. While one should be careful in extrapolating findings from one historical 
period to another, insight can be indicated when thinking about current societies’ attempts to 
transition to more sustainable energy mix, which is less reliant on fossil fuels. Examining the 
expertise and ideas behind energy policy during the first oil crisis thus promises insight into the 
different concerns that influence energy transitions more broadly. In emphasising the role of 
specific institutional contexts for policy ideas, the analyses can highlight the structural conditions 
that may hinder or aid different types of policy change. Studying both the institutional and agency 
dimension of change is therefore useful in relation to debates of today as well.  
The disciplinary relevance of studying the time period of the 1970s is further enhanced by often 
being used in the literature as an anchor to descriptions of shifting macro-economic policies 
following from Keynesian to more Chicago-school dominated policies (Hall 1989). At a broader 
level, the familiarity with the period in the literature will make it more easily observable how 
arguing for greater theoretical interaction between historical institutionalist and ideational 
scholarship can contribute to our understanding of ideational dynamics. The emphasis of the 
analysis on role of ideas among experts speaks more directly to this literature and more recent 
scholarship (Ban 2016; Chwieroth 2007b, 2010), but the subject of energy policy in the response to 
the oil crisis also speaks to role of ideas in policy contexts characterised by high levels of technical 
complexity. From the policy angle, the analysis has particular relevance as well, because it has long 
been a mainstay of policy-studies that the development and trajectory of policy was a long-term 
phenomenon (Bösch and Graf 2014). This is particularly the case for large infrastructure and 
resource-intensive sectors like that dealing with energy. From an empirical perspective, the fact that 
the 1970s is outside the usual limitations of access to public records directly affects the ability to 
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access historical archives from the period. Other than the theoretical backdrop of being a known 
entity, the accessibility of archive material makes it possible to reconstruct the debates of experts in 
energy policy with a great degree of precision. 
The cases of France and the United Kingdom are particularly interesting in examining the dynamics 
between international crises and national responses. At prima facie, existing explanations that 
emphasise party politics in charting policy, developments do not seem sufficient to understand the 
interest that lead to specific policy choices in the two countries. In the early 1970s, these two 
countries had similar right-leaning conservative governments, yet their reactions were very 
different. What is more, despite the first French socialist president being elected in the following 
period (François Mitterrand, 1981), the overall policy of energy policy following nuclear energy 
through extensive state-intervention continued.  
While not the main focus of this work, the emphasis on the dynamics of policy choice and change 
in the energy sector may have useful corollaries to some of the more recent developments in newer 
times. In particular, the United Kingdom’s renewed interest in nuclear power as a source of clean-
energy and the switching focus of reform policies from more market-led approaches to more 
intervening attempts at facilitating goals for energy policy in the face of climate change. Moreover, 
this particular development speaks to relevance of understanding the genesis of these crisis 
responses of earlier times, as these newer policies in the U.K. involve the Électricité de France as a 
key partner in developing nuclear solutions (Keay 2016, 249). Knowledge of both these countries 
and the histories of their energy policies at crucial times in earlier periods is thus paramount. 
Moreover, a more detailed reconstruction of the reasoning and motivation of decision-makers 
during the 1970s may help cast new light on reorganizations of the relationship between the 
government, regulators and the market seen in more recent periods (Rutledge and Wright 2011, 
chap. 10). Finally, because energy policy in recent years has become a component of, if not 
subservient to, the agenda of climate change and environmental policies (which dominate many 
debates and questions related to global governance today) the dynamics of crisis and response in the 
energy sector during this particular period may be of broader interest than otherwise dictated by the 
specifics of the period. 
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1.4 Argument in brief 
Crises are periods of uncertainty where preferences and goals can be in flux. International crises are 
common to a wider set of nations and thus opens the possibility of comparing national responses to 
international crises. Understanding the role of domestic factors in mediating policy choice has been 
on ongoing question in the social sciences.  
The scholarship on the role of ideas in policy choice has made significant impact in this regard. A 
key contribution is the argument that crises are events that are not reducible to informational 
asymmetries or constraints (Blyth 2002; Hay 1996, 1999; W. W. Widmaier, Blyth, and Seabrooke 
2007). Focusing on a highly technically complex and knowledge-based policy field like energy 
illustrates the point that information does not necessarily reduce ambiguity – and thus the role of 
politics. This has led to some parts of the scholarship explicitly tackling how institutions and ideas 
interact. They highlight, that insufficient attention have been given to the way in which existing 
institutional characteristics can constrain or permit different dynamics of policy ideas (A. Baker 
2015; Moschella and Tsingou 2013). 
Synthesizing existing arguments from ideational scholarship and historical institutionalism I argue 
that policy ideas are potentially influential in shifting the power balance between expert groups 
within energy policy in France and the United Kingdom, but that the way in which these shifts take 
place depend on the open or closed nature of the bureaucratic structure in which these experts 
reside. This line of argument emphasises that “structures do not come with an instruction sheet” 
(Blyth 2003). However, this is not a cultural-determinist argument in the sense that there is no 
agency outside these ideational constructs. The argument is thoroughly constructivist, in the sense 
that structures and agents interact in producing change or stability. So, while structures do not come 
with an instruction sheet, “ideas do not float freely”, either (Risse-Kappen 1994). The material and 
political dimension of this becomes how different political groups or alliances form around 
particular policy ideas. This is exactly important, because acting on the basis of ideas can have very 
material redistributive consequences. The open or closed nature of a bureaucratic system affects the 
way in which domestic experts in energy policy of a country can build alliances around particular 
policy ideas that affect the energy policy response of a country to the international oil crisis of 1973. 
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A follow-up aspect of the analysis is therefore not in controlling alternative explanations per se, but 
instead in accepting this complex interaction of ideas and institutions. This is crucial for 
understanding why some policy ideas may win out over others. The selection mechanism for some 
ideas over others is crucial exactly because of the policy responses and future trajectories that may 
be instituted on the basis of them. 
1.5 Research question and Hypotheses 
The research question that frames the investigation of this thesis can be phrased as:  
How do domestically specific institutional configurations shape the dynamics of policy ideas among 
experts in energy policy during the first oil crisis?  
To answer this rather broad question, we need to specify some hypothetical claims about specific 
domestic institutions and policy ideas among experts. Below I have specified a main hypothesis as a 
more specific variant of the research question and two sub-hypotheses relating to the different 
aspects of the focus on institutions and their interaction with policy ideas, respectively. What I term 
the bureaucratic structure is a subset of institutional characteristics, which are hypothesised to affect 
policy idea dynamics across different operational categories of ideas. These will be elaborated in 
the theoretical framework (chapter 3), but it is worth briefly mentioning them at the outset. 
The main hypothesis is derived from the above research question but formulated as a more specific 
claim about the nature of institutions and policy ideas and can be formulated as: Differing 
bureaucratic structures helped shape ideational exchange and negotiation about policy responses 
to the First Oil crisis in France and the United Kingdom. In this main hypothesis, I emphasise that 
a subset of institutional contexts can be operationalized as what I term bureaucratic structures, 
which is the institutional context of the exchange of policy ideas of experts who are embedded or 
related to the state bureaucracy (which will be elaborated in the theoretical framework, chapter 3). 
The variation in such institutional context is hypothesised to affect the exchange of ideas and 
negotiation among expert actors in the two cases around the period of the first oil crisis. This means 
the analysis should focus on the period before and after the crisis to examine the variation in policy 
idea dynamics that may follow from variation in bureaucratic structures. This broader main 
hypothesis presupposes two sub-hypotheses. The first sub-hypothesis is that: The bureaucratic 
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structure varied across the two cases examined. The analysis therefore needs to examine whether 
difference can be observed along sufficiently nuanced and yet easily distinguishable variational 
patterns of bureaucratic structures. Thus, the second sub-hypothesis is that: The bureaucratic 
structures influenced the dynamics of ideational development in different directions. The key to this 
hypothesis is that the policy ideas of experts (in whatever form they may take) varied in accordance 
with conditions of the specific bureaucratic structure. In conjunction, the two sub-hypotheses form 
each side, the institutional and the ideational, of the main hypothesis and thus allows the analysis to 
answer the research question. 
In this brief introduction, I aimed to show how the mediation of international crises to a domestic 
context can be a worthwhile research endeavour that may shed light on a crucial period of post-
world war development in the field of energy policy. In particular, on the role of expertise in 
complex policy fields may be usefully illustrated in terms of existing debates on the respective roles 
of institutional environments and policy ideas. The research question and hypotheses provide the 
vantage point of the investigation by aiming to pinpoint the conjunctive role both of these aspects in 
understanding broader questions of change and continuity during crisis and their dynamics. 
Before we can get into the clarification and operationalisation of the specific analytical concepts 
relating to the research hypotheses (in chapter 3), we need to situate the research question of 
institutions and policy ideas during crisis in the broader literature, to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 The relationship between crises and domestic institutions 
Studying the relationship between crisis and state structures is situated in the literature on 
comparative political economy. The literature on comparative political economy has long been 
interested in the balance between characteristics dynamics such as crisis of the economic system 
and its interaction with state forms. For an early example, we may recall Shonfield’s examination of 
the balance between private and public power and the characteristic features of capitalism after the 
Second World War (Shonfield 1965). These different features, which we might today term a form 
of Keynesian demand management, were characterised by elements like; industry regulation, 
counter-cyclical economic policy with the explicit goal of full employment and welfare state 
expansion(Clift 2014; Hall 1989). The particularities of the specific institutions that supported these 
elements in each country as well as particularities of economic development trajectories is what 
resulted in distinctive variations of policy despite overarching similar economic policy projects in 
Modern Capitalism (Shonfield 1965). Against this backdrop of the high-growth, demand-
management decades following the second world war, examining the first oil crisis might be termed 
the ‘beginning of the end’ of the era of the so-called “trente glorieuses”. This period is broadly 
understood as ranging from the end of the second world war to the early to mid-1970s (Coates 
2005, chap. 11) and marked by high levels of average GDP growth (Piketty and Goldhammer 
2014)5 averaging 5.2 percent real growth in the world economy (Bending and Eden 1984, 13).  
A large part of the studies on the relationship between economic development and state structures in 
political economy has taken the vantage point of institutionalist theory. What institutionalist 
approaches surfacing in the 1980ies have in common is a shared preoccupation with deriving 
outcomes from material incentive structures (preferences) under assumptions of rationally 
calculating actors (Cohen 2008, 148). These actors often, explicitly or implicitly, work under a set 
of assumptions deriving from micro-economics, chief of which are: 1) political economy should 
study relationships between given ends and scarce means under conditions of scarcity, 2) the 
primary, if not only, problem to be addressed is the maximization of utility, 3) utility is subjectively 
determined by actors, 4) parsimoniosity and ceteris paribus assumptions about the influence of 
                                                 
5 I leave outside the scope of this examination whether the period from 1945-75 constituted an anomaly of high-growth and is therefore unique 
(Piketty, 2014; Panitch & Gindin, 2002) or the consequence of the permanent downward shift in the rate of profit (Brenner in Coates, 2005: 216-8). 
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historical and political factors, 5) individuals are rational utility maximizers with perfect 
information about ends and means, 6) markets are perfectly competitive and “clear” to an 
equilibrium state between supply and demand (Clift 2014, 87). Much of what has been termed the 
Open-Economy Politics approach to international political economy works in a similar manner 
(Lake, 2006). Perhaps because of this focus on generalizable and law-like patterns, neither 
Rogowski nor Frieden, proponents of the open-economy politics approach(Frieden 1991; Rogowski 
1989), like the other institutionalist literature of the 1980ies speak to the potential effects of crisis as 
an independent factor in its own right on affecting actors choices and institutional formation. 
2.2 Neo-institutionalist reflections to change 
The institutionalism of the 1980ies with its focus on the rational choice of actors from given 
preferences is called the rational choice institutionalism (RCI). In very brief terms, rational 
institutionalist scholars work from an axiomatic assumption of actor rationality, which, among other 
things, as described above, entails assumptions of fixed and transcendent preferences, which allows 
the ordering of different alternative actions according to a list – or order – of expected outcomes. 
Consequently, institutional change is perceived as a collective action problem (Shepsle 1989). The 
outcome of the cognitive computation of preferences and means to achieve them, in a setting of 
similarly minded individuals, results in series of strategic games and alliance-building which are 
essentially considered equilibria between different actors’ preferred outcomes(Shepsle 1972, 1979). 
The approach often applies the logic of game theory to great effect, because of its ability to predict 
different types of outcomes - like a Nash-equilibrium(Weingast 1998). Because strategic action 
between individuals with potentially conflicting interests are the crux of this approach, they 
emphasise the role of institutions through the rules they set on actor behaviour. As Douglas North 
famously put it: “(a) set of humanly devised rules of the game” (North 1990) which structure the 
human behaviour by setting incentive structures for political actors6. Consequently, the focus of 
such analysis becomes the constraints of institutions and how it impacts rational action. The causes 
of changes to outcomes, such as the reaction to crisis, in such a model, however, becomes a 
necessarily exogenous element of the explanation, because the approach essentially attempts to 
                                                 
6 Other versions of rational choice take a “bounded” approach to rationality inspired by Herbert Simon. Here, informational asymmetries and 
cognitive limitations of individuals push agents to utilize shortcuts in reasoning to make sense of an otherwise incalculable number of alternative 
actions in complex and information-rich environments (Simon 1979).  
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model why stability, or collective outcomes, can be secured through the interaction of individuals 
with varying preferences in a context structured by a particular set of rules where everything wider 
outside the strategic game is held constant.  
More recent scholarship in this vein has emphasised the metaphor of the game to model actor 
interaction over repeated games of collective action problems by emphasising how these ceteris-
paribus assumptions can switch between being fixed and non-fixed – a so-called a quasi-parameter 
(Greif and Laitin 2004). This injects a possibility increased endogenous change in the model, 
because quasi-parameters are perceived as such by the actors involved. However, this pushes the 
question of endogenous change a step further out in the logical chain to the concept of quasi-
parameter. How do actors make a choice of whether and what is perceived as a quasi-parameter? In 
effect, the causal weight is shifted from utility maximizing actors in a stable setting, to the whether 
or not actors perceive the setting as given. To sum up, the rational choice institutionalist analysis 
has put emphasis on the role of state institutions and conditions for alliance building and strategic 
actions in the political response to economic developments and crisis, but has not emphasised how 
these institutions can change actor’s preferences and sources of strategic action as anything other 
than an exogenous element. 
2.3 Historical institutionalism 
Another prevalent strand within institutionalism investigating the relationship between state 
institutions and economic developments has been the historical institutionalism (HI). Within the 
tradition of historical institutionalism, the emphasis has from the beginning been on long time 
periods and causal complexity to understand politics - thus incorporating more of the contextual 
variation held constant by the rational choice approaches. In one of the foundational texts of 
disciplinary reflection Steinmo, Thelen and Longbottom attempted to synthesize the main 
characteristics of the approach against the contrasting backdrop of Marxist and behaviouralist 
literatures (Steinmo and Thelen 1992). Historical institutionalists often emphasise that putting 
things in their proper time and context is what is essential to understanding the formation of 
preferences and identities of actors: “neither interest nor value have substantive meaning if 
abstracted from the institutional context in which humans define them” (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 
9). This lead historical institutionalists to a theoretical focus on longer time periods compared to 
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rational choice institutionalism (and sociological/organisational institutionalism7) to make sure that 
research designs could capture the different interaction and contextual effects that produced varying 
patterns of politics (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003).  
A classic example is in the transition patterns developing countries which developed differently 
according to sequence through which they transitioned to a new form of political regime according 
to the varying ways in which labour forces were incorporated into the transition (R. B. Collier and 
Collier 1991). These junctures are critical because they fix institutional setups or arrangements on a 
specific path - a point made both by scholars coming from a political (Pierson 2000) as well as 
sociological quarters (Mahoney 2000). Moreover, to the path dependent mechanisms, for which 
they act as a theoretical starting point, they are difficult to alter ex post because they generate self-
reinforcing patterns. This differs from the fixed-model of preferences assumed by rational choice 
inspired approaches exactly because the evolution of constraints and opportunities the multiple 
institutions that shape human interaction create different types of political games over time.  
Therefore, such theorizations are, to a larger extent, able to speak to questions of how institutions 
shape preferences during a crisis – something that is downplayed by rational choice theories. The 
calculations of actors over how to achieve their preferences, and even, what their preferences are, 
will change over time as actors compare the costs and benefits of sets of institutional setups at time 
t1 with those at t0. However, the literature focus on the concept of path dependence and emphasise 
the causes and consequences of path dependence as a socially grounded process that is dominated 
by a dynamic of increasing returns. Scholars in this vein emphasised how these paths lead to 
institutional patterns that may be hard to revert because, as the effects begin to accumulate, they 
generate virtuous (or otherwise) cycles of self-reinforcing activity  (Pierson 2000). Authors have 
emphasised that path dependence does not preclude change (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; 
Thelen 1999). Instead, path dependent logics preconditions which types of change are more likely 
to happen and significant work therefore moved in the direction of specifying how historical 
sequences with deterministic properties could be traced back to contingent events, which 
specifically went some way towards an analytical separation of the phenomenon of institutional 
change from that of stability (Mahoney 2000). 
                                                 
7 This is the last of the three “new” institutionalisms. It is not treated explicitly here, because it has not been as prevalent in the study of crisis in 
international relations and international political economy 
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When examining long periods of institutional development it becomes clearer that the dynamics 
that drive different institutional developments generate distinctive patterns of institutional outcomes 
(Pierson 2004, 15). Further developments moved toward the argument that institutional 
development could create distinctive patterns of outcomes. Streeck & Thelen moved in this 
direction by emphasising the different modes of institutional development that may be examined 
over time. They emphasised that the institutional development was characterised by different forms 
of slow incremental change called “drift” (changed impact of rules because of changes in 
environment), “layering” (introduction of new rules alongside, or on top of, existing ones), 
“conversion” (strategic redeployment of existing rules and changed enactment as result) and 
“displacement” (the removal and replacement of existing rules with new ones) (Streeck and Thelen 
2005).  
These categorizations of different forms of incremental change allowed a more fine-grained 
understanding of the developmental paths of institutions. However, the theorization was light on 
specifying actually did this “layering”. In a sense, they were primarily descriptive categories of 
types of change and thus while the heuristic was useful to map change patterns, the theoretical 
understanding of change was developed further by the literature. In a more recent development of 
this branch of historical institutionalism, Mahoney & Thelen attempt to grapple with exactly what 
caused these patterns to emerge. To facilitate this reorientation they formulate institutions as 
battlegrounds of distributive questions:  
“Any given set of rules or expectations – formal or informal – that patterns action will have 
unequal implications for resource allocation, and clearly many formal institutions are specifically 
intended to distribute resources to particular kinds of actors and not to others.” (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, 8).  
Reinstating political struggles over distributional issues as the main driver requires a 
conceptualization of who or what takes part in these struggles. To solve this theoretical issue, they 
suggest the concept of a “change agent” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 22). These most openly exist 
when benefits of the status quo of institutional setup is not conferred on them. In such a case, they 
become motivated to push for change, which they can do according to a number of strategies 
differentiated, chiefly, according to whether they follow the rules of the institutions and whether 
they seek to preserve a given institution. This allows differentiation between short-run conformity 
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and long-term strategies (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 22–23). In this way, the study of 
developmental dynamics suggested by Pierson, 2004 is still present, but the focus is shifted from 
the temporal models of causality to developmental paths over time to a focus on the distributional 
struggles and strategies of the actors that animate these conflicts (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 14).  
In particular, the focus on actors and their concrete political struggles of distributional issues have 
moved us a significant step beyond the dichotomous relationship assumed by earlier literatures 
between external shocks and self-reinforcing mechanisms of stability. They even move a significant 
step towards incorporating the importance the meaning that actors ascribe to winning or losing 
distributional battles. This happens when they state that change agents act under a more elemental 
level of ambiguity (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 11) than normally ascribed by scholars that 
emphasise the role of compliance in promoting collective action by reducing free-riding problems 
(e.g. (North 1990; Ostrom 1990). However, while they may have a broader scope for their 
conception of ambiguity as a permanent feature of institutions, ambiguity still refers mainly to rules 
that affect agent behaviour, not the underlying distributional resource conflict that animates it (W. 
Widmaier 2016, 340-41;, 2016, n. 4).  
In this way, ambiguity is a feature of the institutional environment, not of actor preferences per se. 
Moreover, they still emphasise the role of institutional element of the explanation than that of 
agency. The differences in veto-possibilities and extent of discretion in institutional enforcement 
end up being the main contextual factors that determine the types of change-agents we observe: 
“Change agents become the intervening step through which the character of institutional rules and 
political context do their causal work.” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 28). Hence, we still have 
institutional dynamics structuring the micro-level behaviour of individuals, who then do the 
changing. In this way, the shift to a focus on agency in distributional struggles over resources 
becomes a severely institutionally circumscribed conception of agency, where factors external to 
agency structure the types of agency, which is possible. The flip-side of this move might be what 
one scholar noted, that in an attempt to generate a general theory of endogenous change, a strong 
theory of institutions has become a derivative theory of agents and coalitions formed under 
conditions of rule ambiguity and uncertainty (Blyth 2016, 466). Moreover, the “trigger” of why 
particular patterns of policy response prevail in a particular time is still underspecified. 
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Essentially, the model of change, and its relations to crisis and state institutions, is the same: 
punctuations come either from exogenous factors in the context or from perceived changes in the 
context (quasi-parameters). The latter explanation endogenises change by emphasising individual 
actor action involved in change through their identification and reliance on quasi-parameters, but 
leaves underspecified how the identification of switchable parameters is supposed to happened and 
under which conditions. It is basically a sequence of Markovian chains, where one causal factor is 
limited to the rules that govern the disequilibrium of actor preferences for a given collective action 
problem in a given point in time (contextually fixed, time-fixed game of strategic actors). That is to 
say, that cause A at time1 affect B at time2 in such a way that B now becomes cause C. From there, 
one can predict patterns of actor behaviour just as a well as one could if the entire history of the 
institutional setting was known, but this also means that the full institutional history is unnecessary 
because the path forward becomes ever more contingent on the contextual causes and effects at a 
given point in time. Thus, we end up with a model of change that is separate chains of cause and 
effect where the importance of path dependence as an explanatory engine is reduced in favour of 
mutually contingent chain links of causal relationships. This, in effect, makes history reversible and 
thus causally unimportant (Blyth 2016, 465). 
In conclusion, both the rational choice and historical institutionalism can speak to the relationship 
between state institutions and economic developments such as crisis through how have 
conceptualized dynamics of change and institutions. While rational choice as emphasised actor 
preferences and subsequently incorporated the attempts at explaining the changing of structures and 
its effects on actors as part of quasi parameters, it still has not explained the link between actor 
change and the nature of these quasi parameters. The historical institutionalist literature has on the 
other hand had more sensitivity towards how institutions can affect actors preferences from the start 
and underscored how institutional structures could change actors views and interplay in determining 
policy outcome of handling economics developments and crisis it arrived at the same theoretical 
issue as rational choice institutionalism in theoretically specifying views of actors change. In order 
to engage with this theoretical problem, a subsection of the historical (and to a lesser degree rational 
choice) institutionalists turned their attention to the dynamics of ideas and how that actors 
understanding is established in order to subsequently structure their preferences in a given situation.  
25 | P a g e  
 
2.4 Ideational literature 
In the early to mid-1990s an increasing focus on the role of ideas began to take form developed in 
the spirit of insights from the discipline of international relations (e.g. by (Ikenberry 1992; 
Kratochwil 2001; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1992)). These developments questioned the material nature 
of things like erstwhile accepted analytical assumptions of the lack of sovereign resulting in a state 
of anarchy between nations in the international system of states. This helped gap the analytical 
blind-spot that had resulted in inability to predict the end of the cold war (Burchill 2009, 229–31) or 
the puzzling permanence of NATO in a post-soviet union world (Mearsheimer 1990). 
As this analytical focus moved to other disciplines within the social sciences, it became part of the 
neo-institutionalist debates as a corrective to solely materialist explanations of institutional origin 
and causes(Hall 1989) and their inability to explain the change embodied in the origin of new 
institutions. At the heart of many of these debates were underlying assumptions about the 
connection between structures and agency, and ultimately what explains the agency that is not a 
strict function of preferences and path dependency conditions by pre-existing institutional 
structures. This debate had gained traction with sociologists, perhaps most prominently with figures 
like Anthony Giddens in previous decades (Giddens 1986) and much of what became the 
constructivist turn in the social sciences relies on these cognitive schema (see also (Hay 2002)).  
Early attempts to include ideas in institutional analysis (e.g. (Goldstein and Keohane 1993)) gave a 
subservient role in the explanation of policy outcomes by effectively reducing them to the residual 
of the explanatory model. In so doing, the role of ideas becomes to “mop up” the residual variance 
not explained by existing models of preference formation, path dependency and quasi parameter. 
This was sufficient for the role that ideas had been assigned in solving the abovementioned 
theoretical problem. Therefore, it was perhaps to some extent natural that this was the function they 
served. However, the renewed interest of ideas quickly spawned a subsequent critique that existing 
rational choice institutionalist or historical institutionalist uses of ideas did not take the independent 
explanatory role of ideas seriously but reduces ideas logically to a deus ex machina which is 
introduced when the limits of rational choice institutionalism becomes evident(Gofas and Hay 
2012, 19–21). This was opposed to a more radical use of ideas in institutionalism where they was 
not just explanations of quasi-parameters but rather was to be key variables in and of themselves 
(Blyth 1997). In this view ideas could not simply be instrumentally employed tools by which to 
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reduce search costs or focal points that aid convergence on policy by different actors (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993) because that would make ideas completely determined by the institutional 
environment in which they are located (Blyth 1997, 241).  
Much of the later scholarship of ideas following this critique worked towards showing the specific 
role that ideas had in explaining policy outcomes in across different policy fields outside of the 
existing interest-based explanation where the interests of actors involved could be derived from the 
institutional context in which they were located. This critique meant actively examining how the 
interests of involved actor were constructed through ideas. Hammering home the distinction 
between materialist inclined institutionalisms of RCI and HI, Colin Hay called the collective 
ideational scholarship “constructivist”(Hay 2008): 
” constructivist institutionalists place considerable emphasis on the potentially ineffective and 
inefficient nature of social institutions; on institutions as the subject and focus of political struggle; 
and on the contingent nature of such struggles whose outcomes can in no sense be derived from the 
extant institutional context itself” (Hay 2008, 64). 
Therefore, the focus of ideas moved to some extent away from informing the theoretical problems 
of rational choice and historical institutionalism to form a new strand of institutionalism in itself 
that focused on ideas as explanatory factors in themselves. Much of this new strand of 
institutionalism can be re-found in classics of the neo-institutional comparative literature that 
examines the role of ideas in policy change in times of crisis (Blyth 2002; Hay 1996). They focused 
on the different ways that crisis could be narrated to empower specific policy outcomes (Hay 1996), 
or how the uncertainty generated in a crisis can make frames developed and deployed by agents to 
make sense of the world viable as and as blueprints to restructure, or finally embed themselves in 
institutions to stabilize them (Blyth 2002, chap. 2). It is perhaps also from this heritage we find the 
propensity to equate the changes in policy following from ideas as a phenomenon mostly associated 
with crises. Although the focus on crisis narratives in the study of the ways ideas matter to politics 
has not decreased following the financial crisis in 2008 (see, e.g. (Matthijs 2016; Matthijs and 
McNamara 2015; Schmidt 2016)). 
In this tradition, multiple different strands of work has been done on the different forms that ideas 
can take and how they come to affect state institutions and its relationship to crisis. They vary in 
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several ways. Ideas may usefully be described as relating to: meaning, cognition, uncertainty or 
subjectivity (Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010), or more discursive approaches (Schmidt 2002a, 
2008, 2010a) or speaking of ideas as constructs of bricolage (Carstensen 2011b, 2015) that can both 
explain the perception of crisis and how state institutions change but can also be the explanandum 
as ideas dependent on specific forms of crisis or shaped in specific ways by state institutions. 
Perhaps naturally from this disciplinary origin, the debates moved further in the direction of 
examining what constituted ideas and their role as explanations for policy or institutional change 
and how they could be said to “matter”. What much of the early 2000s literature on ideas had in 
common was a preoccupation with examining the isolated role of ideas in explaining policy 
outcomes (Mehta 2010). The preoccupation with crisis was also specified as because ideas were 
held to have the greatest influence in times of crisis because of the inability of existing patterns of 
thinking in reliability predicting the outcomes of interactions of actors (Culpepper 2008). 
Having established that ideas “matter” as independent causal factors for institutions in their own 
right one significant question arising from the development of this literature became under which 
conditions they matter for policy outcomes. More recently, this has been explored by parts of the 
ideational literature emphasising the specific ways in which ideas interact with power (Béland, 
Carstensen, and Seabrooke 2016; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). This approach is useful, because it 
reorients the study of ideas towards the way in which ideas can in different ways express one of the 
most basic of concepts in the social sciences: power. For instance, how ideas can become embedded 
in something as seemingly scientific as mathematical models and economic indicators (Mügge 
2016; Mügge and Stellinga 2015). However, I also agree with the cautionary note by some 
ideational scholars, that following the specific framework of power “through”, “over” or “in” –ideas 
run the risk of unnecessarily limiting analysis of how ideas matter to these dimensions(Blyth 2016). 
Outside such limitations, much useful work has been done on ideas, which does not necessarily 
follow this conceptualization of ideational influence (e.g. (Matthijs 2016)).  
A related question to the current literature in the understanding of when ideas matter. The turn in 
the ideational literature towards the conditions through which ideas matter shifts the focus toward 
the ways ideas matter in given contexts (or not). This puts into question some of the assumptions of 
the classic paradigmatic approach often adopted in the earlier literature on ideas which borrowed 
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from Peter Hall’s (most famously (Hall 1989, 1993) use of the Kuhnian concept of scientific 
paradigms to explain changes in ideas (Kuhn 1996).  
Somewhat simplified we might illustrate this model of change as assuming a particular dynamic of 
change through which ideas operate, in which paradigms of ideas shift from exogenous shifts that 
allow their replacement by another paradigm (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018). As noted by one of 
the foremost scholars of ideas this dynamic of change through paradigmatic shifts resulted from an 
inherent ambivalence of logic within Halls original argument between a “Bayesian” model of 
commensurate knowledge and a “constructivist” model of incommensurate knowledge (Blyth 
2013b; Hall 2013). In the original argument, paradigm shifts occur as the accumulation of what was 
termed “anomalies” begin to undermine the existing paradigm (Hall 1993, 280). Hall is not explicit 
about which particular logic he ascribes the accumulation, but speaking of how experimentation and 
attempts to ad-hoc support discredits the paradigm, point in the direction of what Blyth termed 
“bayesian” logic (Blyth 2013b, 198). Here, failures of the paradigm to predict or describe the 
political reality and thus ascribe policy suggestions is deteriorated by subsequent empirically 
verifiable and objective “failures”. Thus, social learning becomes linked with an empirical record of 
a reality characterised by commensurable knowledge (Blyth 2013b, 199). However, in several 
places in the argument Hall makes reference to political discourse as a relevant partial explanation 
of social learning. For instance through the ability of actors to gain influence by affecting the 
political discourse (Hall 1993, 290).  
This would imply a more constructivist interpretation by which a given political discourse ascribes 
authoritatively the given meaning of an event in politics(Blyth 2013b, 204) or at the least an 
acceptance of some level of social construction in the ascription of anomalies to a paradigm (Wilder 
and Howlett 2014, 190). Moreover, the logic of the classic model of social learning through 
paradigmatic shifts seems to favour third order change, where change in ideas can only occur once 
the paradigm (third order) is changed by external substitution, not from within (A. Baker 2015). 
This assumption is problematic, especially for some policy fields, to which we shall now turn. 
Becoming aware of this implicit assumption have allowed the scholarship of ideas to move towards 
other potential dynamics through which ideational change might take place. Rather than being 
limited to paradigmatic violent shifts that happen as a consequence of crises, ideas may exert 
influence through an incremental dynamic of change. Subsequently, while the study of ideas has 
managed to bring to the fore both that ideas “matter” as independent causes of change and has put 
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focus on the how and when ideas matter, the study has detached itself more from the historical 
institutionalist focus on material institutions and has thus provided less attention to specifying the 
interplay between material and ideational institutions.  
2.5 Re-integrating historical and ideational literatures? 
Despite a general attention to the contextual conditions and “whether, when, and how” similar 
causal mechanisms yield different outcomes across time and space (Falleti and Lynch 2009) the 
possible synthesis of historical institutionalist and ideational institutionalist approaches has been 
fragmented. While one of the original founders of the approach, Sven Steinmo, stated that there was 
a natural fit between historical institutionalism and the study of ideas (Steinmo 2008) not all are as 
consistently positive. Streeck & Thelen’s 2005 anthology of the discipline delves deep into the 
different patterns of development that can be mapped with HI, but emphasise explicitly that their 
definition of institutions is a formal one. As such, it does not contain elements of norms and beliefs 
– which they instead associate with anthropology, not social sciences. They prefer instead to 
highlight the different policy dynamics expected under varying forms of institutional setups which 
they characterise as  “drift”, “layering”, “conversion” and “displacement” (Streeck and Thelen 
2005).  
The more recent Mahoney & Thelen, 2010 seems more amenable to incorporating ideas when they 
speak of “change agents” who utilize ambiguity and power to enact change(Mahoney and Thelen 
2010). While I agree with the critiques of (Blyth 2016; W. Widmaier 2016) that these approaches 
are severely limited in terms of explaining change through ideas in and of themselves, they do 
highlight the importance of institutions to change, and they focus on the different dynamics of 
policy that different institutional orders can generate. Irrespective of the ability of these particular 
works in studying ideas, the institutional and path-dependent or incremental logics can also have 
their uses in examining the specifics of the conditions for some types of ideas over others to 
succeed or fail. By explicitly making the institutional environment of our study of ideas part of the 
analysis, the conditions in which ideas matter can be better specified. This would also take us closer 
to understanding examples of expected paradigmatic shifts that do not occur (Crouch 2011; Hay 
2011). 
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As I have noted already noted, this is not to say that there is a steep divide between those 
researchers that examine ideas and those who examine institutions. Whether this separation is 
because of a drift in recent historical institutionalism towards rational choice I do not know. 
However, I do agree that historical institutionalism and ideational scholarship have many potential 
overlaps in modes of study (Schmidt 2010a) and that some renditions of historical institutionalism 
can take into account the role of ideas in a way consistent with the ontological purview of most of 
ideational scholarship (Hay 2008, 61–63).. A great example of how institutional settings matter to 
ideas (even when conceptualised as paradigms) is the work on how neo-liberalism travels and 
becomes embedded in an existing institutional structure. In this sense, paradigms are not different 
“opposing” policy ideas and goals, but the processes by which different seemingly antagonistic 
theories can become intertwined over time which aim towards common dominant goals. In this 
way, the resilience of neo-liberalism as an economic paradigm can be explained through  the ability 
to “go local” through flexible co-option of competing frameworks that it came into contact with 
when being applied in particular domestic contexts (Ban 2016, 10–11).  
Another way in which the focus on ideas and institutions has been sought synthesised is in the 
examination of institutional power over ideas This is because the concept of institutional power 
over ideas (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018, 438) speaks to the way in which ideas can be constrained 
by an institutional environment. This can take several forms, but some of the most common are 
probably the ability of some actors to act as “policy gate keepers” who have the institutional 
position to frame evidence to conform to specific political preferences ((Wilder and Howlett 2014, 
194)(Hay, in: (Campbell and Pedersen 2001, chap. 8)). Another way in which institutional power 
over ideas might be relevant to the study of ideas is how institutional positions can allow actors to 
ignore conflicting interest of other actors through different forms of institutional resistance – like 
veto-power (Matthijs and McNamara 2015)8. Another relevant insight is also how institutional 
logics travel within a political economy. Here, change is driven by the understanding of institutional 
interlinkages as perceived by actors and the undermining of a dominant paradigm through “invasion 
from within”. This consists in a three-stage understanding of 1) progressive weakening of one 
paradigm in an institutional setting and the subsequent strengthening of another in an adjacent 
                                                 
8 As (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018, 438) rightly note, the ability of policy actors to define the core beliefs around which they understand their 
interests and behaviour has been an element of earlier scholarship of, for instance, epistemic communities (Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1989, 1992). 
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setting 2) build-up of alliance in the other institutional field 3) the use of framing to legitimize 
actions supported by the new paradigm and delegitimize the old (Carstensen and Röper 2019). 
To be fair, we have already seen examples of some of these logics being applied with great effect in 
the study of ideas, which also suggests that the paradigmatic lens is not always the most useful tool 
to examine change (be it of ideas or by ideas). It may also be, that some policy fields are more 
relevant to study through the paradigmatic lens than others. What seems to be the case, though, is 
that in studies of the IMF, researchers have found that ideational change is better characterised by 
dynamics of incremental, additiveness and pragmatism which has led to the reintroduction of other 
concepts of change than the punctuated equilibrium model assumed by the classic paradigm logic 
(Clift 2018, 52; Moschella 2015). The dynamics of ideational change can be viewed through such a 
lens not only because it allows the examination of how actors can operate within the constraints of 
institutional environments for ideas to change, but also because this environment is itself enabling 
of some changes over others (Moschella 2015, 443). For instance, by utilizing ambiguity of the 
rules in the IMF statutes that afforded the fund flexibility in its belief in the use of capital controls 
(Moschella 2014, 2015). In that institutions constrain actors as well as are changed by them they 
serve a double function (Schmidt 2008). This allows change within the constraints of the 
institutional setting and makes it more likely that ideational dynamics will be characterised by 
adaptation than punctuation (Moschella 2015, 448).  
This point involves two of the dimensions of ideational scholarship examined above. First, it seems 
to imply that studying the permissive role of institutions (Soifer 2012) in the role of ideas is a useful 
theoretical and empirical endeavour for the discipline. Second, it implies that the study of ideas 
should focus on other dynamics of ideational change than characterised the initial wave of 
ideational scholarship focused on punctuated logics. I would agree with the latter point and 
emphasise useful attention might be brought to the different policy fields that may be more likely to 
exhibit incremental logics (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018). The first argument, I would push a step 
further. Given that ideas never operate in a vacuum (Risse-Kappen 1994), it would seem prudent of 
students of ideational dynamics to take into account more systematically how institutions and ideas 
interact and how some institutional environments may enable some types of ideas and not others. 
While the dynamics of ideational change may in some respects be left to the empirical investigation 
of a given research programme, the role of institutions should always be carefully thought out. 
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Moreover, in taking the step (in some ways back) to examining the interacting role of ideas and 
institutions we can gain significant insight into the role of ideas. 
Seen at the broader level of the discipline of comparative political sciences, the puzzles inherent in 
these questions do have some relevance to earlier work done in the discipline. This thesis is 
interested in the examination of a period of crisis and emphasises the role of domestic institutions in 
shaping the possibilities of policy ideas to dominate among different experts the bureaucratic 
structure in the specific policy area of energy in two countries. I want to stress, that while my 
argument so far has been the need to better specify the interactions between institutions and ideas in 
the study of politics during crises that does not imply that the discipline has not worked implicitly to 
do something along these lines. As has been illustrated above, the discussions between historical 
institutionalism and the ideational scholarship in neo-institutionalist debates have been an example 
of how these different dynamics can be examined. Even earlier work by classics like Peter 
Katzenstein and Peter Gourevitch have examined the intersect between external stimuli (like a 
crisis), varying domestic institutional conditions and different policy outcomes 
Within comparative political economy and international political economy, the 1978 work of Peter 
Katzenstein picks up along a similar vein as Shonfield’s classic, in emphasising that advanced 
industrialized states had very different domestic, social and political structures (Clift 2014, 12) 
which affected how their individual economic foreign policy adjusted to the economic crisis of the 
1970s. In so doing, he effectively opened the “black box” of the state in the study of international 
and comparative political economy (Cohen 2008, 120). This meant that situating the national 
political economy in an international context while emphasising that international developments 
outside an understanding of domestic structures of advanced industrialized state leave the 
explanation of differential foreign economic policies underspecified (Katzenstein 1978, 13–16). In 
terms of his conceptualization of crisis, the work does however leave something to be desired, in the 
sense that it does not contain an explicit formulation of how agency is affected by crisis only that 
different domestic structures react differently to similar external pressure.  
In terms of explaining change, the analytical logic has similarities with comparative statics (Hay 
2002, 145–48) in describing the “shift” between before and after a given event, without a further 
examination or theoretical specification of agency in these shifts other than those derived from 
structures of domestic institutions. While I agree with the innovation of examining the domestic 
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factors in responding to external stimuli, the specific explanation of shifts in foreign economic 
policy is thus extrapolated from these institutions rather than linked explicitly to actions or 
cognitions of actors. Thus, it suffers somewhat from some of the critiques also levied against 
historical institutionalism above. Moreover, while the argument was relatively nuanced in 
describing the interaction between domestic and international as influencing each-other 
(Katzenstein 1978, 11)9, the fact that domestic structures are the starting point and independent 
variable of the analysis, invariably, led to some critiques that some of the historical events of the 
time, e.g. the oil crisis of the 1970s which was also described in Katzenstein’s own work, might 
have affected the domestic structures that determined the economic foreign policy of nation-states.  
In other words, the domestic structures could not be assumed to be exogenous, but endogenous to 
changes in the international system. It was therefore necessary to ascertain “…the extent to which 
the (domestic structure) itself derives from exigencies of the international system”– a critique also 
known as the “second image reversed” (Gourevitch 1978). This critique points to a problem of 
endogeneity where the explanation (domestic structure) of foreign policy in the international system 
is explained by dynamics in the international system itself. Thus, the causal relationship between 
explanans and explanandum is in fact reversed (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 68). When 
examining the intersect between international and national it is thus necessary to specify carefully 
how an international phenomena (like the energy crisis) interacts with domestic structures. This 
problem of endogeneity in the explanation of policy change is in fact what is at stake when 
ideational scholars critique historical institutionalism for weakening the explanatory power of the 
framework 
It is worth spending a bit more space on the work of Peter Gourevitch because one of the classics of 
the field penned by him is an indication of how the neo-institutionalist insights of historical and 
ideational form can be usefully co-contributive to understanding policy dynamics. In “Politics in 
Hard Times”, Gourevitch tackles the problem of endogeneity head on. He examines the policy 
responses to economic crisis in France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States (Gourevitch 1986). He also deals with endogeneity in another way than the methodological 
isolation of causal direction. The examination of policy responses in different crises highlights an 
attention to how actors map policy options to policy alternatives. In emphasising the role of 
                                                 
9 Something also noted by (Clift 2014, 12) 
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coalitions in this process, he essentially predates the attempts of historical institutionalism to move 
towards an endogenous explanation of change rather than a causal relation that relies on phenomena 
external to the object studied to understand change in behaviour. He maps out the different policy 
options available to policy-makers during these crises (Gourevitch 1986, 35–53) so that the choices 
facing policy-makers can be compared with different explanations of policy choice that he derives 
from domestic aspects of the case countries. The four explanatory models he suggests to map 
according to the political options available are 1) the political parties and interest groups who 
manage the linkage of economic actors to the state 2) the organizational laws that characterise the 
state (like electoral laws and balances between branches of government and courts as well as the 
bureaucracy 3) The ideologies that provides understanding of the economy (which is in crisis) and 
motivations of other actors 4) the coalitions between countries derived from the placement of the 
country in the international system of states (Gourevitch 1986, 21, 54–65). Using these relatively 
broad analytical categories, the analysis is able to capture a great deal of empirical nuance possible 
explanations. 
For Gourevitch, a crisis is understood as “moments of flux when several things might happen but 
only one actually does” (ibid. 9). In invoking this understanding, he juxtaposes periods of “crisis” 
with periods of “normal” politics which helps us to comprehend the potentially multitude of 
contingent factors that may characterize “…the open moments when system-creating choices are 
made…the range of choices, present and past, from which new systems emerge”. (Gourevitch 1986, 
34). While the immediate setup of the argument relies on a distinction between crisis and non-crisis 
to make the argument, this is much more of a logical figure than an a priori claim about a particular 
mode or dynamic of policy change assumed to follow paradigmatic shifts per se. 
This move allows the analysis to compare the policy responses of different countries to the same 
“stimulus”(Gourevitch 1986, 10) and to map out patterns of support that have formed around the 
various programmes of economic policy that countries have adopted in response to severe 
disruptions in the international economy (ibid, 20). That is, his analysis attempts to pin-point the 
choice among alternative responses to a crisis as well as the political support and conflicts over 
these alternatives. The weight of the explanation, so to speak, is on the political alliances that form 
between coalitions underpin the policy stances in different periods. In this way, the policy responses 
he is examining become a function of coherence between policy preferences of political groups at 
the domestic level and their ability to limit policy alternatives for other political groupings. 
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The argument has become a classic for a reason. It convincingly shows how there is a considerable 
domestic dimension to the response to crisis. Moreover, it is explanatorily rich in accepting the 
multi-causal nature of political analysis that deals with broad questions of policy choice, reaction 
patterns and crisis. The careful and reflected way in which different explanations are linked to 
different policy options across the cases makes in a very compelling examination of extremely 
complex phenomena of crisis and change dynamics. The analysis also highlights the inherent 
political component of politics during crisis (specifically in economic policy). In emphasising the 
different conditions for coalitions to form around policy choices in periods characterised by 
ambiguity and uncertainty it actually incorporates many of the concerns highlighted by recent 
historical institutionalist scholarship that emphasises the role of coalitional balance of power and 
institutional ambiguity (Mahoney and Thelen 2010)10. Moreover, the careful way in which the 
analysis of different crises is done makes a convincing argument in itself that dynamics of change 
(paradigmatic or incremental) do not have to be a priori modelled for a historical research to have 
convincing analytical purchase. 
This historically sensitive analysis is able to incorporate agency and institutional parameters in the 
multitude of explanatory factors he employs in a very convincing manner. Moreover, this move 
essentially sidesteps the problem of historical institutionalism to become too deterministic and path-
dependent because the analysis is very sensitive to the shifting explanatory factors that support 
some coalitions over others. As Blyth has also pointed to, these elements are worth a second 
consideration in trying to tackle HI and ideas literature theoretical issue of endogenous change 
(Blyth 2016).Writing in the mid-1980s, Gourevitch naturally did not anticipate all the theoretical 
developments in neo-institutionalist theory among other elements the explanatory power of ideas in 
themselves. As such, his analysis of the relationship between ideas and institutions is limited to the 
role of “economic ideologies” as nationally specific traditions and values concerning the economy 
which can support coalitions around policy consistent with them (Gourevitch 1986, 61–62). 
However, the dynamics of ideas as well as the institutional basis of how ideas of coalitions are 
formed are not explicated in Gourevitch’s framework. That is, further research might usefully put 
focus on the conditions for the coalitions as a function of relevant contextual agents themselves. 
                                                 
10 While I would not go as far as Blyth in saying that Gourevitch “ate historical institutionalism for lunch” (Blyth 2016, 466), I would contend that 
there are important similarities in approaches suggested by newer strands of historical institutionalism and the pioneering work done by Gourevitch. 
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Such a move would also take the literature a step closer towards the endogenous change that was 
the goal for historical institutionalism with the concept of “change agent” - but perhaps not quite 
fulfilled. This entails moving into focus the specific back-and-forth of individuals or groups that 
push different policy ideas within the given domestic institutional environment. This would also 
allow more explicit examination of the varying role of different types of actors that hold. For 
instance, the varying degrees of influence due to not just formal political control, as emphasised by 
Gourevitch, but also to the pluralism of different policy-elites and experts that make up modern 
policy-making. This would allow analyses to speak to a broader focus on the role of expertise in 
politics and the reliance of politicians on knowledge to solve increasingly complex or wicked 
problems (Peters 2017). Incorporating ideas explicitly in the way agents interact might be a useful 
way to solve this. This would involve expanding the ideational factor across analytical categories 
and linking them more explicitly to how it motivates agency which could as one possibility 
“trigger” the coalition building that both historical institutionalism and Gourevitch consider key to 
understanding change.  
However, accepting that ideas matter and has importance for outcome in turn brings a similar 
challenge to explanatory in ideational scholarship, namely how ideas relate to other institution. 
Ideas are embedded in institutional environments where their success in terms of adoption or 
acceptance by others is dictated not only by their construction as mattering, in the sense that they 
may “activate” or “trigger” change, as we see in logics from the paradigmatic school of ideational 
scholarship. The ability of ideas to achieve influence is just as much a matter of how well they 
operate in the institutional environment they are in - paralleling the relationship between actor 
preferences and institutional environments in earlier institutionalist scholarship. This opens the door 
to an understanding of ideas that more actively engages with the specific way in which ideas matter. 
That is not to say, that much of ideational scholarship has been unaware of the interconnection 
between institutions and ideas. Indeed, the empirical examination of ideas in different institutional 
settings has been done in several seminal works (Blyth 2002; Parsons 2003; Schmidt 2002b) and 
some work has even examined the national institutional setup that generates the conditions for 
particular ideas (Campbell and Pedersen 2001, 2014). Thus, the point is not that institutions have 
been forgotten. Instead, it seems to me, that in having spent time defending the, worthwhile and 
important, goal of an isolated and individual effect of ideas in politics, the role of institutions were 
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relegated to contextual variation, which was more of a constant that had to be described and stated 
rather than a part of the explanation of ideas. 
My plea to the ideational scholarship, and the backdrop of this thesis, is to reintroduce institutions 
into the examination of the role of ideas in a manner that takes their combined role seriously. A 
greater understanding of the potential patterns in institutional setup might help us toward a broader 
understanding of why some actors or groups attain power “through”, “over” or “in” ideas, as it 
were. Nuanced historical analysis is required for such analysis of the intersect between ideas and 
institutions to succeed. This goes beyond a historical description of the institutional context in 
which policy change is brought about by ideas or how the ideas change. Compared to the direction 
of both historical institutionalist scholarship and the ideational scholarship just examined, I suggest 
we move towards slight more abstract but more generally applicable concepts of ideas and 
institutions. Rather than over-emphasising on which type of power and idea wields, we should 
focus attention on specification of the institutional context in which ideas operate. Classics like 
“Hard Times”, I think, are an indication of the direction this could take. Broader analytical 
conceptualizations that incorporate ideas as well as institutions. In this context, it is more important 
that the relevant ideas and institutions examined are specified with relation to the context they 
operate in. That means some level of inductive thinking is required in laying out the reasoning for 
how these broader concepts can help illuminate dynamics of the chosen object of study. This means 
that the institutional context should be operationalized and analysed at a level of abstraction that 
allows specification of the mechanisms and the patterns of policy dynamics that expected to be 
more likely to gain traction in the cases examined. This, I think, would also take us closer as a 
discipline to accepting the fundamental insight that agents and structures interact (Hay 2002, chap. 
3) and it is in this nexus that we find the dynamic potential of ideas to explain politics. This also 
takes us closer to examining the distinct constitutive explanatory power of ideas (Wendt 1999) 
when their interconnectedness with institutions is taken seriously as part of the research design. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In summary, three strands of literature have been discussed in their relation to state institutions and 
crisis. The rational choice institutionalism, historical institutional and constructive institutionalism 
have especially focused on the change and the role of agents. Open political economy models or 
institutionalist models of rational choice have in common that their basic logic of change is derived 
from exogenous shifts to the utility-maximizing calculations of rational actors that are assumed to, 
at least principally, be able to order the possible actions in a list according to already given 
preferences. When newer renditions of this logic incorporate new concepts like the quasi-parameter, 
they are moving the question of endogenous change to the perceived state of a parameter, thus 
implicitly incorporating an element of individual interpretation, but weakening the formal strength 
of the rational actor model otherwise implied. Historical institutionalist accounts on the other hand 
have emphasised the role of institutions in shaping the paths through which agency behaviour could 
occur through a focus on path-dependence and critical junctures. While the latter has more potential 
to examine change, these approaches had a tendency to externalise change and instead examine the 
origin in preferences as a function of institutions. Newer renditions attempted to solve this problem 
with “change agents”, in a similar move rational choice, but this waters down the explanatory 
power of institutions and still does not adequately specify what drives these agents.  
Ideational scholarship, or constructivist institutionalism, has attempted to solve this problem by 
emphasising the role of ideas as opposed to material institutional structures or material preferences. 
Instead, they emphasise the different ways through which meaning is constructed to explain change. 
This has led to debates eschewing towards emphasising the differences between ideational and 
especially historical institutionalist scholarship even if initial work on ideas was very cognizant and 
nuanced in their description of the role of ideas in institutional contexts across time. This has led to 
an emphasis on models of change which are punctuations of equilibria rather than incremental in 
nature. Recent literature on ideas is now trying to incorporate other modes of change into ideational 
logics, which have greater similarity to the incremental logics examined by historical 
institutionalists. 
A way to think about how these approaches may learn from each other is through the prism of what 
has been done before the advent of neo-institutionalist debates. Gourevitch, 1986 is a good starting 
point for illustrating some of these insights because his work his highly detailed and historically 
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sensitive work that incorporates a multiplicity of different explanatory factors that follow different 
logics. His specific explanation of policy responses to crisis, as a function of the coalitions that form 
around policy alternatives, may superficially look similar to a historical institutionalist argument. 
However, I believe that expanding the role of ideas in relation to the institutional patterns can 
integrate the focus on how agency is driven by ideas and the institutional environment they find 
themselves in. In that sense, this is where my thesis is situated and the debate to which I somewhat 
modestly contribute. First, both institutions and ideas clearly matter to change. We can usefully 
examine early ideational scholarship and historical comparative studies outside the straightjacket of 
current debates to find a way to re-combine the focus on the materiality of specific institutions with 
the focus on agents’ ideational content and through this change of institutions. This entails a move 
away from the tendency to create ever more nuanced conceptualizations of ideas and towards 
broader concepts which can be applied in careful historical analysis. In combination with a well-
specified institutional context this would allow a more detailed examination of the intersection of 
institutional and ideas in unison – and significantly contribute to the literature of both ideas and 
institutions. Second, opening this avenue would make it more obvious that different logics of 
change may come about due to the role of ideas. Thus, the predominance of punctuated equilibrium 
models of change in the study of ideas should be joined by careful diachronic examinations of how 
ideas matter in “crisis times” through “normal times”. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical framework 
This thesis is about the intersect of institutions and ideas. More specifically, it attempts to 
operationalize a way in which bureaucratic structures as a causal factor affect policy ideas within 
energy policy in the context of crisis. The agency component that links the causal factor of 
bureaucratic structures and policy ideas are the public experts within bureaucracies that surround 
modern policy-making. The policy ideas of these experts have a crucial role in politics in general, 
with the increasing prevalence of technically advanced policy decisions or wicked-problems. The 
role of experts will increase in cases of energy crisis where technically complex policy issues 
combine with the need for political action. Domestic bureaucratic structures in the given country 
affects the available policy ideas in policy making by structuring which experts are able to push 
policy ideas on the basis of which the crisis is interpreted and policy solutions preferred.  
I operationalize the causal factor of bureaucratic structures as broadly following a distinction 
between open and closed bureaucratic structures. This attempts to capture the difference in the 
permeability and accessibility of outside influence (experts or otherwise) on the bureaucratic 
structure. This basic distinction is then further developed along three dimensions of a bureaucratic 
structure that may affect the role of experts and the policy ideas they can push.  
First is a distinction between the weak or strong capacity of the state to affect behaviour of societal 
actors. This draws on a classic distinction by Krasner, but is expanded with the addendum that the 
lacking will to affect societal actor behaviour can have similar effects. This leads to the introduction 
of distinctions from comparative politics of forms of market-state relationship where the United 
Kingdom is claimed to favour a less regulatory and liberal form of state-society interaction and the 
French case an opposite form which favours intervening actively in the society and markets in order 
to direct it (dirigisme). The relative unwillingness to intervene and control the economy is 
hypothesised to correlate with more open bureaucratic structure, where the expertise of multiple 
societal actors may be equally influential on policy ideas. Direct intervention into the society by 
state actors is expected to correlate with a more closed bureaucratic structure where policy ideas are 
dictated by the intervening state rather than defined by a multitude of state-society actors. The 
power of policy ideas by public experts is going to be higher in this case, because they are more of a 
monopoly on interpreting the correct intervention. 
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Second, the style of interaction between experts will be different in open and closed bureaucratic 
structures. Open bureaucratic structures will include experts from multiple different parts of society 
or state and will therefore be of a more personal nature when interaction happens. By comparison, 
closed bureaucratic systems will have a style of interaction that is more formalized (e.g. in special 
committees, or at set intervals). These differences will affect which policy ideas experts are able to 
push because the variation in interaction style changes the conditions for agreement on policy 
issues, and personal interaction becomes similar to a series of unconnected strategic games. 
Third, the institutional basis of the substance of expertise will vary in open and closed bureaucratic 
structures. If a bureaucratic structure is open, it more easily allows different types of actors to affect 
the policy ideas that are created as input to decision-making. This means that there are less like to 
be formal constraints on which educational background, the number and difficulty of accessibility 
requirements to the bureaucratic structure, as well as the requirements of pre-existing specific 
educational training and the ability to shift expertise within the bureaucratic structure. Open 
bureaucratic structures will have either much less of these requirements or relinquish control in 
other ways, e.g. by having a general requirement and then allowing mobility in function and 
expertise as part of the employment in the bureaucratic structure. Closed bureaucratic structures will 
more tightly control all these aspects of the institutional side of the experts that are allowed access 
to the bureaucratic structure. The policy ideas that different experts ascribe to are likely to become 
more specialized because the particular training and access requirements are fostered by the state. 
Open bureaucratic systems are likely to have less specialization due to more exposure to different 
policy ideas as well as a lack of steering of the knowledge basis of expertise in the bureaucratic 
structure. 
The outcome factor is operationalized as the policy ideas that experts utilize to interpret the energy 
crisis. The substance of differences in policy ideas might have been sufficient in comparing the two 
cases to each other at an aggregate or overarching level. By disaggregating policy ideas in three 
different aspects, it is made possible to examine the variation in policy ideas also between experts 
within the cases across time. This adds the additional nuance to the analysis, that while bureaucratic 
structures affect the form of policy ideas that experts can utilize, it does not mean that only one set 
of policy ideas can exist with a given bureaucratic structure. The analysis is structured as a form of 
correlational analysis where the bureaucratic structure is first identified as resembling open or 
closed. Then the policy ideas of different public expert groups within the field of energy policy are 
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examined. This is repeated for two cases. Finally, the effect of open or closed bureaucratic structure 
is evaluated by comparing the correlation between the causal factor of bureaucratic structure and 
outcome factor of policy ideas. 
3.1 Causal factor: Bureaucratic structure 
Despite some discussions of the ups- and downs of bureaucracies in modern states (Olsen 2008), the 
fact remains that bureaucracies persist surrounding most modern democratic systems and supply 
vital rule-driven and functional needs of those political systems. Perhaps, due to this fact, the de-
bureaucratization waves have come and gone, but the functional necessity of bureaucracies have 
kept them around (Ferlie et al. 2005). Slightly less determinate statements emphasise that societies 
simply haven’t discovered a more effective way to coordinate complex action (Kettl 2008, 373). In 
the following section, I will define a bureaucratic structure and set out some operational 
characteristics by which to identify variations in bureaucratic structures across countries. Finally, I 
will describe how these distinctions may apply to the two cases of France and the United Kingdom. 
At first glance, we observe that what I have termed bureaucratic structure consists of two 
components. The two component concept consists of bureaucracy and structure. Both concepts have 
individual long histories of use in political science in many different forms, so it is necessary to 
define them before we move on.  
3.1.1 Structure defined 
A structure is defined in Merriam Webster’s as a number of things, broadly as either the act or 
outcome of an action of construction or as a type of pattern of organization. It is this second set of 
meanings that relate to this thesis in that it emphasises the role of different patterns of constituent 
parts of a bureaucracy when examining its effect on policy ideas. In this sense, a structure is 
understood as “something arranged in a definite pattern of organization” (ref. def. 2b). In this 
sense, it is similar to the use of the concept in the discipline of classical political economy, which 
speak of economic structures as “organization of parts as dominated by the general character of 
the whole” (ref. def. 4b.). The particular variation in pattern of organization in the relevant 
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bureaucracy thus is posited to be a key explanandum when understanding varying policy ideas. In 
political science, structures of various kinds can therefore be said to have been studied11.  
In relation to the role of structure in conjunction with policy ideas and policy change, the literature 
has followed two broad conceptualizations. A structure may be understood as a set of formal or 
unformal conditions that affect or constrain the agency of actors. In that sense, structure is similar to 
the way that rational choice theorists understand institutions as formal rules of the game (Shepsle 
1979, 1989). Structures may however also be of a non-formal kind, similar to cultural norms and 
conventions (March 1989). The debate on structure resurfaced exactly within the literature on 
institutions, because it was claimed that such understandings of institutions were too narrow to 
adequately describe how agency interacts with the institutions that constrain it. Most explanations 
of policy choice thus became reducible to the institutional environment and left very little, if any, 
room for actual agents to act. The debates about the relationship between individual action and 
institutional constraints is often known as the structure-agency debate (Hay 2002, chap. 4). I follow 
this literature, and draw on Parsons understanding that structure is a contextual element of agency 
that has an existence outside of agency itself, but which can, like institutions, be affect by agency 
over time (Parsons 2016). Thus, structures may be understood as agency choices that become 
embedded over time. A structure a contextually specific constraint on agency behaviour, whose 
variation affects policy ideas. 
The use of the concept of structure with a specific organization (like bureaucratic) relates firstly to 
the point that I consider structures as being of different forms (there are different bureaucratic 
structures across the selected cases in this thesis, for instance). Second, the concept of structure, as a 
pattern of organization, indicates that the pattern has several constituent parts. These different 
elements of a structure are what allows variation in the man institutional factor of bureaucracy. The 
concept itself, as we shall see below, is too aggregated to be applicable and as such requires 
separation into different components that all can be said to be part of the structure of bureaucracy. 
The concept of structure in relation to bureaucracy means in this context that we are selecting 
partial components of the institutional constraint that bureaucracy is for agency, but that it can vary 
depending on which agency our research question is interested in understanding. Before we can 
                                                 
11 In the broadest sense, bureaucracy itself may be seen as a structure. However, in this case, structure relates to the specific pattern of organization of 
unit of bureaucracies 
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move on to examine which dimensions are relevant to bureaucratic structures in relation to policy 
ideas of public experts, we need to examine bureaucracy. 
3.1.2 Bureaucracy defined 
Max Weber famously identified modern nation-states with the development of a formal system of 
organization known as rational-legal bureaucracy12. Bureaucracy for Weber referred both to the 
formal organization of work, but also to the person working at the bureaucracy; the bureaucrat. A 
long line of research has been born out from these distinctions, and at the risk of generalizing a 
little, it is not wholly wrong to characterise the later work on bureaucracies as still highly dependent 
on Weberian categories. 
The characteristics of the rational-legal model of bureaucracy that Weber proposed and other 
scholars have followed in depicting modern administrative structures of nation-states have several 
characteristics relating to the type of organization of tasks and manpower as well as their training, 
organized careers, salaries and pensions. These characteristics of the bureaucrats and the structure 
of their working environment are then assumed to adhere to certain behavioural traits leading to a 
procedural rationality of bureaucracy, which was contingent across political governments. This 
resulted in a system driven by laws, rules and regulations that create a level of predictability and 
consistency in administrative decision-making as well as a rule-bound hierarchy that allows swift 
decisions and accountability through rule-following – procedural decision-making (Du Gay 2000; 
Olsen 2008, 4). This classic model has received some level of criticism from several quarters. 
Empirically, this has been due to an observation of the rise of competitive markets and policy 
networks rather than bureaucratic forms of organization (Dunleavy and Hood 1994). These new and 
more advanced forms of administration were by some scholars considered inevitable leading to a 
convergence among many western countries (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). This has led some 
scholars to claim that while bureaucracy is still relevant it has been challenged as an organizational 
form and fundamental changes to its external organizational boundaries with new forms ready to, if 
not replace it, then reduce its influence ((Goldsmith and Eggers 2004), Bogason, 2005 in (Ferlie et 
al. 2005)). 
                                                 
12 In describing the historical variation in administrative organization he distinguished three different ideal-types. Each consisted of different 
organizational characteristics which resulted in varying operating logics. Weber identified a traditional, a charismatic and a legal-rational ideal-type of 
bureaucratic organization (Weber 1958) 
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Despite some of all these interventions against the bureaucratic form of governance and the 
empirical challenges to rational-legal modes of bureaucracy in newer recent periods, some scholars 
still maintain that bureaucratic governance is functionally necessary in modern societies (Meier and 
Hill 2007) or due to its ability to coordinate complex action (Du Gay 2000; Kettl 2008). Without 
delving too deep into these discussions, it is sufficient for our purposes to maintain that there is still 
some useful application to the concept of bureaucracy in social science research.  
Due to Weber’s purpose being to illustrate the difference between bureaucratic organization vs. 
other types of state administration, there are obviously some limitations as to how narrowly his 
original categories may be applied to a thesis that deals with two cases which are both bureaucratic 
in some form. This has a few implications. Theoretically, it has meant an anchoring of much 
scholarship in the Weberian rational-legal model of bureaucracy, with all other systems being 
compared to this reference point. The theoretical anchoring has obfuscated some real differences in 
the origin and sequence of bureaucratic developments across countries (Silberman 1993).  
Empirically, this anchoring has meant empirical comparisons of bureaucracies required significant 
further contextual theorizing to be applicable (Evans and Rauch 1999). While these points may not 
be surprising per se, it means that some additional and more specific theorizing and choosing of 
relevant aspects of a bureaucracy must be selected when emphasising their role of particular 
dependent causes – like policy ideas of experts within them. The original conceptualization of 
bureaucracy is useful to get a general understanding of bureaucracy as: both 1) an organization of 
administrative authority around rules, hierarchy, standardization and specialization that results in 
functional division of labour as well as 2) the professional, full-time administrative staff with 
lifelong employment and organized career, salaries and pension (Olsen 2008, 4–5). That being said, 
it is not sufficient to apply directly to specific aspects of expertise.  
Instead of utilizing Weberian  bureaucracy in its classic rendition as a specific definition for this 
thesis, I follow Silberman in arguing that defining different ideal-types of bureaucracy should be 
utilized as categorical descriptions of the phenomena in question (Silberman 1993, chap. 2). 
Following this line of thinking, it would be necessary to specify which particular aspects of 
bureaucracy I am utilizing in examining the policy ideas of experts. What this requires, is that any 
further examination of the differences in bureaucratic aspects of two cases are further specified to 
pinpoint the variation in the aspect of bureaucracy that is central to the research question at hand. In 
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this case, that means further theorizing how specific aspects of bureaucracy and structure can be 
understood to affect expertise and thus policy ideas of those wielding expertise.  
Therefore, I apply the concept of a bureaucratic structure, rather than the often used concept of 
bureaucracy, to indicate that the analytical focus is on a certain structures of particular bureaucratic 
functions around a political system. The chief purpose of the recasting of definitional focus is to 
avoid some of the critiques of literature on bureaucracy. The key is, that bureaucracies do in fact 
vary widely across countries, even if they may involve similarities in along the broad definitions 
initially set out by Weber and later refined and operationalised by more recent political scientists 
and public policy scholars. 
3.1.3 Open and closed bureaucratic structures 
How can one speak of differences in bureaucratic structures. Of course, different dimension of them 
may vary. At a more general level, it is useful to operate with a basic distinction, which allows 
distinguishing different forms of expertise as it manifests around bureaucratic structures. The 
chosen research objects will naturally affect the relevant distinctions to be made. This thesis is 
about the intersect between institutional constraints, agents – in the form of experts – and policy 
ideas. For that reason, it is necessary to understand how these three component elements interact in 
making policy.  
Working from a basic principle that is not meant to be exhaustive of all potential variation of 
bureaucratic structures, we may work from a distinction between open and closed bureaucratic 
structures. As with any analytical distinction, others could potentially have been made. The strength 
of this, is that it is relatively simple, and it attempts to capture the variation in access to different 
types of interests and agents to the bureaucratic structure. In a sense, it can be thought of as the 
pluralism of actor interests that can be made to bear on policy choice in the nexus between expertise 
and policy ideas. At the most simple level, this is about how isolated experts in the bureaucratic 
structure are from influence outside the bureaucratic structure. As such, it would overlap somewhat 
with proxies for pluralism of interest representation in the machinery of government. This does not 
mean that specific outside interests cannot be incorporated into the policy ideas of experts within 
the bureaucratic structure, but that these interests are not explicitly represented by external actors. 
These may be anything from lobbyists, private enterprise, think tanks or even universities.  
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The distinction between open and closed bureaucratic structures is meant as an ideal-typical 
distinction. In being an ideal-type, they are categories that allow distinction on a key parameter of 
the explanatory factor but only simplifications that allow comparison of general characteristics. For 
instance, this means that an open bureaucratic structure is more permeable and inclusive of a 
multitude of societal actors than that of a closed bureaucratic system. However, even open 
bureaucratic systems may exhibit elements of formal limitations of access of outside actors.  
At a general level the relationship between open and closed bureaucratic structures are expected to 
have effects on the role of public experts, because it generally acts as an indicator of how much 
outside conflicting expertise is allowed to compete with existing experts in the creation of policy 
ideas. The more access to the bureaucratic structure by outside actors, the more potential for 
conflict over policy ideas as the number of policy ideas in play increases with the number of actors. 
3.1.4 Open and closed Bureaucratic Structures and specific research questions 
Open and closed bureaucratic structure may make intuitive sense as a distinction to capture the 
isolation of public expert influence on policymaking in government, but it is not sufficient to 
analytically capture the nuances of different forms of bureaucratic organization. Part of the reason 
for this, is simply that the distinction is at a too high level of analytical abstraction to adequately 
capture the variation of interest in the information that pertain to cases. Therefore, it may help us 
delineate some further dimensions at a lower level of abstraction.  
These dimensions need to be closer to the specific research questions that pertain to the analysis in 
order to capture the variation in bureaucratic structures that may affect the policy ideas of experts 
within them. These dimensions are drawn from different literatures. The first dimension leaning on 
comparative economics and state development. The two second dimensions draw more on studies 
of administration and bureaucratic history. In further description of what these dimensions entail, 
we can then begin to see the contours of a theoretical framework. 
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3.2 Three sub-dimensions when examining experts in bureaucratic structures 
and expectations 
The relationship between the state and society is, at least in part, based on the authority and capacity 
of the state to affect behaviour of citizens within its legitimate area of sovereignty. The ability to 
make autonomous decisions by the state may thus be conceived along the lines of open and closed 
bureaucratic structures as well. The permeability of the bureaucratic structure is high for open 
bureaucratic structures and low for closed bureaucratic structures. The role of the policy ideas of 
public experts is expected to be less in cases where the ability of the state to affect behaviour of 
societal actors is lower.  
The second dimension draws on administrative literature in distinguishing how open bureaucratic 
structures that are more permeable to outside influence will be characterised by less rule-bound and 
formal interaction of experts in the generation and conflict over policy ideas. This is because a more 
open bureaucratic system does not have the same persistence and regularity in how and which 
experts are involved. In an open bureaucratic structure, interaction between experts is expected to 
be characterised by more personal interactions in advocating policy ideas and vice-versa for those 
of a closed bureaucratic structure. 
The third dimension attempts to capture the substance and institutional dimensions of the public 
experts themselves. The types of rules that regulate their access to the bureaucratic structure is 
expected to be great in a closed system with greater state control over the different institutions of 
meritocracy and education. Moreover, the closed bureaucratic structure is expected to facilitate the 
creation of hyper-specialized experts because they do not need to compete with outside experts 
about the authority of their expertise to the extent that would be necessary in a more open 
bureaucratic structure. 
These three dimension all attempt to capture the aspects of the bureaucratic structures that is 
relevant to understanding the role of expertise in policy-making surrounded by formal and semi-
permanent administrations. In the subsequent section, I will examine in more detail these three 
aspects of bureaucratic structures and relate them to the two cases of France and the United 
Kingdom. 
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3.2.1 Dimension one: State capacity to change behaviour of societal actors 
In the classic distinctions inspired by comparative political economy, we may extract some 
categories by which to initially understand the case-selection and their differences vis-à-vis 
bureaucratic structures. These are naturally ideal types in Max Weber’s sense of them 
approximating a silhouette of a phenomenon, but emphasising key aspects that may be considered 
relevant for the research purpose at hand. In the branch of comparative political economy that 
examined policy styles and regimes in the 70s, the distinction of open and closed types of policy 
systems can be of instructive use  (Katzenstein 1978). Furthermore, it survived in a reformulated 
form in the later literature on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes, and 
Thatcher 2007), so we may consider the two cases in respects to governing styles.  
United Kingdom and France differ markedly in their approach to organizing the productive forces 
of the economy. France historically preferring a coordinated structure of connections between 
public and private along with a particular type of government management referred to as dirigisme 
(Hall 1986, chap. 7; Zysman 1982), and, the U.K. falling closer to the United States in preferring a 
less restrictive and liberal economic structure. Along somewhat broad distinctions between 
decentralized/centralized and closed/open policymaking they both fall closer to the centralized and 
closed policy-making part of the spectrum. In the United Kingdom, the characteristic is the 
permanent nature of the professional cadre of civil servants in the civil service referring only to the 
respective minister of a policy-area. At the other end of the spectrum, a state that has the strength to 
modify the types and patterns of interaction between private actors, values and economic 
institutions; in short, to remake society.  
This model was meant to describe regime stabilization and destabilization, and, as such, the extreme 
points are of little use in this case. However, the distinction itself may still be useful in more stable 
liberal economic regimes to conceive of the difference in state autonomy from civil society 
(Krasner 1978, 55–57). Along these lines, the U.K. may be considered a weak state because while it 
may have the power to resist societal pressures it has been unable or unwilling to change the 
behaviour of private actors as significantly as – for instance - other European countries (Marier 
2003, 280). By comparison the French state can be considered strong, because it both manages to 
insulate it’s decision-making from societal pressure groups, but likewise has the ability to, and has 
historically used it, to manipulate both economic structures and interactions between private actors 
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in a way consistent with much more state controlled economic planning – as is also emphasised in 
classical comparative political economy (Shonfield 1965). 
Because of these characteristics, the United Kingdom more so likens a weak state as described by 
(Krasner 1978). Based on an assumption of fundamental distinction between state and civil society, 
Krasner develops an ideal typical continuum between weak and strong states to analyse the strength 
of a state in relation to its own domestic civil society. The weak state is characterised by permeation 
of pressure groups and as a result, central government organizations and institutions serve specific 
interests rather than a presumed common purpose of the citizenry. Because the United Kingdom 
favours a less regulatory and liberal form of state-society interaction and the French case an 
opposite form, which favours intervening actively in the society and markets in order to direct it 
(dirigisme) there will be variation in the conditions for policy ideas of public experts. In the case of 
an open bureaucratic structure, the relative unwillingness to intervene and control the economy is 
hypothesised to correlate with a situation where expertise of multiple societal actors may be equally 
influential on policy ideas. The individual role of policy ideas by public experts will be less due to 
more expert actors being present. Moreover, more actors can mean more vectors for conflict over 
policy ideas, and thus less likelihood that agreement is found on which policy ideas are allowed to 
interpret the situation. The closed bureaucratic structure correlates with direct intervention into the 
society by state actors and is expected to correlate with policy ideas being more closely dictated by 
the intervening state rather than defined by a multitude of state-society actors. The power of policy 
ideas by public experts is going to be higher in this case, because they have more of a monopoly on 
interpreting the correct intervention. Which particular conflicts will exist among groups of public 
experts over time is an empirical question that the operationalization of the outcome factor will 
attempt to deal with below. 
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3.2.2 Dimension two: Personal vs. Expertise-based management 
The effect of open and closed bureaucratic structure is also relevant with regard to the style of 
interaction that characterises the experts in each. Because a closed bureaucratic structure allows less 
outside access to the bureaucratic structure the relevant groups of experts is expected to more 
consistent in makeup over time. This means that interaction between experts can be more rule-
bound, systematic and formalized (e.g. in committees, at regular intervals, following specific 
procedures). The opposite expectation would exist for open bureaucratic systems, because the 
multitude of experts from different parts of society can interact.  
This will lead to an increase in number of actors as well as the policy ideas they believe in. This 
decreases the probability of agreement on policy ideas and makes interaction more personal and 
akin to unconnected subsequent strategic games over time, which reduces the possibility of 
stabilizing a certain policy idea. United Kingdom has been characterised as a society of 
entrepreneurial leadership13. This meant that interaction and management historically has been 
highly personal rather than abstract and based on rules. One of the manifestations of this 
characteristic is in the prevalence of the “chat” as a mode of coordinating policy decisions (Heclo 
and Wildavsky 1974). The corollary for the functioning of UK bureaucratic system entails a highly 
personalized bargaining and negotiation processes which despite complex bureaucratic tasks and 
organisation seem to be the norm as opposed to more classic command and control logics which 
rely on the imposition of authority based on bureaucratic rules  (Peters and Peters 2002, 37).  
One of the implications of this is that most decision-making becomes the object of contestation and 
political conflict over whose interests are served by one policy choice over the other. Conflict and 
contestation is of course the hallmark of any democratic political system to some extent, and as 
such, this also takes place in societies based on less personal interaction for cohesion and 
agreement. However, the implication is that the frequency of contestation and the points at which a 
closed case decision can be re-opened for renewed debate and conflict is higher and more prevalent. 
Even highly ritualized and regular tasks like those performed by the treasury are performed along 
these lines (Peters and Peters 2002, 37).This leads to a highly politicized decision-making cycle 
                                                 
13 See Reinhard Bendix for this distinction ((Bendix 2019) /1956) 
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where political supervision of the bureaucratic structures that support the political system is quite 
high, and the possibility of politicians to second-guess or revert decisions is equally so.  
3.2.3 Dimension three: Institutional basis of expertise authority 
In a study of the role of public experts on policy ideas, it would be remiss to not mention the 
seeming similarity in educational requirements in the two cases. I should note, that do not focus on 
how the origin of expertise authority in university training, but it is necessary to note some 
commonalities. In both cases, candidates for administrative positions are highly educated. Both 
require high levels of educational background from top universities in order to quality for 
membership of the bureaucratic structure.  
That being said, there are substantive differences between the position of experts in society and 
their substantive education, which we shall go into presently. One such difference relates to how 
they are organised vis-à-vis the society. In France, they represent a cadre of experts that permeate 
large public and private companies whereas the civil servant in the UK resides mostly in public 
service. The preference for broad state involvement both in the training and facilitation of these 
elites and spreading them across sectors of society is broadly consistent with ideas of French 
dirigisme mentioned above. Similarly, the preference for private training and stricter less state-
influence can be seen in the comparatively less encompassing societal role served by the British 
civil service which is primarily relegated to Whitehall. These variations mirrors the different 
preferences for state-society organization of the economy in the two countries which has been 
described by the comparative capitalisms literature (Jackson and Deeg 2008). Finally, the substance 
of how and in what the candidates for administrative functions are trained matters in terms of the 
substance of their educational background.  
Traditionally, the workforce of the U.K. bureaucracy is drawn from broadly the same background at 
the top universities (Oxford and Cambridge, historically). These universities have over the years 
generally been known for educating classically trained students who have a broad knowledge of 
humanities subjects or perhaps law, but relatively sparse specialist knowledge from hard sciences 
leading to the perhaps pejoratively inclined description of “talented amateurs” (Peters and Peters 
2002, 92). Obviously, the different tasks of various parts of the bureaucracy requires specialization 
of the workforce, so a system of achieving experience through training “in the job” has developed 
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over time. This means that expertise is gained over time rather than known at the beginning. This 
trait of bureaucratic structures in UK also means that career paths also emphasise the possible 
movement between ministries or agencies, because the underlying idea is that one is a civil servant 
first, then a specialist or expert of a given knowledge field. 
In the case of France, the reform that created the the Ecole Normale d’Administration (ENA) in 
1945 effectively put the education of non-technical civil servants under the control of the state 
Further, the requirement of passing an centrally controlled exam known as the concours helped 
insure a level of uniformity of the educational background and skillset of the civil servants. 
Additionally, to even attempt the concours, the student was required a diploma from a grande école 
like ENA (Silberman 1993, 91) leaving the educational background firmly in the control of the 
French state. A further asymmetry exists. While the judicial training in ENA may generally be 
comparable to the classic schooling of British civil servants, studies at ENA also emphasised 
economics.  
The administrators at ENA are only one group of the two main institutional sources of public 
experts in the French bureaucratic structure. A large part of the public experts in French 
bureaucratic structure were of an educationally natural science background. The Polytechnique 
trained and supplied natural scientists like physicists and chemists and the two engineering schools, 
École des mines, or École Points et chausses, were the source of engineers (Silberman 1993, 93). 
The resulting association with a cadre of a specific training in a common university helped 
reinforce the elitist image of the civil service and foster a degree of main characteristics of pre-ww2 
structures were still surrounding: grade, cadre and group as opposed to specification of job. That 
means there was considerable departmental specialization with very little cross-ministerial 
movement of civil servants as opposed to functional specialization (Silberman 1993, 92). As 
opposed to the U.K. cross-ministerial movement was rare and the specialization of the civil service 
was higher than the more “jack-of-all-trades” quality of the broadly educated civil servants in 
Whitehall. The resulting basis of expertise is much more technical know-how of the practical 
policy-decisions and thus a capability to work with much more complex policy solutions. The 
influence of these differences naturally should vary with the policy-field, but in the area of energy 
policy where different technical solutions to the oil crisis and fears of energy shortage are in play, 
this difference should be significant. 
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3.2.4 Bureaucratic structure 
Table 1 Comparison of Bureaucratic structures 
Type of bureaucratic structure Open Closed 
Capability of state Weak, pluralistic Strong, controlled 
Negotiation style Personal and characterised by 
diverse actors 
Formalized and characterised 
by limited actors 
Basis of expertise General education, broad 
knowledge and experience 
Specialized education and 
specific technical knowledge 
Resulting policy dynamic More politicized issues, ad hoc 
decisions with frequent back-
and-forth on policy decisions 
More coordinated, closed, 
highly technical and driven by 
strategic planning 
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3.3 Experts and Expertise 
Having now defined bureaucratic structure both in a general sense, and sub-dimensions necessary to 
examine its effect on policy ideas of public experts, we now turn to what constitutes an expert in the 
sense applied in this thesis. In the final section, I will define the concept of policy ideas as the 
output of experts in policymaking. 
3.3.1 Literature on Experts 
Within more classic political science literature the role of experts has been cropping up in different 
forms. In relation to a non-material dimension of their activities International Relations literature on 
in the early 1990s is indicative of this shift. In the 1990s international relations and comparative 
political science saw the introduction of the concept of epistemic communities (Haas 1992). This 
branch of the literature attempted to deal with the increasing existence of transnational groups of 
experts who were held together as groups by a set of epistemic beliefs and norms. Irrespective of 
the staying-power of this specific concept in terms of generating new problems and conceptual 
developments (Dunlop 2000), it still sees continued use across political science sub-fields. 
Moreover, their contribution was more substantial in terms of allowing scientists to think in terms 
of groups that were transnational in character and the insight that they were being driven by what 
was essentially a common belief system of objectivity of science, rather than interest politics(Adler 
and Haas 1992).  
That is not to say, that the authors were not aware of the potential for classical politics of conflict 
and interest to intersect and be relevant when examining these groups, but rather that they existed 
and were based on a seemingly non-material basis of scientific beliefs. Furthermore, as complexity 
of political problems increasingly become problematic to deal with at a national level – like 
environmental issues – the stage is set for increasing role of such epistemic communities in 
international politics, and as such, for their power to define the relevant policy problems and 
potential solutions. In this sense, the epistemic community literature represents a classically 
pluralist view of politics where experts in the sense of epistemic communities are groups formed in 
civil society who attempt to affect state action, now also, but not theoretically necessarily, at a 
transnational level. This literature thus reminds us of the extra-national and sometimes global nature 
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of expert groups and their potential to affect politics even if they do not explicitly form a part of 
formal decision-making processes.  
In different branches of comparative political economy, we may draw some insights on how 
expertise may be activated in different ways to achieve political goals. In Great Transformations 
Mark Blyth is famous for having noted the role of ideas as weaponized and “blueprints” of 
institutional change in the period following the recession of 1930s and later in the end of the golden 
era in the 1970s and 1980s. A key point for Blyth is that these ideas are push irrespective of any real 
technical merit to their claims (Blyth 2002, chap. 1). These battles of defining the problem at stake 
were between different groups of state, public and private actors.  
During the 1930s recession in the United States, the TNEC hearings, including testimony from 
Harvard academics like the Keynesian economist Robert Hansen helped the state to defeat finance 
ideas that were being pushed by business actors and the Treasury department and set the basis for a 
new underlying principal enemy that economic policies should seek to solve: the lacking private 
investment to attain higher employment. Business attempted to reduce the impact of these ideas 
through the committee for economic development, but with limited success. The National Resource 
planning board reports from the early 1940s attest to the institutionalization of state intervention to 
solve the lacking private investment and achieve higher employment(Blyth 2002, 258). These ideas 
became the bedrock of further state intervention in the U.S. economy and what became known as 
the “new deal” set of infrastructure and economic policies meant  to boost aggregate demand in the 
U.S. 
For our purposes, it is key to note the role that different groups, representing various interests, made 
claims to authoritative knowledge of the economic crisis the country was facing at the different 
points of crisis described by Blyth during the depression and the stagflation of the 1970s. Blyth’s 
work has been instrumental in showing the role of ideas on policy and likewise how some actors 
cement ideas as institutional blueprints that limit the future policy-alternatives to those consistent 
with their ideas(Blyth 2002, chap. 2). Ideas may through institutional embedding become more 
permanent. One aspect of this otherwise excellent examination, which is still a puzzle, is the 
function served by different institutional arrangements for the role of ideas. Why were some groups 
of interests the key actors in pushing certain ideas, how does the institutional setup of a given 
country affect which actors are allowed to participate in the battle of ideas that is described? I 
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should note, that these comments are merely a reflection of Blyth’s analytic focus on ideas and 
specific societal interests they represent rather than a general oversight. The question, however, 
remains an interesting one for the literature to tackle.  
Remaining within comparative politics, we can examine a more explicit take on the role of experts, 
in the literature on think tanks in policy-making. Andrew Rich has worked extensively on the role 
of think tanks as groups of experts in within the context of American Politics. Think tanks can be 
considered a particular form of knowledge regimes that produce public policy documents often 
following a political agenda or with a openly political leaning – especially in the United States 
(Béland and Cox 2011, 196). Rich, 2004 charts the dissemination of conservative political ideas 
through the rise of think tanks in American politics since the 1970s (Rich 2010). As independent 
non-profit research organizations they function as expert groups that can supply the political 
decision making process in several ways. Expertise delivered by think tanks may become influential 
in several stages of the policy process. They may act as a warning about incoming policy problems 
or facilitate guidance as to how to revise policy. Once policy is under deliberation, think tanks may 
supply ammunition as well as support to policy-makers views. In the implementation phases of 
policy, they may act as guidance for assessment of the effective institution of a new set of policies. 
In charting the different ways in which conservative ideas have affected different stages of key 
policy since the 1970s, the work of Rich, illustrates how expert knowledge is a factor throughout 
the policy-process, but also the specific characteristics of the plural and open type of politics in the 
U.S. 
A more structural approach to analysing the nationally distinct role of experts comes from a strand 
of the literature on comparative political economy which has attempted to combine two major 
directions in the literature.  It stands at the intersect between the literature on the effect of policy-
making regimes’ effect on national economic competitiveness (Katzenstein 1978) and the literature 
on Varieties of Capitalism which examines the effect of nationally distinct production regimes on 
domestic economic performance (Hall and Soskice 2001). According to the knowledge regimes 
literature, these strands underspecify how the policy ideas come about that explain the origin of 
these policy-making and production regimes-, respectively (Campbell and Pedersen 2014, chap. 1). 
Expertise and experts have a key role in such and explanation, even if the concept of knowledge 
regime refers to a broader and more abstract range of phenomena that constitute: “sets of actors, 
organizations, and institutions that produce and disseminate policy ideas that affect how policy-
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making and production regimes are organized and operate in the first place” (Béland and Cox 2011, 
167). This leads to analyses that emphasise the different ways that nationally distinct institutional 
arrangements affect the types of ideas that are created and disseminated. Along this vein of 
literature is research emphasising the role of experts in translating and adapting broader economic 
ideational developments, like the spread of neo-liberalism, to different domestic cultural contexts 
(Ban 2016). 
Perhaps because of the connection with the literature on the role of ideas, this strand of literature 
does not single out expertise in an analytically distinct category as explanans. At the operational 
level, such analyses examine the data, research, theories and policy recommendations that underpin 
different types of public policy (Béland and Cox 2011, 167; Campbell 1998). The various policy-
mixes that this entail will in turn have differential implications for national economic 
competitiveness. Despite variations in analytical level, many of the descriptions that follow might 
be consistent with my empirical goals, although less analytically specified at the outset. The key 
difference is that I am explicitly singling out an aspect of a formal institutional condition in open 
and closed policy-making. Within this sub-division I further focus on the role of expertise in 
bureaucracies understood as the permanent and state funded functions of policy-making process 
(see also the chapter on independent causal factor). That means that my aim is both more narrow 
and more specific in scope than that of the knowledge regime literature.  
First, this is about a difference in analytical level between emphasising structural aspects and more 
actor-level analysis. The knowledge regime literature emphasises the knowledge production 
apparatus that is specific to each domestic economy. As such, the focus naturally on mapping the 
domestic types of knowledge producers that exist in a given regime to trace the origin of particular 
“sense-making” structures(Campbell and Pedersen 2014, 3). As opposed to a somewhat 
genealogical analysis of the origin of knowledge particular production for national competitiveness, 
I am interested in the particular experts, or groups of them, within state apparatus that are proximate 
to decision-making. Not that knowledge regimes cannot speak to this aspect, but I start from the 
policy field and focus much more narrowly on the actors who create “sense-making” in the area. 
Moreover, while overlaps of relevance exist between my analysis and the knowledge regime 
literature, I do not purport to make an analysis exhaustive and broad enough in scope to constitute a 
knowledge regime of the entire political economy of my chosen cases. Rather, I focus on a number 
of key expert groups whose sense-making is relevant within the narrower field of energy policy.    
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Second, because  I am interested in the inter-expert conflict over a policy area, I need a more 
detailed set of analytical categories to examine how the knowledge produced by these groups varies 
and contest each other. This narrower focus naturally means I can only speak to a much smaller 
range of policy-related issues, but that the more specific focus should allow the analysis to come 
closer to identifying how ideas mattered in a particular policy context. This means that the 
contribution of my analysis is also an exploration of the mechanism through which particular ideas 
became powerful in a given institutional context. The analysis does not speak to how policy 
knowledge came to be, rather, how it contests other knowledge. The more explicit focus of my 
analysis is thus on the inter-expert contestation of the “sense-making” in a given policy area.  
My further contribution to this debate is to examine the more detailed interaction of particular 
institutional characteristics with the role of expertise within policy-making. Furthermore, the 
ultimately dependent policies are not related directly to national economic performance, although 
some actors in the analysis may believe so, rather I am interested in the energy policy that followed 
from the different organization of public expertise around policy-making on energy. The particular 
period I chose to examine these dynamics is the periods surrounding the first oil crisis from the 
early 1970s crisis up until the second crisis in early 1980s. The explanans in this case is not ideas 
by themselves, but the different formal institutional organization of expertise in the political 
systems examined – France and the United Kingdom. 
These works collectively speak in various ways to the organizational infrastructure of ideas (Béland 
and Cox 2011, 196). Although their different purpose of analysis and choice of units to examine 
affect their scope. Much is now known about the role of experts and expert ideas in affecting policy 
change because of these works. However, there is still much untapped potential in examining both 
other instances of the organizational infrastructure of ideas, but also, more specifically to focus on 
the interaction between the formal institutional context and the role of ideas. While this has given us 
a better understanding of institutions and ideas in relation to expert knowledge, we are still lacking 
a more specific understanding of how specific forms of expertise, like technical knowledge affect 
policy outcomes in an increasingly technologically dependent society. 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) sit at the intersection between technology, science and 
politics. In this literature, the work of Sheila Jasanoff stands out. In much of her work she deals 
with problematizing the often assumed neutrality of science and emphasises the constructed nature 
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of expertise as it interacts with policy-making (Jasanoff 1994, 1999, 2012). In a recent anthology, 
the empirical implications of such are examined. In examining the different dimensions of what she 
terms the sociotechnical imaginaries, several of the contributions tackle how expertise and scientific 
knowledge interact with politics(Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 339).  
In the chapter by Clark Miller, it is argued that the creation of institutions like the WHO (World 
health organization) and WMO (World meteorological association) allowed the creation of a new 
global imaginary of governance. This shift was made possible by the increasing use of science-
driven projections, modelling and visualization of populations that rather previously representing 
nation-states, represented groups of the world population at risk of HIV/AIDS, rising sea levels or 
other pandemics. This doesn’t just supersede national jurisdiction, it creates a new type of 
scientifically legitimized and expert-driven definition of how problems and solutions should be 
understood – and which institutions are best suited to deal with them(Jasanoff and Kim 2015, chap. 
13).  
Andrew Lakoff’s study in the same anthology, illustrates that this superseding of national 
jurisdiction and competence is not always as automatic or seamless as first assumed. Indeed, much 
of such a process depends on some degree of submission and supplanting of previously existing 
institutions of experts. In examining WHO preparedness programmes for global health 
emergencies, he emphasises the conflicts of interest that occurred in the process of shifting the locus 
of legitimate action from national health authorities in the nation states to a global set of UN-based 
institutions. The work thus illustrates that expertise is neither neutral, nor are scientific and 
technical inclusion into politics going to remove conflicts – neither between levels of governance or 
between different types and groups of experts (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, chap. 14). 
In this literature, the emphasis is on the collective construction of meaning through the application 
of sociotechnical paradigms (Jasanoff prefers the term “imaginaries”)(Jasanoff and Kim 2015, chap. 
1). These imaginaries are then shown to affect institutional and policy choices in different areas, but 
often of using historical and diachronic methods to examine the genesis and shifts of imaginaries 
over time. This leads to shifts of instruments or definition of problems and solutions within a policy 
area or the creation of whole-sale new policy fields of broader scope than before – like the 
introduction of scientific tools to identify and combat global public health threats in the WHO or 
issues of climate change (Jasanoff and Kim 2015). Experts and those who wield expertise, in this 
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sense, are a subfield of actors who are giving meaning to a policy field through a given 
sociotechnical imaginary – or attempt to change it through attempts to legitimize or delegitimize 
different tools or scientific understandings of a phenomenon14. 
The way Jasanoff applies the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries it is as an outcome of a process 
of expert disagreement and settlements. Her analytical focus favours how these aspects can 
reproduce broader cultural and societal preferences for particular types of evidence and delegation 
of authority (Jasanoff 2012, 12). Compared to this work, of my work has more in common with the 
more subject specific investigation of expert disputes on the concrete intersect of technical types of 
knowledge and politics that are found elsewhere in the literature on STS - especially, in the 
contributions of Miller and Lakoff on how expertise within global governance structures such as 
WHO and WMO or other similar works (Miller, Edwards, and Haas 2001).  
From the point of view of this literature, the creation and dissemination of sociotechnical 
imaginaries is what holds the key to how complex policy problems become solvable. This is not as 
straightforward as one might think. From the point of view of economic sociology, what is at stake 
here is the attribution of probabilities to an unknowable future outcome. Frank Knight is famous for 
having distinguished probabilistic uncertainty and radical uncertainty. The cognitive action of 
moving from radical uncertainty imply that values and probabilities assigned to outcomes in the 
future required explanation with reference to the actors who assign those probabilities(Abdelal, 
Blyth, and Parsons 2010, 138pp)15. 
A sociotechnical imaginary thus requires individuals who presume to understand and can analyse 
the probabilities of future outcomes. Experts become relevant as actors who create the techno-
political imaginaries that help to understand the possible future outcomes of one policy choice over 
another. As policy problems become more complex, the reliance on experts and sociotechnical 
imaginaries through which to understand and ascribe meaning to policy problems will increase. 
Indeed, the reliance on experts in modern political systems is already significant and their authority 
inseparable from expertise (Jasanoff 2012, 12). The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries is, 
                                                 
14 Perhaps owing to the interdisciplinary and openly pluralist roots of this literature there is no one definition of expertise being applied. However, one 
could make a distinction between those who are experts as those who have already been accepted as wielders of legitimate expertise within a field, 
and as such, the attribution of expertise is an interaction process that requires the construction of specific expertise as relevant to a policy field before 
one can speak of groups of experts. Experts are thus, logically and sequentially, those who have already achieved acceptance among relevant policy 
actors as experts of the problems pertaining to that policy field.  
15 For a concise and clear introduction to some of these debates in the classics of economic thinking, see the chapter by Cornelia Woll in (Abdelal, 
Blyth, and Parsons 2010). For more detailed renditions of these discussions, see (Skidelsky 2010) 
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perhaps due to the holistic aspirations of parts of STS, left somewhat broad. For each practical 
application it would be necessary to further specify some ways through which expertise and 
understanding are applied by experts in a given policy field. Before we can move to this step, we 
need to examine more closely the substance of what constitutes expertise and those who wield it - 
the experts - in relation to the study of this thesis. 
3.3.2 Sociotechnical imaginaries and expertise 
Perhaps owing to the more broad aspirations of much of the STS scholarship surrounding Sheila 
Jasanoff, the field does not utilize explicit or consistent definitions of expertise and experts. Rather, 
most of the works seems to prefer a more empirically grounded approach to empirical studies, 
where the specific nature of expertise can be teased out within the context of each case. The 
scholarship seems to prefer broader examinations of which kinds of reasons best correlate with 
different publics (opinions, broadly understood?) and their relation to political culture and the 
legitimacy and authority of expertise (Jasanoff 2012, 5). 
Some work in the literature gets close to an operational definition, where expertise might be seen as 
a corollary to what she calls “Civic epistemology”. This consists of a number of dimensions: (1) the 
dominant styles of public knowledge making; (2) the methods of ensuring accountability; (3) the 
practices of public demonstration; (4) the preferred registers of objectivity; and (5) the accepted 
bases of expertise (Jasanoff 2012, 72). The specific focus of this work is on how such paradigms are 
legitimized to a public (which perhaps becomes clear when examining especially point 1 and 3). 
However, the methods of ensuring accountability, preferred registers of objectivity and the bases of 
expertise may all relate to a definition of expertise. The first point relates to how expertise produces 
knowledge that is actionable upon as policy solutions. The second, registers of objectivity, refers to 
the ways in which the produced knowledge attempts to solidify itself as true, or un-political in 
nature. This may be through perceived technical basis in natural sciences, complexity or similar. 
Finally, the basis of expertise attempts to encapsulate why given experts are accepted as having 
expertise within a field to begin with. Thus, this dimension speaks to the origin of the social 
construction of expertise within a field. I can appreciate such sensitivity to the unique ways in 
which expertise might manifest, however, as a consequence, these guidelines and dimensions are 
still too broad and holistic to be utilized in an operational manner in a study of more specific policy 
area. 
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On the inability to predict the 9/11 2001 terror attacks on World Trade Center, the commission 
tasked to analyse the event noted that imagination is normally not associated with bureaucracies16. 
One might debate the general ability to predict future events is a problematic endeavour that 
confuses calculable probability with risk (Knight 2012). Working from an understanding of the 
modus operandi of bureaucracies as routine administrative analysis, the statement perhaps makes 
more intuitive sense. More to the point, however, is that even expertise that allowed such 
“imagination” would require to be accepted as a viable threat that the existing administrative system 
and eventually policy-makers had to deal with as a policy problem with associated policy solutions.  
This translation of expertise into action is in fact possible within existing bureaucratic structures, 
but which experts and thus what policy ideas are allowed to dictate the combination of policy 
solutions and problems is variable. The variability of expertise in policy-making depends on the 
characteristics of the particular bureaucratic structure in question, which will vary based on general 
country specificities, but also on in policy-sector specific manner. The interaction between these 
more formal institutional contexts of expertise and the concrete expertise that helps guide policy-
making is thus an empirical question. A question that this thesis attempts to grapple with. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the empirical existence of the conflict or coalitions of 
experts within two different bureaucratic structures. Instead. analyses similar to those advocated by 
Jasanoff and parts of the STS scholarship emphasise “deeper imaginaries” representing a common 
cultural representation of  (public) reason which ultimately relies on reference to a public space 
(Jasanoff 2012, 19). Although, some of the authors within STS who work on specific policy fields 
get closer to what I intend to do (e.g. Miller and Lakoff, above).  
I share the emphasis that “The rationality of experts….is never natural but always achieved, through 
institutionalized rules of the game that admit or preclude particular modes of asserting expertise” 
(Jasanoff 2012, 12). Moreover, the concept of imaginaries points to the potential conflict over 
expertise whose legitimacy is ultimately socially constructed. However, the origin and creation of 
this embedded authority is not my focus. Instead, my analysis will attempt to illuminate how 
different groups of experts are positioned given the bureaucratic structure they are embedded in. 
This entails contextual knowledge on part of the researcher and the analysis to take into account the 
                                                 
16 The exact quote reads: “(i)magination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies” (9/11 commission, 2004: 344, quoted in (Jasanoff 2012, 
69) 
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variations of the aspects of bureaucratic structures like the ability of the state to affect behaviour of 
other agents in society, the type of inter-governmental negation and the basis of selection of experts. 
By emphasising these aspects I am attempting to bridge the institutional aspects of a given case with 
the more active role that agents (such as experts) can play in policy-making. 
I am examining the inter-expert conflicts of achieving closure around their particular policy-
preference within energy policy. This means examination of expertise in policy-making needs to 
take into account the non-technical aspects of how policy-solutions and agendas are set. This 
implies that there is always a political component to expertise in policy-making (perhaps in general) 
in that democratic systems often require the explicit or implicit consensus either of governing 
bodies, expert groups and politicians to achieve agreement on policy choices. 
3.4 What is expertise? 
Before moving on to a discussion of experts and their relationship to political decision-making 
within energy policy, we need to, first, examine what constitutes expertise.  
Upon initial examination, it becomes clear that the two words are highly correlated. Thus, in 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary expertise and expert are simply defined in terms of the each other. 
Thus, expertise is simply “the skill of an expert” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary n.d.). 
Moving beyond the semi-tautological implications of statements a-la “expertise is held by experts 
and experts are holders of expertise” we may come a bit closer by examining the origin and 
etymology of the term.  
The origin of the word expert is in the Latin adjective “expertus” meaning "tried, proved, known by 
experience," which in 14th century French came to mean the attribute of being “skilful” (Online 
Etymology Dictionary n.d.). “Skill” in turn is from the Old Norse verb skil: “to separate; discern, 
understand” (Online Etymology Dictionary n.d.). To separate into constituent parts is similar to that 
of analysis; which we draw from Greek, the literal "a breaking up, a loosening, releasing," (Online 
Etymology Dictionary n.d.). This has later become what is in most sciences understood with the 
concept of analysis: "resolution of anything complex into simple elements"(Online Etymology 
Dictionary n.d.).  
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We can thus see a line between expertise, to skill and the ability to understand through ability to 
separate into constituent parts. The ability to discern and separate to allow understanding, like the 
separation of a research object into smaller components in order to understand them. Now we are 
beginning to see how the understanding is linked with expertise. The ability to understand a given 
phenomenon is thus the key to having expertise. Thus, we are left with an intrinsically linked set of 
concepts. Expertise is the application of skill to understand and analyse a phenomena and those who 
hold particular skills are experts. Applied to the area of politics and policy-making those who hold 
expertise are: Individuals, or groups of them, who have skills to analyse and thus understand the 
given policy area.  
In principle, expertise may be held by an individual or group of individuals in many parts of 
society. They will furthermore vary on a case by case basis, and often also on a policy area basis17. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the chosen subgroup of experts are those related to decision-making 
within energy policy of the United Kingdom and France in the period surrounding the first oil crisis. 
In a part of the bureaucracy, this may be a ministry agency or some other public bureaucratic 
division – even publically owned but politically controlled entities. This definition of expertise and 
experts does not directly deal with the question of whose knowledge and skills are considered 
relevant for the solving of policy issues. A further implication is that many experts will, and indeed 
do, exist surrounding the policy processes examined in this thesis. However, following similar logic 
as indicated above, it is also the purpose of any examination that purports to understand a 
phenomenon to delineate and separate the relevant aspects of the phenomena in question.  
Therefore, the thesis does does not have aspirations to be an exhaustive examination of all the 
expert influence that may have been surrounding the making of energy policy surrounding the first 
oil crisis. Rather, it is an attempt to select and examine the most relevant actors with reference to the 
research question studied. It is my claim, that a key contribution of the empirical part of this thesis 
is the uncovering and identification of the use of knowledge and skills to influence how energy 
policy developed as applied by experts within the decision-making processes of the two countries in 
the period. This does not mean that it takes into account all the potential experts, but instead focus 
                                                 
17 Although it would be difficult to imagine a policy process where the Treasury does not have some kind of influence, if not at least, in terms of 
setting the financial conditions for scope and quality of policies. 
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on those that relevant for the examination of the nexus between bureaucratic structures as policy 
ideas in the two cases. 
3.4.1 Who are the relevant experts? 
As alluded to earlier, experts may be anywhere in society. However, for the purposes of this thesis 
we are limiting the focus to experts within the political decision making process.  
Furthermore, the focus on the interplay between the role of ideas and institutional constraints 
necessitates a focus on experts within the institutional constraints defined by focus of the thesis. The 
thesis examines the interaction between the difference in types of bureaucratic structure and 
different ideas of energy policies in two cases. This means that the experts in question are those 
who exist in the institutional setting surrounding the political decision-making process of energy 
policy in the two cases. In effect, we are examining a subset of the administrative bureaucracy in 
the United Kingdom and France. Bureaucratic structures as they will be defined below may of 
course manifest different in other countries, and as such, these insights are not immediately 
transferable to other cases, policy areas or to other countries besides those institutions relevant to 
the cases. At a higher level of abstraction, inferences about the conditions under which open or 
closed bureaucratic structures allow some ideas over others may however be relevant to examine, 
and as such, the study may indicate the type, or which ideas among several possible, ideas in a 
given policy field, would become dominant with different combinations of expertise or political 
oversight. 
These experts may in theory be relevant throughout the classic policy-cycle distinctions of agenda-
setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation stages, but the classic theoretical 
expectation, which I carry over from this literature, is that the role of bureaucratic agents is 
strongest in the definitiorial and formulation stages. The stages metaphor is not meant to be a strict 
analytic category but pertain to the areas where the analysis will broadly refer (DeLeon 1997; 
Lasswell 1956; Sabatier 2007) to indicate the areas of policy-making that are more likely to 
characterise bureaucratic involvement. For this reason, the focus of the analyses will also favour the 
policy-formulating and agenda-setting ability of particular expert groups wielding different types of 
policy ideas to do so. 
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Experts are important in modern policy-making, and permanent expert groups within government 
bureaucracies no less so. Ultimately, however, politics is the arbiter of who holds authoritative 
voice over issues; experts may fall out of favour as political power changes with government cycles, 
or due to increasing role of some types of political issues - which favour some ideas sets over 
others. Moreover, there may be differences in dominant ideas within a bureaucratic organization 
itself. For instance, one might imagine that the classic Weberian command-and-control logic of 
hierarchical bureaucracy was stronger at the higher echelons of civil service and more technically 
driven expertise in lower levels closer to the more specific policy formulation and actual production 
of bureaucratic decisions (Peters and Peters 2002, 72). The degree to which expertise has become 
the guiding logic of the bureaucratic organization surrounding decision-making – as opposed to 
more classically hierarchical notions - is therefore also a question that circumscribes this thesis. The 
specific contextual factors that affect these dynamics, and are inherent to each case, may shift over 
time or across cases. The general point to bring across is that there is a significant role for the type 
of bureaucratic structure in filtering expertise in different ways. This variegated filtering process, in 
turn, will favour the content of some expertise over others and thus make some types of expert 
advice more prevalent in policy decisions.  
3.4.2 Institutionally bounded relevant experts? 
In principle, the above arguments about the nature of expertise and the difference in which experts 
are relevant could be made for many more experts than those situated in different administrative 
and public functions. They make take the form of individuals who we might then term knowledge 
entrepreneurs, but they may also be conceived as a collective of some description, through either an 
agency, ministry or other grouping or more broadly as epistemic communities(Adler and Haas 
1992; Haas 1992). The central point, is that these experts are in possession of relevant and non-
general knowledge about the given policy field in question and that they are perceived as relevant to 
the policy-making process by actors in the political system for this reason – either through 
invitation into debates, consulting roles or formal administrative oversight or definitorial 
responsibility for policy.  
However, in this way, most contributions to policy-making might be conceived as expert-input. We 
need to further delineate which types of experts we have in mind to study and why. The relevant 
experts in the study of something as dynamic as policy-making will of course be difficult to 
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determine a priori. However, we may make some preliminary sub-groups of experts that also reflect 
the focus on the institutional focus on bureaucratic structures of the thesis. These qualifications 
serve to ascertain that experts with significant institutional ties to bureaucracies and policy 
formulation are in focus. 
First, is that the access to the policy process where experts may have influence must be of a 
formalized and somewhat permanent kind, in the sense, that their input into the policy-making is 
expected in principle. By formalized I do not necessarily require that rules exist for the inclusion for 
the involvement of e.g. a given ministry, but rather to limit the examination of experts to those that 
are already accepted as having expertise within a given policy field. Because of their expected 
involvement, they will therefore often be of a somewhat permanent nature in the institutional 
context, or at least have had a stable position over some time period sufficient for them to achieve 
the position of experts. Thus, it is not the shifting of inclusion of different expert groups into the 
policy process that interests this thesis. This is not an examination of the origin and attribution of 
legitimate expertise. Rather, it is on how the setup of bureaucratic structures affects the generation 
of expert policy input and the potential conflicts of policy ideas that exist between those that have 
already been accepted as having expertise in the field by other policy-makers (often the government 
who may request advice or policy-formulation capacities).  
Second, another way to indicate institutionally relevant actors is through their continued funding by 
state finances. The reason why my thesis limits focus to those that are not private actors – in terms 
of their access to the policy process – is that public funding or control can be conceived as an 
indicator of the perceived importance of the function. Thus, in principle, the inclusion of ministry 
task forces, the special policy unit or publically owned companies in the policy-making process 
indicate their perceived importance to the policy outcome –through different forms of expertise or 
formal gatekeeping roles. Further, these groups are crucial to the puzzle of this thesis in that they 
represent groups that can be said to have a relationship to the bureaucratic structure of the case. 
That means that the organization of these expert-groups around the policy-making process 
represents a view into the institutional constraints on ideas, while those ideas can still be 
analytically separated from the constraints that affect them.  
These experts are thus not just any experts. How the broader different institutional setups of 
bureaucratic structures are organized in the two cases is the reason why some experts and their ideas 
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are more important than others. Thus, as explained in the introductory chapters, if the broader 
puzzle of this thesis is the institutional constraints on policy ideas, the more specific is that of how 
different bureaucratic structures affect the types of experts and thus policy ideas that come to define 
energy policy following crises. Expertise may be located inside the civil corps or it may be a more 
autonomous actors which functions more akin to a politically instituted think tank (especially the 
Policy Unit and CPRS in the UK, spring to mind). Moreover, the use of external (to the political-
administrative system) actors and agencies like public and private companies in steering committees 
or as consultants may also vary. In short, the location of the experts also vary with the contextual 
parameters of the specific case, but a common trait is that whatever position they have, the structure 
of bureaucratic system will affect their ability to influence the process of policy-making.  
An expert from the point of view of studying bureaucratic structures and ideas in policy making is 
therefore: Individuals or groups within the bureaucratic structure that have knowledge and skills to 
understand the relevant policy-field and who are directly or indirectly financed by the state and are 
a formal part of the decision-making process over time 
As indicated earlier, these definitions serve as heuristic delimitation to maximize the opportunity to 
observe and create specific knowledge of the importance of bureaucratic institutions for policy 
ideas within a limited policy area and not the general importance of experts to politics more 
broadly. This means that the type and range of experts studied using this definition are just a limited 
number of the total number of experts that may exist in the broader policy-making environment of 
the two cases. 
3.4.3 Which type of expertise? 
All experts are not created equal. Indeed, what is perceived as the authoritative knowledge varies 
over time and by policy area. 
Experts studied in this thesis are those that directly or indirectly are financed by the state and are a 
formal part of the decision-making. This means that while it would be possible to extrapolate 
insights about the capture of a political process by specific ideas heralded by a group of bureaucrats 
who hold some specific set of expertise, it would be the expertise that was the object. Hence, 
insights from this study are about the role of ideas in a particular institutional context of 
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bureaucratic structures characterised by openness or closedness, which I further defined as the 
degree of expertise of bureaucrats themselves as well as the degree of political supervision. These 
two dimensions may vary across policy areas. 
Inferences about the role of different actors in co-opting the political process can only be made in 
this thesis with some significant caveats. Studies that examine the role of different actors in 
coopting the political process or regulatory capture often emphasise how civil society or market 
actors outside the traditional decision-making procedure may co-opt a policy process. However 
interesting such studies indeed are (Rich 2010), and they do have corollaries to some observations 
made in this thesis, like the role of specific actors in defining and formulating stages of policy, it is 
not possible, per se, to examine the specifics of potential state or regulatory capture by special 
interests.  
3.4.4 Groups of experts as coherent units 
Examining conflicts between groups of experts such as EDF, CEA, Ministry of Finance in the 
French case and others assumes that these groups represent unified actors. It is true that actors 
inside these groups are not equivalent. However when acting within the decision-making processes 
of the administrative system of their respective political systems these organizations tend to speak 
with a singular voice, at least when representing the organization itself. This means that when 
comparing the ideas set out in the framework, the actual ideas identified are not necessarily at the 
level of individuals who may espouse them, but examined because they can be said to represent 
ideas present in the organisation as a whole.  
It is not impossible that several ideas may exist within an organization at once. To the extent that 
several ideas exist, the point of this analysis is not the origin of these ideas within the organizations, 
rather it is how these ideas as represented by the organisations change over time and are fielded in 
interaction with other organizations; how different ideas underpin policy conflicts in different ways 
and finally how some ideas rise and fall. The introduction of an idea need not necessarily lead to its 
dominance in a point in time or space. The effectiveness of ideas also depends on the institutional 
and political context in which they exist. The analysis of each case will attempt to indicate when 
interactions like this exist. Furthermore, the chapter concluding on the analyses and their findings 
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attempts to put the ideational developments and policy trajectory of energy responses to the first oil 
crisis into context of which other non-ideational factors facilitated these developments. 
3.5 Outcome factor: Policy ideas of experts 
In political science, the study of the role and influence of ideas on politics has been increasingly 
popular. It began in late 1980s with work indicating the role of ideas or norms as causal factors. 
During the early 1990s, the development of a constructivist strand of literature within International 
relations began emphasising the constructed and intersubjective nature of “social facts”.  In positing 
anarchy as the main structuring characteristic of interaction between states and their propensity to 
war, the existing literature within realist and liberalist traditions (as well as their neo-forms) had 
been unable to explain or predict the end of the Cold War exactly because they did not emphasise 
this intersubjective and constructed element of anarchy (Wendt 1992). The literature on the role of 
ideas ballooned from this starting point and soon spread to other branches of social sciences.  
Within comparative political sciences the cognitive turn led to a drive toward using ideas as 
explanatory factors for different political outcomes and most of the literature in 1990s and early 
2000s dealt with the role of ideas as independent variable or causal factor in the description or 
explanation of political (often policy-related) outcomes (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hall 1989, 
1993). Much of the early debates centred on debates about the nature of ideas as explanatory 
factors. Discussions revolved around whether (or not) existing literature – especially within neo-
institutionalist branches of historical and rational institutionalism - took ideas seriously as more 
than just “filler to shore up already existing research programmes rather than treat ideas as objects 
worth investigation on their own” (Blyth 1997).  
The studies that spawned from this critique attempted to examine ideas as objects outside the 
instrumental and functionalist logics of previous attempts to incorporate ideas (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993; Hall 1989, 1993) emphasised a multitude of different concepts to catch different 
ideas held by actors, but fundamentally shared the starting foundations of the intersubjective and 
constructed nature of ideas. The ideational turn was analysed using many lenses, a good overview 
of the different ways they have been applied in comparative politics and international political 
economy, respectively is through categorizations of meaning, cognition, uncertainty and 
subjectivity (Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010). As the field expanded in scope, the questions that 
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the literature attempted to grapple with invariably also shifted. One could argue that one of the 
initial steps in this new direction was already indicated when earlier work made the point that ideas 
do not float freely, indeed they are embedded in a political and institutional context which matters 
to their mattering (Risse-Kappen 1994). Whatever the starting point of this shift in the literature,  
what happened through this process of “taking ideas seriously” (Schmidt 2010b) lead to an 
increasing attention to the practical ways that ideas could be studied rather than the referencing to 
other research traditions to justify a new approach. Following these interventions in the literature, 
further scholarship has moved towards a less confrontational line of reasoning vis-à-vis other 
research traditions – like rational choice – and simply attempted to focus on a more pragmatic 
approach to how ideas can matter in different ways and contexts (Parsons 2016).  
In an attempt to distance the study of ideas from previous categories of preferences and interest 
Carstensen & Schmidt move significantly in this direction by attempting instil a more holistic 
understanding of power in relation to ideas. To encompass this more widened scope of forms of 
power, they distinguish the different forms powerful ideas may take by distinguishing power 
through ideas, power over ideas and power in ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). Some 
extremely interesting research has formed from this new fork in the literature, which works much 
more pragmatically on the role of ideas in different contexts. An interesting example is the work on 
the surprisingly feeble foundations upon which commonly accepted macroeconomic indicators rest. 
By unpacking these different intersections, studies of ideas may illuminate both how ideas become 
powerful (their origin and political struggle over them) and how ideas actually exert that power 
once institutionalized (Mügge 2016). This has the potential to sidestep the cleavage between those 
who study ideas as weapons that are wielded by rational actors and those who believe ideas are so 
embedded in human thought that those ideas are believed to structure all action that follows (Mügge 
2016, 422).  
I would add to this debate, that in order for research to truly examine the conflict over ideas as well 
as the power they exert post-hoc it necessitates a longer term perspective. Research that aims to 
examine both these separate questions thus need a diachronic dimension in their study of ideas. 
Second, I would reiterate – although I do believe the literature and I are in agreement, if tacitly – 
that the institutional context is still of utmost importance when examining these aspects of ideas. 
For example, the work on economic indicators convincingly shows that the way we operationalize 
and define our mathematical models of growth or asset valuation standards have political and 
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potential redistributional consequences (Mügge and Stellinga 2015). That being said, the ideas 
themselves never exist in a vacuum (Risse-Kappen 1994). It is entirely possible that similar ideas 
may have different conditions for existing in various institutional settings. This may be due to 
inertia of existing rules, or dominant managerial cultures, or some other reason.  
I should be clear. I am not saying that we therefore cannot draw valuable insights from these 
studies. What I am saying is that we need to be very careful to specify the conditions under which 
certain ideas mattered or not. The promises of doing so are numerous. First, perhaps most 
substantially, a carefully specified institutional context may teach us just as much about the power 
of ideas as the actual variation in ideational power. For instance, it may alert us to scope conditions 
of some ideas, or the ability of particular mechanisms of legitimizing some types of ideas to benefit 
their influence and not others. I am not saying this to be pedantic, but to emphasise that to really 
move from the question of “whether” ideas matter to politics and policy onto studies of “how” they 
matter (Mehta 2010), we need to be very careful about specifying not just the movement of the 
ideas, but the institutional context they exist (or do not exist) in. Second, such a renewed emphasis 
would ultimately make it easier to determine under which contextual factors an argument about the 
role of ideas is made. As such, it would a) make it much simpler to clearly specify new research 
questions for follow-up research b) think more critically about how any research findings can be 
generalized to other cases, policy fields, contexts. 
The research topic of this thesis falls into this part of the literature, but shifts the focus slightly from 
the role of ideas to the role of institutional contexts on ideas. It attempts to do so by choosing two 
cases of policy development over a number of years in a policy field that is highly technical and 
susceptible to expert influence. Within this narrower field, the thesis explores the role of expertise 
from publically run bureaucratic structures to the policy ideas that conflict over the definition of 
policy choice in politics. In so doing, the thesis attempts to illustrate the role of different variations 
of bureaucratic structures on the organization of public expertise in a policy field and the 
subsequent policy ideas. 
3.5.1 Policy ideas give meaning to policy 
A policy idea is a cognitive construct containing explicit or implicit policy imperatives. At the most 
basic it is about how governmental actors link problems and solutions – and in so doing – enable 
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governmental steering. However, problems and solutions are not objective phenomena. Even 
rational-choice inspired approaches to public policy work under assumptions of “bounded 
rationality”. In other words, human capacity for full information about a given problem and its 
potential solutions are ontologically asymmetric. This is more-so the case during times of “crisis”18. 
Labelling phenomena as “crisis” is neither neutral nor homogenous across contexts. Agents do not 
automatically and unproblematically respond to material shifts in easily predictable ways and even 
exogenous shocks, such as an oil crisis, must necessarily be interpreted by actors (W. W. Widmaier, 
Blyth, and Seabrooke 2007, 748). During crises, it becomes crucial for policy-makers to be able to 
ascribe meaning to the crisis in the sense that it is interpreted using policy ideas. The interpretations 
of an event like the oil crisis by actors should be understood as constructs containing different 
aspects of policy ideas, which provide policy actors with interpretive framework that allows 
ascribing meaning to what is experienced by actors. When experts in bureaucratic structures ascribe 
meaning to the oil crisis through policy ideas to solve the crisis, they essentially are wielding 
epistemic power by turning principled understandings into causal models (W. Widmaier 2016, 344). 
A policy idea, in whichever aspect (see below) is a thus a cognitive construct within which an event 
such as the oil crisis can be defined, diagnosed and explained as necessitating particular sets of 
actions (Blyth 2007, 762)19 (see also (Jones 2009; Stone 1989)). Policy ideas act as the 
manifestation of how experts understand a crisis. I will apply the concept of policy idea 
operationalized along three different aspects or modes of manifestation to show how crises become 
understood by experts in a given bureaucratic structure. These aspects proceed in three stages which 
also represent decreasing levels of abstraction20.  
However, when examining experts understandings it is crucial to emphasise that the necessary 
analytical move is the inverse. The identification of concrete policy problems associated with the 
crisis, as the experts define it, is the starting point of empirical investigation. From there, more or 
less consistent sets of problems and solutions may be amalgamated by the analyst. It should now 
also become clear, why such an analysis necessitates a longer time perspective to appreciate how 
                                                 
18 Distinction must be made between “crisis” where information is less or more limited, which opens the space for rhetorical use of “crisis” by 
politicians or other elites in order to achieve preferences set independently of crisis. This problem is related to the fact that it is often hard to tell what 
beliefs were causal for several reasons 1) separating statements the person knows are false from what she “really” believes 2) determining a rank 
order of these justifications. 3) empirical claims by individuals can often contradict or be in tension with one another (Jervis, 2006: 646). 
19 Emphasis is mine 
20 Parts of the ideational literature has emphasised the need to separate normative and causal (or factual) aspects of ideas (e.g. Campbell 1998; 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993). While this may seem intuitive, there is no clear agreement on how to separate these elements and that normative and 
factual concerns often overlap in practice. My use of the term policy idea should therefore be understood in this broader sense of incorporating 
normative as well as factual aspects (see also, (Mehta 2010)). 
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shifting problems and solutions reflect up on broader views of the crisis and the implications for 
policy it may engender. I argue that maintaining a view of ideational elements, which actors are not 
just affected by, but may also affect and utilize, it would be consistent with this approach to argue 
that a valid hypothetical political strategy could be to maintain a crisis as an accident as long as 
political responsibility can in some way be shifted through blame-avoidance or other strategies. 
3.5.2 Policy ideas operationalised 
Moving to a lower level of abstraction, we can begin to theorize how policy ideas may be captured 
in the empirical material by analytical categories. The classic interpretations of how ideas shape 
policy outcomes is often referenced in the neo-institutionalist literature to the work of Peter Hall 
(esp. (Hall 1989, 1993). He famously distinguished between three levels of overall goals, 
instruments and settings of instruments to capture shifts in policy as a consequence of events that 
proved anomalous to prevailing paradigms of knowledge (Hall 1993, 291). Implicit in the 
distinction, and explicit in his writing, is an attention to how problems and solutions become linked 
through knowledge when policy choices are made. Ideational scholars have since developed this 
more explicitly – among classics e.g. (Campbell 1998, 2002).  
The original rendition of this typology was intended to examine policy problems. However, I 
suggest the categories of goals, instruments and settings may usefully be applied to capture different 
aspects of policy ideas among experts. In this sense, what problem definition and solutions are 
associated with the crisis is part of the constitutive mark-up of the crisis per se. This is a necessary 
explication because Hall’s original article is interested in studying the policy goals, instruments and 
settings associated with different levels of social learning, where the social learning primarily shifts 
at the third-order of paradigms. I make no such a priori theoretical claim. Instead, I perceive of the 
categories in a more heuristic manner. They exist to allow examination of dynamics of 
communicative interaction between political elites as they debate the crisis internally and how to 
deal with it. Moreover, I make no empirical assumptions about the general consistency between 
settings, instruments and overarching goals.  
Further specification is also required in the theoretical understanding of the source of change. The 
source of change in the original typology is social learning which is understood primarily as a 
deliberate adjustment of goals and techniques of policy to respond to past experience and new 
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information (Hall 1993, 278). By itself, this is not well-specified enough for application as an 
explanatory model of change. While (Hall 1993) emphasises the disconnect between material 
factors and change when specifying the insufficiency of new economic developments as causes of 
paradigmatic change, he instead externalizes the this cause to a similarly ‘objective’ phenomena 
namely the accumulation of events which prove anomalous with the terms of the existing paradigm 
(Hall 1993, 280)21.  
As others have shown, policy experimentation does not have to follow from accumulation of 
anomalies incongruent with the interpretation of a dominant paradigm, such shifts may happen out 
of intentional acts with unintended consequences (Morrison 2016). Indeed, as recent literature on 
responses to the financial crisis of 2007-8 has emphasised, there is a puzzle as to why ideas may 
influence different policy areas differently – as (A. Baker 2015) have recently shown for monetary 
and fiscal policy – and how some ideas become successful and not others in affecting policy change 
– as (Chwieroth 2010) has shown in the decline of welfare state policy in Latin America. What this 
means, is that just as common knowledge among decision-makers may reflect material and 
structural positions of power of actors, they do not have to. Similarly, shifts in the dominant ideas 
and the overall goals, instruments and settings they prescribe cannot be assumed to follow from 
material shifts or objective events. Structures, as it were, do not come with an instruction sheet 
(Blyth 2003). 
That being said, there is still considerable insight in the observation that changes in policy rely on 
ideational components that affect problem definition. Moreover, the three-tier structure is still a 
useful analytical tool because it allows disaggregating different types problems associated with the 
crisis. To apply the distinctions associated with policy to distinguish different aspects of 
manifestations of policy ideas, conceptual clarification is needed from his original formulation. 
First, Hall is deriving policies at a hierarchical level of policies (overarching, instruments and 
settings) which invokes a sense of dealing with policy solutions in his framework. Instead, I use his 
categories to refer to different aspects of the problems associated with a crisis. In the application of 
these concepts, we can extract more clarity about the conceptual boundaries of the category.  
                                                 
21 One scholar notes that part of the strength of the argument is in the inherent duality of conflicting logics (Blyth 2013b).   
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Overarching policy goals are paradigms in the sense of being “embedded in the very terminology 
through which policy-maker communicate about their work, and it is influential exactly because so 
much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole” (Hall 1993, 279). In 
empirical terms, these take the form of dominant concerns that instruments and settings must be 
coherent with. The example used by Hall is the replacement of employment with inflation as the 
primary concern of policy-makers (Hall 1993, 283–84). It is difficult to know exactly how such 
shifts manifest a priori, although one hypothetical way that it might manifest in terms of the oil 
crisis is overarching ideas of alleviating energy-supply constraints due to the Yom Kippur War. The 
way in which that idea mediated by the bureaucratic structure is what renders the particular 
dynamics of ideas among experts in that case.  
The second level refers to the techniques or instruments associated with the overarching problem 
definition. Here I divert somewhat more from the original formulation, because of its heritage in 
typifying policies. Instead of understanding instruments as policy instruments (overlapping with 
solutions) that take the form of new regulation on monetary control and methods for planning 
public expenditures (Hall 1993, 283) I emphasise instruments more along the lines of the concrete 
variables or indicators that policy-makers refer to when defining the policy options in the crisis. 
Maintaining the example from above, a reference to the increasing hostilities among countries in the 
region, and need to secure crude-oil supplies through international diplomacy, would be an example 
of an instrumental policy idea.  
The precise setting of those instrumental policy ideas refer less to the actual content or definition of 
policy ideas and more to the degree to which an instrumental idea is pushed. Obviously, if an open 
bureaucratic system reduces the possibility for a single instrumental policy idea to be agreed upon 
among experts, the question of setting may become less manifest in the analysis. If an indicator 
associated with the instrumental policy idea is highlighted by expert actors as varying in state (e.g. 
decreasing, if countable) it may be used as arguments for already implemented policy working or 
that the crisis is not longer present. An example could be the extent to which financial constraints 
have been taken sufficiently into account. Where the instrument itself refers to a particular 
operationalization of (often a measurable) aspect of the policy idea associated with energy policy it 
does not have to be the only instrument, whereas a change of setting can only refer to the same 
instrument. 
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3.5.3 Aspects of policy ideas 
Table 2 Aspects of Policy Ideas 
Content of different policy ideas 
Aspect Definition 
Overarching policy idea Dominant concern of energy policy 
Instrumental policy idea Concrete tools referred to by experts (e.g. 
nuclear reactor type).  
Setting of policy idea Variation in state of policy instrument 
highlighted by experts 
 
Analysing changes in policy-making in terms of the ideas that influence it therefore requires a keen 
eye to the different ways in which ideas can manifest and how the characteristics of the institutional 
context affect the dynamics of policy response in different policy areas. A crucial theoretical point, 
is that while ideational scholarship borrowing in one way or another from these types of three-level 
typologies often assume that different levels of ideational variation may interact, is rarely specified 
at the outset how this might occur. In the original formulation (Hall 1989, 1993) paradigmatic shifts 
were considered the overarching category not just in terms of the breath and inclusion of the 
category, but also in hierarchical terms of how it modelled the coming about of policy change. This 
meant that many ideational works borrowing from this model have indirectly or otherwise included 
an assumption of change taking place once a paradigm shifts through a shift in overarching ideas 
(Blyth 2013b). However, this may not necessarily be the case (Moschella 2015; Moschella and 
Tsingou 2013). Whether this implicit assumption to see policy change as theoretically deriving from 
shifts from the top-down are a reminiscence of the inspiration in Kuhn’s work on paradigms I will 
leave unsaid. The point remains that in my application of the above categories I do not assume such 
a hierarchy and the connections between the different levels of ideas in bringing about policy 
change should instead be a question of empirics rather than tacit theoretical assumption. Without 
presupposing too much of the following chapters, what my analysis indicates is that this theoretical 
primacy of third order change underestimates other analytical dynamics in energy policy ideas in 
France and the United Kingdom. 
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Chapter 4 Method and description of sources 
Before getting into the analyses of the cases in the coming chapters, it is necessary to reflect on the 
type of methodologies and logics applied when making analytical claims. This chapter will first set 
out the logic of using comparative case designs in qualitative studies and the limitations to 
generalizability. It then argues for the use of a diverse case selection strategy and process tracing to 
support the relationship between bureaucratic structure and policy ideas. Finally, it describes the use 
and collection of empirical archive material for use in the analyses. 
4.1 Comparative case design 
The methodology of the investigation advances from a comparative logic. The comparative case 
study logic is used across political science as a way of exploring the significance of causal factors 
across countries to establish the significance of certain casual factors for specific outcomes across 
countries. This is related to statistical analysis in which a large number of cases is compared with 
regards to a smaller number of independent variables and outcomes. However, in the study of the 
politics of different countries studies are often faced with a small number of possible cases (small 
N). As Della Porta (quoting Eisenstadt (1968)) suggests: “Although in this approach the quality of 
control of the relationship between variables is low, it is often the only scientific method available 
for the study of macrodimensional, interdimensional and institutional processes” (Della Porta and 
Keating 2008, 202).  
This has pushed such studies in the direction of comparative studies that implies a parallel 
reasoning but within the limitation of small number of cases (small N). John Stuart Mill’s 
methodological discussions have been a popular reference point for the establishment of the logics 
of a comparative case study (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008, 646; Della Porta and 
Keating 2008, 68, 204; George and Bennett 2005). It is worth reiterating some of these logics at the 
outset; because it helps us better understand the limitations of different logics of comparison and 
what can be done to alleviate them. Moreover, understanding where the claim to causality lies in 
these methods helps us better deal with the logical implications of the case selection strategy 
chosen. The principle methods Mill suggested were the: “method of agreement” and “method of 
difference” (George and Bennett 2005, 153–54). 
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The method of agreement aims to find similar independent factors, which are co-varying with 
outcome factors of two or more cases. By contrast, the method of difference aims to find different 
independent factors, which co-vary with different outcomes in two or more cases. In modern 
iterations, this terminology has been inverted so the focus is now on controlling the context of this 
relationship (or third variables). In most different case designs, which mirrors the method of 
agreement, control of the context (for third variables) is assumed by choosing cases where all other 
elements of the context are maximized but the variation of the explanatory factor is minimized. In 
this logic, the explanatory factors that are similar across cases are the ones that led to similar 
outcomes given. Conversely, for most similar case design, cases are chosen to exhibit minimum 
variation in the context but maximum variation in the explanatory factors. These two are by now 
well-known comparative logics in the literature, but are also significantly limited by fundamental 
challenges of over-and under-determination relating to the strict requirements on logic of 
elimination (George and Bennett 2005, 155–56).  
A common problem for comparative research, as indicated by Theda Skocpol, is that it can be 
difficult to find cases that contain the differences or similarities required for a given research 
question and clear outcomes(George and Bennett 2005, 158–59)22. Moreover, there is a risk 
“overdetermination” in the explanations of comparative analyses (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 
201). Because countries are complex entities we can never assume that similar countries are similar 
in all other respects than the explanatory variables in comparative analysis. Therefore, there is 
considerable insecurity in causal inferences in the sense understood by more quantitative 
approaches. While over-determination can of course be a problem in all attempts to model reality 
(Kratochwil in (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 81) it is a common risk in qualitative approaches as 
well (Vennesson 2008, 238). 
This often makes the logic difficult to apply purely in investigations of countries. However, most 
similar and most different case designs are not the only ones. Indeed, a reasonable amount of energy 
has been spent by researchers in trying to more broadly examine the consequences of small-N case 
research and – especially –selection on the outcome23 (D. Collier and Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990; 
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This has focused on more universal criteria by which case 
                                                 
22 See (Skocpol 2008, 37–40) for the full argument. 
23 What most quantitatively inclined research would term the dependent variable 
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selection can take place in research designs that rely on small-N of cases24 but is not limited to the 
strict most similar or most different case selection (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008 suggests two basic criteria for case selection  
1) representativeness of the cases of some wider population of cases and 2) useful variation on the 
dimensions of theoretical interest of the research.  
Relating to the first criteria, the primary strength of the most different or most similar design logic 
is the claim to, in parallel to statistics, establish a (although to varying degree, see (Della Porta and 
Keating 2008, chap. 11)) generalizable casual claim through the control of other intervening factors 
between cause and effect. Irrespective of the general usefulness of this first criteria in seeking 
generalizable causal claims through qualitative small-n studies (D. Collier and Mahoney 1996, 63–
64) one should be careful to not oversell the importance of the criterion. I would submit, that the 
importance of either of the two criteria shifts depending on the type of question the given research 
is interested in. Of course, it is relevant to know the range of cases that given analytical findings 
might apply to. Partially, however, this can be addressed by the researcher being very careful about 
the ambition of the analysis in the scope and reach of the conclusions one draws from the analysis – 
an assumption which less nomothetic approaches to case studies have mostly lived by25.  
Thus, while comparative studies might not afford the ability of certain generalizability but provides 
the basis for discussing generalizability in further studies. At the outset, a key concern for a 
researcher should therefore be whether the given cases represent theoretically interesting variation 
on the causal factor that the research project is interested in studying. Thus, I would be more 
inclusive in what I would term comparative case study research with the understanding that 
reducing the importance of the first criterion does shift the focus of the research towards the 
importance of the theoretical connections that it allows the research to generate. This affects the 
case selection strategy chosen but also investigations findings which will have more focus on theory 
generation and specification or the mechanisms through the indication of how theoretical works 
rather than the applicability of said schema to a wider set of cases.  
                                                 
24 Cases, not observations per se. See also Gerring in (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008, chap. 28) 
25 To be fair, Gerring and Seawright are probably aware of this when they distinguish case studies with generalizable intentions from case studies 
with: “a very different style of case studies (so called) aims to elucidate features specific to a particular case” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296). See 
also: (Gerring 2006). 
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In light of challenges of utilizing the pure comparative logic, the focus of the present study on an 
ambition of theory generation and the establishment of causal mechanism, a less stringent approach 
to comparative case studies is required. This approach takes the vantagepoint of George & 
Bennett’s description of combining the comparative logic with process tracing. George & Bennett, 
2005 argue that scholars like Theda Skocpol have used the comparative case study logic 
supplemented by process tracing as a way of supporting the establishing causal relations and 
mitigating the obvious limitations of the method. The weight of reliance on the quasi-controlled 
comparative logic of the case selection strategy can then be shifted to the within-case examination 
using process tracing with the result that the wider research project and claim to causality is 
strengthened through the “unravelling of historical narratives” that the cases illustrate (George and 
Bennett 2005, 159). A similar point is also made by (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 219; Mahoney 
1999; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 365–67). 
Acknowledging the limitation of the comparative logic in small N comparative studies, I will 
conduct a diverse case design which seeks a maximize the variation on the causal factor of 
bureaucratic structures and relying extensively on within-case process tracing to support the 
mechanisms through which policy ideas are linked with institutional structures like those. This 
follows the assertion that it is still worthwhile applying the comparative logic under the conditions 
of maintaining focus on the limitations of the method. Because this approach is different from the 
classic approaches outlines above, it is worth specifying how this relates to the logic of comparison. 
In most similar or most different case designs there is an inherent logic aspiring to some level of 
causal claim built into the selection strategy itself26.  
In following the case selection strategy of diverse cases the logic of selection is more akin to 
typological theorizing where a combination of variables are assumed to affect an outcome that 
varies across cases (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008, 651). This means that the logic of 
case selection does not inherently imply a causal claim through controlling the context like the most 
similar or most different designs. The implications are twofold. First, that the requirements of 
causality dealt with by Skocpol in relation to Mill’s methods (explained above) are less strict. 
Second, somewhat paradoxically, this also means that because there is no inherent causal claim in 
the case selection logic, the claim of a relationship between bureaucratic structures and policy ideas 
                                                 
26 Even if Mill’s original formulation of agreement and difference was more cautious about such aspirations with very strict conditions (George and 
Bennett 2005, 155). 
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must be supported through an additional technique if not inherent to the case design itself. The 
chosen tool for this is process tracing. Before we turn to a closer examination of the case selection 
strategy of diverse cases and use of process tracing, it is worth expanding on the consequences for 
causal claims that these techniques have for the analyses. Because the analyses rely on process 
tracing to drive the argument of a relationship between the outcome factor of policy ideas and 
causal factor of bureaucratic structure, the claim to causality will have other limitations to those that 
can be achieved with other designs.  
As a consequence, the study does not enable the clear testing of causal relations stricto sensu, but 
instead allows the analysis to give an indication of this relationship. As such, the comparative 
element and with-case process tracing strengthen the case for the significance of the identified 
bureaucratic structures on the formation of ideas and explores the hypothesis of how these 
bureaucratic structures function and impact ideas but does not provide conclusive empirical 
evidence to firmly establish this causal relation in similar cases. The use of process tracing takes the 
context into account (not the case selection logic) by showing the specific explanatory factors 
affecting the outcome in concrete instances and investigating if other factors affected the outcome 
simultaneously. In this way, the comparative and process tracing elements support each other in 
establishing a case for the significance of the explanatory factors of bureaucratic structures. 
However, it is worth underscoring that this does not imply a certain causal claim but rather an 
indication and specification of the relationship. As such, more analysis would be required to 
establish this causal relationship in a wider and more representative scope of cases. 
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4.2 The chosen case selection strategy and “casing” 
The diverse case method aims for the “achievement of maximum variance along relevant 
dimensions” (Gerring in (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008, 650)). It may take the form 
of examining individual variable or values of multiple variables – the latter of which relies less on 
the more obvious diversity across one theoretically specified variable and instead follows a logic of 
typological theorizing that assumes effects of combinations of variables that varies across types 
(ibid: 651). The diverse case strategy requires that at least two cases be selected, because the 
variation across the explanatory factor and the outcome aims to show the outer-points of variation 
in the scope the theoretically relevant factors. In that sense, there is a minimally implied 
representativeness of the cases to a larger population because they represent the full variation of the 
population across the variation of the theoretically defined factors(Seawright and Gerring 2008, 
297). 
The logic implied in this case selection method, as applied to this research project, is that cases 
selected should help to explore the patterns of relationship between different institutional setups and 
policy ideas. Having only two cases, it of course means that representativeness in terms of the 
distribution of a potential and broader population of cases (domestic institution in other countries) 
may not necessarily represent the findings of the diverse cases selected. However, since the 
theoretically defined variation between types of bureaucratic structures (see the theoretical 
framework) can be broadly defined as open or closed bureaucratic structures, this issue is reduced 
while it cannot be eliminated. The selection of diverse cases thus aims to choose cases that 
represent relevant theoretical variation on the institutional causal factor as defined in the 
framework. The two cases selected are France and the United Kingdom. While both countries have 
a broadly common history as part of Western Europe, the two countries nonetheless represent very 
different forms of institutional setup.  
France and the UK constitute prima facie examples of how oil-supply was insured bi-laterally rather 
than finding a solution through cooperation in the European Community. The two countries share 
the choice of non-community solutions, but also why France followed a path of Nuclear energy 
(Ikenberry 1986; Wade 1980) and the United Kingdom chose an expansion of coal and oil 
extraction (N. J. D. Lucas 1982, 101–2). The oil crisis hit both countries in two stages. First, the 
quadrupling of oil prices as a result of price increases by OPEC, and secondly, an oil embargo by 
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the OAPEC-alliance for U.S. support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war in October of 1973 
(Bösch and Graf 2014; Venn 2002).  
The two cases shared a preference for a national response to the crisis, which became evident when 
European Community attempts to settle on a common response inspired by a memoranda on 
common energy policy by the Commission a few years earlier (European Commission 1968) failed 
in December of 1973 as France and the newly joined United Kingdom made concessions about 
Israel to secure bilateral agreements for oil and avoid being labelled a “hostile country” (Dinan 
2005, 70; Lenczowski 1990). As we shall see in the analysis, the configuration of policy ideas and 
institutions that supported these decisions were however, like the general policy trajectories, quite 
different. 
Similarly to how the policy ideas may vary across the cases, the explanatory factor has to have an 
element of variation that can be indicate the causal relationship with policy ideas among experts in 
the two countries. The two countries are therefore selected also because they represent to different 
variations of bureaucratic structures. The United Kingdom is an open bureaucratic structure and 
France is a closed bureaucratic structure. This institutional diversity is hypothesised as the 
explanatory factor of why distinct configurations of policy ideas can be observed in the two 
countries – which is congruent with the policy trajectories illustrated above. The difference of these 
institutions have been explored and substantiated in the theoretical framework 
4.3 Process tracing to support comparative logics 
What is process tracing? In a very broad sense, it is descriptions of following a process linking 
events. This might be considered the modus operandi of most historically inclined work, be it in the 
discipline of history or social sciences. Indeed, much of the classic literature in social sciences 
depends on archival or interview knowledge to construct processes and make their analytical 
claims. Within the International Relations literature, Graham Allison’s work on the Cuban missile 
crisis springs to mind (Allison 1969), but also within decision-making and in the study of power has 
such sources been crucial (Dahl 2005).  
Past events are useful for social sciences because they have a certain distance to on-going events. 
They may therefore seem less in flux, or existing understandings of the events have been 
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established to analyse and discuss. Moreover, the practical point that making public of internal 
bureaucratic documents are often made available by nation-states after a set grace-period (often 
around 30 years) speaks to the point that studying past events may hold new insights. Such studies, 
if designed correctly, may teach us about aspects of   past events that may be of importance when 
evaluating ongoing discussions. Case in point, is the energy policy discussions of governments 
during the first oil shock of 1973 which feeds quite well into ongoing debates on climate change 
and future energy demands and clean energy supplies that governments (and the world, if ICCP is 
to be believed) face in the 2000s. 
Process tracing is a broad concept, but this does not mean it cannot be a useful technique for 
analysis if specified correctly. In general it is thought as part of a broader attempt to historicize the 
social sciences (George and Bennett 2005, 205). In broad terms, we might think of process tracing 
as a focused and structured narrative exploration of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome 
(Vennesson 2008, 235)27. A strength of process tracing is the ability to deal with multiple 
interaction effects (Hall 2003). Some process tracing methodologists suggest that process tracing 
can only make sense when carefully specified to examine the mechanisms through which a causal 
factor is linked with an outcome (Beach 2016). As such, the unit of analysis is the mechanism itself 
rather than the individual components of a causal claim. This, I think is an unnecessary reduction of 
the scope of the process tracing, and should rather be appreciated for the pluralism of different 
research settings and questions it allows us to adapt to (Hay 2016). Without going into the details of 
methodological debates about the use of the term of process tracing, it is necessary to point out that 
parts of the scholarship of process tracing methodology would therefore prefer to term the use of 
process tracing in this thesis as more akin to congruence analysis, because the focus is on the 
analysis on the causal factor (type of bureaucratic structure) and the causal outcome (specific 
patterns in policy ideas) and supporting their connection using careful examination of the historical 
record through archives, biographies etc. rather than outright examination of the linking mechanism 
between them. This choice is intentional. The purpose of the thesis is to examine the dynamics of 
change in policy ideas in their institutional environment. This formulation retains the focus on 
configurational logics of much of process tracing research and in the respect for multi-causal nature 
of qualitative research.  
                                                 
27 This is a broader understanding of the use of process tracing than that supported by for instance (Beach and Pedersen 2013) 
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Using process tracing in this project has a number of implications for my research design. The 
choice of most similar systems design often risks a high number of intervening variables (a problem 
of over-determination) (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 215). In the language of quantitative 
methodology, this is because more than one independent variable co-varies with the dependent 
variable in a “theoretically meaningful way” (Blatter and Haverland 2014, 79). This means in effect 
that it, especially in country-size cases, can be hard to strictly construct sufficiently similar cases to 
satisfy the assumption that only one independent variable influence the dependent variable  
However, the fact that process tracing builds on the logic that observations must be linked in 
particular ways to result in the given outcome reduces the risk of this indeterminacy by examining 
in detail the context of how given factors interact in the two countries (George and Bennett 2005, 
207). As mentioned above, process tracing in this way serves to reinforce the conditions of using 
most similar case designs in case choice in comparative political economy. In this way, the present 
method embraces both the multi-causal nature of social world, as well as also the multitude of 
pathways that may lead to an outcome (equifinality) but at the same time retain the ability to 
problematize co-variance between the independent and dependent variable in a similar case design 
by way of missing processual connections.  
I is central to understand, that combining different approaches to causal analysis in process tracing 
(both through mixed methods designs, but also as a means of triangulation of data validity) is 
definitely compatible with process tracing. However, it is also necessary to stress that process 
tracing follows a different kind of “configurational” logic than more statistically inclined studies of 
co-variance ((Blatter and Haverland 2014, 80), see  also (Ragin 2008)). This is, to large extent, a 
function of the kind of data that is often used. Where the nature of evidence of causal inferences in 
statistical approaches work under an assumption of unit homogeneity (that is, one observation is the 
qualitatively the same as another) process tracing observations are different. In my design, I will 
draw heavily on archive material to substantiate potential causal links, but how does one equate a 
personal letter between actors, a policy brief and a minutes of meetings among government leaders? 
One does not. The nature of observations in case study research applying different variations of 
process tracing do not understand observations in the same way that covariational logics – e.g. 
statistical regression analyses – do.  
Instead, process tracing observations are “not different examples of the same thing, they are 
different things” (Gerring 2007, 179). This means that the nature of evidence in case-study research 
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is often opaque: e.g. non-comparable and non-countable. Rather than focus on multiple instances of 
X1 Y (large N cross case) it therefore focuses on multiple different instances of explanatory 
factors in causal chains. X1  X2  X3 Y (often containing multiple switches and feedback 
loops) (Gerring 2007, 173). By implication, the emphasis of this approach is more focused on the 
specific outcomes on the dependent variables and the combination of conditional causes relating to 
the independent variable that lead to these outcomes (Blatter and Haverland 2014, 80). 
According to (Gerring 2007), in increasing the validity of a process tracing accounts the researcher 
has a set of options. More problematic is the verification along with estimations of relative 
uncertainty for each step and the model as a whole (Gerring 2007, 181–83). In this way, my 
research goal becomes examining causal chains that link specific configurations of different 
bureaucratic structures to different policy ideas (Vennesson 2008, 231). That is to say, the logic of 
causality implied here must be much more cautious, because the analysed influence of bureaucratic 
structures on policy ideas are configurational in nature. That implies that while the theoretical 
assumptions of different effects from open or closed bureaucratic structures are not in question, the 
particular interaction between different types of ideas and dimensions of bureaucratic structures 
may exhibit policy idea dynamics with some types of ideas rather than others.  
Determining which parts of a causal chain to examine is dictated by theoretical importance and 
generally held prior assumptions. The threshold for which causal links to examine is therefore when 
common knowledge and obvious contextual factors makes the causal conclusion “trivial”. That is, 
the general rule of process tracing focus should be on the links in the chain which are 1) weakest 
and 2) most crucial for the overall argument (Gerring 2007, 184). It is difficult to specify concretely 
which elements in the chain are going to be the weakest a priori, but the analysis should whenever 
possible reflect on the limitations and possibilities of other causes as claims are made. This should 
furthermore be reflected upon when summarizing the scope and certainty with which claims can be 
made when concluding on the findings of the analysis.  
In conclusion, the process tracing approach to establishing and evaluating casual connections is 
more qualitative than statistical co-variance analysis but has the benefit of being able to substantiate 
or discard causal connections which might show signs of co-variance. This is the main reason that it 
is employed as embedded in a diverse case design where the qualification of process tracing within 
the cases provides additional verification and falsification of the postulated relationships by 
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specifying their process. Furthermore, the choice of process tracing also contributes to describe in 
more nuances the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. As such, while an 
expected causal relationship can be established by a most similar case design, the complexity of 
causal interactions within this relationship are explored and thereby provide additional knowledge 
to the relationships contingencies by the application of process tracing.  
4.4 Use of historical sources in the social sciences 
The dominating principle of academic empirical investigations is the collection of new primary 
empirical material for each specific investigation. While this is a general principle to hold on to a 
topic can simply be too large to study exclusively through primary sources collected by the 
researcher him or herself. At the same time, it seems improbable that social scientists would be able 
to amass enough expertise within a given historical period to rival that of historians. On this basis, 
Skocpol argues that historical data can be sufficiently drawn from existing secondary sources as 
evidence in a research project, mainly because the expertise and time requirements associated with 
such collection would render most macro-historical social science impossible (Skocpol 1984, 382). 
Whether or not primary or secondary data sources are viable to collect for a given research project 
of course depends on the scope and size of a given project. However, reading a bit closer, we can 
extract how she perceives the use of historical sources in social science.  
In his study of puritan communities and deviance, Kai Erikson notes that while collection of 
primary source material is part of the method through which the research question is answered, it is 
stressed that the study is “sociological rather than historical”. By this is meant, according to 
Skocpol, that while historical work would emphasise how this primary source material may cast 
new light on the “historical facts” or the puritan community in New England. Instead, sociological 
attempts to “add something to our understanding of deviant behaviour in general” (Skocpol 1984, 
364).  
This is not to say that all social science does, or even should, strive to study the general. But at the 
minimum, it does imply that comparative historical work may be utilized to derive further 
theoretical questions which could then be studied (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The distinction 
between historical and sociological use of historical sources thus helps us further limit how the use 
of sources are relevant for historically oriented social science. This puts into focus social scientists 
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selecting particular sources or bits of data, which may illuminate particular parts of a more 
structured explanation of the studied events. This enables a more pragmatic approach to the 
question where primary source material can aid the researcher illuminate key periods when 
available and allow utilization of secondary material in others.  
4.5 Empirical sources 
In the analyses of this thesis a combination of secondary and primary data sources are utilized to 
support the analytical claims. The primary sources are empirical material drawn from the national 
archives in France and the United Kingdom. The general approach to primary data collection in 
archives is sometimes limited by availability and access. Some of these limitations can be mitigated 
with planning and freedom of information requests in the United Kingdom (or so-called “Demande 
Derogation” in the French national archive system). Although in practice, access can never be 
guaranteed. In such cases, these limitations have to be worked around, for instance, by getting to 
information about meeting conclusions through other actors involved in a policy question.  
The first step for collection of data is to have an idea (at least roughly) of what archive material will 
be relevant to the research question. In the case of this thesis that was provided primarily by 
secondary works within different disciplines of economics, history and social sciences that spoke to 
the research question on experts and energy policy. In practice, this meant checking footnotes, 
looking up on mentioned actors, noting down events or particular commissions they were part of –
well-known techniques in the study of historical material (Brundage 2013, 115). Beyond these 
techniques, the actual collection and following of empirical traces requires a certain level of 
pragmatism because of the other limitations mentioned above. The online catalogue of the national 
archives in both country cases were helpful in allowing the more detailed examination of empirical 
traces across events and actors, because they allow searching based on tags that give a quicker 
overview of the content of different archive collections than would otherwise have been possible 
(Brundage 2013, 37).  
In the methodological terms of the social sciences, the practice of mapping the development of 
ideas through following of ideational traces in archive material might be termed somewhat 
differently. In social sciences, we would probably refer to these techniques a form of non-
probability sampling (Corbetta 2003, 221). Here, it is known in advance that the empirical material 
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collected will not be able to represent the variation of a broader population. However, as we saw in 
the discussion above, the process tracing observations are of a qualitatively different type to the 
comparable units of quantitative approaches and thus additional caveat apply to this similarity. 
Furthermore, we would require mentioning that while the technique of this thesis in dealing with 
historical material is similar to a variant known as snowball sampling, it does not share the same 
ultimate goal of necessarily representing a population of empirical variation. That being said, non-
probabilistic snowball sampling is similar to the working method applied in following a trail of 
policy ideas in the archive material of different expert groups in the bureaucratic structures 
examined in this thesis. Here, the identification of relevant empirical material follows from referrals 
in the existing material examined within chosen time periods (Corbetta 2003, 222)28.  
As is the case for all qualitative research, the risk of ascribing too great importance to those 
individuals or empirical material that is available is a relevant concern. However, these problems 
can be mitigated by the analyses being sensitive to the views of other groups or alternative views 
presented in secondary sources, which can be incorporated into the interpretation of the findings in 
analyses. This mirrors traditional methods of source comparison of the historical discipline where 
“listening to different voices” is an integral part of the interpretation of historical events (Howell 
and Prevenier 2001, 69). It is in this sense I utilize a working method similar to snowballing in 
relation to gathering empirical primary material in the archives below.  
The various empirical material collected and utilized have been selected in accordance with the 
above logic across a time-span from before the crisis in the early 1970s to the late 1970s29. 
Knowledge of the existing countries’ institutional specifics in energy policy may also help this 
collection of data just described. For instance, specificities of course exist as to which departments 
were key actors due to structural differences in policy making procedures. In this sense, pragmatism 
does not mean unstructured – at least it should rather move the analyses in the direction of the more 
systematized examination of events and historical material. At the same time, it is necessary to 
emphasise the contingency that often can characterize more verstehen-oriented work in political 
sciences and therefore some level of flexibility must be maintained.  
                                                 
28 Corbetta uses the example of hidden or hard to access groups of individuals, but the general logic of the data collection is similar. 
29 While some material from the late and early 1970s may have been collected and helped to inform of the general period it has not been applied in the 
analyses directly as empirical sources because it risks overlapping with the effects of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the second oil crisis that it 
helped spawn (Alm and Weiner 1984, 3; Venn 2002, 21–29). 
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In practice, this means that while a structured approach can be approximated (e.g. through a priori 
expectations, knowledge of some sources, relevant actors or institutional patterns from before the 
empirical data collection begins), it would be to betray the scientific curiosity to not follow up on 
hunches or snowballing from one source to another, if the examination of a particular idea or 
demands it. This should not be seen as betraying an otherwise structured examination, but as a 
balancing act between structured empirical scientific enquiry and story-telling.  
4.5.1 Sources of empirical material in the two cases 
The analysis of the crisis understandings of the two countries under examination rely on a 
combination of primary and secondary sources. Both types of sources will have been either 
obtained in digital form or digitized subsequently to the collection of sources for purposes of easing 
storage and systematization for analysis. Those sources that could be obtained from the archive in 
digitized form are have been referenced in the literature list of references (primarily cabinet meeting 
minutes in the United Kingdom). Other sources, which required note-taking, photographic or other 
manual recording in the research process, have been referenced in the list of archive material. 
Several types of documents were collected from the archives and used in the analyses. They 
comprise in particular; internal meeting minutes, personal letters, reports (published and some 
unpublished), economic estimates and strategy papers. Here the focus was on the internal 
bureaucratic communication between ministries about the policies or problems associated with 
crisis and energy in the examined period. A more classically qualitative approach had to be applied 
for data selection for the simple reason of feasibility. Where it is possible to collect and analyse 
meeting documents for a specific group of people over the period it would be impossible within the 
timeframe of this project to examine the entire corpus of documents for even the select subset of 
ministries that were crucial in energy policy responses to the oil crisis.  
For that reason, a combination of techniques were applied to reduce the amount of archive material 
to include and search through. While the archive documents themselves are not always digitized, 
the databases of their number, year, origin and even brief description of content is quite often 
available. In practice, the examined archive material for the two case countries amount to around 
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2000 pages of documents per country30. This in no way constitutes the entirety of the paper-trail 
constructed by the experts surrounding energy policy in the two countries. That being said, the 
collection method allowed snowballing (see below) from different departments and references of 
actors and groups across the government apparatus. A large part of these documents were possible 
to photograph and later extensively study in digital form on a computer. Moreover, while not the 
key to the analysis per se, the existence of OCR software made it possible for the computer to read 
text in the digitized archive material. This made double-checking of references, recurrent actors and 
key concepts possible across these many digitized documents. Further, this means that the views 
expressed by the different expert actors in the analyses can to the furthest degree possible for such 
work, corroborate the positions and points-of-view of the relevant involved actors. This means that 
selecting a broad range of internal communication in the entire period is possible as well as a 
general idea of when production of documents is higher or lower throughout the period. Beyond 
these practical techniques it is of course crucial that what is then selected for examination allows to 
examine the research questions and hypotheses to a degree where they can be answered. In other 
words, a more qualitative way of selecting the important data was needed. In the United Kingdom, 
this came in the form of the newly instituted (in early 197031) Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS). 
This relatively small group of people were centrally placed within Whitehall by reporting directly to 
the Prime Minister, but also by being a key actor, if not driving force at times, of policy formulation 
in the area of energy policy. For these two reasons in particular, they form a good starting point for 
examining the internal debates and energy policy discussions during the period. Their central role 
and placement combined with their relatively small size meant that they relied quite heavily on 
interaction and communication with other ministries and as such they act as a good proxy for the 
ongoing debates on policy formulation in the period. Quite often, the archives of the CPRS will 
even include the internal documents and meetings of other relevant departments such that several of 
the quoted treasury or ministry of energy documents later found in their respective ministry archives 
were actually duplicated in the CPRS files. As a result, much of the empirical material was 
collected following a kind of snowballing technique (as described above) that originated in 
empirical archive material from CPRS. This helped to focus the empirical material to questions of 
energy, but also to be attentive, from the beginning, to the ways in which communication and 
                                                 
30 Including cover-pages this was more than 2300 pages for the French archives and 1600 pages for the United Kingdom(this excludes the officially 
published cabinet meeting minutes of the UK government from 1973-1979  CAB128-52 to CAB128-65 which were also examined, at around 200-
300 pages per document folder). 
31 See (Ball and Seldon 1996, 89–91) for a description of the context of its inception. 
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negotiation happened between different groups in the expertise machinery of the United Kingdom. 
These references and inclusions of cc’ed letters, updates, policy briefs on ongoing discussions, 
allows the analysis a reasonable level of certainty that relevant actors surrounding policy making 
have been represented by the analysis. To the extent that some groups are less represented, it would 
represent that they were indeed less involved. In this regard, the perhaps most surprising in the 
initial data collection period was the stark difference between the almost constant involvement of 
the nuclear expertise of the CEA in France and the relatively less central position of the UKAEA in 
the United Kingdom. 
In the case of France, all the documents in question were obtained through access to the physical 
collections of documents located primarily in the Government archive branch of the French national 
archives in Pierrefitte, Paris. The archives analysed was more limited in availability than was the 
case for the United Kingdom. For instance, despite making initial requests for cabinet meeting 
minutes in the summer of 2017, the requested material had not been released a full year later. A 
number of other potentially relevant documents relating to the internal communication among key 
actors in energy policy were also limited in access. This means that the examination of the policy 
ideas among experts in France had to rely more heavily on snowballing archive material and 
generally on secondary sources of information, like historical accounts by other researchers of the 
internal debates. Combined with a similar snow-balling technique to the one applied in the United 
Kingdom, it was possible to examine archive material relevant to the analysis, but it required 
additional substantiation with secondary sources in a way that was less necessary for the case of 
United Kingdom.  
The primary empirical basis of the analysis of crisis understandings and policy formulation attempts 
is the two types of data mentioned above. However, as to understand the context in which this took 
place, of course other sources may be included to strengthen or triangulate the validity of claims. 
When this directly affects conclusions of the analysis this will mostly take the form of memoirs or 
biographies of ministers during the examined period in the two countries. Other sections than the 
analysis will of course rely on more broad historical accounts for context. 
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Chapter 5 Analysis of Bureaucratic Structure and policy ideas in the 
United Kingdom 
The following analysis examines the institutional dimension of bureaucratic structure and policy 
ideas of experts within energy policy in the period surrounding the first oil crisis of 1973 in the 
United Kingdom. The analysis proceeds in two major steps. 
The first section analyses the institutional context of energy policy in the United Kingdom. The 
institutional analytical aspects are drawn from the dimensions of bureaucratic structure defined in 
the theoretical framework: capacity of the state, negotiation style and basis of expertise. In the case 
of the United Kingdom, the finding is that the capacity of state is relatively weak within the policy 
area of energy and is characterised by a multiplicity of actors in policy environment where access to 
debates is not clearly defined and shifting - despite principally being the purview of the state. The 
negotiation style in the area of energy policy is fragmented and characterised by personal contacts 
between experts, which in combination with consensus-seeking dynamics and power symmetry 
between actors results in ideational conflicts often being extended indefinitely. This helps to 
maintain status quo policy outcomes. The generalist nature of the basis of expertise of many of the 
expert groups means that ideational gridlocks due to these institutional dynamics can not be broken 
with reference to technical or authoritative knowledge. Instead, even technical policy issues 
involving actors who do possess policy specific skills tend toward politicisation and policy ideas 
not dependent on technical knowledge, which however, are not able to break potential gridlocks 
from disagreement, without political intervention into debates.  
The second section of the analysis examines the policy ideas of policy experts within the open 
bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom. It does so using the analytical categories of 
overarching policy ideas, instrumental policy ideas and settings of ideas that experts express in 
energy policy within this institutional context. The layout of the analysis is separated into two 
sections of before and after the oil crisis in the autumn of 1973. As will be the case for the analysis 
of the French case, this temporal distinction makes no assumptions about empirical or theoretical 
content in these two sections. The primary purpose is to ease reading and given a rudimentary 
distinction perhaps make it easier to spot changes in policy ideas. The three aspects of policy ideas 
are analysed in relation to the bureaucratic structures examined in the first section of the analysis. 
96 | P a g e  
 
Both sections together thus examine the institutional context and the way policy ideas are fielded by 
experts within an open bureaucratic structure. 
5.1 Bureaucratic Structure in United Kingdom. 
5.1.1 Capacity of the state: Planning the UK economy.  
The capacity of the state in the United Kingdom is in many was a consequence of a history of free-
market inspired approaches affecting the way state and society interaction should be seen. The 
approach to interaction between the state, market and civil society in the United Kingdom is 
generally consistent with a consensual approach. With regard to the market, it draws mostly from 
Anglo-Saxon free market thinking (Hall 1986, 35–37; Polanyi 1957; Shonfield 1965). The capacity 
of the state is weaker the more actors are actively involved and thus it is useful to examine the way 
in which the state interacted with the market.  
Government intervention was not as broad as other countries, instead favouring a few select 
industries (aircraft, aerospace, nuclear). Remaining sums of government went to bail out ailing 
industries rather than more specific government action to reorganize industries along a planned 
strategy. Although there were examples of attempts to mirror the role of the type of strategic 
investment planning done in other countries, (e.g. the French Planning Commission) the U.K. 
equivalent never received the institutional power to become more than a consultation arena for 
different branches of state and market actors – foregoing the sanctions allowed to its equivalents in 
other European countries (Hall 1986, 55). Before the first oil crisis a few attempts are worth 
highlighting to illustrate this point. These trends crossed political lines.  
For instance,  the National Economic Development Council in 1962 by the Conservative 
government, or the Department of Economic Affairs in under the Labour government in the early 
1970s. Both relied on some form of consensualism and failed to institute either sanctions or 
investment strategies due to a number of contextual factors, which mostly relate to a multitude of 
actors involved in decision-making and a Treasury reluctant on public spending (Hall 1986, 55). 
Another attempt was the creation of the Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC) with the 
purpose of reorganizing the economy to achieve economic growth, but its purpose was rather 
broadly defined and the mandate not particularly explicit, so while it did achieve some success in 
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facilitating mergers between industrial companies it primarily ended up functioning as a loan-giver 
to ailing industries.  
Crucially, to an evaluation of state capacity to intervene, there was relatively little attempt to 
analyse the different sectors that might be the most economically optimal target of investment or 
reorganization. Moreover, the analyses that were created were so broad as to make comparison of 
sectoral performance impossible, thus rendering decisions-making to be made in a vacuum(Young 
and Lowe 1974, chap. 8). In fact, there was an active attempt to avoid the production of more 
expertise or knowledge within the area, which could have increased the potential for a stronger state 
capacity path to be chosen. Interestingly, this was seemingly an active choice by the IRC where 
emphasis was given to action rather than more calculated and strategic intervention in the economy: 
“We don’t feel the need for economists…and we don’t believe in great volumes of analysis. It is not 
a question of analysing a problem – there are plenty of Little Neddies32 and twenty-five reports of 
everything – what is needed is action” ((R. Brooke, Deputy Managing Director of the IRC, quoted 
in (Young and Lowe 1974, 87))33.These patterns lead to a characteristic of state capacity in the 
United Kingdom as relatively weak. Again, relating to our conceptual discussion in the theoretical 
chapter, this does not mean that state did not have power, strictu sensu, but rather that state 
institutionalized the relationship between itself and other spheres of society according to a general 
belief in consensus among different actor. This also meant that the policy tended to reinforce the 
relative strength of the private sector vis-à-vis the government leading in broad terms to a type of 
shared authority over the strategic policies that could be enacted (Hall 1986, 56). 
It is always a challenge to positively show the absence of capacity in a case, if this parameter is not 
quantifiable or readily identifiable. However, the identification of other elements that exclusively 
exist instead of the strong capacity of the state can indicate this absence of a capacity. This is what 
is at play in the UK case. That being said, initially the French case shows clearer signs of shifting 
towards a less hierarchical command and control logic compared to earlier periods (see the analysis 
of the French case), the period around the early 1970s in the United Kingdom is not characterised 
by a similar shift. Rather, the preceding period under both Conservative and Labour governments in 
                                                 
32 “Neddy” is British vernacular for a horse or donkey, in this context implying something akin to a person being silly. 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/neddy  
33 Young & Lowe, 1974 speculate that this mind-set was related to the IRC having been created in a context of rising political concerns over balance 
of payment problems (Young and Lowe 1974, 87). Nevertheless, the result was that no attempts were made to directly link the work of the IRC to a 
strategic longer-term plan for the economy. 
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the 60s before the crisis had served as the shift towards more strong state capabilities of dirigiste-
type intervention by the state into the market and industry relations through instruments like 
investment allowances for industry. The crisis reverted this pattern back to state intervention 
primarily revolving around bailouts and other forms of economic aid to ailing sectors of the British 
economy. Moreover, this was a pattern consistent for both the Conservative Heath government (70-
74) and the later Labour government under Harold Wilson (74-79). Especially the automobile sector 
received almost all of the regional aid in the period. Thus, the allocated funds to regional 
development went as financial subsidies to the ailing British Leyland, Rolls Royce and others.  
A point could be made that these attempts at interventionist policies examples of strong capacity of 
the state rather than weak. However, it is relevant to note the almost complete lack of strategic 
effort to reorganise these sectors from the hand of the state and the management or structure of the 
companies that were being helped did not shift fundamentally after receiving help (Young and 
Lowe 1974, 79). While some of these attempts could be classified as corporatist in nature and thus 
as an attempt at some form of state control (Winkler 1976, 115), their practical implementation lack 
the control measures necessary for strategic steering of the economy that involves. At best we may 
term this a form of quasi-corporatism within the context of a general preference for cooperation 
(Hall 1986, 53) . The weak capacity of the state is corroborated by examples of mergers facilitated 
by the IRC, above. After the merger itself, little was done by the state to actively steer British 
Leyland or Rolls-Royce towards profitability or competiveness. This meant that these schemes 
effectively became a backstop for complete economic collapse of parts of private British industry, 
rather than an active attempt to direct and steer what types of goals and industrial sectors should be 
fostered in Britain.  
This pattern of private autonomy holds to a broad number of interventions into the economy in the 
1960s and 1970s (Young and Lowe 1974, 205). The resulting structure between the state and civil 
actors thus became one of consensualism that emphasised forums for bargaining between the 
different parties of the economy – namely industry and labour – rather than overt state steering 
through strategic investments or control. This means that while these interventions can be 
understood as state capacity, the fact they were applied in a way that limited the actual reorganizing 
capacity of the state on private actors, implies that the actual state steering that evolved from this 
was relatively limited in terms of defining the relevant sectors, actors and purposes thereof. This 
description is consistent with classic descriptions of the governance pattern of the economy in 
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Britain that emphasise a preference for laissez-faire approaches to the market and its actors (Polanyi 
1957; Shonfield 1965) despite temporary corporatist inclinations. 
5.1.1.1 Governance of the energy sector 
As we gleaned in the introduction, the United Kingdom is rather well endowed with natural 
resources in energy, albeit at different stages of extractability at the time of the oil crisis. The 
dominant energy source continues to be coal through much of the post-war years. In addition to a 
large (and politically powerful) industry around domestic coal extraction and production, the United 
Kingdom has the potential to extract oil and gas from deposits in the North Sea which in theory 
makes the country less reliant on importing oil in the longer term. At the time before the oil crisis, 
the United Kingdom was however still highly reliant on importing oil to supply those parts of 
society that could not easily be substituted to other sources of energy that were more readily 
available (as we have seen). The history of the United Kingdom as a colonial power with historic 
ties to the Middle East may hold some relevance in explaining their preference for relying on 
diplomacy to insure stable supplies of oil imports. On top of that, the international market for oil 
was dominated by a few large corporations one of which had clear ties to the United Kingdom. 
Through a combination of diplomatic influence with the Middle East (especially Iran) and in 
particular British Petroleum (BP), it was believed that oil supplies could be maintained (Heath 
1998) until domestic extraction from the fields in the North Sea could begin. 
5.1.1.2 A mixed energy policy 
To the extent that it makes analytical sense to speak of an energy policy in the United Kingdom as a 
coherent policy-phenomenon (a point that is debatable34) we may consider it as consisting of several 
prongs. One relates to the reliance on imported oil. The supply is insured internationally through 
influence with the British arm of large oil corporations as well as diplomatic ties to countries in the 
Middle East due to historical links between the United Kingdom and these areas. This strategy 
shifts over time as the oil crisis hits, both in recognition of some of the limitations of the 
aforementioned strategy, but also because domestic extraction of oil and gas becomes a viable 
option for a more stable supply of oil – as well as a potential income to the state. The initial effect 
                                                 
34 See (Kuiken 2014) for an brief examination of the different parts that make up energy policy in the United Kingdom. 
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of the crisis was to upset the internal balance of energy. The OPEC price increases resulted in 
crude-oil prices being transferred directly to the product market, which meant that substituting of oil 
to coal resulted in coal prices rising in tandem with heavy fuel oil prices used for electricity 
generation. The gas market was relatively unaffected however because of a combination of 
monopoly of gas from the North Sea and favourable supply contracts (Kohl 1982, 101). 
Another prong is the role of the state in relation to the energy-sector related to coal extraction and 
electricity generation. The importance of the coal miners’ strike throughout the 60s and 70s are 
well-researched, if sometimes misunderstood (Hay 1996). The capacity of the state in this area of 
energy policy is likewise characterised as weak, because it has not restructured the relationship 
between actors in the economy. Instead, it has relied on existing systems of consensus that 
minimally interfere with existing systems of negotiation in the economy, like principles for triparty 
conciliation between unions representing the labour force and business groups representing industry 
and capital (Hall 1986, 44pp).  
The final prong of the structure of energy policy in the United Kingdom is the nuclear energy. It is 
controlled by a multitude of actors with varying degrees of public control, but mainly it is 
controlled through cooperation between the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and the 
Department of Energy. In principle, this is the area where capacity of the state should be greater 
because of more control over the involved actors. However, the number of actors involved in the 
nuclear policy creation leaves us with an image of a chaotic system of interests making up the 
nuclear policy. 
5.1.1.3 Consensualism and protectionism  
We are left with an impression of the capacity of the state in United Kingdom is characterised by 
consensualism and a general preference for laissez-faire of the economic sector. The capacity of the 
state is therefore weak in the sense of relatively limited occurrence of intervention, in the form of 
control and steering, into the economy and society at large. To the extent that state capacity is 
manifested, it often takes the form of different schemes to reorganize failing industries rather than 
actively seeking to create new industries. Moreover, the degree of reorganization actually results is 
sometimes difficult to ascertain and thus the intervention pattern is more so one of outright financial 
lending or bail-outs rather than direct control and reorganization of industry. 
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5.1.2 Negotiation Style: Fragmented and personal 
The analytical dimension of negotiation style is an organisational dimension that attempts to capture 
the dynamic of interaction that is set by the institutional setup of the actors who are involved in 
policy formulation within energy policy in the United Kingdom. Because the institutional context of 
energy policy formulation revolves around a mixture of policy-advisory groups, Ministries and the 
Cabinet, the access to the debate is open to several diverse actors and prone to reformulative 
attempts. While the negotiation style is not completely open to the extent that anyone in the political 
system are heard, access to the energy policy formulation switches between actors on a case-by-
case basis and thus, the number of actors remains high in the process as well as characterised by 
different actors with different functional positions in the political system.  
This makes the entire negotiation style prone to asymmetric negotiations where both the 
competences and background of involved actors can vary wildly, but the hierarchy of power 
between these actors can become unclear – even within the cabinet influence over energy policy 
shifts around between ministries throughout the period examined. The interactions between the 
actors is also less regularised along certain recurring commissions or reports, for instance. That is 
not to say, that commissions regarding energy questions do not exist, but rather that they are not a 
regularised part of the institutional setup, but rather an ad-hoc act of political choice by government. 
The multitude of different actors, different non-specified functional roles and their eclectic level of 
influence on the process of policy formulation lends the negotiation style in the bureaucratic 
structure of the United Kingdom a certain level of ad-hoc and openly politicized character. In such 
an environment, coalition building between different actors in this system should be more frequent, 
but less stable than those formed in more closed and regularised systems of negotiation style that 
characterise more closed bureaucratic systems. It is to a closer examination of these structures we 
now turn. 
5.1.2.1 Fragmentation and Politicisation 
It is worth drawing some connections between these broader descriptions above and some more 
specific actors. Interaction in the Treasury, while reliant on coordination through the standard 
paper-trail of bureaucratic and ministerial work, it is perhaps even more so reliant on the use of 
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personal contacts among each other who know each other (Pearson 1981, 64)35. This pattern of 
coordination relying on personal contacts to ensure quality of outcomes exists outside the treasury 
as well. The Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) was an advisory organization under the Prime 
Minister which was created a few years before the oil crisis, with the purpose of advising the 
government on various policy issues - one of which was energy policy.  
In describing their work, key members of CPRS staff write how the type of cooperation that existed 
with the CPRS and other branches of government was not at all uniform. In their interaction with 
different groups of government, former members of the CPRS note how the willingness to 
cooperate varied across party-political lines as well as organizational differences. This was 
particularly noticeable surrounding the shifting of Secretary of Energy from Erik Varley to Tony 
Benn under the labour government, but also in relation to information exchange with the CEGB 
(Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 75–77). The Central Energy Generating Board was more willing to 
lend assistance and information to the CPRS’ work in the nascent years after the CPRS inception in 
1971. As that cooperation waned, the CPRS increasingly relied on information from the Department 
of Trade and Industry to make their reports and policy recommendations (Blackstone and Plowden 
1990, 76).  
This indicates the information exchange and shifting of actors in an open negotiation style. As for 
the link between experts in the CPRS and the Department of Energy, it was likewise a mixed affair. 
Under the two successive Secretaries of State for Energy (SSE) right before and right after the oil 
crisis there was amicable cooperation. According to Tessa Blackstone of the CPRS they got along 
“equally well” (Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 78), despite the fact that the first (Lord Carrington) 
was a conservative and the S.S.E. under the newly elected government after the crisis (Eric Varley) 
was from the Labour party. However, when the Eric Varley and Tony Benn swapped Ministries in 
June 1975 this cooperation halted almost completely (Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 78). In the 
open negotiation style, patterns of interaction are less regularised because the access of multiple 
shifting actors to the process of policy makes alliances with fixed actors less necessary, because no 
particular actor is in permanent control. Politicisation of issues or interactions between actors is a 
variant of this characteristic of open negotiation styles in an open bureaucratic structure.  
                                                 
35 This characteristic is so prevalent, that some scholars have used the name of “mafia” to describe the type of close-knit family like similarity in 
frame of mind and level of intimate coordination between them. See also (Pearson 1981, 64). 
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The Department of Energy was set up the spring of 1974 to attempt to coordinate a coherent 
response to the oil crisis (Pearson 1981, 23). By civil service standards, it was a relatively small 
department numbering around 1200 people. By comparison the Department of Industry numbers 
more than 10.000 people at the time (Civil Service Statistics archive n.d., 26–27)36. The purpose of 
the Departments  was to observe to the national energy interests, as a whole, in order to ensure that 
energy policy became coherent and coordinated rather than piecemeal policies for each industrial 
sector applied over medium or short term (Pearson 1981, 53). This coordinative function cements 
the intention of including many actors into the policy-process because the Department was not 
given direct mandate to control the policy, rather it should coordinate the views of the different 
actors that were assumed involved.  
This further re-emphasises that the risk of fragmentation is present due to the open nature of the 
negotiation style. Perhaps because the role was intended to be coordinative rather than controlling, 
the department’s role in terms of formal capacities and resources was somewhat limited. As for 
reduced formal capacities, this was especially the case with regard to the nuclear policy. The 
department was wholly reliant on the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) for guidance (even to the 
extent that budgeting was done by the AEA itself, rather than the Department of Energy that, in 
principle, oversaw them). As will be examined later, the Department of Energy was made up of a 
combination of employees that could be spared from other departments, which might suggest that 
those departments did not want to give up their best employees (Blackstone and Plowden 1990). 
Whatever the case, any new department will take a while to get going in splitting up the different 
functions and working efficiently. This is more so the case if the department is made up of people 
with backgrounds in different departments – and rarely have formal training in the policy issue the 
new department should deal with (this point is elaborated in section 1.3). This is perhaps why the 
department was criticized for being too reluctant to take on new policies (Pearson 1981, 52). 
While openness in the process of policy-making has perhaps not generated the level of public 
debate that was intended, the instigation of procedures for sharing committee on energy meeting 
minutes with the public was a cardinal political view of Minister Tony Benn(Benn and Winstone 
2005, 390). If nothing else, it indicates a willingness to open the policymaking to more actors 
                                                 
36 Of the 693.921 civil service staff in 1975, the size of individual departments vary significantly. For instance, the Scottish Land Tribunal has only 7 
civil servant employees whereas Ministry of Defence employs 266.470, or staying on the civil side, inland revenue at 73.470 (Civil Service Statistics 
archive n.d.). 
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beyond Whitehall and industry groups(Pearson 1981, 52). This leaves us with a negotiation style 
between experts within the U.K. bureaucratic structure as quite open and prone to intervention 
across departments and groups.  
5.1.2.2 Personalized interaction 
A characteristic worth emphasising about the negotiation style in the bureaucratic structure of the 
United Kingdom is also that it tends to emphasise personal relationships. This is significant because 
personal relationships are illustrative of a more open negotiation style. When negotiations rely on 
personal interactions, they reflect the assumed opportunity to change positions between different 
actors on an ad hoc basis. These examples are illustrative of the fact that the efficacy of cooperation 
between experts in the policy sector surrounding energy was characterised by fragmentation and a 
high level of personal connections, which cannot be reduced to merely party-political 
disagreements.  
These observations are similar to structural characteristics of the type of negotiation and interaction 
described by Heclo and Wildavsky when describing the indispensable use of the “chat” as a more 
general tool of the everyday working of British Government (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974). This 
means that rather than regularised and formal interaction in committees or in meetings, the actual 
day-to-day coordination among experts takes place outside the traditional arenas of negotiation 
between smaller groups of individuals who rely on personal relationships (Pearson 1981, 64). While 
this lends the experts within the U.K., bureaucratic structure a certain level of flexibility in 
achieving goals, it provides less stability in its operation compared to the more closed and 
structured interaction of France (as we shall see later).  
It is worth drawing attention to a key difference in the pollicisation this may cause compared to 
different bureaucratic structures. Every bureaucratic structure in connection with a political system 
of course is accountable to and has a share of political influence exerted upon its working (at least it 
should, in democratic systems of government), but it does not have to be the same. In comparison 
to, e.g. France, the U.K. the negotiation style of experts in the policy field of energy is not only 
more fragmented and more personal in nature, but also organized around much more directly 
politicized organizations. The expertise that weighed in on energy policy within the publically 
controlled expertise system (as defined in the theoretical section) was primarily from the 
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Department of Energy or Treasury (which is part of Whitehall) or from the CPRS (which was part 
of the Prime Minister staff)(Pearson 1981, 20). That is not to say that there cannot be political 
influence in France. These categories are ideal-typical, and of course, an organization like the CEA, 
in France, was reporting directly to the President. However, a significant analytical difference is the 
difference between autonomy within a politically defined mandate (the CEA) and the characteristic 
of the U.K. where public experts in energy policy operated in, and relied on for information, a 
network of actors in a more actively politicized environment than that of the EDF and the CEA did 
in France. 
5.1.2.3 Open, fragmented and personal 
The negotiation style of the bureaucratic structure in the United Kingdom is characterised by 
fragmentation due to the many actors that are often involved across different departments. Perhaps 
due to the coordinative role ascribed to the Department of Energy, this effect of including more 
actors in policy negotiations is increased37. The interaction of different groups of experts in the 
bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom seems to mirror the reliance on the “chat” observed 
by other scholars. We observe similar trends in the reliance of the Department of Energy on 
different agencies for their functioning and the CPRS mentions the reliance on personal ties in 
departmental interaction. This leaves an impression of the negotiation style of the bureaucratic 
structure in the United Kingdom as open, fragmented and reliant on personal interaction to function. 
The open nature of the negotiation style may also lead to more politicized formulation of policy 
advice rather than technical. The effect on policy ideas is expected to be ideational instability and 
more fundamental shifts in policy as opposed to more gradual or incremental changes over time. 
5.1.3 Basis of expertise : Highly educated generalists 
The basis of expertise in the bureaucratic structure aims to relate those actors that are involved and 
allowed access to negotiations on policy formulation to the skills and competences that are brought 
to these interactions by experts. 
                                                 
37 This effect is further increased, as openness of government becomes a key point for the department under Tony Benn 
in 1975 onwards (Pearson 1981, 50). 
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5.1.3.1 Highly educated, classically trained 
The expertise among the public experts in the government of the United Kingdom are historically 
educated at higher degrees like the universities of Oxford or Cambridge – colloquially referred to as 
“Oxbridge”. While the Fulton Report of 1968 attempted to change this pattern, its effect was 
somewhat slow to trickle down into actual practice(Pearson 1981, 71). Thus the civil servant 
employment patterns were bound by educational requirements that restricted access to 
administrative and executive roles in the public administration of the United Kingdom (Peters and 
Peters 2002, 116). The makes it difficult to argue anything other than that the educational level of 
the experts in or surrounding the government at the time of the oil crisis is a class of highly 
educated experts. Some studies suggest that up to around two thirds of civil servants in the United 
Kingdom have an educational background from the “Oxbridge” pair of elite universities – even if 
this hiring pattern of choosing only candidates from the universities of Oxford or Cambridge is 
declining from the 1980s onward (Drewry and Butcher 1991)38. 
5.1.3.2 Lack of technical expertise among experts 
The majority of experts in public roles were drawn from elite universities, in particular Oxbridge, as 
we saw above. Another relevant question is which type of education these highly educated civil 
servants received. Here a significant pattern of “classic”-schooling appears. In the relevant period 
around 1970-74, during which the oil crisis hit, the distribution of major educational types were that 
52 % of the college majors of civil servants had a background in the humanities. Another 
reasonably large group, around 26%, had a background in natural sciences and only 3% in law 
(Peters and Peters 2002, 118). Perhaps even more surprisingly, the entire civil service of the United 
Kingdom employed only 19 people with a background in economics in 1963. While this number 
shifted to 106 trained economists in 1967, the general pattern was still consistent with this 
generalist-characteristic of the United Kingdom civil service (Committee on the Civil Service, 
Fulton, and Fulton 1968, 17). This illustrates a pattern of emphasis within the U.K. civil service on 
general education as opposed to the attainment of more technical skills emphasised elsewhere. This 
typifies the generalist school of public bureaucracy where general intellectual ability and post-
                                                 
38 The elitist nature of the education system in in relation to the civil service in the United Kingdom has even penetrated into mass-culture references. 
In the TV-show “Yes, Prime Minister”, the senior civil servant “Sir Humphrey” in describing the need to reduce power of the masses, mentions the 
need to protect higher education: “The universities, both of them”.  Similarly, the different civil servants often wear ties corresponding to the colleges 
of the Oxbridge university they were trained at. (If the right people don’t have power - Yes, Prime Minister - BBC 2010). 
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secondary education is the primary criteria for eligibility when selecting among candidates for the 
civil service.  
The system is essentially a remnant of the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854, which set out the 
basic tenets of the civil service in the United Kingdom. The report distinguished intellectual from 
routine work – and the selection of civil servants on that basis (Northcote and Trevelyan 1954, 10–
11). The access to senior civil service of government is thus directly linked with education 
(Committee on the Civil Service, Fulton, and Fulton 1968, 64–65). Since then attempts have been 
made to break this pattern. Most proximate to the oil crisis was probably the Fulton  Report, 
which argued for a change of the elitist hiring in the civil service (and Whitehall more 
broadly)(Committee on the Civil Service, Fulton, and Fulton 1968). However, despite these 
attempts the tradition of hiring classically educated employees from the universities has persisted in 
that arts and humanities make up more than half in higher civil service in the United Kingdom all 
the way up to the late 1980s, sometimes referred to as a system of “talented amateurs” (Peters and 
Peters 2002, 93).  
That is not to say, that the primary hiring patterns of the United Kingdom prevents specialized 
knowledge to permeate parts of the experts surrounding government. Part of the philosophy behind 
seeking the generalized, but highly educated, background in candidates is exactly that they would 
be able to adapt to the constant flow of information and shifting political climate. However, this 
does mean that significant parts of the expertise in the administration of government in the United 
Kingdom relies heavily on in-the-job training. This is not necessarily a problem per se, but it does 
leave recruits with a disadvantage in dealing with technical or economic questions at the outset of 
their careers (Peters and Peters 2002, 93).  
An analytical implication of this characteristic of the educational background is that special or 
disciplinary knowledge does not dominate debates between experts in a given policy field. When a 
policy field is characterised by technical questions, the validity of claims based on technical 
grounds need to be first accepted by the actors involved. This does not mean that it is impossible in 
an open bureaucratic structure to have policy discussions based primarily on technical arguments, 
but rather that the validity of this type of arguing has to be accepted by those involved on a case-by-
case basis. The implication is that closed bureaucratic systems where technical knowledge and 
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functional specialization characterises the basis of expertise will be less prone to politicization of 
policy areas than open ones. 
5.1.3.3 Basis of expertise in specific organizations 
Having noted the generalist nature of the basis of expertise in the open bureaucratic system of the 
United Kingdom, we now turn to specific organizations – or groups of experts surrounding 
government and policy-making. The specific organizations described are relevant to the analysis of 
the energy policy before and after the oil crisis because they in particular represent key actors in 
spreading policy ideas for the energy policy in the United Kingdom at the time. That is not to say 
that other organizations have no relevance, and they will be mentioned in the analysis, but that these 
chosen organizations represent an empirically variation in positions across the period, which helps 
illustrate the usefulness of the theoretical framework for showing the connection between policy 
ideas and institutional structures.  
Department of Energy  
As the seriousness of the oil crisis settles in with politicians, the creation of the Department of 
Energy in 1974 was an attempt to combine the disparate policy areas related to energy to better deal 
with ensuring energy supplies in the future (Heath 1998, 505) . While there had been different 
departments related to questions of energy after the war (e.g. Ministry of Power and the later 
Ministry of Fuel & Power) this was the first time an attempt was made to combine energy policy 
under one department (Kuiken 2014).  
The lack of expertise and the relative youth of the department, along with the way in which it had 
been cobbled together with personnel that could be spared from other departments, meant that the 
D.E. was extremely reliant on other agencies. The fragmented nature of the background of the 
department employees in the beginning does not necessarily mean they were unable to function as a 
department. After all, some of the key civil servants that were moved to create the Department of 
Energy had a background from the Ministry of Fuel and Power. For example, Sir Jack Rampton 
joined the Department of Energy as Permanent Undersecretary of State and came from DTI with a 
background in Ministry of Technology, but ultimately his education background was as an Oxford 
alumni who began his career at the Treasury (Pearson 1981, 28). Thus, while expertise can be 
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gained through training in the job, it indicates that expertise at the top civil service level came from 
experience, not educational specialization. This re-emphasises the point that the bureaucratic 
structure of the U.K. is characterised by a lack of educational specialization among these experts 
along with the pattern of departments being created from personnel drawn from several diverse 
departments – even in the case of one of the most senior of positions in the Department of Energy.  
Reliant on other agencies 
That is not to say that the pattern of drawing employees from other departments was an unusual 
phenomenon. As mentioned above, it was one of the primary ways in which advancement took 
place in the U.K. system of civil service. Employment and training in-the-job is what allowed 
movement across different departments. This pattern probably also helped reinforce the need for 
general training that allowed the civil service to be ready to apply skills in a variety of different 
fields, rather than specialization in a narrower field. This pattern was the case also with agencies in 
policy fields that dealt with issues of high technical complexity. When the United Kingdom Atom 
Energy Agency (UKAEA/AEA) was formed in 1954, many civil servants were transferred from the 
Ministry of Supply to fill their ranks39. This helps explain part of the close connection between 
experts in the civil service and the external experts working at the AEA. Because of this existing 
administrative capacity at the AEA, additional resources were not added to the Atomic Energy 
Division of the Department of Energy. Thus, checking budgets and controlling policy essentially 
became the remit of the AEA itself (Pearson 1981, 42–43). The lack of specialized knowledge in 
the Department of Energy regarding nuclear energy is and the reliance on the AEA whom their, in 
principle, oversaw does give the impression of an external authority of expertise driving the 
decision-making of the department and its Minister . This pattern of reliance is not unique to the 
Department of Energy, even if their control is further limited by lacking proper budget controls of 
the AEA. Another example of this reliance is during the investigations by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General into the financial scale of the AEA’s reactor programme. In their reply to the audit, 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) espoused a view that they saw no reason to question 
the AEAs competences in reactor development or the quality of their forecasting techniques by 
which future economic benefits of reactors were based (and thus, indirectly, what costs could be 
                                                 
39 That is not to say, that the AEA did not employ technical expertise at the time of their inception or later. Of course there were both engineering and 
physics graduates in this agency. The point is that the pattern of filling new agencies or ministries with personnel from other departments required a 
certain ability of civil servants to apply their knowledge across many different specializations. 
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justified in the here and now) (Williams 1980, 200). One scholar traced this view of the expertise of 
the AEA back to a doctrine espoused by Sir Friston How of the Atomic Energy Office in the 
Department of Energy in mid 1950s40. In a reply to the Select Committee of 1967, Minister for 
Technology at the time, Tony Benn, expresses a similar view to those just illustrated. One scholar 
summarized the view as essentially boiling down to: “…ministers, who knew nothing of nuclear 
technology, advised by civil servants, who also knew nothing of the technology, would appoint 
members of the Authority, who would infallibly get the technical and economic answers on nuclear 
energy right” (Burn 2014, 177–78).  
The CPRS 
The Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) was formed under the Government of Edward Heath to 
support the Government and supply advice on policy issues. Organizationally, the CPRS sat 
alongside the Policy Review Group in reporting directly to the Prime Minister’s office (Pearson 
1981, 20). The policy areas that the CPRS supplied expertise to was relatively broad. Often the 
topics or issues dealt with were in some way tasked by the Government. Their role in energy policy 
was relevant at several points in time before and after the oil crisis hit in 1973 (Blackstone and 
Plowden 1990, chap. 5).  
The specific educational background of CPRS does not at face value make them experts on energy 
policy, as not many employees had a background in energy. A couple of caveats apply, however. 
First, it is the case, that in the beginning of its existence, the CPRS was not highly staffed on people 
with specific experience from the energy industry. However, two successive directors of the CPRS 
had a background in the energy industry and under their leadership, especially Lord Rothschild, 
made these areas a focus for the CPRS. Moreover, the relative lack of expertise in Whitehall as a 
whole on matters of energy meant that while the CPRS were not wholesale technical experts on the 
topic they quickly managed to build expertise in the topic to a degree not otherwise found within 
government. This was probably aided by the fact that the newly formed Department of Energy 
consisted mostly of whatever personnel could be spared from other departments and was therefore 
                                                 
40 The department relied primarily on the Authority for information, thus “ you had to go to 'those who know' and they were 'almost all in the 
Authority'” (Burn 2014, 177). 
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relatively ill-staffed, perhaps paradoxically,  with expertise in the field of energy. Thus, the CPRS 
quickly became an authority on the subject (Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 76).  
5.1.4 Basis of Expertise in the United Kingdom 
Table 3 Basis of Expertise in the United Kingdom 
 
5.1.4.1  Limited specialization and politicisation 
The basis of expertise in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom is less complex than in 
the French case. It is characterised by a similarly high level of educational background for senior 
civil servants and experts, but by less variation in the substantive education type. Most of the 
experts within the bureaucratic structure have a generalist background at one of the two major 
universities Oxford or Cambridge (Oxbridge). This pattern is reinforced in the career paths of civil 
servants who attain special expertise in the job, rather than during their education. This fosters an 
environment where experts jump from department to department, which again, reinforces the lack 
of highly specialized roles among experts. This pattern is evident in reliance on other agencies by 
the Department of Energy, or the reliance on external expertise by the CPRS – despite existence of 
some internal expertise. This supports the other structures of open negotiation style and weak 
capacity of the state. One effect of this, is that while it is of course possible to have technically 
complicated policy discussions within such a system, it is not the norm, and when it happens, either 
the specialized expertise completely dominates the policy area or there is a more open conflict 
 Department of Energy CPRS Treasury 
Academic origin of 
personnel 
Oxbridge Oxbridge Oxbridge 
Type of academic 
training 
Classics, in the job 
training. External input 
from AEA 
Classics, but some 
economic and natural 
sciences from senior 
staff and external 
network of experts 
Classics, in the job 
training in economics. 
Overall education 
basis 
Classic Mixed Classic 
112 | P a g e  
 
about the political nature of such policies. Thus, ad-hoc decisions and the risk of politicisation is 
ever-present in a bureaucratic system whose educational basis is not based on technical 
specialization and functional roles derived from it. 
5.2 Bureaucratic structure in the United Kingdom 
A few key comments can be made with regards to the open bureaucratic structure that the United 
Kingdom mostly resembles. The capacity of the state to intervene and steer the direction of the 
economy or control actors is generally weak even if there is some nuance to this after the labour 
government comes into power after 1974. While the public does hold control over some aspects of 
the economy through public ownership or shares in private companies (e.g. BP), the willingness to 
utilize this influence to shape the relationship between state and other societal actors is low. The 
general trend of state intervention in the United Kingdom follows patterns of consensualism where 
agreement is sought through existing institutional arrangements rather than attempting to actively 
steer them.  
The negotiation style in energy policy is characterised by a multitude of involved actors who 
operate in a level field. While some actors are regularly present in energy policy, the precise 
number and why is much more irregular in nature than elsewhere (e.g. France). Because 
negotiations are open in this way, this results in ad-hoc membership of commissions and 
interdepartmental meetings dealing with energy policy. The knock-on effect is consensus-seeking 
behaviour among the experts involved because their power symmetry results in veto points 
according to the number of actors in specific negotiations. In addition to this fragmented nature, the 
negotiations tend to rely on personal connections to make agreement between experts possible. The 
basis of expertise in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom is characterised by high level 
of education of most of the experts involved in energy policy questions. Most senior staff is drawn 
from Oxbridge Universities, but with few exceptions are of a generalist bent rather than specialized 
in a particular field (even economics). Even with the exception of the Atomic Energy Agency 
(AEA), the general pattern is still that generalist backgrounds dominate the expertise in energy 
policy in the United Kingdom. 
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5.3 Dynamics of policy ideas among experts. 
Before the crisis 
The dynamics of policy ideas among experts in the United Kingdom is affected in various ways by 
the bureaucratic structure. Before we go in to the examination of the interaction of different policy 
ideas with dimensions of the open bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom, we need to briefly 
situate this analysis in the energy policy developments surrounding the oil crisis. The energy policy 
is not dominated by one particular energy source becoming the key element of a national energy 
policy. Interestingly, this holds across the period, that is to say, the advent of the oil crisis does not 
allow one set of policy ideas associated with a particular energy policy to prevail over others. The 
energy policy of the United Kingdom as dealt with by experts is centred on three core sources of 
energy.  
The first is the oil sector. Before and in the beginning of the crisis, the key concern is ensuring oil 
supplies. Initially this is primarily a diplomatic issue, which is sought dealt with through 
international bilateral connections with oil exporting states (especially Iran). These diplomatic 
relations are seemingly selected on the basis of personal connections between Edward Heath and 
the Shah of Iran as well as historical legacy linking the two (Venn 2002, 83). After the labour 
government comes to power, focus of oil policy shifts towards the future extraction of oil from the 
North Sea. Here the question lies in maintaining national control over oil extraction and ensuring 
public interest. BNOC is set up in part to make up for the limitations of previous licensing deals that 
significantly limited state capacity to directly ensure oil supplies.  
The second is the coal sector. The United Kingdom has a large domestic sector of coal mining 
companies that extract and supply electricity generating coal power plants. Historically, this sector 
has been important, as part of the industrialization of the United Kingdom and with that has come 
political power of the unions that organize the workers in this sector. The context of coal miners’ 
strikes before and after the oil crisis throughout the 1970s cannot be ignored when examining the 
energy policy ideas of experts in the United Kingdom. What is perhaps interesting, as we shall see 
in the analysis of policy idea dynamics, is that the importance of industrial action and the coal 
sector is more important during cabinet meetings than when comparing with internal documents 
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from groups of experts (although more important for those experts directly connected with 
ministries). 
The third is the nuclear sector. The state capacity in the nuclear sector in the United Kingdom is 
principally run through the R&D arm of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (AEA). 
However, not being directly linked to the political machinery (unlike the CEA in France, for 
instance) the specificities of policy are only indirectly affected by the AEA through influence on the 
Energy Department, CPRS or other ministries. While technical expertise exists in the form of the 
AEA, their role is conditioned by existing in a context of other expert actors who hold as much 
authority as them, despite not being technical experts. Ultimately, the political decision for a 
nuclear energy policy lies in the political system. Like in the French case, the question of nuclear 
policy revolves to a large extent around the instrumental ideas related to choice of reactor 
technology. The expert groups surrounding government were consistent with the cabinet meeting 
opinion that options should be kept open, thus no firm decision was made. The UK had an existing 
technology in the gas-powered MAGNOX reactor from which the subsequent AGR was developed. 
Allowing for multiple different sub-types of the AGR to be developed had in combination with 
unforeseen problems spiralled cost and extended deadlines for construction of the four AGRs 
ordered (Burn 2014, chap. 9). At the same time, several prototype reactor types were constructed an 
operated since the 1960s. The “Dragon” High Temperature Reactor (HTR), the “Winfrith” Steam 
Generating Heavy Reactor (SGHR) and a prototype of a Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR). Briefly, this 
resulted in the order of SHWGR in 1974, but in 1978 the AGR returned (Williams 1980, 241). A 
combination of factors lead to this back and forth.  
The bureaucratic structure of the U.K. in being more open allow many different actors to affect the 
outcomes of policy. Combined with an attempt to seek consensus on issues, the question of reactor 
choice was for a long time bogged down in “keeping options open” and not restricting the UK 
nuclear programme to a single technology. Worth noting, is that the AEA itself followed this 
approach in allowing various AGR designs to be built at the same time. This meant that risk of 
failure in terms of cost increases or delays was increased. Also of note is the role of particular 
ministers. The treasury view throughout the period was that cost should be curtailed. In order to 
keep research and development ongoing while waiting for problems to be ironed out with the AGR 
reactors already under construction, the Secretary for Energy decides to push for the development 
of a Steam Heavy Water Generating Reactor in 1974. This never amounts to more than a prototype-
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reactor, however. The perceived failures of AGR and alternative technologies in LWR split the 
expert groups of Treasury and CPRS on one side and the Department of Energy (and AEA) on the 
other. After 1975, the active will against nuclear technology by Tony Benn as Secretary of State for 
Energy is partially to blame for the impasse in further developments, but he is to some extent at 
odds with views of much of his own staff. By 1978, the AEA and Department of Energy view that 
AGR can be salvaged prevails and the AGR is again chosen as the main reactor technology. 
5.3.1 Capacity of the state 
5.3.1.1 Overarching idea: Ensure energy supplies through market. 
The overarching policy idea before the crisis with regard to energy policy is to ensure energy 
supplies and maintain industrial stability in production of domestic energy sources. There are two 
principal dimensions to this approach. Both approaches are consistent with allowing separate 
spheres of society maintain the institutional structure and attempts to affect the existing order of 
relationships between actors are relativity minor. In general, policy selection is affected by the weak 
state structure, but with different manifestations given the specifics of the energy area in question.  
The first relates to ensuring supplies of oil. This is primarily understood through an international 
dimension that emphasises the use of influence with multinational oil companies, in particular 
British Petroleum, to ensure supplies of oil(The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 193). 
As the oil crisis is about to hit in the autumn of 1973, the question of oil supplies has already been 
debated within the bureaucratic structures of the United Kingdom and its government (Blackstone 
and Plowden 1990, 76–77). Nonetheless is still comes as somewhat of a surprise to the Government 
that their influence with BP cannot be utilized to achieve special treatment in terms of higher quotas 
of oil supplies than other countries (Heath 1998, 503). This shifts the governments approach to 
attempt to achieve oil supplies through more diplomatic means. Specifically, Prime Minister 
Edward Heath raises the policy idea of the diplomatic solution in a cabinet meeting (The National 
Archives (TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 75). The Prime Minister mentions his good relations with the 
Iranians and that the meeting in a ski resort in Switzerland the previous year had allowed an 
understanding to be reached that the United Kingdom would not be hit by sanctions imposed by 
OPEC, because the Iranian government would talk to the rest of OPEC on behalf of the United 
Kingdom to supply them with oil (The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/52 n.d., 3). Moreover, 
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the Prime Minister’s personal relationship with Sultan al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi was very good the 
United Arab Emirates would continue to supply the United Kingdom with all the oil they needed 
(Heath 1998, 502). This point of ensuring oil supplies through diplomatic means rather than 
outright attempts to control speaks to the general laissez-faire attitude of the United Kingdom 
towards the economy.  
That being said, the ability of any one country to reorganise the international market for oil is 
probably quite limited. It is however telling how little was done by the government after they 
realised BP was not going to help them and acted as a multinational corporation which delivered oil 
supplies to countries equally in accordance with sanction criteria. The mobilization of state capacity 
before the crisis takes the form of overarching idea of emphasising the circumvention of oil supply 
constraints through existing structures of diplomatic relations and industry-labour relations. Rather 
than attempt to control these circumstances, the overarching policy idea of energy supply 
maintenance becomes defined in terms of protecting the status quo of the international oil markets 
and their organisation around producer countries and multinational corporations. An alternative 
overarching policy idea could have been to seek to control multinationals through cooperation with 
other countries. That is not to say that state capacity is not mobilised, but it is mobilised in a way 
that does not actively shift the power balances of existing structures of the energy dependence of the 
United Kingdom. This lack of concern for the home market on behalf of a British-based private 
company surprised and “deeply shamed” the Prime Minister (Heath 1998, 503). 
The second dimension of the overarching idea of ensuring energy supplies is through the domestic 
dimension of the energy question. Here the case for the United Kingdom manifesting as weak is 
perhaps even clearer, because the possibility for direct control over relations between actors is much 
greater in the domestic sphere than the potential influence on multinational oil corporations or oil 
producing states. While oil and gas extraction plans are underway in the early 1970s, the primary 
source of energy supplies available to United Kingdom at the time is coal and the associated 
industry. This was a key concern for government before the crisis (Ball and Seldon 1996, 176–83). 
Some years before the oil crisis the Heath Government had had issues with maintaining stable 
industrial relations that prevented conflicts. The general economic issue at the time related to 
balance of payments problems and one way the government attempted to deal with this was through 
different forms of reducing the growth of labour costs: e.g. reducing the wage-increases of workers. 
The coal mining industry in the United Kingdom is quite old and therefore has had ample time to 
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develop strong networks between trade unions and labour. The relatively well-organized labour 
force in the coal-mining industry acted in their own interests when attempting to limit these 
policies. This lead to strikes and supply issues as well as power cuts in several periods throughout 
the 1970s, but more relevant to the response to the oil crisis was that it had recently happened in 
1970 – a few years before. This was probably significant for why the government saw this 
particular issue of industrial conflict important for policy41. The open nature of the bureaucratic 
structure meant that the government expresses a general trait of maintaining the structures of 
labour-capital relations as they are rather than changing them, which supports an overarching idea 
of providing stable energy sources from these structures. This is the case before the crisis, but also 
as it becomes clear that the coal sector will become important as potential offset for limited oil 
supplies in the immediate run-up to the crisis.  
In the early 1970s, the weak capacity of the state manifested as attempts to coordinate and facilitate 
a compromise between the parties of the economy (labour and capital) rather than outright control 
of the situation. Despite the severity of the risk to the coal supplies of the United Kingdom and the 
increasing risk of greater reliance on this domestic energy source, should oil in different forms need 
to be supplanted, the government maintained the approach that consensus should be sought through 
existing modes of cooperation42. The fact that the government in the beginning allowed the process 
to be controlled by several actors external to itself, through a process of conflict resolution that was 
more in the hands of the parties of the economy than itself as well as the clear purpose of achieving 
consensus was perhaps a smart electoral move to avoid critics, but emphasises the characteristic of 
the state capacity of the United Kingdom as weak in a setting where it could principally have more 
control had it chosen to.  
This is perhaps part of why the premiership of Edward Heath has been, somewhat unflatteringly, 
described as: “(That) of a skipper of a yacht changing course dramatically when confronted by very 
hostile weather, than a conductor of an orchestra, who persisted with his score regardless of the 
disasters befalling his musicians and their instruments” (Ball and Seldon 1996, 13). What such a 
                                                 
41 This is also the impression given by (Heath 1998, chap. 18). 
42 A good example of this is in a preparatory statement (at the time not yet publicized) from the Prime Minister in January, 1974. The PM goes 
through the attempts to seek an agreement with NUM and the continued efforts to seek a compromise, but that the 3-day work week has to be 
instituted to limit consumption despite the economic hardships it may cause. Even understanding the economic implications, the Government still 
decides to work toward a solution within existing relations of power between actors in society. Instead describing the insistence on overtime bans by 
unions as “That is their decision, and they are perfectly entitled to take it” Letter from Prime Minister’s office to Chris France, Roger Dawe, John 
Caines, William Armstrong and John Hunt. - Secret and Personal. 11. January 1974.  (PREM 15/2174) 
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description underplays is the role of the existing institutional environment where decisions had to be 
made. The diplomatic dimension of the overarching idea of ensuring energy supplies is affected by 
the weak role of the state vis-à-vis international actors that make up the oil supply. Heath had 
possibilities and incentives to deal differently with the unions in the coal sector and the industrial 
conflict, but the consensus-approach (we will examine in detail below) was remarkably consistent 
with existing patterns of state-society relations and derived from a weak capacity of state.  
There is obviously a difference in the practical possibility and scope of state action in relation to 
international oil supplies and other countries compared to domestic societal actors. In that sense, the 
international oil dimension to the overarching policy idea of ensuring energy supplies is an easier 
case to make for the influence of weak capacity of state43. That being said, it is still worth 
highlighting, that other options for ensuring supplies are not chosen, for instance in relation to 
British Petroleum which the government had a substantial stake in (Pearson 1981, 123)44. We are 
thus left with an overarching policy idea of ensuring energy supplies, which is defined by the 
government through existing institutional structures – international for the oil question – and 
domestic for the other energy sources, primarily coal and related industry. The general outline of 
this policy idea means that role of the state is rather limited in terms of affecting the relations and 
actors. We now turn to the more instrumental ideas that characterised these dimensions. 
  
                                                 
43 This point would apply generally when distinguishing the potential applicable state capacity when comparing the national sovereign territory with 
the international system of states. 
44 At the time of the oil crisis, the Government of the United Kingdom held a 48% stake in BP, although this was reduced in 1977 (Pearson 1981, 
123). See also (Sampson 1975). 
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5.3.1.2 Instrumental idea: Diplomacy and industrial relations 
The instrumental policy ideas chosen for ensuring energy supplies reflected the weak capacity of 
the state in an open bureaucratic structure. The international diplomacy dimension is perhaps an 
obvious point, because most states have limited ability to direct affect the relationship of actors in 
the international system, barring the threat of war. The policy idea was affected by the indirect 
support for the existing system of multinational oil companies and oil producers, which the United 
Kingdom had thought it could benefit from through personal connections, special diplomatic 
arrangements and influence with the oil companies.  
In practice, this instrumental idea meant that the United Kingdom would negate the supply 
constraints on oil that would result from the OPEC embargo. This was going to rely on both 
cooperation with British-based oil companies like BP and Shell whom the cabinet expected 
preferential treatment from vis-à-vis other countries in Western Europe. Initially this does not give 
great evidence for the significance of the effect of the bureaucratic structure of a weak state on 
policy ideas. However, when preferential treatment for UK is not forthcoming the Prime Minister is 
surprised, but still does not seek alternative solutions (Heath 1998, 503), which supports the 
significance of the weak capacity of the state in the presence of the instrumental idea. This aspect of 
the instrument of diplomatic solution is tenuous when it becomes clear BP and Shell intend to 
distribute the remaining oil supplies in accordance with the embargo to stay friends with the oil 
producer countries (Venn 2002, 121). This results in personal ties becoming key to the diplomatic 
instrumental solution when the Edward Heath suggests his personal connection to the Shah of Iran 
and conversations in an alpine resort in Switzerland on the basis of which the Prime Minister 
believes the United Kingdom will be able to ensure oil deliveries from the Iranian state oil company 
(The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/52 n.d., 3)45. 
The fact that the government did not plan beyond this work-around to oil shortages shows that they 
did not fully believe in the ability of the oil producers to maintain the export limitations on oil, 
because they would internally disagree among themselves and eventually the sanctions would lift. 
This view is reflected as an option among several expert groups. In a meeting with representatives 
of the U.S. Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry arrived at the conclusion that the 
                                                 
45 For a slightly more cautious, but consistent retelling of the potential for Iranian oil supplies, see (Heath 1998, 508). 
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sanctions would not hold, and that the United Kingdom and the United States should attempt to 
facilitate the breaking of cohesion in the block of OPEC members on the question of sanctions46. 
The CPRS raises a similar point when evaluating the risk of oil supplies and the economic situation 
in in an interdepartmental meeting between the CPRS, DTI and Treasury in December of 197147. 
Another aspect of the instrumental policy ideas relating to the capacity of the state is the domestic 
dimension of the oil crisis. Here, the instrumental policy idea of industry cooperation to achieve 
stability in both labour-capital relations as well as productive output of the coal sector is seen as 
crucial. This is because part of immediate reaction to the oil crisis is an attempt to reduce the 
reliance on imported oil as much as possible. This requires stopping production of oil-fuelled 
electricity generating plants and increasing production in the coal industry to shift electricity 
production to coal-driven power plants48.  
Before the crisis, minutes from cabinet meetings mirror this concern for minimising industrial 
conflict through agreements between the parties of industry, even if the reference to energy 
concerns is not always explicit. One section on industrial affairs deals with the industrial conflicts 
over wages in electricity supply and coal industry without explicitly referencing the oil crisis and 
instead emphasises the possibility of solving this wage-conflict within the terms of the counter-
inflationary policy stage 3 programme (The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 191, 208). 
Over the period of the Heath government, the link between energy supplies and instrumental policy 
ideas to maintain the overarching policy idea of industrial stability becomes more explicit. As the 
embargo hits, more and more meetings the follow-up discussions to separate issues of industry 
conflict and energy stocks emphasise the direct link between decreasing oil energy supplies and the 
problem of industrial action - especially in the coal mining sectors as coal serves as a supplementary 
buffer for the balancing reduced oil imports into electricity production (The National Archives 
(TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 209). 
                                                 
46 Confidential: Note for the Record – Talk with Secretary Simon (Qh0869). 26th. July 1974 .- CAB184/165. (Central Policy Review Staff Files. 
Central Policy Review Staff Report ‘Energy 1974 and After’) 
47 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy – Oil Economics and Supplies(EPC71). December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review 
Staff. International Oil Questions). 
48 This is an explicit strategy suggested by the CPRS as early as 1971 and repeated again in 1973.  
An Energy Policy For Britain – A report by the Central Policy Review Staff. May 1973 – CAB184/114 (Central Policy Review Staff Files) and 
Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy – Oil Economics and Supplies(EPC71). December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review 
Staff. International Oil Questions). 
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As the overtime work ban is approved by miners unions it becomes crucial for the government to 
ensure de-escalation of conflict between capital and labour forces in the electricity production 
sector(Heath 1998, chap. 18). A clear example of the explicit linking of the government of 
electricity supplies and industrial conflict is when the Electrical Power Engineers Association chose 
to strike. On the 14th of November 1973, the Prime Minister urges both secretary of state for 
employment and the Minister of Industry to urgently find a way to solve the potential problems in 
domestic energy supply within the parameters of the Pay code (The National Archives (TNA): 
CAB128/53 n.d., 180–81). This means that energy supply is directly linked with industry stability, 
in this case and that the solution should be found within the parameters of wage-increases allowed 
by the pay-code, but using the tools of cooperation with unions and industry to make this a reality. 
A day later, this was accompanied by attempts to limit reliance on foreign imports of oil by 
reducing both industrial and motor oil consumption by 10% is introduced on the basis of a meeting 
in Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy and The Central Electricity Generating Boards had 
indicated a plan to reduce oil consumption by 10% for electricity production.  
These combined policies attempted to reduce reliance on oil imports, but had the effect of making 
the United Kingdom increasingly reliant on the remaining sources of energy, increasing the 
importance of stabilising industrial relations in the coal sector. The coal supply industry was already 
at lower than regular production, as coal as a source of electricity, at the time, reduced output  by 
around 20% as a result of an overtime ban by the union of miners. Combined with the risk of 
industrial action by the in the electrical supply industry electrical power engineers from earlier in 
the year, this ran the risk of actual out-right power cuts due to inability to supply electricity for the 
grid (The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 182). In late November, the policy idea of 
industrial stability becomes even more important as it is realised that with current stocks of coal and 
continued supply problems uninterrupted electricity supply could no longer be guaranteed by 
February (The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 208). This happens while there is a 
spreading of over-time bans across unions, which risk reducing the amount of workers available to 
alleviate the supply of coal.  
Despite this intensification of the problem of energy supplies, the Prime Minister does not attempt a 
new policy idea but continues with utilizing existing institutional structures of ensuring industrial 
stability by urging the secretary of state for employment to emphasise to the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) the impact on coal and electricity supplies that are being felt by continuing industry disputes 
122 | P a g e  
 
(The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 215). The increasing severity of the oil supply 
issues and their knock-on effects on reliance on other energy sources makes the stability of 
domestic energy supply industry crucial, but the state is not willing to attempt to apply power to 
reorganise the interaction between actors in order to ensure it despite increasing severity of the 
problems. We see the indication that the weak capacity of the state supports the instrumental ideas 
of supporting non-state actors in achieving overarching ideas. However, this push the dynamics of 
solutions towards outside actors, which provides for more ideas tied to different actors but shifts the 
emphasis on different ideas according to which actors succeeds in supporting overarching ideas 
The area of nuclear policy is also affected by this need to shift reliance onto other energy sources. 
In December 1971, CPRS lays out their view of future oil economics and supplies in Ministerial 
Committee Economic Policy. The view of future oil supplies is rather grim. The CPRS evaluates 
that the possibility of a wholesale replacement of oil with alternative fuels is not likely. Given 
potential increasing demand for oil, the prices are likely to increase, even if oil producing nations 
decide not to increase prices (which the CPRS also finds unlikely)(p. 1)49. The CPRS suggests a 
diversification of energy demands of United Kingdom away from oil towards natural gas and 
increasing focus on discovering and extracting domestic oil supplies – a crucial factor being that 
“we can keep it for ourselves. It will not help us if it goes into the pool”(p.2)50. Besides increasing 
oil and coal stocks as soon as possible, they recommend that expected run-down of coal in the U.K. 
is examined in detail, to better understand the probability of using coal stocks. Finally, they 
recommend the use of surplus heat from nuclear power generation in industry and a “maximum 
acceleration” of nuclear power to generate electricity (p. 3)51. 
One might think that state capacity would be strong in questions relating to nuclear energy where 
state controlled agencies like the Atomic Energy Authority had upheld control over the research and 
construction requirements for nuclear industry in the United Kingdom (Pearson 1981, 103–4). Of 
course, the control by state over nuclear energy tends to generally be greater than in other energy 
areas because of the enormous capital requirements, sensitivity of the research, and not least its 
                                                 
49 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy – Oil Economics and Supplies(EPC71).  December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review 
Staff. International Oil Questions). 
50 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy – Oil Economics and Supplies(EPC71).  December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review 
Staff. International Oil Questions). 
51 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy – Oil Economics and Supplies(EPC71).  December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review 
Staff. International Oil Questions). 
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relation with national interest and military nuclear weapons development – and a wish from 
governments to limit the spread of nuclear weapons (Simpson 1983, 2, 60). 
In this area, we might therefore expect the greatest difficulty in observing weak state capacity 
affecting instrumental policy ideas. Internal documents around the nuclear policy suggest a key 
concern was the organization of the industry. Meeting of Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Strategy on May 1, 1972. ES(72)20 suggestions to reorganise the nuclear industry. Structural 
weakness of the nuclear industry is related two elements. 1) AGR is considered faulty and 
uncompetitive with Light Water Reactors developed in other countries 2) until then the industry had 
consisted of two separate design and construction consortia, which the market for nuclear reactors is 
simply not big enough to support in the United Kingdom. What is interesting is that there seems to 
be a broad interest in simplifying the nuclear construction business from two consortia into one. 
While this would seemingly result in less competition (which was the argument used by the Central 
Electricity Generating Boards at earlier times for having 2 separate consortia) this is no longer 
supported. Instead they now agree with the AEA and Select Committee on Science and Technology 
that reorganisation into one consortium was necessary (p 4-5)52. One might think this would result 
in less competition, but the involved expert groups agree that the new consortium should look more 
like Westinghouse or GEC in the United States, which are full companies that have integrated R&D 
development, design, construction and assembly into one organisation (p. 4-5)53. On one hand, this 
focus on competitiveness in the heavily state-involved nuclear industry is indicative of a capacity of 
the state, the way the state is engaged in shifting the structure of industry within nuclear energy it is 
not fundamentally shifting the organization towards more control, rather they seem to prefer it 
becomes more similar to the private company structure of the American nuclear industry.  
  
                                                 
52 Draft DTI revision of GEN 100(72) – Reorganisation of the Nuclear Industry (Qa391).  13. June. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
53 Draft DTI revision of GEN 100(72) – Reorganisation of the Nuclear Industry (Qa391).  13. June. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
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5.3.1.3 Setting: Small interventions in foreign relations and industrial relations 
The general setting of policy idea is that the instrumental ideas of diplomacy and industrial relations 
should be maintained which entails that the existing structures of industry cooperation are utilized 
to ensure energy supplies in the United Kingdom. The setting of each reflects the influence of weak 
state capacity in minimizing intervention which can be illustrated in three different areas of energy 
policy. 
In the area of oil, the setting of the diplomatic policy idea is increased by the use of existing 
diplomatic ties or even personal contacts of ministers. The first relies on good relations with Iran to 
put pressure on OPEC for the United Kingdom to be exempt from embargo quotas on oil supplies. 
The latter attempts to utilize personal connections between Prime Minister Heath and the Shah of 
Abu Dhabi to ensure oil supplies to the United Kingdom. What these settings of policy ideas have 
in common is that they mobilize very little of the existing state capacity to ensure energy supplies. 
The first relies on already existing relations and the remit of implementing these policy goals are 
essentially a question for the Foreign Office. In the setting of policy ideas relating to personal 
connections between political leaders, the relevant state apparatus in play is even less clear, because 
it seems the actual policy idea relies on ad-hoc ties between individuals rather than any form of 
state capacity to organise or influence relations between actors. 
On the domestic side, the setting of policy idea of least intervention had two major effects on the 
coal energy sector. Both are consistent with the state operating within existing structures of seeking 
cooperation with industry actors in the market to solve problems. One way that a minimum of 
intervention maintained energy supplies was by increasing coal productions and cancelling closing 
of coal pits. The increasing reliance on domestic energy sources meant that planned closures of coal 
pits were delayed to maintain production in the coal mining sector and ensure coal supplies to 
generate electricity in case supplies of heavy fuel oil were restricted or absent.  
Another way the domestic energy source of coal was sought to be increased to off-set oil 
restrictions was by attempting to shift as much energy consumption toward domestically 
controllable energy sources. The setting above increased coal supplies by increasing the number of 
available pits for mining. Another way least intervention was sought in this sector was maintaining 
the existing number of work-hours of miners, which was sought through the traditional triparty 
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deliberations between capital and labour. A key concern for the government was to limit the use of 
over-time bans within unions in the mining industry (as we also saw above). If the miners unions 
agreed to widespread over-time bans this would result in reductions in the workhours of miners and 
thus the potential supply of coal in the sector. Despite understanding the severity of this problem 
(Heath calls it a crisis in his autobiography(Heath 1998, 350–52)) the capacity of the state is not 
mobilized in new ways compared to the existing system of cooperation through triparty bargaining 
despite the understood severity of the problem. 
5.3.2 Negotiation style 
In an open bureaucratic structure, there are more actors involved. The negotiation style is therefore 
characterised by multiple directions and ideas being in play. In such a system of relatively 
symmetrical power-relations, most actors hold similar influence over a policy issue and thus their 
ability for specific policy ideas to dominate. The general tendency becomes the generation of a 
conservative trend where the status quo is maintained and it is difficult for any one policy idea to 
dominate the agenda. In pluralist bureaucratic systems like those, the primary way that change is 
enacted is through strong political powers that may override or dominate the otherwise symmetric 
relations of power between experts. Change of policy ideas happens primarily in cases where 
political power supersedes the logic of the open bureaucratic structure. 
5.3.2.1 Overarching idea: Coordination among multiple experts 
The general pattern of the negotiation style in the United Kingdom before the crisis is that the 
different groups of experts in the bureaucratic structure coordinate across and between each other 
on multiple issues on a per-topic basis. The pattern by which a given issue is chosen for 
coordination is sometimes politically defined by cabinet asking for a view on a given issue, but 
often it can also follow from previous meetings where individual experts or groups ask for a given 
issue to be taken up at a later time. 
The department of Energy did not exist before the oil crisis had hit, and thus in the period before, 
energy policy was a combination of interactions between various experts from different ministries 
and working groups. This was partly the case for most energy issues, but in particular, for questions 
relating to oil policy the institutional makeup was complex. First, historically what became the 
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Department for Energy had had an unstable development. It began as the ministry for power, which 
in 1969 was absorbed by the Department of Technology in 1969 and then by the Department of 
Technology and Industry (DTI) in 1970, until drawing personnel from the latter and becoming a 
separate Department of Energy in December 1973 after the oil crisis had hit in the autumn. This 
tumultuous history and resulting departmental instability goes some way towards understanding the 
lack of a coherent energy policy in the beginning (see also (Kuiken 2014)). The relatively small size 
of the department of around 1200 people, noted earlier, also indicates the reliance on other groups 
for their work. Second, most decisions on matters of oil policy had been taken by cabinet based on 
advice from a number of different ad-hoc working groups that consisted of actors from different 
expert groups drawn from the Treasury, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Power. 
Moreover, many of these groups relied explicitly on advice and technical data directly from 
domestically based multinational oil companies like British Petroleum and Shell (Kuiken 2014, 
274).  
The closest to an equivalent to what became the Department of Energy was the coordinative role of 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Their overarching policy idea was cooperation 
between industry and agencies related to nuclear issues. They suggested restructuring the 
institutional setup of nuclear policy so that decision-making was moved from the Atomic Energy 
Agency and more directly onto the demand side of the nuclear industry, which meant the electricity 
generating boards, in particular CEGB and the Government who they saw as ultimately accountable 
for the R&D spending costs that will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future(p. 6).)54. 
Thus, energy policy was an amalgamation of unstable departmental structures and coordination 
between multiple ministries and working groups that relied on private companies for part of their 
technical expertise.  
The CPRS had done work on estimating the effects of increases in future oil prices which they 
presented to ministers of the government in summer of 1973 according to former CPRS staff 
(Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 76). This report represents the general view of the CPRS that oil 
prices were going increase and have tremendous effects on the balance of payments for the United 
Kingdom – even under the least worrisome of the three price-scenarios they projected from55. This 
                                                 
54 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy – Oil Economics and Supplies(EPC71). December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review 
Staff. International Oil Questions). 
55 An Energy Policy For Britain – A report by the Central Policy Review Staff. May 1973 – CAB184/114 (Central Policy Review Staff Files). 
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report became the basis from which the CPRS drew their conviction of shifting U.K. energy 
supplies away from oil to the extent possible – until domestic supplies could be extracted from the 
North Sea. According to Tessa Blackstone, the CPRS was however quite alone with this idea and 
many other departments were in outright disbelief about the projected oil prices and simply refused 
to believe the validity of the more severe oil price scenarios sketched by the report (Blackstone and 
Plowden 1990, 77).  
A coordinated policy response was needed according to the CPRS, which included focus on control 
of the future North Sea oil and increasing production and cancelling closure of coal pits to off-set 
reductions in imported oil due to higher prices. They also emphasised to get nuclear reactor 
developed as a means to supplant other energy sources. This entailed keeping existing AGR 
development alive and not necessarily start developing new technology alternatives - like the 
SGHWR56. The coordination attempted between different expert groups, and explicitly mentioned 
as a future goal by the CPRS. The fact that no coherent policy existed meant that policy was an 
amalgamation of suggestions and goals, which overlapped policy-areas, and competences of 
different departments. When disagreements existed, several policy developments might therefore be 
delayed or stopped. Thus no clear overarching policy idea was suggested by any of the experts 
involved 
5.3.2.2 Instrumental idea: Consensus 
This splitting of oil policy between different expert groups meant that consensus had to be sought 
for advice to reach cabinet. This also meant a certain level of symmetry of power between the 
involved expert groups as no one group had a claim to authoritative policy ideas that could 
dominate the policy advice. 
Within oil policy, this can be seen before the oil crisis. In reference to an interdepartmental meeting 
in late 1971. The CPRS director notes a disagreement between the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the CPRS on how the oil policy should look. In the meeting, the DTI follows a general 
idea of seeking cooperation between the government and the multinational oil companies, in 
particular the domestically based ones like BP and Shell (Heath 1998; Kuiken 2014). This is 
                                                 
56 Letter to the Prime Minister from Lord Rothschild – Nuclear Reactors (QA 0548).  28th June. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
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consistent with the overarching diplomatic instrumental policy idea of capacity of the state seen 
above. The DTI believes that the official interests of the oil companies should be supported by the 
diplomatic resources of the United Kingdom in attempts to achieve better licensing deals. The 
instrumental policy idea of diplomacy is invoked in order to support the private interests of 
multinational oil companies in the belief that benefits to oil industry (especially those based in the 
United Kingdom) is advantageous to the energy supplies of the United Kingdom. CPRS believes 
supporting multinational oil companies is resources that could be spent better elsewhere rather than 
have the Foreign Office lobby for multinational companies. This is partially also, because the CPRS 
does not believe the international oil companies will necessarily do what is in the interest of the 
United Kingdom. When suggesting that this policy idea is left behind, the reply by DTI is, 
according to CPRS, that “BP would not like it”.57  
The CPRS instead followed an instrumental policy idea of maximizing domestic energy sources. 
This approach seems to much more focused on domestically controllable energy resources. While 
the CPRS are aware that full shift away from oil dependency in the economy is unfeasible, they 
generally believed that moving towards greater reliance on domestic sources of energy was 
preferable to relying on international diplomacy. To this end, the CPRS attempts to calculate the 
cost savings to the balance of payments if parts of oil consumption could be shifted to indigenous 
energy sources like coal. Their internal debates and calculations estimate that temporary subsidizing 
of the coal industry would allow an increase of 10 million tons of coal per year, which they estimate 
would save £38 million pounds over a 15 year period. This leads the author of the CPRS document 
Dr. Anthony Fish to conclude “The case for supporting coal is obvious”58. 
These differences in policy instrument ideas cannot be immediately solved because of the 
negotiation style in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom does not allow for one group 
of experts to decide above others. In essence, this results in a group of actors who all have a veto on 
which policy ideas should be followed as the division between CPRS and DTI showed above. In 
such a context, the veto-power results in a decision-making stalemate, which must be broken in 
order for decisions to take place. Attempts by the CPRS to involve the Prime Minister in the debate 
                                                 
57 Confidential letter to the Prime Minister from Lord Rothschild (Qa01401). 8th December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
58 Document to Wade Gery, Lord Rothschild, C.R. Rose and F.E.R. Butler from A. Fish Oil versus Coal (Qd0425). 8th December. 1971 - CAB184/57 
(Central Policy Review Staff. International Oil Questions). 
 
129 | P a g e  
 
can be seen as an attempt to shift this stalemate by involving political decision-makers in the 
debates among experts. In a personal letter to the Prime Minister from the director of the CPRS, 
Lord Rothschild expresses the variation in policy ideas among experts during debates in the 
interdepartmental committee on oil. From these debates, it had become clear that CPRS was much 
less optimistic about the future oil prices than the rest of the experts involved (in particular the 
DTI). This difference of opinion mirrors the overarching idea mentioned in the section on capacity 
of state that oil supplies can be ensured diplomatically. CPRS disagrees with the DTI about this and 
somewhat mockingly notes: “(DTI)  also believed we should treat the oil- producing countries as 
reasonable equals and not as brigands - having a nice cup of tea with them from time to time, if that 
is the right beverage”(p. 3)59. One might argue that this is simply to inform the Prime Minister of 
debates. However, it is also the case, that if experts can not agree on a common position, then 
political intervention is required to break the deadlock60 (alternatively decisions can be extended by 
the expert groups, if they agree to do so – see nuclear below). Thus we see that the negotiation style 
of UK pits several instrumental ideas against each other but that the ideas prevailing a given by 
political intervention and (as indicated by the previous section) the political interpretation of the 
development and success of these ideas. 
In the area of nuclear energy policy, some interesting observations can be made about the 
interaction pattern between different expert groups. The fact that energy policy is much more spread 
across several energy policies covering different energy sources in the U.K. only reinforces the 
tendencies of the negotiation style being characterised by multiple actors and ideas. In the area of 
nuclear policy, we might have expected a particular dynamic to be less prevalent in that there might 
be a greater potential for technical debates to dominate the agenda given the subject matter. But 
rather, the existing negotiation style pattern between the multiple involved experts leads to 
symmetric power relations characterising the debates. Increasing the seeming technical complexity 
of the policy area does not specifically seem to matter. As we shall see, this entails that consensus is 
sought between actors since no particular expert group is a priori able to dominate the interaction 
and the result becomes extending one of the two policy advice into the future, thus maintaining the 
status quo. This power symmetry between expert actors is despite the participation of the Atomic 
Energy Authority at many of these meetings (which as the UK equivalent of the CEA in France has 
                                                 
59 Confidential letter to the Prime Minister from Lord Rothschild (Qa01401). 8th December. 1971 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
60 Tessa Blackstone notes, when describing the working of the CPRS, the importance of the position and regular contact with the Prime Minister’s 
Office (Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 29). 
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the technical knowledge to potentially shift the negotiation style to a more technical form). During 
an interdisciplinary meeting between the DTI, CPRS, the Treasury and AEA the topics of the 
current and future structure of nuclear construction industry and choice of main reactor technology 
for nuclear power plants are debated. Among the different actors the attempts at consensus means 
that an attempt to seem agreeable to the concerns of other actors, while making your own 
arguments.  
This point is perhaps clearest when Treasury and CPRS criticize the existing AGR reactor 
technology for not having lived up to the expectations that were promised about export potential of 
the technology and that there are still significant problems with the current AGR reactor designs 
current under construction in the U.K.. Treasury and CPRS seem to prefer the import-option for 
reactor design, but on the other hand are in favour of a previous concern raised by the DTI (and 
AEA internally) about the need to reform the nuclear construction industry. Especially the Treasury 
believe that restricting the current two big consortia of nuclear construction companies into one 
consortium that is more similar to an integrated corporation like Westinghouse or GEN in the 
United States would be a crucial first step before any decision is made about specific reactor types 
to develop further. CPRS has a less clear-cut opinion of particular reactor types, but generally 
agrees with the sentiment of the Treasury that no choice needs to be made right at this moment and 
thus are also in favour of the restructuring effort before decisive choices are made in nuclear reactor 
policy. In this way, the fundamental differences in instrumental policy ideas among the DTI and 
AEA on one hand and Treasury and CPRS on the other results in a stalemate of expert policy ideas. 
Either agreement is found by way of one of the groups giving concessions and thus leaving their 
instrumental policy idea, or focus is shifted towards the areas where agreement is possible. 
The result is the latter. The DTI and AEA both concur that the export potential has not been 
fulfilled, but that this should not necessarily mean a complete abandonment of the AGR technology 
or to begin importing foreign reactor designs like the Westinghouse-designed Light Water Reactors 
from the United States. Moreover, it is possible to begin new designs based on Steam Heavy Water 
Generating Reactors without much new retooling which should allow a prototype to be up and 
running in a year or two – which could allow for future experts of that technology - while the AGR 
design is being fixed. DTI and AEA both agree that restructuring efforts in accordance with the 
suggestions of the Vinter commission should be a first step for the nuclear policy and that nuclear 
reactor choice can be postponed.  
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What we observe in this meeting is a consensus-orientation that leads to the question of reactor type 
being pushed into the future and agreement on future talks of industry organisation. This is the 
result of multiple instrumental policy ideas being in play in a setting where no one actor holds an 
ability to veto or dominate the negotiation. This power asymmetry even extends to the highly 
technical nature we might have expected to find when discussing nuclear reactor choices. Instead, 
the meeting ends up postponing the technical choice, not for want of discussing it, but because there 
are variations in opinion which are not easily overcome. Even in cases where the AEA are present, 
whom we might have thought could hold authority on the subject matter of nuclear questions, the 
style of negotiation remains a cordial and consensus-oriented one. In that sense the negotiation style 
of the open bureaucratic structure in the United Kingdom can be said to foster status quo policy-
making where choices are often made when either the policy is sufficiently broadly defined that all 
actors can agree to it, or that consensus can be achieved by extending crucial decisions into the 
future61. 
5.3.2.3 Setting: Consensus and ideational inertia 
This splitting of oil policy between different expert groups meant that consensus had to be sought 
for advice to reach cabinet. This also meant a certain level of symmetry of power between the 
involved expert groups as no one group had a claim to authoritative policy ideas that could 
dominate the policy advice 
In general, the negotiation style requiring consensus means that most of the energy policy ideas 
rarely reach the level of debate their individual setting. Thus, we rarely see debates between CPRS 
or DTI for instance focusing on the particular degrees to which instrumental policy ideas should be 
followed. If following a policy idea requires consensus and there are conflicting instrumental ideas 
about the energy policy area in question, it becomes difficult for discussions to reach a point of 
detail where settings of ideas can be debated. This is perhaps not surprising given that the 
bureaucratic structure can affect policy ideas in the case of the CPRS and DTI who, after all, 
represent very different instrumental policy ideas on how to deal with oil supplies – CPRS 
                                                 
61 Note on interdepartmental meeting between DTI, Treasury and CPRS. (Qb453). 6th april. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
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preferring to maximise the domestic sources of energy and DTI preferring to increase cooperation 
between the government and multinational oil companies.  
It is perhaps slightly more surprising that this limiting dynamic of a negotiation style with many 
veto-actors also applies for the area of nuclear energy. At face value, we might have surmised that a 
greater level of technical sophistication involved in the policy matter at hand (nuclear physics and 
engineering being of the this sort) would result in the ensuing interaction patterns between experts 
to more quickly find a common ground on basic principles and then be able to debate the settings of 
a consensus on instrumental ideas. However, this is not the case. Instead, we see a similar dynamic 
to what occurred in the area of oil policy. The mechanism is slight different this time, however. 
Rather than outright to seem agreeable to the concerns of other actors, while making your own 
arguments, disagreements are accepted between the Treasury and CPRS on one hand and DTI and 
AEA on the other. The result becomes that the instrumental policy idea that separates them 
regarding the domestic or international sources of reactor technology is completely sidestepped – 
but not due to any one actor dominating the debate and removing the options. Rather, the involved 
experts agree they should rather focus on restricting the nuclear industry, which takes the form of a 
reduction in the number of consortia that constitutes the industrial production-side of the nuclear 
policy. Thus, the bureaucratic structure in the nuclear setting leads not only a stalemate but to one 
which concludes in the, at least temporary, abandonment of the general policy idea. 
5.3.3 Basis of expertise 
5.3.3.1 Overarching idea: Generalists and politicisation of technicality 
The general pattern that senior civil service consists primarily of classically trained university 
graduates is even more pronounced before the crisis. The Fulton report and civil service archive 
statistics both note the slow increase in number of employees with specialized training – especially 
economics and natural sciences. Often they were generally trained at one of the Oxbridge 
Universities (Civil Service Statistics archive n.d.). This pattern reinforces some of the general 
tendencies observed in the negotiation style about the lack of technical debates dominating 
interaction between experts. That is not to say that experts in the United Kingdom cannot debate 
technical issues, but the fact of most of them lacking specialized training or technical skills means 
that the debates take on a more openly political nature. These debates are more likely to be 
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intervened in by other political actors and policy decisions are therefore difficult to close debates 
around a decision because no particular basis of argument is more legitimate than others. The fact 
that no particular expertise was expected to dominate policy views on the basis of special 
knowledge is institutionalised in the coordinative preference for the policy-making within energy 
policy.  
The DTI had very few resources or formal capacities to control the AEA within nuclear energy (as 
did the department of energy when it was later formed). Their relatively meagre size combined with 
lack of specialization made the department highly reliant on outside sources of expertise in policy-
briefs, which was expressed explicitly by Tony Benn when he was Secretary for the DTI (see 
section 1.3). The lack of competence among several groups of experts within the bureaucratic 
structure of the United Kingdom was a more general phenomenon with the exception of the AEA, 
the CPRS comes closest to explicitly stating this lack of specialized knowledge competence. The 
CPRS admits to this limitation of technical knowledge as early as 1972. Upon being asked to 
comment on the possibility to shift energy demands from oil to other sources of energy, a key 
CPRS employee jokingly remarks when having to evaluate the technical details of different reactor 
choices to accelerate nuclear electricity production:  
“No one in CPRS understands documents (like these) …is it something to do with the effects of 
LSD, or what?...So,  we can't form an informed independent opinion” (p. 1) 62.  
While this is perhaps the strongest expression of this sentiment among different groups of experts, 
the CPRS also delivers an argument for how it is that coordination of such technical issues then 
function in a bureaucratic structure where technical specialization is not a strong characteristic. The 
same letter goes on to explain, that because different reactor choices affect the time-scales for 
construction, it relates directly to the expected demand curve for industry. Because the nuclear 
industry is expected to supplant some of the electricity generating requirements from oil and coal, 
the spill-over effects from these choices can be evaluated in terms of their consequences rather than 
on technical terms. In a sense, the CPRS starts from the policy implications on other energy sources 
– and the policy idea of ensuring energy supplies - and works backwards to gauge which policy 
                                                 
62 Letter from A. Fish to Rothschild – Our Dependence on Oil . 1. January 1972. CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. International Oil 
Questions). 
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ideas to adopt with regard to reactor choice63. Applying a similar logic allows much of the debates 
between different expert groups in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom to make sense. 
The overarching policy ideas stalemate identified in the sections previous, are thus reinforced. This 
becomes clearer when we examine the lack of technical argumentation in instrumental policy ideas.  
5.3.3.2 Instrumental idea: Generalists and keeping options open 
As we saw above, the debates about otherwise technical matters thus become driven by policy ideas 
that are affected by technical choices rather than the technicalities themselves. This reinforces the 
characteristic that no one particular expert group can dominate the discussion because the 
negotiations reflect policy ideas not directly related to understanding of the policy choice in 
question but rather to its expected consequences to other policy ideas – importance ascribed to 
which varies across expert groups. 
A relevant starting point is during the spring of 1972 in an interdepartmental meeting between the 
Treasury, DTI, CPRS and AEA. The meeting discusses the future of the nuclear industry in the 
United Kingdom and what policies should be advised for government. 
The Treasury pushed a policy idea of expenditure reductions above other concerns. Treasury takes 
the view inspired by a previous DTI report, on the structure of the nuclear industry, in suggesting 
merging and reducing the number of different consortia that make up the production capacity for 
nuclear plants in the United Kingdom. This would allow the nuclear industry to work more 
efficiently, which effectively would reduce cost. Where the Treasury differed from the DTI was that 
they did not believe any further choices regarding reactor technology and specific technicalities 
could wait until such a reorganisation had taken place. They feared that waiting would create strong 
pressure groups with special interests in persuading the government to invest extensive public 
expenditure on further research and development into a particular reactor type. Essentially, this 
would mean that spending on nuclear power plants should be limited to maintain sufficient 
technological capability to develop more advanced nuclear reactors once they were expected to 
become viable in the 1980s64. This effectively meant curbing spending on more nuclear power 
                                                 
63 Letter from A. Fish to Rothschild – Our Dependence on Oil . 1. January 1972. CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. International Oil 
Questions). 
64 Note on interdepartmental meeting between DTI, Treasury and CPRS. (Qb453). 6th april. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
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plants beyond what is necessary to keep the industry alive while restructuring industry to become 
more cost-competitive, but limiting the influence of this smaller group.  
The Department of Trade and Industry and the Atomic Energy Agency believed that restructuring 
the industry to fewer consortia that make up the production of nuclear power plants was a good 
idea. However, they were in disagreement with the Treasury in that they thought a new reactor 
technology should not be imported from outside the United Kingdom. Both expert groups agreed 
that the export potential of the AGR had fallen short of previous expectations. They suggested that 
research be maintained on the AGR reactors since five plants were already under construction. 
Completely abandoning the development of the AGR at this time would demoralise the industry.  
The CPRS takes a rather pragmatic view on the topic of nuclear policy. While some level of 
pragmatism is perhaps always required in an open bureaucratic system for negotiation to be 
achieved, we can gauge how indifferent the CPRS had been to the technicalities of nuclear reactor 
choice by examining their internal discussions before the above meeting took place. CPRS had in 
the spring of 1972 been internally debating what line to take on the question of nuclear reactor 
choice. Internal memo from Robin Butler to Lord Rothschild, John Rosenfeld and Robert Wade-
Gerry 65. In the letter, Butler explains the predicament with regard to choosing between different 
nuclear reactor types. Notice that the argument do not derive from technical descriptions of 
advantages or disadvantages, but rather from concerns over issues with existing AGR reactors being 
built and keeping the industry supported until a choice can be made about the future viability of the 
domestically developed AGR reactor.  
“Unless we order an AGR before the bugs have been got out of the present ones or an SGHWR 
before it is designed or a PWR before the safety inspectorate has formulated its regulations, there is 
nothing we can order before late 1973..(thus).. no nuclear plant can come on stream before 1979” 
(p. 2)66  
This effectively meant that any increases to electricity demands before then would have to be met 
by fossil fuels, which is exactly the price and availability of which the CPRS had before been 
                                                 
65 Letter from F.E. Robin Butler – Nuclear Reactors. (Qd0992). 27th march. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. International Oil 
Questions). 
66 Letter from F.E. Robin Butler – Nuclear Reactors. (Qd0992). 27th march. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. International Oil 
Questions). 
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worried about (see above). Thus, in the interdepartmental meeting in the spring of 1972, the CPRS 
has to make a choice in this dilemma of sub-optimal choices. While the CPRS leans towards 
importing PWR technology from the Americans or Germany, similar to the Treasury, they end up 
following the same line as the treasury by recommending to postpone a decision on the specificities 
of reactor types before it would be necessary (p. 2)67. It is important to note, that the view of the 
CPRS compared to the Treasury is driven more by a policy idea of positive pragmatism in the face 
of technological problems with existing domestically developed AGR reactors while accepting 
nuclear energy as a general solution to ensuring energy supplies rather than the cost concerns ideas 
that are dominant within the Treasury. 
What is particularly worth noting about the instrumental policy ideas floated by different expert 
groups is that the ideas take this less technically defined form and instead relate to more classic 
political distinctions – although this is consistent with the approach outlines by the CPRS in the 
previous section. This is despite the presence of the AEA at the interdepartmental meeting and the 
fact that the topics relate to nuclear industry organisation and nuclear reactor development choices – 
all topics that require a high level of technical sophistication to maintain. Despite this, the debates 
themselves revolve around more classic distinctions between political actors. The Treasury pushes a 
policy idea of expenditure reduction, which leads them to suggest importing technology rather than 
spend for potential economic gain in the future. The DTI and AEA have similar policy ideas about 
ensuring domestic production capacity by supporting industry both through maintaining ongoing 
AGR construction and through ironing out of problems, but also to select a new reactor type that is 
more likely to become an economic benefit in terms of exports in the future. From the views of the 
CPRS during the meeting, and their internal debates, we can affirm that while they are more 
confident in the need for nuclear energy than the views put forward by the Treasury, the CPRS did 
not have a clear preference for one nuclear reactor over another on technical grounds. Rather the 
question was a pragmatic one, to solve a dilemma between bad options that left the nuclear industry 
without anything to produce for several years, which, crucially, made the United Kingdom more 
dependent on fossil fuels for electricity generation in the interim period 
  
                                                 
67 Note on interdepartmental meeting between DTI, Treasury and CPRS. (Qb453). 6th april. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
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5.3.3.3 Setting: Primacy of non-technical knowledge 
Settings of ideas of the basis of expertise in energy policy generally reflect the patterns of non-
specialized knowledge characterising the debates. The consequence of this is seen in relation to 
several of the analysed instrumental ideas.  
One way we can observe the primacy of non-technical knowledge in the response to the CPRS 
report on the future of oil supplies. Despite drawing on the economics discipline to make 
projections for different scenarios of prices for future oil supplies, the general consensus was that 
while it was a worthwhile report to do, several ministers simply did not believe the scenarios for 
future oil prices were realistic (Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 77). Similarly, the legitimacy 
ascribed to economic special knowledge was reduced when CPRS based views on future oil 
dependence on this work in interdepartmental commissions between CPRS, DTI and Treasury. DTI 
in particular, did not accept the veracity of the different price scenarios the CPRS had projected and 
believed in any case that if there was a future oil supply reduction in the world market, then the 
intimate connections between the United Kingdom and BP and Shell would garner them special 
privileges in terms of oil supplies not given to other countries. Thereby the basis of knowledge of 
the involved actors push the discussions away from the technicalities and knowledge on the 
particular issue to a discussion of political relation (ibid). 
Returning to the discussion of nuclear reactor choice, we could have assumed would be more likely 
to involve debates of a technical kind they instead represent reductions of the technical aspects into 
settings consistent with instrumental policy ideas. In the case of the Treasury, they generally are not 
keen to recommend reactor technology, but would prefer purchasing pressurised water reactor 
systems (PWR) from either the Germans or the Americans because there had already been 
significant operational experience with these designs. While Treasury admits to some issues with 
safety, they believed that these issues could be overcome in the next two years, although no 
argument is given to support this timeline (p. 2) 68. What is important to the treasury is the setting 
policy idea of reduction of cost in the industry through the cheapest and most reliable reactor 
technology. This policy idea setting is defined in terms of general political goals rather than any 
                                                 
68 Note on interdepartmental meeting between DTI, Treasury and CPRS. (Qb453). 6th April. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
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technical arguments about the particular policy object or any kind of technical reasons for a 
particular design over another. 
The fact that the Treasury pushes for the option that maintains budget frugality is perhaps not the 
most unintuitive finding. However, it is slightly surprising that a similar tendency can be observed 
with the two expert groups consisting of the DTI and AEA - the latter of which is an expert on the 
technical matters of nuclear reactors. They believed that in order to protect domestic industry a 
second research project could be started with a Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR), 
which had the advantage of allowing the U.K to keep up with new technological innovations while 
supporting the maintenance of technical capabilities in the nuclear industry for a later time. 
Moreover, the possibility to later export the SGHWR technology to third countries would be 
preferable to importing technology that did not have this option69. The setting of the instrumental 
policy idea of protecting the nuclear industry is argued for using arguments that have no direct 
relevance to the technical choices that are being made. Given the general educational basis of the 
bureaucratic structure in the United Kingdom, this should not surprise as a general pattern. 
However, it is significant that it takes place so obviously even when technical expertise is at hand in 
the debates. The resulting policy dynamic is similar to what was described in the instrumental ideas 
section above. Treasury, CPRS, DTI and AEA all agree that the more pressing matter is to 
reorganize the nuclear industry rather than setting a direction for the technology to be used and thus 
they decide to postpone the decision of specific reactor choice70. 
  
                                                 
69 Note on interdepartmental meeting between DTI, Treasury and CPRS. (Qb453). 6th April. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
 
70 Note on interdepartmental meeting between DTI, Treasury and CPRS. (Qb453). 6th April. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. 
International Oil Questions). 
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After the crisis 
The oil crisis hits in the autumn of 1973. At the same time, a series of strikes among coal miners 
over the winter months occur and we see the creation of a combined department for energy issues. 
These developments culminate with the election in February of 1974 see the incumbent 
conservative government under Edward Heath exchanged by voters for the labour government 
under Harold Wilson (Ball and Seldon 1996, chap. 14)71. The capacity of the state manifests in 
different ways under this new government, but the general pattern of a weak capacity of the state 
still exhibit influence on the ideas behind attempts by the new government to take greater control of 
the oil extraction in the North Sea.  
The creation of the department of energy as an anchor point for a combined energy policy could 
potentially have had a changing effect on the consensus-seeking nature of expert group 
deliberations; however, this is not the case. The pattern of several different areas of energy sources 
defining the energy policy also continues after the crisis has hit. The analysis of the negotiation 
style surrounding the specific oil policy ideas regarding the North Sea oil show that politicisation 
and intervention across departments characterises the debates – with the Department of Energy 
standing somewhat alone after Tony Benn is selected as minister in 1975. Within nuclear energy, 
the basis of expertise is most clearly seen again as being relatively devoid of technical discussions. 
Reflective of the split among experts political intervention is required from Erik Varley in 1974 to 
select the SGHWR reactor and later in 1978, Tony Benn reverts this decision to continue the 
domestically developed, and otherwise cancelled, AGR design (Williams 1980, 338).  
  
                                                 
71 For an interesting perspective on how the 1974 election became the break with the paradoxical combination of political stability with economic 
instability that characterised much of the post-war period, see the chapter by Bogdanor in the same volume (Ball and Seldon 1996, chap. 15). 
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5.3.4 Capacity of the state 
5.3.4.1 Overarching idea: Indirect control of domestic oil 
The overarching policy idea relating to oil supplies is a general concern with maintaining energy 
supplies. The international strategy from before the crisis is maintained. The United Kingdom had 
maintained relatively good relations with parts of the Arabic world before and during the oil crisis. 
The diplomatic dimension sought before the crisis, Prime Minister Edward Heath informs cabinet 
that a personal guarantee has been given to him d been given to him by the Iranian Shah that oil 
supplies would not be limited from Iran something which is confirmed by a note on oil allocations 
from the Department of Energy to the Prime Minister in March 197472. While Kuwait was a 
potential problem, the promises of the largest oil producer of the OPEC alliance, Saudi-Arabia, to 
not decrease supplies to the U.K. put the British oil import situation in a potentially better 
diplomatic situation than other European countries (esp. the Netherlands) (The National Archives 
(TNA): CAB128/53 n.d., 217). For sake of comparison, it is worth noting that France attempted to 
follow a similar approach by way of being part of what OPEC countries in the UN diplomatic 
context called “non-hostile” countries, which meant their oil supplies were not supposed to be 
affected by sanctions (Venn 2002, 18–19)73. 
The oil crisis hits in autumn of 1973 and the cost of oil increases manifold as a consequence. By 
December, the risk of overtime-bans continuing and resultant strikes in the coal-mining sector is 
putting pressure on the government. The Department of Energy is created over the Christmas 
holiday in 1973, but before much can happen in this new department, an election is called on the 
28th of February 1974 leading to the cessation of government to the labour party. As the Labour 
government comes to power, the question of ensuring energy supplies is maintained as an 
overarching policy idea. The government attempts to deal with the different areas of energy policy 
does seemingly shift the passivity of the state with regard to energy policy somewhat. In the area of 
oil policy, the capacity of the state is applied to seek control over the future oil supplies to be gained 
from the North Sea (Donoughue 1987, 150). This is an interesting nuance, because the limited way 
                                                 
72 Letter and note from Eric Varley to Prime Minister - Oil allocations – projected oil supply, demand and stocks to end September 1974. 18. March 
1974. (PREM 16/251). The note on page 2 says: “Since these figures were prepared, the Government deal with Iran has been finalised» As a result a 
further two to three million tons of crude and products should become available before the end of September.” 
73 In judging the effectiveness of the oil-as-a-weapon strategy of OPEC, some scholars have noted how it effectively accelerated the process of oil 
being sold in a world market rather than governed through diplomatic bi-lateral or multilateral supply agreement. An acceleration of the 
internationalization of prices on oil would effectively reduce the potential impact of future supply constraints by producers (Goldthau et al. 2010, 40). 
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in which this ends up occurring in the analysis indicates the resilience of the weak capacity of the 
state to minor shifts in overarching policy ideas.  
Thus, without pre-empting the subsequent analysis too much, there are some limitations to the 
actual change this brings about. Several critiques exists that the licensing of fields between private 
and public actors could have been more to the advantage of the public. Essentially, they maintain 
that private oil companies got the long end of the deal because of being better prepared than the 
government (e.g. by knowing where and how much oil might be in different fields), but also due to 
a lack of will in the government to push for a better deal on the splitting up of the seabed through 
international courts (Pearson 1981, 122; Sampson 1975, 193). Backing up this view of a less 
fundamental shift than might on the surface seem to be present are internal documents from the 
Treasury evaluating the revenue tax on oil that followed when oil began being extracted.  
The document suggests a general agreement that the government knew the initial taxation scheme 
had been of a more cautious nature and thus that the government could have pushed harder on 
public interests vis-à-vis private interests at the time74. While the overarching policy ideas still 
seems to be affected by a weak capacity of the state, the overarching policy ideas of domestic oil 
does shift slightly, if cautiously under the labour government. Some of these later debates speak 
directly to the state-society control in ensuring energy supplies that the capacity of the state 
attempts to capture. It is at least part of the nuance of the developments, that there are internal 
debates between DTI and other cabinet ministers about the degree to which nationalizing oil 
extraction is beneficial and whether other concerns should take precedence.  
In a note for a cabinet meeting, then Secretary of State (FCO) James Callaghan (later prime 
minister), notes the severity of the situation and compares the negative effects of the balance of 
payment problem to the effects seen during the depression. He is concerned with the ability of some 
of the wider-reaching suggestions (e.g. by DTI) to “Powers which disturb the psychological  
ambience and cannot be implemented for lack of the necessary manpower should be postponed 
while energetically pursuing our aims of wider and stricter controls over the private sector” (p. 6)75.. 
Thus, while there are internal discussions of the use of greater reach of state control in matters of 
                                                 
74 Notes for meeting on GEN137 - UK/USA Double Taxation Treaty and Review of North Sea Fiscal Regime. (A866). 26 July 1978. - (CAB 
184/486)(Taxation and energy policy: review of North Sea fiscal regime).  
75 Secretary of State – Some thoughts on medium term strategy for the chequers meeting of the cabinet. (Qa880) 11. November 1974. - CAB184/165. 
(Central Policy Review Staff Files. Central Policy Review Staff Report ‘Energy 1974 and After’) 
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energy, and in particular, in domestic oil extraction, the internal debates suggest discussions about 
the breadth and intensity required. Therefore, while a greater role for state intervention is debated in 
relation to the overarching policy idea of ensuring energy supplies, in practice, there is still a 
preference for non-intervention and industry relations are still seen as vital for energy production 
despite ideas being a little more informed on state intervention. We see this distinction between 
domestic and international concerns in the instrumental ideas pushed by Treasury and Department 
of Energy (something we also observe in the negotiation style).  
5.3.4.2 Instrumental idea: Compartmentalized public control 
The newly formed Department of energy was headed by the Secretary of state for energy. After the 
election in early 1974, Edward Heath’s conservative government lost to the labour party lead by 
Harold Wilson. The overarching policy idea of ensuring energy supplies that had been followed by 
the department under Lord Carrington (albeit short period of existence) was continued under Erik 
Varley who became the new Secretary for Energy in the Wilson government. Erik Varley quickly 
got to work on drafting the outlines of a multipronged domestic response to the oil crisis. He laid 
out this plan during a cabinet meeting in early July of 1974. The policy ideas represented in this 
plan represent a slight shift in mentality towards oil policy in the United Kingdom compared to 
earlier. The instruments of this policy idea within oil involved five different but reinforcing 
elements: it required creation of the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC), instruments of 
taxation for company profits from the continental shelf extraction, including closing of loopholes in 
tax regulation, conditions for government participation in future licences (The National Archives 
(TNA): CAB128/54 n.d., 276–77).  
These policy ideas reflects a shift in the structure of energy policy compared to the previous 
government towards a more explicitly active state role in the extraction of domestic energy 
resources and reflecting an explicit goal of “move towards majority public participation on all 
licenses”(The National Archives (TNA): CAB128/54 n.d., 277). This is an example of attempts to 
increase the public control over a particular part of the energy sector through instituting a public 
actor in the market for oil extraction. The conditions under which such an actor operates and how it 
shifts the conditions for other market actors is an indication that some more interventionist policy 
ideas were being selected despite a generally weak capacity of the state. This is perhaps the best 
example of overt attempts to publically control future revenues from the North Sea fields. However, 
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it bears mentioning that the internal debates (also examined in negotiation style below) suggest the 
shift is not as stark as it may seem. As already mentioned, the government was aware that the 
tighter public control over licensing came with much less cost associated than would have been 
possible. As Tony Benn and Erik Varley switch ministerial remits in June 197576 the agenda of 
Tony Benn largely follows the path set by the contours of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines 
Act in 1975 of establishing a primarily state-controlled company to ensure state involvement in the 
energy extraction from the North Sea Oil and Gas fields. 
The nuclear energy policy shifted relatively slowly despite attempts by the electricity generating 
boards to seek an immediate expansion of domestic nuclear energy sources similar to what 
happened in France (Williams 1980, 208). The combination of increases to coal supplies made 
possible after agreement with the coal industry parties right after the labour government got into 
office in 1974 and the increasing availability of oil from the North sea was probably condition for 
the possibility that nuclear energy policy could be procrastinated to the extent that it was (Kohl 
1982, 101, 105).  
 
Between 1974 and 1975, work was done to establish an understanding of the supply situation with 
regard to nuclear energy. Here the general view of the weak role of the state is visible among several of 
the involved expert groups that co-author the report. Moreover, the number of expert groups involved 
again illustrates how many actors are involved in debates and their need to coordinate a common 
opinion on a given question. Within nuclear energy the discussions around the procurement and supply 
stability of uranium in UK nuclear power plants is discussed. After the crisis, an interdepartmental 
study group consisting of members from Department of Energy, AEA, BNFL, CEGB, CPRS, FCO 
and the institute of geological sciences is set up to write a report on the uranium supplies for the U.K.  
 
What remains is an impression of the active role of government being rather limited. While it is fair to 
say, that an indirect role in procurement is played by the government through the publically owned 
British Nuclear Fuel Limited (BNFL)77 it is worth noting the explicit way in which the government role 
is described in the report. Only a single section of the full report notes the role of government and 
essentially relegates it to use of diplomatic ties to facilitate connections where country-to-country 
                                                 
76 For the different views of this, internally, very contentious move, see (Benn and Winstone 2005, 320–24; Donoughue 1987, 52–56; Wilson 1979, 
143–45). 
77 BNFL was created as a publically owned company in 1971 from the former production arm of the Atomic Energy Authority 
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interaction is necessary to ensure supplies or potential agreements surrounding cooperation78. Thus, 
while the shift in policy instruments in oil policy gave a clearer image of a wish to grant greater public 
control (with some caveats) the type of role envisioned for direct government intervention is limited in 
nuclear energy to diplomatic help to secure overseas agreements for joint ventures for uranium mining. 
What is more, the combined group of experts that wrote the report emphasise that conditions for such 
intervention favours the commercial interests involved: “… action at Government level would need to 
be carefully coordinated with the commercial negotiations”(p. 17)79.. That would mean that while the 
government of course has a role in the creation of facilities that utilize the nuclear material, the 
conditions under which they should be acquired seem to leave a lot to market forces and government 
role as a facilitator rather than strategic controller. 
 
5.3.4.3 Setting: Limited intervention 
The setting of policy ideas affected by capacity of the state in the United Kingdom after the crisis 
reflect the slight shift in focus in one area of energy policy and the maintenance of status-quo in 
another. In the area of oil policy, we see the largest shift of policy ideas towards a seemingly greater 
public control over the patterns of interaction in oil extraction. The increased setting of public 
control is difficult to evaluate per se, since the reference point is a somewhat new set of 
instrumental policy ideas – state controlled actors in the market for oil extraction and licensing.  
That being said, it is worth repeating the limited scale at which the licensing cost and to which 
fields they apply are followed through by the state. This is both a critique in the literature as well as 
a point of contention within the government as we saw above. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
while BNOC was a publically controlled company it was only partially owned by the state. To some 
extent, the state capacity of the United Kingdom was maintained through partial ownership of 
British Petroleum who held 20% of North Sea Oil. This level of control was however reduced in 
1977 when the Government decided to reduce its holdings in BP from 48 percent to 31% with an 
explicit intention to maintain the relationship between the state and private companies in a way that 
did not breach with what was considered the “traditional practice of non-intervention in the 
administration of the company as a commercial concern” (Pearson 1981, 123). This meant that 
while the institution of BNOC did mean more interventionist settings of policy ideas than what had 
                                                 
78 It is not clearly specified, but what this probably implies is cooperation on the SGHWR reactor project since it technically similar to the nuclear 
reactor technology in utilized in the Canadian CANDU-reactor. 
79 Study of the Security of Uranium Supplies to the UK. (EG 7/211). Study of security of uranium supplies to UK: final report 1974-1975. 
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been previously seen in the area of oil energy it is also worth noting some of the explicitly chosen 
limitations regarding these ideas are still emanating from the overall weak capacity of the state 
bureaucratic structure.  
In this light, while the setting of policy ideas related to oil are towards more interventionism, these 
changes need to be put into a diachronic context to gauge their individual changes properly. The 
debates around which parts of the North Sea seabed represented international and domestic waters – 
and thus were eligible for state control – the role of the government had previously also been on the 
cautious side vis-à-vis private enterprise. The potential for oil extraction from the North Sea outside 
the coast of Scotland was already known by multinational oil companies before the British 
government(Pearson 1981, 122). In defining the national boundaries in the Continental Shelf Act in 
1964, the U.K. was allocated 35% of the North Sea, despite potentially being eligible for a larger 
share of the oil-rich seabed had the issue been taken further (e.g. international courts) (Sampson 
1975, 193). 
In nuclear energy, the setting of policy ideas of capacity of the state is actually moving the opposite 
direction to the pattern seen in oil. Moreover, it is moving towards less control in an area of energy 
policy where states tend to keep tighter control (Simpson 1983). Of course, the policy ideas that 
relate to acquisition of nuclear fuels do not make up the only aspect of nuclear energy policy. 
However, it is interesting to note that the debates in nuclear fuel acquisition, which involve a 
majority of expert groups and less politicians, are characterising tendencies of following existing 
modes of operation for the state capacity: in this case, to seek a relatively weak state capacity 
through primarily aiding other existing actors to achieve cooperation to acquire nuclear fuels.  
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5.3.5 Negotiation style 
Before the crisis we observed how the different groups of experts in the bureaucratic structure 
coordinate across and between each other on multiple issues on a per-topic basis. Moreover, the 
area of energy policy was formally split across several departments with overlapping competences. 
After the crisis, the creation of the Department of Energy partially addresses this by creating a 
common department for the policy area. However, the negotiation style is still characterised by a 
multitude of different expert groups and the role of the department is limited to coordinating policy. 
These dynamics lead to lowest-common denominator consensus on several occasions and the 
politicization of the energy policy area does not become less pronounced after Erik Varley and 
Tony Benn switch places as head of the Department of Energy in 1975. This leads to conflicts with 
other groups of experts in both oil policy and nuclear policy with the Treasury and CPRS, among 
others. 
5.3.5.1 Overarching idea: Tighter coordination 
One of the final changes that Edward Heath manages to institute before a snap-election in the spring 
of 1974 changes government to labour is the creation of the department of energy over the 
Christmas holiday in 1973. The explicit goal of the department was to facilitate better coordination 
within the many areas of energy that had characterised energy policy of the United Kingdom until 
then. In that sense, the creation of the department might be expected to reduce some of the patterns 
exhibited by the negotiation style in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom. This is 
because a strong coordinating actor with agenda setting privileges at the centre of energy policy 
debates would be expected to be able to reduce the tendency to for a multiplicity of different policy 
ideas to draw in different directions even if the number of actors involved is not reduced. 
This is not the case. The key problem is that the creation of the Department of Energy does not 
constitute the introduction of a new actor into the negotiations that has formal power to decide on a 
direction (Pearson 1981, 53). The role of the department is primarily to coordinate the different 
policy areas related to energy rather than to combine the different expertise into one big department. 
One the one hand its creation does attempt to simplify some of the institutional decision-making 
issues that have characterised the organisation of expertise in energy policy in the U.K. before the 
oil crisis by making one government department responsible for the coordination and creation of 
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national policy. On the other, the size, competences and formal remit means that it does more to 
seek consensus and coordination than to outright select policy ideas or change number of actors 
involved in decision-making – even if it does attempt centralise the discussions around a particular 
department. Within the legal framework that the department does allow for, there has been conflict 
among the many involved actors as to which policy instruments should be used to effectuate this 
tighter coordination of energy policy to facilitate the overarching policy idea of ensuring energy 
supplies. As we shall see in the policy instruments, the increased use of taxation on companies was 
not favoured in the area of oil, because several expert groups and other departments did not agree to 
them – sometimes because they considered the specific ideational instruments too strong 
interventions80. The overarching policy idea of tighter coordination is thus fostered within the 
context of the existing open bureaucratic structure where the Department acts as another veto-player 
whose role is to better coordinate interaction of the others. While this might arguably have been 
effectual in centralizing energy debates among experts to always involving a particular actor, this 
did only increase the tendency for negotiations to be characterised by attempts to seek coherence 
and thus a need for agreement which leads to status-quo maintenance unless political intervention 
into the debates expert-groups is made. We will now turn to how different policy instruments 
manifested in these negotiations between different expert groups. 
5.3.5.2 Instrumental idea: Public control versus diplomacy and expert gridlock 
The instrumental policy ideas affected by negotiation style after the crisis represent itself in two 
different areas. The first is the way in which an increased role of public control in domestic oil 
extraction is debated. The other is the area of nuclear policy. Where the first has high levels of 
direct political negotiation between department heads and Ministers, the second is more driven by 
experts themselves. 
Tony Benn and the Petroleum Revenue Tax 
When Tony Benn becomes Secretary for Energy, he pursues the agenda of trying to maintain 
national control of public oil fields. The instrumental policy idea that he pushes is taxation through 
the Petroleum Revenue Tax, which was first introduced by his predecessor Erik Varley in early 
                                                 
80 According to the former advisor to Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, this was referred to as “Bennery” by rest of Whitehall (Donoughue 1987, 
52). 
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1975. At that time, there was some trepidation about pushing too hard on the PRT because 
especially the FCO and Treasury were afraid of the international repercussions. Especially with 
regard to the United States. Benn wishes to increase the PRT so the public gets a greater share of 
the oil revenues from the North Sea. The ensuing debates between the Department of Energy under 
Benn and especially the Treasury are indicative of a distinction in policy ideas among ministries as 
to whether international or domestic concerns should primarily influence energy policy. 
The Treasury under Denis Healy is supportive of a greater public share of the profits from the North 
Sea oil fields and is personally in favour of the changes to the Petroleum revenue tax suggested by 
the Department of Energy under Tony Benn81. However, the Treasury believes that this support for 
the PRT increases must be a balanced approach that takes into account the partnership between 
private and public sector. This entails securing the needs of the community through a fair share of 
benefits arising from national resources in the North Sea while also taking into account the risks 
involved for the private sector and the need for a fair rate of return on investment into developing 
oil extraction in these areas.(p. 3)82. This indicates that while there is agreement on the instrumental 
idea of taxation by the state of private companies, the Treasury is not willing to go as far as the 
suggestions by the Department of Energy and perhaps more interestingly, they believe that oil 
policy should be considered in lieu of international concerns rather than primarily the goal of the 
policy. This initially seems to produce a stalemate of ideas described above as part of the open 
negotiation style. 
However, this picture is mitigated by the fact the aspect of this debate that it consists primarily of 
actors with direct political power, not through the employment at a department or similar. Thus, it 
can indicate the role of political influence on decision-making when asymmetries of power are 
allowed to dictate a discussion – as opposed to negotiations involving less political actors. This is 
clear on the question of whether the state-controlled oil company (BNOC) should continue to be 
exempt from the PRT or should instead operate on equal ground to other market actors in the North 
Sea. The treasury through Denis Healy believes this exemption for public companies should be 
removed (p. 2)83 . The Department of Energy on the other hand believes that BNOC should 
                                                 
81 Notes for meeting on GEN137 - UK/USA Double Taxation Treaty and Review of North Sea Fiscal Regime . (A866). 26 
July 1978. - (CAB 184/486)(Taxation and energy policy: review of North Sea fiscal regime) 
82 Letter and statement to Secretary of State for Department of Energy from Private Secretary to Exchequer B.S. Morris of Treasury - Proposed 
Changes in PRT. (A1084). 31. July 1978. 
83 Notes for meeting on GEN137 - UK/USA Double Taxation Treaty and Review of North Sea Fiscal Regime . (A866). 26 
July 1978. - (CAB 184/486) 
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continue to be exempt from the PRT tax, a point on which the Treasury disagrees, but which seems 
to be a view more broadly shared in government when the cabinet secretary mentions in a letter: 
“Mr. Benn is isolated on this one”84 . In addition, the Treasury believes that maintaining special 
status for BNOC in terms of tax exemption on the basis of it being a public company would bring 
the United Kingdom into conflict with other countries in the European community they recently 
joined. According to the Chancellor, BNOC’s exemption has already attracted critical attention of 
the EC commission although no formal complaint has been raised yet. If the special exemption for 
BNOC is removed it would potentially become easier to make the United States accept an increase 
to the PRT because it could be argued that the government no longer discriminated in favour of 
BNOC (p.2)85. 
The internal conflicts over the role and limits of public intervention in the area of oil policy are 
evident in relation to another aspect of the North Sea oil. The conflict is once again between the 
Department of Energy and Treasury. The Department of Energy argues that the current negotiations 
with private oil companies about the licensing and drilling rights should involve the department of 
energy since it relates to questions of oil extraction and control over public energy sources. The 
department of energy is refused access to the deliberations and instead they take place between 
Inland Revenue and the relevant private oil companies. Treasury disagrees with the department of 
energy about intervention on the legal basis that inland revenue is not allowed to disclose taxation 
details from private companies to other departments and further that the Department of Energy has 
no legal statutory influence on questions of taxation – despite the fact that they relate to taxes on 
energy productions in publically controlled fields. The fact that “discussions cover in detail the 
companies' contractual arrangements with foreign governments..”  which makes it “simply not 
possible for officials other than Inland Revenue to have a seat at meetings with the companies” (p. 
1)86.  
The discussion between them is escalated to the level of the Prime Minister, when Tony Benn as 
acting Secretary of State for Energy writes a personal letter to the Prime Minister arguing for the 
                                                 
84 Letter from Secretary of Cabinet, John Hunt, to Mr. Wicks - United Kingdom/United States Double Taxation Treaty 
and Review of North Sea Fiscal Regime (A07681). 18. July 1978 - (CAB 184/486)(Taxation and energy policy: review of North Sea fiscal regime). 
85 Notes for meeting on GEN137 - UK/USA Double Taxation Treaty and Review of North Sea Fiscal Regime  (A866). 26 
July 1978. - (CAB 184/486)(Taxation and energy policy: review of North Sea fiscal regime). 
86 Letter to the Prime Minister from Chief Secretary to the Treasury- Tax loopholes open to oil companies (A923). 3. October 1977 - (CAB 
184/486)(Taxation and energy policy: review of North Sea fiscal regime). 
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allowed presence of his department in talks with private oil companies87. Here we see how the 
negotiation style with multiple different departments and overlapping areas of competence directly 
affect the conflicts between experts. Moreover, the area of energy policy relating to oil, seems also 
to have a greater direct involvement by political actors like Tony Benn and Denis Healey. This is 
consistent with the open bureaucratic structure and weak capacity of the state, as some of the policy 
instruments suggested by Department of Energy are not consistent with existing structures of 
relationship between the state and market. This manifests in conflicts between the Department of 
Energy on one side and the Treasury on the other over whether domestic or international concerns 
should weight most heavily on petroleum revenue taxation. This ideational conflict is lost by the 
Department of Energy, as attempts to involve higher political intervention into the conflict fails, 
when the Prime Minister sides with the view represented by the Treasury. 
Nuclear energy ideas 
The nuclear energy policy is another area where we can observe the instrumental policy ideas that 
manifest within the specific negotiation style of the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom. 
A key difference from the example in oil above is that these debates are rarely escalated to 
discussions between a few key ministries that involve the ministers themselves. Rather the pattern 
of policy ideas as they manifest here may have origin in a broad political concern, but are debated 
primarily by experts. In nuclear energy, most actors seem to agree that the current form of the AGR 
reactors have been a failure and the plants currently underway are riddled with expensive 
production problems. 
Fear of technological irrelevance, European competition and future path ahead 
Soon after the Labour government comes into power, Lord Rothschild of the CPRS has a meeting 
with the new Secretary for Energy, Erik Varley. Rothschild notes that the Minister is worried about 
being left behind in cooperation on nuclear technology development and has quandaries about 
which future nuclear reactor technology the United Kingdom ought to support88. Specifically, the 
Minister was worried about speed at which other European countries were deploying low cost Light 
                                                 
87 Letter to the Prime Minister from Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn - Tax loopholes open to oil companies (A713). 27. September 1977 - 
(CAB 184/486)(Taxation and energy policy: review of North Sea fiscal regime). 
88 MEETING MR. VARLEY/ROTHSCHILD. (Qa0340). 30 April 1974. - CAB184/165 
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Water Reactors and that in 15 years’ time the United Kingdom would have inadequate nuclear 
capacity89. While Rothschild is at first unsure what this implies for specific choices, he sees the  
instrumental policy idea of increasing cooperation on nuclear technology development as consistent 
with the existing view within the CPRS90. 
The CPRS has since before the crisis believed that the nuclear energy programme faced a dilemma 
between construction failures of the AGR, time to develop an alternative technology (or import one) 
while keeping the nuclear industry alive in the meantime (as we saw  earlier when they sided with 
the Treasury on buying LWR technology). Therefore, CPRS saw the instrumental policy idea of 
international cooperation on reactor technology development as a way to alleviate cost and reduce 
the risk of falling behind other European countries in the technological development on nuclear 
energy. By 1974, the CPRS is frustrated of the failure to ensure such cooperation to take place. 
Internal correspondence emphasises the need to quickly do something to make sure cooperation (of 
fast breeder technology) is going ahead with all possible speed, which requires CPRS to attempt to 
affect policy more: “It seems to me that our past record over nuclear reactors has been too bad for it 
to be justifiable to leave all this to chance (and, by implication, the Department of Energy!)”91. 
Another internal letter puts the responsibility for these delays at the lack of coordinative role from 
the department of energy in ensuring cooperation on FBR development with the French and 
Germans: “The Department (of energy) did not think the time ripe for such a report. I suspect that 
this latter reason is largely a post hoc rationalisation of the Department's failure to fulfil their 
remit.”92. The CPRS thus shares the view of Erik Varley that the choice of nuclear reactor 
technology should be made soon so that the United Kingdom does not fall behind other countries in 
a rapidly developing field but also, for CPRS more importantly, allow the United Kingdom another 
source of electricity to buffer against in case oil supplies become scarcer. 
From the analysis of the negotiation style within nuclear energy before the crisis, it was clear that 
there was disagreement between the CEGB and CPRS (and Treasury) on the instrumental idea of 
                                                 
89 MEETING MR. VARLEY/ROTHSCHILD. (Qa0340). 30 April 1974. - CAB184/165 
90 At first, Rothschild believes this is pushing Varley to veer towards LWR reactor technology (which likely would imply some form of licensing or 
import of technology), but after conferring with Sir John Hunt Rothschild realised it might also mean that the Secretary had decided to support the 
further development of the domestically developed AGR reactors but was worried about the wisdom of such a decision. See, MEETING MR. 
VARLEY/ROTHSCHILD. (Qa0340). 30 April 1974. - CAB184/165 
91 Letter from AB Urwick to Sir K. Berrill – Fast Breeder Reactors (Qa794). 23. October 1974. CAB184/165 (Central Policy Review Staff Files. 
Central Policy Review Staff Report ‘Energy 1974 and After’) 
92 Letter from JRS Guinness to Sir K. Berrill – International Cooperation on Fast Breeder Reactors. 23. October 1974. CAB184/165 (Central Policy 
Review Staff Files. Central Policy Review Staff Report ‘Energy 1974 and After’) 
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pushing a new SGHWR reactor design as a complete alternative to the AGR. The CEGB 
maintained the line that they had indicated before the crisis that the choice of reactor types and 
alternative technological choices were unclear and that this therefore required choices to be kept 
open with regard to choosing Fast Breeder Reactors or high temperature reactors as new technology 
for nuclear industry to construct93. This seems to indicate that the CEGBs instrumental policy idea 
of domestically developing the SGHWR before the crisis had more to do with preventing the 
Treasury and CPRS preference of ordering licensed LWR reactor designs from foreign companies 
than it had to do with the purported benefits of developing the SGHWR as a future export 
technology. Rather, the secondary purpose of maintaining work on the AGRs already under 
construction may have been the preferred option despite the admitted failures of the programme. 
Breaking the institutionalised expert-gridlock 
Some of the existing expert groups in the United Kingdom have realised that the policy ideas of 
different expert groups are entrenched with different actors. CPRS believes that the different expert 
groups have vested interest in one or the other reactor technology choice94 and therefore attempt to 
get a second opinion with advice from Lord Hinton and Dr. Rotherham95, which they discuss at a 
meeting with CPRS officials in the spring of 1976. Hinton and Rotherham believe that minor 
licensing of technology elements and redesign would allow the prototype SGWHR at Winfrith to 
scale from 100MWe to around 200MWe and allow the UK to be in a dominant competitive position 
in around 4 years. This, in turn, should give them plenty of opportunity for exporting the technology 
and increasingly so “when one of the US reactors (which was of a competing LWR reactor design) 
blows up” (p. 1). Beyond that, a firm decision should be made to research the future technology of 
fast breeder reactors.  
It was imperative that this resulted in a larger scale installation because it would not allow the 
generating board to redesign a finished product (p.2 )96 The key concern is that speed is of the 
essence to get decisions locked in, so development could start. Hinton and Rotherham seem to share 
                                                 
93 Letter from F.E. Robin Butler – Nuclear Reactors. (Qd0992). 27th march. 1972 - CAB184/57 (Central Policy Review Staff. International Oil 
Questions). and Nuclear reactor programmes – Agreed note of a Meeting on 20th December 1974. (RC/16/01). 20th December 1974 - CAB184/165 
94 According to Lucas,1982, this is not an unreasonable observation. He claims the “CEGB did not hide their intention to kill the SGHWR within this 
committee, and it succeeded”. At the beginning of 1978, the UKAEA was forced to recommend to the government that work on the SGHWR be 
discontinued. (In: (Kohl 1982, 105)) 
95 Lord Hinton and Dr. Rotherham had a common background with AEA but worked together when they both joined the GECB in the late 1950s 
where Rotherham joined as Member for Research in 1958 and Lord Hinton had become Chairman the year before. In 1966 Hinton became chancellor 
of Bath University of Technology where Rotherham joined as Vice-chancellor in 1966 (University of Bath - Rotherham catalogue n.d., 4). 
96 Note for the record of a meeting at 4:15pm on Monday 9. February 1976. (Qd04597) - CAB184/292. (Energy policy: Fast Reactor Project 1975) 
153 | P a g e  
 
the view previously espoused by CPRS that part of the problem of the current nuclear policy has 
been the multitude of different imperatives from different actors that has characterised the 
developments so far. They argue that development is best ensured by separating development from 
influence of Whitehall and AEA. (p. 2) 97.  
The findings of this report show us a few things. First that the question of reactor technology has 
still not been firmly taken despite officially cancelling the AGR reactor and starting development of 
SGHWR in 1974, even if most actors in the area of nuclear energy want to see the field develop. 
This point is explicit raised when they argue: “If Cabinet could agree to proceed with the Fast 
Reactor on the lines suggested in our Report, it might provide a healthy lesson for the CEGB and 
the Consortium to tell them that, as they have delayed the SGEWR for so long, government feels 
that it ought not to be proceeded with, this and a decision to proceed with the Fast Reactor as 
suggested in our Report might really wake people up” (p. 1) 98. The external experts express views 
consistent with the negotiation style characterised by multiple veto-actors. The different 
instrumental policy ideas on reactor technology has held up the development, because agreement 
could not be achieved and instead gridlock ensued. Moreover, the introduction of a new expert 
group into the discussion of nuclear technology is indicative of the open nature of negotiations 
reinforcing the institutional pattern of the negotiation style of the United Kingdom with multiple 
veto-actors with competing policy-ideas.  
  
                                                 
97 They suggest that a project similar to what they describe could probably be developed by R.V. Moore (chief reactor designer of Caldor Hall at 
AEA) if he could be isolated from Whitehall and AEA leadership influence. See,.Note for the record of a meeting at 4:15pm on Monday 9. February 
1976. (Qd04597) - CAB184/292. (Energy policy: Fast Reactor Project 1975) 
98 Letter to Dr. Hart from Lord Hinton (Qa2876). 23. February 1976. (CAB184/292) 
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The chat and undisclosed personal communication 
This report and the surrounding debates is relevant for another aspect of the instrumental policy 
ideas in the negotiation style of the United Kingdom. It illustrates how the instrumental policy ideas 
among experts rely on personal relationships between experts to insure support. These personal 
communications function similar to the “chat”. The department of Energy has correspondence with 
the CPRS over a period of time debating the points of this report, despite not explicitly being part of 
the remit of the report or wanting to involve the authors in that follow-up debate. The interaction 
pattern reinforces the personal nature of interaction in the bureaucratic structure of the United 
Kingdom. In the cover-letter to the report sent by Sir Jack Rampton of The Department of Energy to 
Kenneth Berril at the CPRS, he expressed the desire to be “kept informed” of further discussions on 
the topic, but that Hinton and Rotherham not be shown the views of the Department on the issue.99. 
This level of explicit secrecy reinforces the role of personal interaction and makes transparency of 
debate more difficult.  
In their comments, the Department of Energy questions the veracity of the claim that a domestic 
reactor technology is, as they claim, the sought goal by the authors of the report100. The type of 
cooperation suggested by the CPRS before (and also by the report in question) is not preferred by 
the Department of Energy. Instead, they prefer cross-country cooperation only in specific technical 
issues like the cooperation of centrifuge development. This more pragmatic and ad-hoc type of 
cooperation emphasises a level of flexibility in the nuclear policy seen earlier with the Central 
Electricity Generating Board when discussing future reactor designs before the crisis. The 
department re-emphasises their instrumental policy idea of a domestically controlled solution, 
which is more in line with AEA and GECB when they note they are explicitly against cooperation 
with other countries that involves shared control over programmes101. These specific policy 
instrument ideas are quite similar to what we saw before the crisis and thus within nuclear policy 
the same issues still exist and do not seem to be decided on. What is more, this pattern is consistent 
with the expected policy pattern of a negotiation style, which is characterised by many actors who 
hold veto power over what decisions can be agreed as the advised policy to follow. 
                                                 
99 Letter to Kenneth Berril from Jack Rampton and report(Qa2599). 9. January 1976. Fast Reactor: Report by Lord Hinton and Dr. Rotherham . 
Comments by Department of Energy (RC/18/03) (CAB184/292) 
100 Fast Reactor: Report by Lord Hinton and Dr. Rotherham . Comments by Department of Energy (RC/18/03) (CAB184/292) 
101 “We would not be in favour of the sort of dual control embodied in the original CENTEC and URENCO structure” (p. 3) 
155 | P a g e  
 
The role of Tony Benn? 
In part through the back and forth dynamics just illustrated, the decision of Erik Varley in 1974 to 
go with the SGHWR reactor has thus been procrastinated. In a letter to the Prime Minister, the 
Secretary of State for Energy informs that the cooperation in nuclear technology is moving ahead 
between France and Germany and that the U.K. might be left behind. He emphasises it is wise to 
make clear the commitment of the United Kingdom: “…But I think we should wait until we are 
more certain about our own position before deciding how best to follow up internationally” (p. 
2)102. The decision on reactor technology was previously claimed by the CPRS to have been due to 
the Department of Energy. However, it is not clear from this position that Tony Benn (and the wider 
labour government) preferred the domestically developed AGR reactors as later claimed by 
observers (Blackstone and Plowden 1990, 81; Kohl 1982, 105). Tony Benn’s own diaries suggest 
he is puzzled as to the sudden change of direction when he is asked to cancel the SGHWR on June 
6th 1976 (Benn and Winstone 2005, 328).  
It is probably fair to say that Benn did not have much faith in the American LWR designs preferred 
by Treasury and CPRS which he notes he “shall fight like a tiger”. On the other hand, he also 
explicitly claims to have no particular preference for either the SGHWR or the AGR (albeit he 
thinks Britain ought to be proud of its achievements in the field)(Benn and Winstone 2005, 329). It 
is no secret that his general political views made him a friend of the coal unions, but that does not 
directly have to translate into being against nuclear power. That being said, later interviews indicate 
that he had become increasingly disillusioned with nuclear power as a technology (Dale 2009). 
Irrespective of the underlying motives for this move, the implication of waiting in a system 
otherwise prone to gridlock between experts is just that – a further procrastination of the 
development of the nuclear programme. In the absence of a political intervention into the expert 
groups that disagree on instrumental ideas of the nuclear policy, an open negotiation style like the 
one in the United Kingdom is prone to indecision. It is not until in 1978 when a political decision is 
made by Tony Benn and the government to revert to the AGR reactor technology that was left 
behind in favour of SGHWR in 1974 (Williams 1980, 258). If nothing else, these developments of 
back-and-forth in the nuclear policy area shows that instrumental policy ideas may shift over time, 
                                                 
102 Letter from Secretary of Energy Tony Benn to Prime Minister (Qa2790). February 6th 1976. (CAB184/292) Energy policy: Fast Reactor Project 
1975. 
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but as we have seen before and after the crisis, debates between veto-actors can stifle decision-
making based on these ideas. 
5.3.5.3 Setting: Multiple expert groups and multiple veto-points 
The settings of policy ideas reflect the instrumental policy ideas identified above. Within the 
nuclear area, the CPRS develops an instrumental policy idea of cooperation on nuclear development 
to speed up the development of nuclear reactors. The report by Lord Hinton lays the blame for 
procrastination of nuclear reactor development on the AEA. Interestingly, the debate surrounding 
this report does not directly involve the authors of the report. Instead, the negotiation style of the 
bureaucratic structure in the United Kingdom again presents us with the characteristic of the 
personal communication and function of the “chat” in decision-making. The deliberations about the 
findings of the report and the impetus for catching up on reactor development is responded to by the 
Department of Energy in a personal letter to a member of the CPRS.  
The settings of the instrumental ideas of cooperation are laid out in terms of remaining flexible and 
preference for ad-hoc cooperation on individual technologies. These settings of cooperation are 
conditioned by the negotiation style in the bureaucratic structure because they represent patterns of 
interaction where a flow of informal policy ideas is shifted between expert actors in a way that is 
not transparent to all the relevant experts in the policy field. This means that even if there were not 
the tendency to seek consensus already noted, it would also be difficult to achieve any kind of 
decision on the basis consensus on policy ideas one expert group is not willing to share with others. 
It is difficult to say exactly how widespread this phenomenon is, but it seems to make the already 
observed consequences of the negotiation style that is prone to status-quo and indecision even more 
likely.  
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5.3.6 Basis of expertise 
5.3.6.1 Overarching idea: Tighter coordination of non-technicality 
After the crisis hits, the Department of Energy is formed and this changes the potential basis of 
expertise in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom. However, the department is 
relatively small organisation by Whitehall standards (Pearson 1981, chap. 2). The new department 
also resembles previous patterns of the basis of expertise among departments in the bureaucratic 
structure of the United Kingdom. While there had been a shift in the number of economists hired 
from the early 1970s to 1974, the larger share of employees were still classically trained – often at 
one of the Oxbridge Universities (Civil Service Statistics archive n.d.). The way in which the 
addition of the Department of Energy to the group of expert actors affects the debates is thus mostly 
by reinforcing the general trend of multiple actors interacting on an equal footing resulting in the 
need for consensus. Perhaps not entirely surprising this was part of the intent when setting up the 
department. This point is directly reflected in the purpose clause for the creation of the Department 
of Energy which emphasises the role of the department as being the “coordination of the different 
energy concerns into one coherent national energy policy” (Pearson 1981, 53). This pattern 
reinforces some of the general tendencies observed in the negotiation style about the lack of 
technical debates dominating interaction between experts.  
That is not to say that experts in the United Kingdom cannot debate technical issues, but the fact of 
most of them lacking specialized training or technical skills means that the debates take on a more 
openly political nature. The changes resulted in comparing the period before and after the crisis is 
thus primarily that the role of the DTI is reduced in favour of the Department of Energy, but whose 
degree of specialization among employee backgrounds is similar. The overarching policy idea 
within energy after the crisis is thus still ensuring energy supplies, but when examining the 
instrumental ideas and settings of ideas forwarded by different experts, we can observe how the 
generalist nature of the basis of expertise reinforced some of the institutional pressures we observed 
in the negotiation style. 
  
158 | P a g e  
 
5.3.6.2 Instrumental idea: The dominance on non-technicality even in nuclear policy 
Perhaps a good illustration of the effect of the generalist basis of expertise on policy idea content is 
in the areas of energy policy where we would expect it most likely that the opposite would be 
observed. In nuclear policy, we would expect the most tendency for technical discussion to take 
place given the requirement for policy choices are related to choices about nuclear reactor types, 
organisation of industry to support highly complex productive capacities, future technological 
advances – all of which require long lead times and thus must be thought through thoroughly before 
making decisions. These factors speak toward nuclear policy as being the area where the 
expectations of the basis of expertise about open or closed bureaucratic systems should be 
strongest103.  
In a meeting on the 20. December 1974 the Central Electricity Generating Board, National Nuclear 
Corporation, South of Scotland Electricity Board, AEA, British Nuclear Fuels meet at the atomic 
energy division of the Department of Energy104. Since this is a full year since the creation of the 
department and present at the meeting are several actors, who should have specialized technical 
expertise related to nuclear energy questions, we would expect technical debates to be present here, 
if not for the bureaucratic structure of the basis of expertise in United Kingdom. 
Again we see a pattern of the specific policy ideas being in play have very little to do with the 
technicalities associated with nuclear energy. The department of energy primarily serves a 
coordinative role during the meeting, by summarizing the views of other participants, which speaks 
to the negotiation style described earlier. This tendency is continued even when debates begin to 
substantiate the instrumental policy idea of the department of flexibility in cooperation, which 
means to develop cooperation on nuclear technologies independently on different technologies, 
rather than fixing cooperation to an entire project consistent with views expressed by the NNC and 
AEA (p. 4)105.  
                                                 
103 This point is a general argument about the specific nature of nuclear technology and policy relating to it and the implications of the theoretical 
framework. As such it should apply equally to the French case as well. However, due to dominance of nuclear energy as the primary energy policy 
response to the oil crisis, indirect control within the case by comparing the dynamics of different energy policy areas is less opportune for the case of 
France compared to the U.K., which is characterised by an energy policy that encompasses several energy sources and areas.  
104 Agreed Note of a Meeting on 20 December 1974 – Nuclear Reactor Programmes (RC/16/01)(CAB 184/165) (Central Policy Review Staff report 
'Energy 1974, and After')  
105 Agreed Note of a Meeting on 20 December 1974 – Nuclear Reactor Programmes (RC/16/01)(CAB 184/165) (Central Policy Review Staff report 
'Energy 1974, and After')  
159 | P a g e  
 
This means that the lack of technical debate surrounding the instrumental policy ideas thus end up 
reinforcing the tendencies of the open negotiation style. For instance, the AEA agrees that 
cooperation in necessary but emphasises the need for flexibility in the type of cooperation and that 
industry preferences should be taken into account when deciding on which form and what should be 
cooperated about. The reason for flexibility is that cooperation on nuclear development is not fixed 
around one particular technology, but instead requires multiple concurrent technologies are kept in 
play. This necessitates a level of flexibility in the type of cooperation the United Kingdom follows. 
As development in the nuclear field continues internationally, multiple different technologies are 
being developed and it is necessary to foster independent links on each advanced system (p. 3) 106. It 
is not clear whether this is because the future dominant form of nuclear reactor technology and 
associated auxiliary technology (steam boilers, turbo-alternators etc.) are in flux or whether the 
AEA believes the UK must maintain expertise in all of them to hedge bets on which technology 
becomes dominant (similar to fears expressed by Erik Varley and Benn). Whatever the form of 
cooperation, the AEA believes “industrial preferences should carry most weight” (p. 6)107. 
The CEGB and NNC are not entirely convinced that the development of Fast Breeder reactors is far 
along enough that deep cooperation should be immediately followed. Fast reactors is still in 
developmental stages and not as far along as believed (p.2). NNC is also questioning whether the 
Fast Breeder reactor is a definite choice of technology choice because no clear argument had been 
forwarded about this versus other types, which would affect the choice of cooperation partners. In 
any case, NNC view is to keep the options open (p. 3). This is consistent with the view of part of 
the nuclear industry in that CPRS noted that General Electric Corporation did not believe it was 
beneficial to develop a Fast breeder reactor (p. 1)108.CEGB is supportive of the idea of seeking 
separate links on different types of technology because neither currently developed nuclear reactor 
technology options of Fast Breeder Reactor or High Temperature Reactor technology was entirely 
settled yet. This meant that the UK should keep options open with regard to reactor technology as 
well as the ensuing cooperation that would be needed (p. 3). A case for adopting a LWR design can 
according to the CEGB still be made, but it would have to be licenced and then developed 
domestically with the international cooperation primarily being on solving security concerns (p. 2). 
                                                 
106 Agreed Note of a Meeting on 20 December 1974 – Nuclear Reactor Programmes (RC/16/01)(CAB 184/165) (Central Policy Review Staff report 
'Energy 1974, and After')  
107 Agreed Note of a Meeting on 20 December 1974 – Nuclear Reactor Programmes (RC/16/01)(CAB 184/165) (Central Policy Review Staff report 
'Energy 1974, and After')  
108 “misgivings about it - have been and are, often, expressed. These were voiced so emphatically by Sir Arnold Weinstock (of the General Electric 
Company)” The Fast Breeder Reactor by Central Policy Review Staff. September 1974. (EG12/148).  
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The NNC holds a similar view that if cooperation should be sought, NNC prefers the French (p.4) 
because German cooperation involved taking shares in different companies located in Belgium and 
Holland as well, which complicated matters. Cooperation with the French was also consistent with 
interests of the Americans who were licensing their LWR technology to the French. (p. 8)109. 
It is clear from this meeting that many different opposing policy ideas on the direction of nuclear 
policy are in play. While agreement exists that cooperation may be beneficial there are differing 
opinions on the type, size and depth of cooperation that should be sought. The sophistication of 
debates is not at a level where the technical implications of different reactor technology is actually 
debated, rather the state of the technological development is questioned by several parties 
(especially the NNC and GECG). The AEA and the Department of Energy seems to have similar 
views as to the need for cooperation, but the AEA is more fixed on domestic preferences of industry 
and developing a national programme rather than the coherent transnational cooperation on a single 
project envisioned by NNC and GECB. It seems that the reference to policy instruments of flexible 
cooperation and hedging on multiple technological developments in a context of multiple experts 
result in more variation in instrumental policy ideas. However, in the absence of a language to 
weigh the pros and cons in a way that makes hierarchical preferences possible across actors, this 
results in fewer resources to decide on particular ideas. This reinforces the dynamics of the open 
negotiation style identified earlier.  
CPRS orders a report from Lord Hinton in an attempt to receive information about reactor choice 
that is not affected by departmental interests they believe are present in discussions of what nuclear 
reactor technology the United Kingdom should chose to adopt in the future. The report reveals that 
the technical merit of the previous policy ideas that have driven nuclear policy has been problems of 
leadership rather than technological choices per se. According to Hinton, part of the blame must be 
laid at the feet of the government and the AEA. The first nuclear programme based on MAGNOX 
reactors was too large and too much time and resources had to be spent on servicing the programme 
rather than developing new technologies. Moreover, the CEGB were forced to construct the planned 
number of power plants even if fossil-fuel based plants were cheaper. Finally, when the next 
development in reactors came in the form of the AGR the CEGB made several mistakes. They 
specified pressure and temperature criteria well beyond those that had been tested in the Windscale 
                                                 
109 Agreed Note of a Meeting on 20 December 1974 – Nuclear Reactor Programmes (RC/16/01)(CAB 184/165) (Central Policy Review Staff report 
'Energy 1974, and After')  
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prototype AGR-reactor. Furthermore, they attempted to minimize cost of construction by the least 
reliable construction consortia in the nuclear construction industry (p. 9-10)110  
“We must assume that growing energy demands can only be met by nuclear fission and fission 
energy can only be based on uranium.” (p. 11) 
CEGB has few engineers, which was part of the reason why the ordering process of AGR went as 
wrong as it did. The organization responsible for ordering the nuclear power plants can only make 
as good demands on industry as they are technically able to make claims for. The resulting lack of 
innovation in the industry follows from this (p. 24, paragraph 87). “Only now is a single central 
department being formed; history has ensured that the reserves of well trained engineers in it are 
limited. On the Board of the CEGB there are no engineers with design and construction 
experience.” (p. 24)111. The report ordered by CPRS thus questions the know-how resources 
available to the CEGB in order to make policy choices in nuclear energy that are based on technical 
merit. This reinforces the impression that technical debates are not determinant for the instrumental 
policy ideas in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom after the crisis. 
5.3.6.3 Setting: Multiple veto-points of non-technicality: forms of cooperation 
Settings of ideas of the basis of expertise in energy policy generally reinforce the patterns of non-
specialized knowledge characterising the debates and its effects on settings of ideas that we also 
observed before the crisis. The consequence of this is seen in relation to several of the analysed 
instrumental ideas.  
As the instrumental ideas identified above, the majority of debates relate to broader political 
concerns with the structure of the energy policy relating to nuclear energy rather than technical 
questions of nuclear energy. This was evident when examining the interdepartmental meeting that 
involved the Department of energy, Central Electricity Generating Board, National Nuclear 
Corporation, South of Scotland Electricity Board, AEA, British Nuclear Fuels. The recurring 
pattern from before the crisis is that despite selecting interactions that involve groups of experts that 
should have the best conditions for counteracting the pressures of generalist as characterizing the 
                                                 
110 The Fast Breeder Reactor by Central Policy Review Staff. September 1974. (EG12/148). 
111 The Fast Breeder Reactor by Central Policy Review Staff. September 1974. (EG12/148). 
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bureaucratic structure of the basis of expertise, the bureaucratic structure of a generalist approach to 
policy ideas are framed or fielded by experts. They focus on the different ways that cooperation 
may be organised to improve the technology of the nuclear programme. None of the experts go 
beyond indicating best-practice examples. .E.g. they might mention the setting of an idea to increase 
cooperation on turbo-alternators, but these ideas are framed in terms of the general structure of 
cooperation that is sought (p. 3)112. That is, similar to what the instrumental ideas emphasises about 
whether cooperation should be organised around larger projects such as cooperating with other 
countries on developing a full nuclear installation or whether it should take the form of cooperation 
on individual, separate technologies. The basis of expertise in the bureaucratic structure of the 
United Kingdom seems to affect the type of content of the setting of legitimate policy ideas even in 
areas where it is most likely that technical content should be the basis of debates and supports the 
significance of this bureaucratic structure on policy ideas. The consequence for policy is 
reinforcement of the trends examined in the negotiation style because no legitimate claim can be 
made that particular specialized knowledge of a policy field should shift the power of one setting of 
an idea over another.   
                                                 
112 Agreed Note of a Meeting on 20 December 1974 – Nuclear Reactor Programmes (RC/16/01)(CAB 184/165) (Central Policy Review Staff report 
'Energy 1974, and After') 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of expert policy ideas within the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom 
identified several analytical findings. The analysis has generally highlighted the way in which 
multiple expert actors are involved in energy policy across several energy sources, but whose policy 
ideas interact in different ways with the open bureaucratic structure. 
The capacity of the state in the United Kingdom is characterised by an absence of strong state 
capabilities and intervention capabilities. This makes politicians and experts inclined to select ideas 
that are less based on state capabilities and more on other actors’ resources. Additionally, expert 
groups are structured in a way to facilitate coordination of policy ideas, but not decision-making. 
Diplomatic ties and industrial relations are two forms policy ideas of relying on other actors’ 
resources for policy goals, which is a recurrent pattern. In expert debates, disagreements between 
different departments about policy ideas that should define the oil policy in the North Sea show that 
concerns for international diplomacy and multinational oil companies sometimes outweigh the 
influence of concerns for ability to manipulate energy demands toward other energy types – and to 
increase taxes on some of them. The Department of Energy focuses on coordination and consensus. 
There is some weight for the political dimension of coal unions early on, but it is less critical among 
experts within government after the labour government comes into power. The importance of 
maintaining industrial stability in the coal sector is however still emphasised by minister in cabinet 
meetings. These patterns repeat across the periods before and after the crisis. 
The variation between the policy ideas between the period before and the period after the crisis is 
not that pronounced in the United Kingdom. Partially, this is due to the inherent stability and status-
quo that is maintained by a negotiation style that is characterised by interactions between many 
actors which are in a symmetric power relationship where no one group can dominate the views of 
another. This is evident from the many attempts to find consensus between otherwise differing 
policy ideas. In addition, the particular configurations of each dimension of bureaucratic structure 
have in several instances reinforced existing tendencies in another dimension. While the capacity of 
state pushes for policy ideas that rely on other actors, the negotiation style in the bureaucratic 
structure of the United Kingdom also invites a range of actors to contribute their own policy ideas. 
This results in a plurality of actors and policy ideas in play. This is in turn supported by the basis of 
expertise, in which policy ideas are debated at a general level rather than in their technical specifics. 
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This results in debates on policy ideas operating mostly at the level of instrumental ideas rather than 
the settings of agreed upon ideas, which reinforces status-quo outcomes. Illustrative of this trend 
were for instance the differences between expert groups about the Petroleum Revenue Tax after the 
crisis, or the differences between policy ideas of CPRS and Treasury on one side and AEA and DTI 
on the other in the topic of reactor choice before the crisis. The common solution is to defer 
decision on issues that can be argued to wait, and agree on the general outline of those that can be 
agreed upon – in the latter case, the restructuring of the nuclear construction sector into fewer 
consortia. This gives the negations a certain level of inertia and bias towards maintaining the status 
quo. 
Domestically the supply insurance is maintained through coalmines and expectations of oil in 
future. Nuclear energy shifts back and forth due to politicisation of technical choice113s. The 
capacity of the state in nuclear was defined in terms of facilitating diplomatic ties that allow 
existing actors in the industry to operate more freely. The need to involve many different expert 
groups in the energy policy development means that technical discussions are not as sophisticated 
as otherwise could have been the case. Moreover, the structure of power symmetry between the 
expert groups means that an emphasis is on consensus. When this cannot readily be achieved, 
questions are pushed for debate at a later time. The negotiation style becomes one focusing on 
flexibility as seen in the nuclear policy, where choices are pushed around through a constant 
concern to not be left behind technologically and to maintain the domestic industry, but which 
effectively results in staggering the nuclear programme. 
The lack of specialized training for much of the expert groups involved in policy means that in 
particular nuclear energy policy becomes characterised by debates that instead focus on implied 
policy outcomes. The technical choices before experts are thus rarely directly debated as technical 
choices, but instead in terms of their implications for the industry, diplomatic relations or future 
development possibilities. This reinforces the pattern of consensus-seeking both before and after the 
crisis. The CPRS explicitly notes the inability of discussing the policy ideas at a level of the 
technological choices required and this characterises the debates across time. As the meetings 
between expert groups on the different stages of nuclear policy before and after the crisis indicate, 
this pattern of non-technical debates is consistent within nuclear energy discussions even when the 
                                                 
113 By comparison, as we shall see, politicisation in France was within the context of strong technophilic tendency and support from strong state 
capacity to intervene and shape future industry. 
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expertise of the Atomic Energy Agency is involved. The last point is crucial for how the role of the 
bureaucratic structure must be understood by examining its three analytical aspects. Alone, the 
educational background might seem to be sufficient explanation of energy policy outcomes: United 
Kingdom experts were predominantly generalists and French were predominantly technical experts. 
However, when examined alongside the category of open or closed negotiation style, we observe 
that the existence of technical know-how can be limited by the type and form of negotiations that 
characterise the struggles between different policy ideas of experts. Moreover, the Department of 
Energy following these limitations is mostly relegated to coordinating the different views of 
involved expert groups rather than controlling the policy direction per se.  
The fact that the framework of open bureaucratic structures applies in terms of weak capacity of the 
state across different political party governments reinforces the point that this is a structurally 
distinct tendency, not a consequence of politics per se. That being said, it is within the formal remit 
of the political incumbents of government to formulate and legislate on policy that they see fit. The 
“disengagement” policy line of the conservatives in the early 1970s can be seen as an attempt to 
limit the role of the public in social life, which may have succeeded in some manner by introducing 
managerial practices of the private sector into parts of the public sector (Young and Lowe 1974, 
chap. 12). However, in terms of changing the open or closed nature of the bureaucratic structure, 
there was limited changes compared to the existing trend of large federal departments despite 
attempts to reduce tendencies for interdepartmental compromise (Young and Lowe 1974, 130–31). 
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Chapter 6 Analysis of Bureaucratic structure and policy ideas in 
France 
The analysis that follows combines the focus of the theoretical framework on institutional factors 
and policy ideas of experts with the empirical record of energy policy in France in the period 
surrounding the oil crisis of 1973. Similar to the previous analysis, it has two major sections.  
The first section analyses the specifics of the institutional setting for French energy policy. It does 
so, by examining the bureaucratic structure of France from the analytical categories of capacity of 
the state, negotiation style and basis of expertise. These three dimensions are drawn from the 
theoretical framework. In the case of France, the finding is that there is a high capacity of state 
within the policy area of energy, which is characterised, by a limited number of actors in a closed 
policy environment where access is maintained by state channels. The negotiation style within this 
domain is highly technical in nature and focuses on specificity of policy solutions to problems that 
require particular skills. The negotiation of policy equilibria and coalitions among expert groups is 
made possible by the basis of expertise in specific disciplinary knowledge held by experts and the 
formalization of policy involves recurrent actors holding such skills.  
The second section moves on from the institutional setting of the bureaucratic structure to analyse 
the role of ideas in such a context. This part of the analysis examines the ideas fielded by the 
experts in a particular bureaucratic structure. The cut-off point between before and after the advent 
of the oil crisis has been chosen as autumn of 1973. This choice of layout of the analysis is 
primarily for pedagogical reasons to aid the reading of an analysis that spans a period of several 
years before up until the late 1970s. The distinction as laid out here thus makes no a priori 
assumptions about the theoretical or empirical content. That being said, if changes do occur before 
and after, it would be easier to pick up having made a rudimentary distinction between the before 
and after an event. The analysis in this section is organised along the same three analytical 
dimensions of capacity of the state, negotiation style and basis of expertise, but attempts to examine 
how policy ideas at different levels of operationalization (overarching, instrumental and setting) 
operate in these analytical aspects of the institutional environment. The broad theoretical purpose of 
this move is to better pin-point analytically the areas where different aspects of policy ideas and an 
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institutional environment interact. More specifically, it helps illuminate how the dynamics of expert 
policy ideas shift, or not, during crises in a particular bureaucratic structure. 
6.1 Bureaucratic Structure in France. 
The theoretical chapter examined the ways in which the bureaucratic structure in the case of France 
can be considered closed because of the centralized and insular nature of policymaking combined 
with a limited number of, primarily, publically driven or directly state-controlled actors who helped 
define policy. The capacity of the state in such a context is strong due to its ability, and willingness, 
to manipulate or directly control the interaction of societal actors in the economy. Interaction 
between the groups of expert actors involved in such policy-processes are generally formalized in 
nature and characterised by regularised patterns of communication. Partially due to the state 
capacity to intervene in society, the basis of expertise, that is to say, the competences of the experts 
themselves tend to mirror more specific roles and their educational backgrounds to be more 
specialized.  
6.1.1 Capacity of the state 
This analytical aspect of the open or closed nature of the bureaucratic structure aims to illustrate a 
couple of dimensions about the French case. Generally, the aspect of capacity of the state seeks to 
examine how many actors are involved in governance of given policy fields – in particular energy. 
These patterns of state capacity reflect historical choices about the degree of state involvement in 
societal affairs and the power asymmetries that exist between the state and other actors. More 
specifically, it speaks to state involvement among the relevant actors in policy formulation. This 
involves gaining an understanding of how frequent and deep the involvement of state is in the 
energy policy of France. 
The period following the Second World War was a time of reorganization and renewal in many 
aspects of European societies. This was no less the case for the way the state operated in the 
economy. As opposed to other European countries, notably Britain, France never adopted an Anglo-
Saxon free market capitalism as a model for their economy or the consequent state governance or - 
lack thereof - that follows (Hayward 1972, 287). Instead, France favoured what we may term a 
traditional statist approach to governance where the government by political power of coercion 
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through the medium of law and legal dominance can dictate the functioning of the economy as well 
as the actors within it. Be it through state monopolies, nationalisation or other direct intervention 
and limitation of free enterprise. These broad ideas about a centrally controlled and directed 
economy has become known as (a variant of) dirigisme, the philosophical roots of which can 
potentially be traced back to Rousseau and the concept of the general will (Hall 1986, chap. 7). 
The fact that the French state conforms more to a strong side of the spectrum does not mean that the 
status is not a dynamic. In relative terms, the shift of capacity between state and other actors may 
shift over time. To a great extent the immediate couple of decennials following the second world 
war were characterised by an unwillingness by Government Departments as well as private industry 
to enter into contractually defined commitments (Hayward 1972, 288). In many ways, this reticence 
to integrate the state, nationalized sector and dominant firms in the private sector into tighter 
cooperation reflected disequilibria that had characterised the fourth republic (Frost 1991, 115–16). 
In the decade between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, France underwent changes that marked a 
transition away from a traditional- to modern capitalism. The geographically diffuse group of small 
business areas that used to be the key clientele of the state was replaced by a corporate- and 
managerial- elite that was spatially centred around the capitol114. 
The demonstrations and industrial conflict that spurred in May and June of 1968 resulted in a crisis 
that shifted the relative balance of state to society and industry by changing the dominant 
organization patterns115. The traditional statist approach organized around a legalistic command 
and control logic where the state controlled subservient companies or organizations through law 
became associated with the failures that caused the crisis. This meant a shift away from the sole 
focus on hierarchical legal superiority of the state vis-à-vis the organizational environment that 
makes up, society at large. While not a wholesale abandonment of this approach, it ushered in a 
period of recourse to voluntary contractual obligations between state and other actors as opposed 
statutory obligation by law (Hayward 1972, 287).  
However, the dominance of these contracts should not be overstated. The shift did not mean the 
complete replacement of state evolvement or the complete abandonment of dirgisme in French 
governance. Instead, it has served to reorient the organization of the relationship between state and 
                                                 
114 A nice overview of this transition can be found in (Kuisel 1981). 
115 For an examination of the union side of this shift, see (Lange, Ross, and Vannicelli 1982, 41pp)  
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the rest of society towards a less legalistic and more voluntary agreement structure. In principle, this 
has meant the introduction of new tool into the governance of French economy and with it a new 
focus on markets as a separate but corollary element to French governance. The general shift of 
thinking is illustrated in Pour Nationaliser l’État by the 1968 research group led by Bloch-Laine of 
the concerted economy based on explicit cooperation between industry and government. The caveat 
being, that the role of the state is still tantamount. One of the planners of the Minister of Finance 
from around the period noted the increasing reliance on market forces in saying: 
“…to recreate the market when it can exist, such is the primary mission of the Government”(quoted 
in (Hayward 1972, 289) 
This ushers in a new role of markets, which are no longer a legally controlled object of the state, but 
rather something that should work in conjunction with state to create society. The key difference to 
a more clearly liberal organization of the economy and less state control is that the state still 
maintains a key role in not only shaping the market, but actively creating it when it is deemed to be 
able to exist – presumably also by government. While a shift away from traditional statist dirigisme, 
it is thus not a complete wholesale adoption of liberal market relations and diminished state role – 
or even reduced intervention. Rather, the concerted economy was to be a tight cooperation between 
industry and state planners. As noted by the President of the French Employers Federation in 1968 
“The salient feature of this new phase of our economic development is the decisive role the States 
will be called upon to play...” (quoted in (Hayward 1972, 287)). In a paradoxical sense, the turn 
towards quasi-contractual obligations, rather than the legal domination of traditional statist 
dirigisme, meant that the new form of state-society relationship ushered in a central role for the 
state in intervening on behalf of French industry.  
This combined acceptance of international competition and profitability as a yardstick of growth 
merged and actually increased the role of state in managing the competition of the French industry 
vis-à-vis international companies and interests. Dirigisme had changed, but was not forgotten. This 
particular combination of pressures is what later allowed the fostering of what President de Gaulle 
called National industrial champions. The general economic governance of the period can be seen 
through this prism, and even later, the echoes of these policies are existent today through former 
French public monopolies. The content and form of dirigisme and the tools applied by French 
government to govern the country has thus changed over time, but in the period examined by this 
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thesis the general characteristic of the French case is that the role of state cannot be ignored. The 
planning commissions of the economy were key throughout the period and the role of the French 
government was significant even after accepting the failures of traditional statist approaches and 
acceptance of profitability and international competition - to the extent that the industry itself 
looked to government. 
6.1.1.1 Governance of the Energy sector 
As we learned in the introduction, the French economy was generally more reliant on oil imports 
than the United Kingdom. That being said, there were some areas of French colonies that had oil 
reserves. In particular, the discovery of oil in Algeria in the mid to late 1950s meant that France had 
somewhat of a pathway to insure energy security through oil fields within, if not France itself, then 
its territories. Here again, the role of the French state was clear. The edict code petrolier saharien 
which dictated an even split of profits from French oil fields between the French state and the oil 
industry (which was dominated by French public monopolies). Moreover, the French state was 
given priority supplies of oil from French owned territories(N. Lucas and Papaconstantinou 1985, 
15). This meant that by the late 60s France actually produced around 80mTe of oil to a national 
demand of 70mTe, effectively making France energy independent within oil in this, albeit short, 
period (N. Lucas and Papaconstantinou 1985, 17).  Throughout the period from the discovery and 
beginning extraction of oil in Algeria up until the oil crisis in the early 1970s the oil consumption in 
France grew – mostly at the cost of coal which went from more than 40% of total domestic energy 
consumption in the mid-1960s to around 16% in 1973. This development was mirrored by the share 
of oil in total energy consumption, which in the period from 1965 to 1973 actually rose faster in 
France than in the U.K.  
Part of the explanation for the difference in share of oil in the energy mix lies with the higher 
importance given to domestic coal production in the United Kingdom rather than in France. In fact, 
the French actively preferred oil to coal. Would that make it possible to argue the French capacity 
of state was actually not as strong as the preceding analysis has claimed? As with many questions, it 
is a matter of the relevant perspective. It is fair to say that compared to coal- and nuclear sectors 
which were predominantly state owned monopolies, there was a lower share of public control 
through ownership in the oil sector (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, chap. 1).  
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This meant that the state capacity in the oil sector was generally weaker, compared to other energy 
policy areas. Part of this was through institutional heritage of the oil licensing system of the 1920s 
was quite restrictive in allowing state involvement in the oil sector. That being said, the oil sector 
operates under different conditions for control than does other sectors. The weaker bargaining 
position vis-à-vis oil producers than other areas of policy, but also simply reflects that the 
fundamental determinants of oil market (like growth of supplies, buying and selling prices as well 
as rates of profit) could not reasonably be controlled by the French state through regular policy tools 
like licensing of oil extraction and refining to oil companies (e.g. Esso and Cie. Francaise de 
Petroles BP). In addition, the control that the French state could hold on oil production through 
French former territories (esp. Algeria) show a considerable state involvement through ownership, 
with Elf-Aquitaine, Shell-Francaise having 70% and 35% state ownership respectively making up 
50% of sold oil productions between them (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 6).  
6.1.1.2 Why did oil supersede coal before the oil crisis? 
While part of the explanation of the growth of a non-state controlled energy source was allowed can 
be explained by reference to the influence of high-ranking Gaulist politicians in the French oil 
industry, it is also, by extension worth noting, that the reliance on oil was seen as a way that French 
energy supplies could be insured to the greatest extent. If that meant collaboration with industry on 
less traditionally statist conditions it still served the purpose of insuring national supplies of oil 
where France were given priority. A fact, which melded well with the French independence sought 
by De Gaulle at the time. In this perspective, the access to cheap oil where licensing rules allowed 
the French state to dictate the conditions of industry involvement can be seen as the most preferred 
option. This interpretation is corroborated by the speed at which the French state attempted to take 
back control of the energy sector when the oil crisis hit and it became evident that access to cheap 
oil was no longer going to be a viable option.  
Nuclear energy provided the alternative, which would allow both control of the production of 
energy of a higher amount of total energy demand to lie with the French state. By controlling 
domestic energy production the state effectively was able to manipulate a basic input factor of the 
economy as well as a proxy for international competitiveness (because lower domestic energy costs 
reduces production costs for French companies thus increasing their relative competitiveness vis-à-
vis other countries). At the same time, it allowed the Gaullist ideas of energy independence to come 
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into full force with the selection of national champions which essentially allowed the state to both 
insure energy independence as well assume more direct control in the economy over companies. It 
would entail creating an entirely new focus on technologically advanced industries which 
themselves, it was believed, create expertise and products which could be a competitive advantage 
in its own right for the general benefit of the French economy. In this light, perhaps it was not 
surprising why a wholesale shift to nuclear energy became the policy response of the French 
following the first oil crisis. 
6.1.1.3 Nuclear energy policy – a return to dirigisme 
The nuclear energy sector thus became the place where the French state put most of their focus into 
a response to the oil crisis of 1973. This is also where we really see the French state take back 
control of the energy policy that had previously relied more heavily on private oil industry, not all 
of which was French nor subservient to state control through demand and supply policies or pricing 
schemes. Key to the nuclear energy policy of the French state was, as often the case, the planning 
commission, as noted above. Because nuclear energy was not just a question of industrial 
construction, but also of technology development, the role of policy development and formulation 
fell on a number of agencies under direct French state control, in particular relevance to the actual 
energy policy choices in nuclear were the nuclear development agency and public energy supplier.  
These were the two big public agencies responsible for nuclear research and development and 
energy production, respectively: Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) and Électricité de 
France (EDF). Key to the story of the dirigisme within energy policy in France is how these 
agencies interacted and negotiated the policy advice that became the basis for French nuclear 
policy. It is by examining these two organizations in the period before and after the oil crisis that we 
come to understand the trajectory of French energy policy in more detail and why the nuclear policy 
that the French state preferred ended up looking the way it did. While the ultimate decision for 
energy policy decisions lay with the Council of Ministers, the CEA and EDF held considerable 
formulation and definitorial power over the nuclear energy policy that came to define the energy 
policy response to the oil crisis in France. It is to these actors, we now turn. 
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6.1.1.4 Nuclear energy is the battleground to examine 
Électricité de France (EDF) was created after the Second World War in direct opposition to the 
previous structure of energy supplies in France and with a view to rebuild French electric 
infrastructure under the auspices of government control (Jasper 1992, 654). Before the war, the 
electricity supply in France had consisted of a multitude of private suppliers running on a number of 
different frequencies and voltages. Attempts were made in the interwar years to alleviate these 
problems through a series of policy instruments concessions for long distance transmission of 
electricity, national bodies through which producers could cooperate and standardize production 
and transport of electricity across the country. Despite such efforts, the end of the Second World 
War saw a chaotic energy production sector. There were still 54 different companies producing 
electricity from 86 thermal stations. About 100 companies utilized some 300 hydraulic stations for 
electricity production. 86 different companies were responsible for transport and transmission 
across long distances and, finally, all of this was encompassed by 1150 different distributors (N. J. 
D. Lucas 1979, 10).  
Predictably, this led to problems of interoperability and unreliable energy supplies throughout the 
period. The solution envisioned by politicians, engineers and labour unions was a single 
standardized electrical network, which was to be controlled by a single large national company as 
opposed to the multiple smaller private companies from before. The law that passed in April 1946 
effectively nationalized all the private electricity suppliers into one publically controlled entity; 
Électricité de France. This new public organization was accountable only to the Ministry of Finance 
for expenditures and to Ministry of industry for its development programme (Hecht 1994, 660). 
This new entity saw as its primary task to stabilize the electricity supply under public control. This 
quite quickly led the EDF to examine the possibilities of nuclear energy in achieving this goal. The 
interest of EDF into nuclear energy probably started already in the early 1950s under the auspices of 
Pierre Ailleret, the research division director at EDF and concurrent member of the steering 
committee of CEA (Hecht 2009, 80). 
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Commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA) was created the year before EDF in 1945, with the 
purpose of  "scientific and technical research with a view to the utilization of atomic energy in the 
several areas of science, industry, and national defense” (Hecht 1994, 660). It was seen as a way to 
increase French status in international relations following the display of military power that was the 
human disasters of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. 
Moreover, it was also believed to help speed up the recovery of the French economy following the 
destructive effects of the war on the economy and society. In short: To build a nuclear bomb and to 
kick-start a potential economic sector of high technology (Roqueplo 1995, 178).  
Different from the EDF, the CEA was created with an explicit mandate of autonomy and was thus 
not accountable to political influence of any particular ministry nor required to follow similar 
financial controls as other state enterprises (Hecht 1994, 660–61). French industry were primarily 
involved in the work of CEA through stakes in the engineering and construction company Franco-
Américaine de Constructions Atomiques (FRAMATOME), which was initially formed to allow the 
Westinghouse-developed design of PWR-reactors to be built in France by the Franco-belgian 
Schneider Group, Empain, Merlin-Gérin and the American Westinghouse company. As well as the 
production division of CEA: Compagnie Generale des matieres nucleaires (COGEMA). The first 
was a conglomerate bidding for the construction orders set out and defined by the French state and 
the latter were directly financed and controlled by the French state through the CEA116 (N. Lucas 
and Papaconstantinou 1985, 2). 
  
                                                 
116  As a side note, in 1982 the French control of FRAMEATOME was increased by higher share of ownership by French industry company Creusot-
Loire as well as increased political control by CEA in the company. After merging with COGEMA in the early 2000 and renaming to AREVA NP the 
French state reacquired majority control through EDF (which the French state holds a majority share) assuming ownership of AREVA NP in 2018. 
Effectively returning both COGEMA and FRAMATOME under French state control, only now, under the auspices of the EDF – a power shift also 
mirrored in this analysis. 
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6.1.1.5 French dirigisme and the energy sector 
This part of the analysis has emphasised the continued, albeit shifting role of the state in the French 
economy. The story is in many ways of how dirigisme has permeated French industrial and 
economic policy throughout the period after the Second World War up until the first oil crisis. The 
interaction and cooperation between markets and state have changed from almost non-existent to a 
cooperation based on the idea of concerted economy. This broader outline of the capacity and 
willingness of the state to intervene in societal and economic affairs becomes manifest in the focus 
on selecting and supporting the international competitiveness of domestic industries into “national 
champions”. Within this context, the energy sector is but one example of how this state capacity to 
intervene has been observed, but one of the more strongly felt. The shifting points from coal to oil 
and then to nuclear were explicit state interventions in the economy and in the case of nuclear, the 
major actors involved in the development of the industry were either in close cooperation, by doing 
the bidding of with the state, or explicitly state controlled actors. This pattern of close state 
involvement and publically controlled (by ownership or otherwise) agencies and companies leads us 
to expect these patterns to affect the policy ideas that permeate energy policy in France. 
6.1.2 Negotiation Style 
The second analytical dimension of negotiation style is an organisational dimension that attempts to 
capture the dynamic of interaction that is set by the institutional setup of the actors who are 
involved in policy formulation within energy policy in France. Because the institutional context of 
nuclear policy formulation revolves round closed commissions and functional merit for access the 
number of actors involved is reduced. The actors that are allowed access based on these rules are 
therefore more bound by these positions. This means coalition-building between different 
institutional actors within these closed commissions is more difficult. The closed nature and size of 
these interactions means that regularised patterns of negotiation may lead to more technical rather 
than politicized formulation of policy advice. The effect on policy ideas is expected to be ideational 
stability characterised by incremental changes over time. 
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6.1.2.1 Closed negotiation arenas with functional requirements of membership 
Regularised interaction of similar actors based on their association with specific agency or specific 
technical expertise. This meant that the total number of contesting policy ideas held by involved 
actors that can possibly be in play is reduced with the number of participating actors. 
It is not an uncommon contention among several observers of the history of French energy policy 
that it was dominated by few groups of individuals with very similar beliefs and educational 
background (Jasper 1990, 83–85; Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 1985; Simonnot 1978). 
Interestingly, it was not the actual number and similarity of the people involved that dictated their 
ability to be involved with and access policy formulation for a for the nuclear energy policy. This 
may have spoken to the techno-philia and ability to reach agreement among members (a point we 
return to in the analysis of policy ideas), but the primal condition for influence on policy is access to 
key agencies and commissions that formulate policy advice for politicians. Access to any of these 
venues requires either a senior position one of the relevant public agencies (or in few cases, French 
private industry involved with commission advice). 
Judged by numbers employed by them in the most key of these commissions, the numerically 
highest probability to be part of central formulation of nuclear policy required a technical 
background and employment with either EDF or CEA - through attendance at advisory 
commissions like commission pour la Production d'Électricité d'Origine Nucléaire (PEON)117. The 
style of negotiation that took place within these agencies was for this reason characterised by 
similar tasks of making policy recommendations for nuclear policy for the government to decide on. 
This advisory and policy formulation role did not shift fundamentally in the period examined. 
Moreover, besides shifting political support towards the nuclear energy programme following the 
oil crisis of 1973, the authority of the agencies involved was not questioned by politicians to the 
extent that the institutions ceased to have influence in the relevant commissions.  
6.1.2.2 The planning commission for nuclear energy: PEON. 
                                                 
117 An argument could be made according to which their presence in these agencies depended on a common background in an elitist community of 
schooling which connected several of the top agencies and bureaucrats within them as well as politicians in France. This, however, is a question of 
how individuals gain entrance into existing bureaucratic and governmental structures, not which form these structures take and how they mould the 
interaction styles of the participants. We will return to the former question in the aspect of bureaucratic structures relating to basis of expertise. 
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In a more closed bureaucratic structure, where there fewer points of access, where does policy 
originate? The answer is necessarily a complex one, and some simplification is necessary. This 
reduction in complexity is necessary also when the policy choice examined within energy policy 
quite clearly favoured one form of energy – nuclear – over other sources. Within this sub-set of 
energy related policies, who helped bring about the policy?  
The role of the Delegation Generale D’energie (DGE) under the ministry of industry is a relevant 
starting point because the Directeur General is one of the closest things to a permanent secretary of 
minister for energy that the French political system has. The directeur sits at the intersection 
between the administrative capacity of the bureaucracy of the state and the political leadership in 
the Conseils des Ministres – who he reports and presents to. He has a small staff that in many ways 
are similar to a minister’s cabinet and is even on occasion referred to as the (unofficial) “Minister 
for Energy” (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 138). However, despite similarities, the small size of the DGE 
means it is highly reliant on information from other agencies and groups like the public enterprises 
(e.g. EDF) or through committees. 
The most important and influential advisory committee for nuclear policy is the aforementioned 
PEON commission (Frost 1991, 191–97; N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 141). The commission was instituted 
by President de Gaulle in 1955 to advise the government on the formation of nuclear policy. The 
composition and access to this commission thus speaks to the relevant actors, power distribution, as 
well as proxies for the type of interaction style that would have existed. The commission reports to 
the Prime Minister and members are drawn from the highest levels of the French bureaucratic 
system, public enterprises and are appointed by government appointment. The formal nature of the 
access requirements meant the meetings took on a regularised form of similar groups of people who 
were present due to either functional requirement or particular expertise.  
The commission consisted of the highest members of the CEA and the EDF, representatives from 
three departments (directions) of the Ministry of Finance (Budget, Trésor and Direction de la 
Provision), the planning commission and major companies of the nuclear and oil sectors (Hatch 
2015, 153). Two types of membership existed, members by right (due to position in key agencies) 
or members by temporary appointment each four years. The latter made possible some flexibility in 
membership and opens the possibility for a less technical and more politicized negotiation style 
when formulating policy advice. Over time, the relative composition of actors did actually shift 
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somewhat between actors (for instance the Ministry of Finance increased its presence from 1968-
1970) and may go some way towards indicating politicization. However, it is worth noting that 
while increased oversight may have been attempted by Ministry of Finance, they held no 
membership of right in the early 1970s and the general composition was still heavily skewed 
towards technical expertise and the EDF and CEA were particularly numerous, with their 
representatives making up almost half of the total commission (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 141–42).  
That is not to say that the number of representatives in the guiding body for a policy area 
necessarily means greater influence. The fact that regularity of attendance and influence in the 
PEON commission was relatively constant over the examined period does not mean there is no 
contestation of decisions, or that re-opening of decisions is impossible. After the nuclear energy 
programme had been chosen as the answer to the oil crisis with the introduction of the Messmer 
plan in February of 1974 the state investment into nuclear programme seemed inevitable. Despite 
this clear favourite status, the Ministry of Finance continued to attempt to limit the scope and cost 
of the programme, as they had done previously, throughout the remaining examined period. 
As will be noted in the analysis of ideas below, the CEA and EDF had attempted to increase 
spending on a government funded nuclear programme for a longer period before the oil crisis and a 
combination of resistance of the Ministry of Finance within the PEON commission as well as less 
political support from the Council of Ministers who would have to approve such a plan meant that it 
was not until the trigger of the oil crisis allowed both to shift (Hatch 2015, 152–53). What is worth 
re-iterating is the relatively closed nature of this commission and the high technical level of 
expertise that dominated it. The reports issued by this body acted as a guide-line for nuclear policy 
choices available to policy-makers and the makeup and conflicts of ideas within this organizational 
body is thus highly relevant when examining French energy policy in general and nuclear policy in 
particular.  
6.1.2.3 A counter-factual: Outside influence? 
Not just that less ideas were floated, but because the main task of defining and formulating a 
nuclear policy was left primarily with the experts in the PEON commission, the possibility for 
outside influence on the policy ideas was limited. In that sense, even if there were of course fault-
179 | P a g e  
 
lines of conflict over ideas about the nuclear policy proposals, they were rarely, if ever, directly 
questioning the nuclear policy itself, rather its technical makeup and cost.  
This should not be understood as if there was no political activity outside of the machinery of 
bureaucracy and state-industry collaboration that debated and contested the nuclear policy direction, 
especially after the expansion of the programme in the aftermath of the Messmer Plan in 1974118. 
However, even the perhaps most famous of the initial public outcries were illustrative of exactly the 
point that decision-making was centralized around Conseil d'État and the agencies that defined 
nuclear policy. Examining this event may help to illustrate, that if the energy policy choices in 
France were less centralized and closed, this demonstration should have less reason to have existed. 
Moreover, the quandary that the fundamental openness of the policy formulation was not opened 
further following this event shows how insular the process of policy-making was around the issue 
of nuclear energy in particular. 
The attempts to build the Superphénix nuclear reactor at Creys-Malville in the south east of France 
in the summer of 1976 were perhaps the best example of this initial public discontent with the 
nuclear policy - which by critics was considered to have been decided without consultation of the 
populace. Because of the proximity of the location to both the German, Swiz and Italian border, it 
also became an example of international organization of popular resistance. That being said, the 
demonstration, or “anti-nuclear celebration”119 (Jasper 1990, 238–39)  was a relatively calm affair 
in the beginning despite the mishmash of nationalities and between 2000 – 3000 people in 
attendance perhaps because of the explicit non-violent stance of the organisers. The violent reaction 
of the French state through the CRS which by use of tear-gas and clubs removed the attendees 
backfired on the authorities when local authorities arranged public hearings on both the nuclear 
programme and the violent reactions of the state towards citizens. (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 197–99). 
The incident at Creys-Malville is perhaps the earliest event involving several thousand 
demonstrators. It is also indicative in that it mirrors the primary public pattern of contention with 
the nuclear programme in this period was primarily strategies relating to public demonstrations 
(Kitschelt 1986, 69).  
                                                 
118 Named after the Prime Minister Pierre Messmer (described in more detail in the analysis of policy ideas in section 2.2) 
119 “fete anti-nucléaire 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the hearings that followed did not lead to condemnation of nuclear programme 
itself, rather the way in which democratic processes had been surpassed by not consulting local 
populations as well as the violence with which the state had attempted to remove protesters from the 
site at Malville. Thus, the socialists and communists of the local council condemned the 
undemocratic nature of the decision-making and the socialists requested a halt to the Superphénix 
until demands for more consultation and openness were met, but did not fundamentally disagree 
with neither the Superphénix nor the nuclear programme in general. The same held for the 
Communists and the presidential majority of the council who made up the two other factions to 
field proposals following the hearing (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 199).  
In hindsight, the development of public opinion in France towards the nuclear programme can 
perhaps be gleaned from the outcome of this event. Jasper, 1990 notes how the initial support for 
nuclear programme was low in France compared to other nuclear countries like U.S. and Sweden, 
but throughout the 1970s and 1980s actually turned towards a higher number of the population 
actually being more accepting of nuclear energy (Jasper 1990, 261). This is a curious development 
given that the fundamental claim of the criticism, that the state was making centralized decisions 
about policy that affected local populaces without notifying or consulting them in advance, was 
probably true – even before the violent reaction by state towards demonstrators. Because the 
Conseil d'État had in fact approved a declaration d’utilite publique (DUP) submitted by the EDF for 
the construction of the Superphénix at Malville despite criticism from local representatives that they 
had not been consulted on the decision (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 197).  
6.1.2.4 Insular and controlled by formal rules 
The negotiation style in the bureaucratic structure of France is generally rather regularised around 
either specific agencies or their work in advisory commissions, which involve an inter-ministerial 
group of actors. The most important advisory commission for nuclear energy is the PEON 
commission whose members are formally members due to function or government appointment – 
all of which represent agencies, ministries or French public (and to a lesser extent, private) industry. 
This regularised and functional approach to membership means relatively few substantial shifts in 
the nature of negotiation around formulating policy advice. Because the temporary membership is 
only each four years, the ability of any one member group to increase its presence is minimized. 
Moreover, this means that meetings become resistant to increased pressure from ongoing political 
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struggles and interests – even should they reach the Council of Ministers. When changes in 
membership occur, there may be shifts in power among spenders and savers, but the general 
composition is biased toward high technicality by design. This affects the reliance of negotiations 
on personal or ad-hoc agreements.  
The insular nature of these negotiations can also be gauged by another angle. By examining the way 
in which the bureaucratic structure has dealt with opposition from outside the select few who are 
allowed attendance in the meetings. The public disaster of the handling of the Creys-Malville 
reactor site is instructive in this regard. It illustrates the centralized nature of the decision-making 
with regard to nuclear policy, but the turning point of the critique against government was exactly 
that the process had been a closed affair between involved agencies and the central government, not 
involving local authorities or politicians in the matter. We are thus left with an impression of a 
highly insular and regularized proceeding of meetings between technical experts, who, while their 
representation shifts over time may indicate shifting power balance and some degree of 
politicisation of the nuclear energy policy formulation, these shifts happen very slowly at the 
institutional level. 
6.1.3 Basis of expertise: Technical skills 
The previous section attempted to identify the actors that are involved and allowed access to energy 
policy formulation in France. This section on the third analytical category of basis of expertise in 
the bureaucratic structure describes the skills and competences of those actors that are involved and 
allowed access to negotiations on policy formulation. By affecting the ideational positions that 
actors take in negotiations, this ultimately affects policy (the dynamics of which are examined in 
section 2, below). In the French case, the level of technical skill is high among the involved experts 
because of a background in the French grande école education system. This reinforces the technical 
nature of the policy advice given by experts to politicians on concrete energy policy.  
6.1.3.1 Strategically placed specialists 
The substance of the educational background of the experts in the French bureaucratic structure 
varied by position and the specific conseil général that the individual was placed in. This wording is 
chosen specifically, because the French state was perhaps as keen to control the educational 
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background of the employees in state functions as they were about controlling access requirements 
to the schools described above. This helped create a group of highly educated bureaucrats who were 
strategically put in positions where they might best serve the purposes of the state (Quermonne 
1991, 179). This point can broadly be gleaned when examining the educational background of 
French bureaucracy around the time. While there are no reports on the subject exactly on the eve of 
the crisis, a report from the early 1980s encompasses the period of the first oil crisis and should 
therefore reasonably represent the pattern of high educational background. At that time, the share of 
senior civil servants with a college degree stood at 93 percent with some college background 
accounting for the remaining 7 percent. No senior servants employed in senior civil servant roles 
had only a high school diploma as their educational background (Peters and Peters 2002, 114). The 
clarity of the pattern should make uncertainties less pronounced even if the numbers do cover 
several different areas of educational expertise. 
6.1.3.2 The distribution of educational backgrounds – technical and specialist 
Thus, while the large share of high level of education among civil servants in France is obvious, we 
need to further examine their substantial expertise to speak to how the educational background can 
help us examine the basis of expertise as part of the bureaucratic structure. This may help to 
indicate to us the type of technical or functional (or otherwise) expertise held by experts in the 
bureaucratic structure of a country, which may affect the policy ideas of a field of experts. France is 
not uncommonly compared to other Western countries with regard to their general focus on legal 
training. Of course, modern bureaucratic systems whose authority is at least in part derived from 
legality of their decisions does require legal training for most of their employees. The grandes 
écoles system in France has been responsible for the education and training of most of the senior 
civil servants in the French bureaucracy and thus the educational basis of the bureaucratic structure 
reflects this. This meant that special training in fields like law, economics and statistics are 
predominant among French bureaucrats. 
This dimension is given an additional level of elitism and exclusivity by concentrating much of the 
legal, management and economics training at post-graduate institutions in the grande école system – 
in particular in the ENA (Peters and Peters 2002, 120). The Ministry of Finance drew many of their 
employees from this exact educational mould of social sciences and law. One of the most 
prestigious schools for this kind of educational background is the École Nationale d’Administration 
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(ENA). The graduates of the ENA were often referred to as “enarques” because of their educational 
training in economic analysis and statistics (Jasper 1990, 95). By the early- to mid-1960s, this 
former group of civil servants began dominating the erstwhile traditionalist Ministry of Finance, 
shifting their focus toward coordination of public and private sectors and inducing economic 
growth. This was in contrast to the preferred directing of growth followed by traditionalists of the 
Gaullist background - something Gilbert Devaux, Finance ministry representative in the board of 
EDF, characterised as transitioning from civil servants who were “literary” to “quantifiers” (Frost 
1991, 119; Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 1985). This pattern still holds today, in particular at the 
economy and finance ministry, where 61% have an educational background from the ENA (Bilan 
statistique des principaux corps ENA et Polytechnique au 31/12/2012 | Portail de la Fonction 
publique n.d., 8)   
This is not the entire pattern, even if Social sciences and Law dominate the general educational 
background of surveyed senior civil servants. In particular, engineering, physics and chemistry had 
a strong presence in the French bureaucratic structure through employees in the state engineering 
corps and the extremely powerful planning commission. In a country where the economy is 
characterised by a high level of state intervention and dirigisme (described in the section on state 
capacity) the role should not be underestimated of those bureaucrats who are  responsible for the 
state-level strategies and plans for the future of the French economy. 
The group of natural scientists are thus a relatively smaller share of the total than those of law and 
social science background, but no less important – especially in areas of infrastructure, planning, 
and the energy policy. The natural scientists were drawn from post-graduate schools much like law 
and economics were from the ENA. In the case of engineering, physics and chemistry the perhaps 
most prestigious school for such training is the École Polytechnique, which since the French 
revolution in the late 18th century has been educating top graduates from the French education 
system. A degree from this grand école was required to be admitted into one of the state engineering 
corps from which many employees of the public energy policy experts were drawn (Silberman 
1993, 91). These employees working for the public and drawn from the top of the students at the top 
post-graduate school were known by drawing their title from the school, being collectively known 
as polytechniciens, whereas those from other schools, who would often not be selected for senior 
public positions and rather work in the private sector attracted less social status from their otherwise 
similar background by being known merely as ingeneur civil  (Hecht 2009, 23).  
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6.1.3.3 Technical expertise in CEA and EDF 
In energy policy, the role of the Commissariat à l'énergie Atomique (CEA) and Électricité de 
France (EDF) has been noted above. Both CEA and EDF drew most of their workforce from the 
grand école system in France. Throughout the history of modern French education system the 
engineers of the highest status have been those of the state engineering corps, two in particular – the 
Corps de Mines and Corps de Ponts et Chaussées (the members of which were known as “Mines”). 
Enrolment into one of these corps required attending the most prestigious of engineering schools 
(the École Polytechnique120) and the two corps would then select among the best graduates of this 
school. Where the CEA drew most of their workforce from these two corps, the EDF also drew 
employees from the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) that were focused on economic 
analyses and statistics (Jasper 1990, 83). Through this institutional path, a special cadre of technical 
experts were created which came to be extremely important in terms of their representation in many 
parts of the French state administration. 
Many individuals from this cadre of grandes écoles background came to be situated at the top of the 
key organizations that came to define French industrial policy more broadly and energy policy in 
particular. (Simonnot 1978) identified a group of 28 people as “les nucléocrates” because of their 
influence and managing of public or private industries related to the nuclear programme out of 
which 20 were from École Polytechnique and one an economist from ENA (Simonnot 1978, 24–
25). These people were trained and held positions of influence and power because they were in 
possession of technical and specialist knowledge that made them privileged but also responsible for 
effectuating on the knowledge on nuclear energy which would promise economic benefits to the 
French nation. This great responsibility can also be seen in the authority attributed to them in 
colloquial language. As Jasper, 1990 quoting a former CEA employee, notes: “X speak only to 
Mines, and Mines speak only to God”(Jasper 1990, 85). That of course does not mean that conflict 
did not arise either in everyday work or in longer drawn policy battles (as we shall see later), but it 
does mean that they had a certain common ground in their status as the educational elite of France 
imbued with a certain level of national pride and sense of civic duty. That the organizations 
principally run by people with similar educational background, sense of public service and belief in 
                                                 
120 Graduates of Polytechnique are sometimes known as ”X” due to the importance of mathematics in the educational programme (École 
Polytechnique - Accueil site de l’Ecole Polytechnique n.d.) 
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technological innovation, were very much in accord about overarching ideas, is in this respect not 
surprising and nuclear energy was just the sort of technological project they could all rally behind. 
6.1.4 Basis of Expertise in France 
Table 4 Basis of Expertise in France 
 EDF CEA Ministry of Finance 
Academic origin of 
personnel 






Type of academic 
training 
Technical expertise plus 
capacity to utilize 






often background with 
one of the two national 
engineering corps). 





Mixed Predominantly technical Predominantly economic 
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6.2 French bureaucratic structure 
The preceding examination of the French bureaucratic structure suggests a couple of key 
observations can be made. Historically, the capacity of the state to intervene in society is generally 
strong, if shifting over time. In the period following the Second World War, this shifted towards a 
more cooperative interaction between state and private market actors, but where the state still had a 
key role in protecting and insuring international competitiveness of domestic companies. The 
Gaullist concept of national champions fits into this pattern and it is through this lens we may also 
understand the energy policy of France – and the nuclear policy in particular. 
The negotiation style within energy policy formulation follows a pattern of centralized decisions 
that are controlled by commissions whose membership are controlled by the government, insured 
either for perpetuity through functional and rules-based membership.. This makes the negotiations 
quite insular and less receptive to ad-hoc political pressures. The composition of these groups is 
dominated by technical experts who sit in either publically controlled agencies or industries and are 
thus indirectly reporting to the state.  
The basis of expertise in the French bureaucratic structure is unique in a number of ways. While the 
educational background of senior civil servants is skewed towards law, like most other modern 
bureaucracies, two key differences are central. Most of the civil servants in senior positions have a 
background in the post-grad educational system of grandes écoles. These elite schools are 
responsible for the educational training of most of the higher echelons of public employees and they 
thus make up a particular cadre in themselves. Among these, there are two major groups split 
between the social sciences and economists trained at ENA and the natural scientists trained at 
Polytechnique. Second, within energy policy the predominant expertise is drawn from technical 
backgrounds. The membership constellation in the PEON commission, and thus policy formulation 
within nuclear energy, is highly technically biased toward the French public engineering corps who 
draw most of their members from top students of the Polytechnique. 
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6.3 Dynamics of policy ideas among experts. 
This section explores the dynamics of ideas among experts in the bureaucratic structure of France. It 
highlights these dynamics in the context characterized by a closed and technically focused policy-
making that is formalized around specific recurrent actors. The section examines how ideas among 
experts was affected by the capacity of the state, negotiation style and basis of expertise in turn at 
the levels of overarching ideas, instrumental policy ideas and setting of policy ideas. 
Before the crisis 
The policy ideas that can be traced among experts in France have their dynamics affected in 
different ways by the closed bureaucratic structure examined in the previous sections. Before going 
into the analysis of specific policy ideas within the bureaucratic structure, we have to situate the 
analysis of these policy ideas in a context of the energy policy developments surrounding the oil 
crisis in France. In contrast to the United Kingdom, the French case is to a greater extent dominated 
by single energy source, especially after the crisis. Thus, the energy policy developments of France 
are primarily centred on the area of nuclear energy. While complete substitution of oil as an energy 
source is not viable (especially in transportation) the general pattern of policy ideas among experts 
in France is dominated by the rapid and enormous expansion of the civil nuclear energy 
programme. 
The state capacity in the nuclear sector is divided between the research and development agency 
Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique and the public energy utility Électricité de France as the most 
important expert actors. They push the nuclear programme through their influence in the PEON 
commission united around an overarching idea of nuclear technology to modernise French society 
and economy. Similar to the United Kingdom, the conflicts can be observed at the instrumental 
level of policy ideas. Here, the choice of reactor technology and the policy ideas of military use of 
nuclear technology for plutonium extraction of the CEA clashes with the instrumental idea of low 
cost electricity of the EDF. This ideational conflict changes the power dynamics in the PEON 
commission when the similarity of basis of expertise of the EDF and the Ministry of Finance allow 
the two to form a new coalition around the instrumental idea of cost. This allows a shift from the 
CEA supported and domestically developed gas-graphite reactor technology - of which seven 
reactors had already been built throughout the 1950s and 1960s (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 66–67). The 
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EDF thus manages to gain support for a nuclear programme built around an imported reactor design 
from the American Westinghouse. As the crisis hits, this has become the new path of the nuclear 
programme and, besides the Superphénix research reactor, exclusively LWR reactors are ordered 
from then on (N. Lucas and Papaconstantinou 1985, 45–46). After the crisis, the difference in the 
setting of the idea of cost by the EDF and Ministry of Finance makes their collation untenable as the 
pressure from the Ministry to reduce spending on the expansion of the nuclear programme proposed 
under Prime Minister Messmer in early1974. In response, the strong capacity of the state to steer the 
strategy and response to the crisis is supportive of the CEA and EDF once again uniting around 
their overarching goal of expanding the nuclear programme. 
Because the French bureaucratic structure is closed, the number of actors involved does not shift 
markedly over the period. This does not mean that the institutional structure results in status quo 
outcomes. Instead, we observe how the combination of state capacity through public planning and 
strategic planning allows the experts in the relevant commissions an extraordinary influence over 
defining the policy trajectories that are eventually set into motion by politicians. Rather than the 
negotiation style supporting of keeping different options open, what we see here is an ideational 
conflict over the type of direction for nuclear policy, which is solved by coalitions forming between 
different expert actors. At first, the shift to LWR designs of the EDF depends on the educational 
basis of the EDF and Ministry of Finance to be compatible. After the crisis, the EDF and CEA resist 
the Ministry of Finance because the capacity of state of grand projet is supportive of the 
overarching policy idea that unites them. 
6.3.1 Capacity of the state  
6.3.1.1 Overarching ideas: Public responsibility for technological development 
A general trait of the French organizational structure around energy, and in particular nuclear, is the 
centralization of decision-making in public agencies and public energy producers as well as their 
technological enthusiasm. Key players in the energy policy following the first oil crisis were of 
course the governments themselves. However, the already existing organisational structures for 
expansion of nuclear energy and their proximity to power made their immediate influence on 
policy-making more apparent than in the more clearly politician-controlled fits-and-starts observed 
in the case of United Kingdom. Key actors in this organizational structure were the CEA and EDF, 
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in particular. The French institutions responsible for research and development and production arm 
of nuclear energy, respectively. Both the CEA and EDF public enterprises expressed a focus on 
nationalization and public control of key industries, but also a clear attempt by politicians to steer 
the economic recovery as well as future trajectory of France. The role of these organizations was 
key in defining the national nuclear programme, which in turn is perhaps one of the better examples 
of a ‘grand projet’.  
In examining the dynamics of the development of the nuclear programme, we also gain insight into 
the grand programmes model of state directed and controlled national innovation of industry system 
in France under successive governments up until the 1980s (Zysman 1982). While the role of 
private enterprise is not absent, the institutions that make up French (and to a wide extent also the 
UK) are during the 1960s and 1970s overwhelmingly state monopolies. To the extent that state 
monopoly exists in electricity, supply, coal mining and sales of gas and the there is a tremendous 
level of state involvement in all these sectors (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 6–7) . Of these publically 
controlled companies, it is worth noting that gas, coal and electricity through nuclear are, with one 
exception, fully state controlled. There is therefore no reason for favouring one energy source over 
the other from the point of view of institutional control on part of the state. While the oil market is 
less controlled due to its more international nature and lack of domestic supplies in France, the 
French government still had considerable formal control through legislation (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 
6–7). In the French case, the choice of nuclear energy as the primary energy solution to the oil crisis 
can of course simply be regarded as a structural necessity based on lack of domestic resources.  
However, when the dynamics of the development of the highly state-involved process of developing 
a civil nuclear programme are examined it becomes clear that the story is more complex. Especially 
in the conflict between different public organizations of the monopolised and state-controlled 
nuclear industry and their interaction with agencies like the ministry of finance or their ability in 
fielding ideas in planning commissions were crucial for the eventual outcome. It is therefore also in 
the interaction and conflict between these agencies that we observe the crucial moments of energy 
policy shifts through the years following the first oil crisis. In particular, understanding why specific 
energy policy choices were made in favour of others, e.g. reactor choice, but also the surprisingly 
reduced influence achieved by financial concerns from the ministry of finance is worth noting. The 
role of private industry is thus substantially less than the influence exerted by these public agencies 
in shaping the contours and investment decisions of French energy policy. In particular, the 
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Ministères des Finances and Ministère de l’industrie as well as the commissariat du plan because 
their formal power extends over all the organizations that make out the eventual energy mix of 
France (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 7). How may we consider these specifically French capacities of state 
as linked with the ideas of experts? 
It is worth noting how the political system may facilitate certain overarching ideas. The 
nationalization of public enterprises after the Second World War was in large part a function of de 
Gaullist French nationalism. This broad set of overarching ideas for energy policy linked political 
autonomy of France, the international status of France as a great power following the loss of 
Algeria (and other colonies) as well as a physical and military force de frappe in the form of nuclear 
weapons with the nuclear development of technology and industry. For President De Gaulle it 
followed that the achievement of these national goals would have to link the development of any 
nuclear programme and French controlled institutions (Hecht 2009, 93). This also helped cement 
the general consensus that energy policy was primarily a public venture, not a private one. This set 
of ideas mutually reinforces the role of experts in the public employ whose task it became to 
effectuate some of these broad ideas into actionable policy. It is worth noting, that Gaullism as a 
descriptor became more than just the general policy directions and ideas of De Gaulle himself. It 
became synonymous with the fundamental principle of public control over energy policy through 
state controlled energy enterprises. This became the overarching consensus both within the 
ministries and departments that dealt with energy policy, but also a unifying idea across the political 
spectrum throughout the period before the crisis (Jasper 1992, 654). 
Such broad agreement was however not enough to eliminate disagreements within the actors of that 
same policy area, in part because they were affected differently by it, but also because they 
perceived a different role for their respective institution vis-à-vis these ideas. Thus, the 1958 return 
of De Gaulle to power in France acted as a conditioning political factor for the expansion of the 
nationalist technophilic visions of the CEA – an organization originally co-created by de Gaulle. As 
Hecht, 2009 notes, it was hardly possible to find an institution with stronger political backing than 
that of the CEA in the nascent years of the Fifth Republic (Hecht 2009, 94).  
That being said, the broader political support for the overarching idea of a publically controlled 
energy policy manifested elsewhere in the political spectrum when, during the first funding debates 
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for the public nuclear energy programme entered Parliament121. Here the link between the nuclear 
programme and De Gaulle’s idea of a “force de frappe” were directly connected and in so doing, the 
role of the proposed nuclear energy programme became one of reinstating France as a great nation 
through military might. The State secretary for atomic energy, Felix Gaillard, thus linked the 
perceived lack of French industrial capacity and the nuclear energy programme, thus effectively 
making “the CEA’s future budget…a national issue” (Hecht 2009, 60). Combined with some skilful 
manoeuvring between the left and right of the political spectrum, he managed to get the CEA 
budget approved and at the same time link the creation of plutonium, not with a bomb, but as part of 
a grander solution to a problem of energy independence, a view even, the then Prime Minister, 
Antoine Pinay shared (Hecht 2009, 63). These broad ideas about the central role of the state in 
influencing energy policy (and other policy areas in general) affected which specific organisations 
were involved in formulation of policy. Because the CEA had previously been set up by De Gaulle 
to research and develop the technical solutions that would allow both a French-based development 
of a new technology that could reinvigorate the domestic industries as well as insure the military 
role and international independence of France, the role of the CEA increased as a result of these 
broad ideas being present. 
  
                                                 
121 CEA seems to have been well-aware that linking of their research task with the military dimension was important at the political level. In a report 
on future budgets of the CEA they imply that reduced budget for research personnel might also affect the branch dealing with Military application of 
nuclear energy.  
Note sur les problèmes d'effectif» et de personnel (424528). 22. October 1973. Energie Nucléaire - politique gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 (CEA – 
Comité interministériel). p. 3-4.  
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6.3.1.2 Instrumental idea: The national champion 
The high capacity of the state was maintained in the instrumental ideas of the energy policy. The 
role of the CEA as a publically controlled entity allowed state control over the development of the 
project that was consistent with the overarching ideas of fostering an invigorated French industry 
through technological advances in nuclear energy as well as obtaining the military force of a 
nuclear weapon. The form of this invigoration of French industry was the instrumental idea of 
national champions. The creation and expansion of a publically controlled nuclear programme with 
the practical goal of producing weapons-grade plutonium was linked with industrial invigoration by 
the CEA.  
In order to research and develop nuclear power (and the output material of plutonium, which may 
result) it is necessary to build a reactor. The CEA followed the idea of finding and grooming the 
national champions by locating private industry contractor to help them build the reactors122. This 
selection, rather than bid for the project, was supposed to foster a “policy of champions” which 
would associate the selected private companies with the prestige of the nuclear programme despite 
the fact that the complexity and size of the project meant it might not accrue immediate profit123. 
The CEA would thus be able to further its goal of obtaining plutonium as well as shaping the 
industrial policy for the future of France – in the short term improving industry base in France and 
longer term improving the economy as a whole. The private companies who were elected 
“champions” were supposed to accept this both out of a belief in the nuclear programme as a long 
term investment project, but also because the know-how they would gain would allow them profits 
through future export of this technology (Hecht 2009, 66). This latter promise would be crucial for 
developments in the future.  
The assumed link between economic invigoration of the broader French economy and the idea of 
“national champions” meant that in the eyes of the CEA there were few concerns beyond speed. 
The faster a reactor systems could be up and running the faster would be the equalisation of the 
technological prowess of French industry vis-à-vis other countries and the extraction of plutonium 
                                                 
122 The CEA engineer in charge of coordinating the G1 and G2 UNGG reactors at Marcoule is on record for noting that the industrial director of CEA, 
Taranger, had meetings with most of French industry, but who were not overly keen on the project, in the end only four companies were interested 
(quoted in full in (Hecht 2009, 66)). 
123 The attention to the international competitiveness gained by national industry by being part of the nuclear programme is given greater attention by 
the CEA in periods following the crisis. See, Note - à l'attention de Monsieur le secrétaire général du Gouvernement - Communication du ministre de 
la recherche et de la technologie sur les activités de recherche civile du Commissariat a l'énergie atomique (CEA) October 16. 1989 (4, 24528,09). 
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would allow the eventual creation of a nuclear bomb and make France a great (military, if nothing 
else) power in the world scene. However, the primary concern for the CEA was the development of 
reactor technology and the selection of private industry to build them. The economic benefits were 
antecedent concerns that were more assumed that actively calculated into their choices. This meant, 
that the high capacity of the state led to a state-controlled organisation leading the energy policy and 
intervening directly in the French economy by selecting those companies who would partake, but 
also that their economic fortunes and know-how build-up relied on the cooperation of the CEA.  
6.3.1.3 Setting: Choices of champions and gains for industry 
With no clear strategy for how the instrumental idea of national champions would lead to increased 
know-how, export potential and growth in French industry, the chief concern became plutonium 
extraction over energy generation and speed over know-how for industry. These choices help to 
illustrate the later ideational conflicts with other public experts in the energy policy formulation of 
France (namely the EDF). 
Before the crisis, the primary concern for the CEA was still to maintain a nationally anchored 
nuclear programme, which followed the overarching policy idea of a militarily strong France. The 
reinvigoration of French economy and society was still a concern, but they were antecedent to the 
concern of ensuring plutonium extraction. The capacity of the state was most strongly felt in the 
way that, in particular CEA, selected the national champions among French industry to build the 
reactors they needed. In the early periods of the post-war years, 1950-60s, this was primarily related 
to how fast a reactor could get up and running to produce the maximum amount of plutonium. At 
the outset of this process, relatively few companies in French industry was however particularly 
interested in making the capital investment and planning necessary to partake in the nuclear 
programme which could also be seen from the very high cost of the bids that were submitted to the 
CEA for the construction of the Fessenheim plant (Lindberg 1977, 146–47). It was also less clear 
how exactly these national champions would garner enough know-how from the process of building 
parts of nuclear facilities because the CEA was the primary research arm of the entire programme. 
This meant that unless the CEA was willing to actively share know-how with industry actors, their 
competitive research gains would be limited – something the CEA was not willing to do in the 
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beginning124 Part of this, might also be related to the dominant role of the CEA, who by an large, 
dictated requirements to industry.  
This combination of factors had a couple of effects. The relatively unilateral concerns of the CEA to 
their own nuclear reactor development and purposes of plutonium extraction helped create a gulf 
between the CEA and EDF (which we will examine later). While it is difficult to assess the cost-
benefit calculations of individual companies125 the inability of industry to convert the status of 
national champion into a profitable endeavour can be indicated by the  by the fact that by the 1960s 
only a few reactors had been ordered by other countries (Jasper 1990, 75–76; Lindberg 1977, 148) 
casting into doubt the promise of a high-technology export gain for industry with only a single 
reactor exported to Spain (Vandellos) (Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 1985, 197).  
The period of the nuclear programme before the oil crisis is thus characterised by a capacity of state 
that is interventionist in the economy, but through policy ideas of experts that are more consistent 
with the political goals of the De Gaulle-era of French politics which attempted to establish France 
as a great military power on the international scene. Some internal documents suggest that the CEA 
shifted policy ideas towards a recognition of these limitations and toward a more industry-focused 
support in the early 70s126. However, the general thrust of the pre-crisis period is one dominated by 
the CEA and settings of policy ideas in the capacity of the state are more consistent with concerns 
of military independence than concern for industry competitiveness or profitability from the 
expansion of the nuclear sector. 
  
                                                 
124 Hecht, 2009 notes how not even the EDF was privy to the planning and design stages of the nuclear programme in the late 50s and early 60s – 
despite having a key role as the public procurer of the turbines that ensured power generation for the nuclear power plant (ref). 
125 This is no less difficult because parts of the nuclear industry in France consisted of private companies that were not wholly French. Thus what 
might be tax-deductible costs for a domestic French company, would not be for another Frost describes some of these complexities in relation to 
electrical equipment firms and risk assessment in the broader energy industry (Frost 1991, 171–86).  
126 Note Sur Les Programmes du  C.E.A.  Dans Le Domaine De l’Electronucleaire  (DgAIN,INT 73,476). 21. Sept. 1973– Energie Nucleaire - 
politique gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 (CEA – Comité interministeriel ). 
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6.3.2 Negotiation style 
6.3.2.1 Overarching idea: Technophilic unity 
The key actors involved in the nuclear energy programme in France were the CEA and the EDF. 
These two organizations were involved in most formulation of policy that would be recommended 
to policy-makers. Thus, examining their interaction and form of negotiating a policy for France can 
illuminate the overarching ideas that shaped the nuclear energy policy of France. 
The limited number of actors which were often directly controlled by the state or (in the case of 
industry) selected by state actors to participate in the enactment of nuclear policy meant that the 
interaction between actors was initially rather amicable at the level of the overarching ideas. That is 
to say, there was a general technophilic tendency among both the CEA and EDF and much of the 
policy formulation thus became a question of rather technical problem-solving rather than 
politicized conflict of interest127. Another aspect of the amicable cooperation between the two 
organizations were that EDF had no clear preference for nuclear reactor technology or types in the 
beginning (Jasper 1990, 75)128. The EDF simply understood their mandate and task as supplying 
energy to France, because growth and technological advancement was understood as being linked 
with electrification of society. 
The overarching ideas driving the nuclear energy policy in the 1950s and 1960s in EDF was one of 
increasing the supply of electricity through the exploration of this new technology. Their origin in a 
process of nationalization and technological optimism regarding the potentials of nuclear energy 
thus made them obvious allies of the other big agency of nuclear energy development in the CEA 
(which had been created just the year before EDF in the same general zeitgeist). Consistent with 
this overarching common interest in the state-controlled development of this new technology there 
were no clear preferences in the EDF for what precise form the implementation of this policy 
should take. Thus, up through and until the mid-1960s EDF showed no particular preference for a 
specific nuclear reactor design, but kept to the mantra also espoused by the United Kingdom of 
keeping possibilities open (Nau, 1974 in Jasper, 1990: 75). As an electrical utility, the main concern 
                                                 
127 This may partially have been out of necessity, because France did not have the resources to sustain separate programmes, thus it was needed that 
the EDF and CEA needed to cooperate on a single programme 
128 A regional manager of the EDF is referenced as having likened a nuclear reactor to any other thermal boiler – as just another way of boiling water 
(Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 1985, 193). Besides being a technical simplification indicating a somewhat uncomfortable or problematic level of 
knowledge of the organization that has to run said reactors, it also is indicative of how little thought the EDF gave to the specifics of nuclear reactor 
technology and choice in the early 1960s. 
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for the EDF was the development of a reactor technology that could produce the most energy at the 
lowest possible costs, which was assumed to allow greater electrification of production in the 
economy and society as a whole, both of which were seen as congruent with modernising France. 
The technophilia of the EDF was similarly present in the CEA. Despite a politically motivated 
restructuring in the 1950s had cleared out a large part of the physicist staff from the organisation 
and replaced them with engineers and economist bureaucrats (Frost 1991, 126–29) there was a 
continued and widespread support of the goal of research and expansion of nuclear energy (Jasper 
1990, 74). The reasons for this were both related to a national nuclear programme as a source of 
national pride in maintaining a high-technology government programme, but also in the defence 
function the extraction of enriched uranium allowed in terms of weaponized nuclear bombs. These 
two ideas were key for the overarching capacity of the state for De Gaulle in initially creating the 
CEA (Hecht 1994).  
As mentioned before, the PEON commission was the guiding advisory body for nuclear energy 
policy formulation in the French state. The EDF and CEA made up most of the members of this 
commission and they made recurrent (often yearly) recommendations for the future development of 
the French nuclear programme. In 1968, the commission came down in favour of the CEA line by 
recommending the continuation of work on UNGG reactors based on French (CEA) design. The 
argument went, that expected costs and costs would be lower in the future due to improvements in 
the technology compared to other energy production technologies (Simonnot 1978, 240pp). This 
meant that the CEA now had support for the further expansion of their gas-graphite reactor type. 
This decision-making process was mostly centralized and the nuclear energy programme was in the 
period between the 1950s and 1960s mostly presented as “…a technical problem solely within the 
domain of a small group of experts, and not as a political problem capable of generating 
controversy and of being the object of a public debate” (Garraud, 1979, 450-51 quoted in 
(Baumgartner 1989, 51). This process resulted in at least five gas-graphite reactor based nuclear 
power plants being constructed as a consequence of CEA and EDF cooperation in the period  from 
1955 to 1969 (Hecht 2009, 96).  
This highlights the relative agreement between the EDF and CEA on broad the overarching idea of 
the nuclear policy. The fact of expanding the nuclear energy programme was not a question, the 
technical nature of the discussions around choices of technology to utilize for nuclear reactor types 
197 | P a g e  
 
likewise. The negotiation style also bears this out. Both organisations were highly technical in their 
approach to policy-formulation, their venue for debating these issues were the PEON commission 
meetings and the result of these debates the PEON report which only they and a handful of industry 
representatives and other state ministries were present. The fact that both organisations considered 
energy policy, in particular nuclear, as a technical exercise did not mean that they could not 
disagree even if they thought broader political conflict over the issue was not a threat. So why 
would these two actors disagree when they were part of the same cadre of “techniciens”129?” 
A conflict looms: Technical choices and nuclear reactors 
The fact that the institutional structure made the negotiation style in French energy policy more 
cooperative and based on technical know-how resulted in interaction that was generally more 
focused on solving engineering problems rather than problems of political interest. That does not 
mean, that conflict over ideas cannot occur, however. Sometime during the mid-1960s a more 
explicit manifestation of inter-organizational conflict came to the fore. So, it does not mean that 
they did not at times, or even often, had different, or conflicting, agendas. In that sense, reactor 
choice and especially the type of reactor chosen can be viewed as distinct political, industrial, and 
technological statements (Hecht 1994, 658) reflecting the different policy ideas at play between 
these two main actors130. The planning process around the G2 plant is useful to illustrate how this 
focus on speed and plutonium extraction by the CEA set the stage for conflict with the other big 
actor in French energy policy; Électricité de France.  
The key to this illustration is that the EDF and CEA were unified around the overarching policy 
idea of nuclear energy as a technical way in which the French economy and broader society could 
be modernised. In illustrating the cooperation and problems therewith, the section also illustrates 
how very specific technical choices can represent proxies for policy idea variation between them. In 
so doing, the section pre-empts some of the analytical categories covered in the subsequent section 
on instrumental policy ideas, but it is necessary to show how unity in the overarching idea was 
                                                 
129 For a historical exposé of the connotations associated with the concept of “techniciens” in French public discourse, see Hecht, 2009: chapt. X 
130 One should be careful when examining and emphasising the conflicts of interest between actors in a closely knit organizational structure of 
decision-making such as that of French energy policy . The EDF, CEA and other relevant state agencies acted so closely together at times, that their 
employees had offices in each others’ departments (Jasper 1992, 655). The general characteristic of ‘French etatism’ in the field of nuclear energy 
policy in particular does not negate the existence of sometimes quite explicit oppositional or conflictual interests over specific policy choices between 
these actors. 
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maintaining cooperation before the underlying instrumental policy ideas became too much of a 
problem for their coalition, which the section on instrumental policy ideas then examines.  
From the outset of the process surrounding the design of the G2 nuclear reactor it was made clear 
that EDF was in a secondary position to the CEA. While technically present at monthly meetings 
with industry, EDF overarching aim of high electricity generation and low cost were generally low 
on the agenda. First, the EDF was significantly constrained in the process. The utility was not 
expected to voice concerns, was often not informed of design changes affecting its work, contracts 
with industry were subservient to those of the CEA and industry and, finally, the main contribution 
EDF did make to the design process was a “energy recuperation installation” which was considered 
an auxiliary addition to the main design – so auxiliary, that it was in fact housed in a separate 
building to the main nuclear installation.  
It was quite clear that electricity generation and supply, the main instrumental idea of the EDF, was 
not the driving idea of the process. Moreover, the “classic” components of the installation relating 
to energy production were specified in great detail ahead of construction both in terms of features 
and cost, the “nuclear” part which was responsible for the actual enrichment of uranium and 
creation of plutonium, the principal purview of the CEA, was not subject to such financial and 
organizational constraints (Hecht 2009, 67). Beyond the reduced role and influence the EDF ideas 
were given at this surface level of design, there were other factors relating to more technical aspects 
of the reactors themselves, which favoured CEA ideas of plutonium generation and extraction rather 
than electricity generation to achieve energy independence.  
To understand the implication of power asymmetry between the two agencies of these choices, it is 
necessary to, briefly, sketch how a nuclear reactor generates electricity. A nuclear reactor works by 
the use of controlled nuclear fission, whether military of civil in purpose(K. Baker 2015, 14). 
Electricity is creation by splitting heavy atoms with a high atomic number, often isotopes of 
uranium or plutonium, which have similar weight because the nucleus that makes up the atom holds 
a comparable number of neutrons. These atoms may exist in different sub-forms according to 
slightly varying number of neutrons131. These variations are termed isotopes and different ways in 
which these manifest is often denoted with a number after the chemical symbol of the element to 
                                                 
131 Although always with the same number of protons, as that defines their place in the periodic table of elements 
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indicate the sum of neutrons and protons in the atom(Simpson 1983, 3). This is relevant to the study 
of which ideas were allowed to dominate the early French nuclear programme, because the details 
of the design and construction choices make the reactor better or worse at creating the stable 
isotopes of plutonium 239 or uranium 235 that are the most useful for nuclear weapons production. 
Moreover, as a general rule, these so-called “pure”, or “weapons grade” materials are most 
efficiently produced by a reactor if it is operated in a manner that is detrimental to the most efficient 
production of electricity (Simpson 1983, 4).  
The one sided-nature of asymmetry of influence is indicated by the derogative way in which the 
CEA referred to the first tests by the EDF in utilizing waste-heat to generate electricity as 
“Ailleret’s toy” after the EDF director of research (Frost 1991, 189; Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 
1985, 187). More specific technical choices support this dominance of CEA’s instrumental policy 
ideas in several stages through the design of the G2 reactor - in favour of the instrumental ideas of 
plutonium generation, but detrimental to electricity generation.  
For instance, the time a fuel rod spends in the reactor chamber. To the CEA the time fuel rods 
underwent irradiation was the simplest way to control the right mix of Pu-isotopes for later use in 
bombs. To insure minimum irradiation time the CEA contracted with the contractor (SACM132) for 
a solution that allowed changing the fuel rods while the reactor was in operation(Hecht 2009, 71)133. 
This came at the cost of a very expensive concrete and metal construction allowing automatic 
loading and ejection of fuel rods into the reactor – thus speeding up the production of non-
poisonous plutonium. This increased the total cost of the reactor design, but also decreased its 
usefulness for electricity generation through the attached steam turbines by ejecting the fuel rods 
before they were fully spent, increasing fuel use of the reactor. Crucially, though it came at the cost 
of heat, because the rods were ejected before they hit peak temperature(Hecht 2009, 71). By making 
                                                 
132 Societe Alsacienne des Constructions Mecaniques ; A conglomerate of electrical and mechanical engineering companies put at the head of the 
group of companies chosen under the “national champions” policy by the Direction Industrielle at the CEA. Any contracts for construction or design 
work for the actual reactors were between the CEA and SACM who then subcontracted to the other companies  and coordinated their efforts in design 
and construction, especially on the G2 reactor (Hecht 2009, 66) 
133 On several occasions CEA notes the role of high pressure in creating electricty with nuclear processes, it is therefore highly unlikely the preference 
for technologies that maximised enriched uranium at the expense of electricity generation were a coincidence and not a deliberate choice. See for 
instance : Confidentiel: Note de Synthese.. 2. November 1973 (424528). Energie Nucleaire - politique gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 (CEA – Comité 
interministeriel). This is repeated several times over the years in different reports. For instance also in 1978 : Production Combinée de Chaleur dans 
les centrales nucleaires (424528.09) 17. Februrary 1978. Comité interministeriel du Energie electro-nucleaire. Energie Nucleaire - politique 
gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 
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this design choice, the instrumental idea of the CEA to generate plutonium for nuclear bombs 
became superior to the instrumental ideas of the EDF of electricity supply. 
These three factors increased cost of the overall design, increased fuel use and decreased the heat 
output below optimal levels for electricity generation (ibid). In fact, it wasn’t even possible for EDF 
engineers to calculate the optimal values of pressure, temperature and CO2 for electricity 
generation, because the CEA had not specified the aluminium cladding surrounding the fuel rods to 
withstand the necessary levels of heat for that purpose.(Hecht 2009, 73). This meant that at best the 
G2 reactor would be able to produce around 25MW under optimal operational conditions (Hecht 
2009, 75). Not that the low output of electricity was the main issue, in fact, even obtaining that 
became a problem for the EDF because the CEA required the reactor to run all the time (for heat 
variation to not damage the fuel rods) and at maximum capacity. A constant and high supply of 
electricity from the nuclear reactor was a problem for the EDF because the demand of the electricity 
grid itself was not constant. In absence of an ability to control output, the EDF had to install a de-
superheater before the steam-generator to essentially dump hot steam that would otherwise have 
overwhelmed the electricity grid had it been turned into electricity (Hecht 2009, 73).  
By 1958 when French politicians wanted a nuclear bomb, the preparatory work had already been 
done, in part at G1 and G2, on plutonium extraction and it meant that the first French nuclear bomb 
test could take place only a few years later in February 1960. In this way, a set of choices regarding 
the engineering makeup of nuclear reactors illustrates a divide between the instrumental ideas of the 
CEA and the EDF. The negotiation style was highly technical and regularised between a limited 
number of actors. At the overarching level of ideas, there was coherence between the technophilic 
visions of an expanded French public nuclear programme to ultimately improve the French 
economy, but as has been hinted the instrumental ideas through which these two actors saw these 
overarching ideas were quite different. The CEA emphasising the military dimension of extracting 
plutonium for nuclear weapons and an increased role for France in international relations and the 
EDF preferring low-cost and plentiful energy generation to achieve a modernisation of the French 
economy. It is to these instrumental policy ideas we now turn. 
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6.3.2.2 Instrumental idea: Relative cost versus weapons. 
As the examination of the ideational underpinnings of technical choices regarding the G1 and G2 
reactor showed above, the CEA overarching ideas of French national military strength was clearly 
dominant of the EDFs ideas of plentiful electricity supplies. The general type negotiation style is 
still consistent with previous descriptions of technical meetings and report-driven interaction 
between a limited number of state-related actors. What shifts at this level of analysis, is that when 
we examine the operational instrumental ideas that different actors follow to achieve their 
overarching ideas, the differences in ideas are more likely to show – despite general agreement 
about the use of nuclear power, the idea that this would generally benefit the nation of France and 
the economy.  
To understand how conflicting ideas began to emerge we need to examine the introduction of a new 
instrumental idea that EDF begins to utilize in their work, in their reports and as basis for arguments 
within the PEON-commission. This ideational instrument took the form of a quantifiable indicator 
in the ministry dossiers on nuclear energy. The most prominent and widely used is when EDF 
begins to estimate cost/kWh produced by a given reactor design. The quantifiable measurement of 
cost per kWh became a crucial part of EDFs insistence on no longer just supplying the most 
possible energy, but allowed EDF to emphasise supplying energy at low cost134.  
This focus on cost opened further the demarcation between the CEAs ideas of plutonium extraction 
for military purposes and nationally controlled nuclear reactor designs because it introduced 
competitiveness into the cost equation. Not only would this legitimise EDF in criticizing the CEA 
reactor programme on cost grounds, but also it would, at a later point, allow the electricity 
production of the EDF to begin competing with and supplanting other types of energy sources. This 
idea became so dominant and central to the work of the EDF that its former general manager, André 
Decelle, noted “the CEA aimed for the Nobel Prize, the EDF for the price per kWh” (Quoted from 
Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 1985, 197). 
  
                                                 
134 This allowed EDF to push questions of competitiveness, cost and relative cost of reactor designs – aspects they lament not having reached broader 
use in the public utilities. P. 5. Concurrence de la production autonome - Commission de l’exploitation. 23. March. 1972. Production Autonome 
(19830369/11). 
202 | P a g e  
 
A new method: kWh/centimes 
Even though the 1950s had been characterised by fierce conflict between management and 
employees in the EDF over the introduction and use of computers in the workflow (Frost 1991, 
201–5) the period leading up to the crisis saw a shift in their application among the personnel 
responsible for the PEON reports. The introduction of the quantifiable measure of cost per kWh 
along with the advent of computers allowed the EDF to conduct optimization-studies, which 
modelled reactor design choices according to the goals of energy supply that EDF wanted to 
achieve. It is not that most of the involved actors had not attempted to do cost calculations before 
(indeed it is the bread-and-butter of most financial ministries), but the concurrent machine-assisted 
nature of these operations made possible entirely new and more accurate modelling. Calculations 
that had previously been done by hand and attempting to find the best compromise with relatively 
little economic data available were now modelled using much more data and many more variables. 
The increased sophistication that these models entailed allowed the EDF to fine-tune the cost and 
goals not just of a combined project, but also of specific elements of a reactor design135. This 
allowed much more fine-grained optimization at the planning and design stage of, for instance, the 
most electricity generation for the least use of uranium fuel thus increasing the unit power of the 
plant and inversely decreasing the cost per kWh generated (Hecht 2009, 106–7). This new tool thus 
allowed the EDF a kind of experimental method through which to test different design parameters 
of a reactor design before actually beginning construction in any way. By the early to mid-1960s the 
cost of kWh was so thoroughly worked into the workflow of the EDF that even the Ministry of 
Finance took note of the level of level of detail the models of optimum(Hecht 2009, 108). 
Wider comparison possible 
The idea of the cost per kilo-watt-hour allowed the EDF to make modelled comparisons between 
competing reactor designs and thus not only criticise base cost of the UNGG programme of CEA, 
but also allow comparison with other international reactor designs. This led the EDF to estimate 
costs of the French UNGG reactors and the American-designed PWR reactors. Comparing the 
Saint-Laurent des Eaux (Loir and Cher, reactors) with the American Oyster Creek reactor both 
capable of generating around 500MW electricity output. 1100 francs /kWh for the UNGG reactor 
compared to 880 francs for the American PWR design. The CEA and EDF both agreed on this 
                                                 
135 My translation. 
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finding, but disagreed fundamentally about what this finding should entail and they eventually 
published separate reports in early 1967 (Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 1985, 197).  
This led cost-estimations comparisons for cost/kwh reactor capacity built where thus heavily in 
favour of American-made light water reactor designs compared to domestic French reactor designs. 
It is worth noting, that these comparisons were based on available data of costs of reactors which at 
that point in time was somewhat uncertain. Simply put, the nuclear technology was such a new 
endeavour that reliable data for actual costs were sparse and sensitive to the level of optimism of the 
underlying assumptions about future cost reductions, number and quality of problems and so forth. 
This means that the data used for American estimates were not necessarily any more correct than 
the French ones136. In fact, most of the estimates of LWR costs that EDF relied on, were based not 
on empirical data on LWR costs, but on speculative, and thus arbitrary, cost estimates for nuclear 
power plants currently ordered as opposed to actual operational data (Jasper 1990, 77). 
The ideational battleground: reactor technology 
The primary venue for this conflict of ideational instruments was in the PEON commission, which 
had previously been in general support of the instrumental ideas of the CEA. In 1968, the PEON 
report was somewhat ambiguous in its wording, perhaps indicating significant awareness by the 
involved parties of the potential conflicts over its conclusions. Despite the careful wording, the 
report essentially favoured the Light Water Reactor type over the existing nuclear plants utilizing 
UNGG reactors championed and designed by the CEA (Lindberg 1977, 148). Thus, it was 
recommended that after the already planned Fessenheim 1 and 2 plants were completed there would 
be no additional need for UNGG reactors. The crucial point concerning this choice is that the main 
argument for the choice of LWR reactors entailed two elements. The first that a prototype reactor 
was to be constructed, with EDF as the main principal of this task as opposed to SACM for the G1 
and G2 reactors. Secondly, but perhaps more important, the argument that was used to justify the 
future reactor types was the lower cost of electricity nuclear power plants based on this reactor type 
would provide (N. Lucas and Papaconstantinou 1985, 20).  
The fact that EDF had succeeded in introducing a new instrumental idea of cost / kWh in a strong 
guiding body and shifted their own instrumental ideas from electricity supply to supply at 
                                                 
136 See for instance (Bupp and Derian 1978) on the ungrounded cost-estimates for LWR utilized by the PEON reports. To this day, the general cost of 
French nuclear power programme is shrouded in uncertainty (Grubler 2010). 
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comparatively lower cost. While the consultative bodies of the French planning commissions are 
powerful, they are not omnipotent and this was sufficient for these new ideas to shift the 
fundamental design choices and speed of the nuclear programme. In 1968, one of the primary 
obstacles for such a shift to occur was the strong support the CEA received from President De 
Gaulle. The president was preoccupied with the project of national grandeur through technological 
progress – of which domestically developed nuclear programme was a key part. De Gaulle was 
therefore not immediately willing to abandon the nationally developed nuclear reactors of the CEA 
only on cost grounds (Picard, Beltran, and Bungener 1985, 197). When Pompidou came to power as 
president in 1969, the idea of French national independence espoused by De Gaulle took the 
backstage and the overarching idea that France should achieve national grandeur through 
technology was linked with an idea that economic activity was the way through which such a goal 
could be achieved. Hence, French industry had to become “competitive” in the international market 
(Frost 1991, 198; Hecht 2009, 118). Thus, EDFs push for a licenced, lower-cost reactor design was 
met with a much more amenable political leader and became the last key to the abandonment of 
UNGG. 
The conclusiveness of the shift away from the UNGG reactors became clear in future PEON 
reports. The PEON reports of 1970 and 1972 were much less ambivalent than that of 1968 and bore 
out the finality of this shift. Not only was the American-licenced Westinghouse design for an LWR 
now the principal reactor technology followed by the French nuclear programme137, the planning 
commission’s Sixth plan (1971-5) involved a rapid expansion of the nuclear energy production 
capacity of France. The planned reactor construction programme eventually incorporated into the 
plan involved eight reactors delivering at least 8000 MWe. This was further amended and increased 
by the 1972 PEON report suggesting an even larger programme of fourteen to fifteen reactors 
equivalent to 13000 MWe of electricity production capacity to be constructed from 1973 to 1977 – 
around 3 per year (Jasper 1990, 90). The shift from natural uranium graphite reactors was complete. 
Thus, out of all the reactors recommended for construction after the 1968 PEON report onwards, 
only a single one was of the UNGG type and all others were planned as light water variants 
(PWR)(N. Lucas and Papaconstantinou 1985, 45). The EDF’s ideas of cost and electricity supply 
                                                 
137 See also CEA acceptance of this shift : Note Sur Les Programmes du C.E.A.  Dans Le Domaine De l’Electronucleaire – Archive name and ref : 
Energie Nucleaire - politique gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 – Subdocument name : CEA – Comité interministeriel – Document identifier : DgAIN,INT 
73,476. 21. Sept. 1973. 
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had won out against the CEA’s technological optimism and focus on the military aspects of nuclear 
power.  
6.3.2.3 Setting: Cost comparisons 
The introduction of the cost/kWh marks a shift in the instrument of the idea of energy supply held 
by the EDF. However, while principally just a methodological and computational innovation, it 
suddenly allowed the discussion of cost and comparisons between different nuclear reactor designs 
to happen on a perceived more scientific basis. It may be questionable whether the data used for 
these new modelled comparisons was reliable(Bupp and Derian 1978, 87; Frost 1991, 197). 
However, it allowed the slow shift towards competition and a shift in the instrumental idea of the 
EDF. It shifted from an idea of supplying energy to suppling energy at the lowest cost - the latter 
which allowed nuclear electricity costs to be compared with other forms of sources in the broader 
energy mix.  
In this way, the negotiation style of the French bureaucratic structure meant that Electricite de 
France (EDF) saw its mission as congruent with the overarching goal of modernising French 
industry and society in general that was also espoused by the CEA. EDF being an electrical utility it 
perceived the goal being best achieved through energy independence. Nuclear energy was a natural 
choice that allowed both the overarching goal of modernising France through energy independence. 
Where the differences to the CEA occurred were in setting of the instrument of energy 
independence. The EDFs insistence that modernising the French society was linked with energy 
independence led them to see nuclear energy as the best way to achieve producing and distributing 
the most energy at the lowest possible cost(Hecht 2009, 80).  
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6.3.3 Basis of Expertise  
The common educational background of several of the actors involved in energy policy formulation 
helps us understand the possibility for conflict or coalitions over different policy ideas. At the 
different levels of ideas (overarching, instrumental and settings), congruence or divergence can 
facilitate or disrupt the conditions for coalitions between actors. As we observe in the case below, a 
common overarching policy idea may make a coalition between actors possible, but if the substance 
of debate relates to instrumental ideas, inconsistencies at this level may render actors less likely to 
cooperate and rather conflict due to these variations in instrumental ideas about energy policy. 
Before the crisis, the overarching ideas of technological optimism had reduced conflicts between 
the EDF and CEA to some extent, but which began to dismantle as the cost / kWh is introduced by 
the EDF. 
6.3.3.1 Overarching idea: Technological optimism unites 
At the overarching level of ideas, the common ground between the CEA and EDF can be illustrated 
in the shared technological optimism of both organisations. This technological optimism138 is a 
general element of French post-war history, where technocratic planners would portray 
technological development as the embodiment of being French and state-driven modernisation 
through technology as a means to unify the French nation (Hecht 1997, 381–82). In the area of 
energy policy, this optimism was perhaps particularly strong because the substantive discussions 
among actors were of a highly technical nature and at a very high level of sophistication. This 
meant that more general issues of whether technological solutions as a means to achieve economic 
growth or energy independence were not explicitly questioned – at least not by the CEA and EDF 
whose main purview it was to develop and implement the nuclear energy programme.  
More crucially, the educational background of most of the senior employees in both organisations 
were drawn from the ENA and Polytechnique, where the ideas of technocratic planning was seen as 
integral to the modernisation of the French state. At the overarching idea level, the technological 
enthusiasm of much of the cadre of civil servants in the French state meant that technologically 
advanced solutions that could be fostered as national projects coalesced well with both the 
                                                 
138 Technological enthusiasm as used by Hecht refers to Thomas P. Hughes’ American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological 
Enthusiasm, 1989. He applied a rather general definition of optimism for “technology”, the latter of which he defined as “the effort to organize the 
world for problem solving so that goods and services can be invented, developed, produced and used” (Hughes, 1989: 6). 
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overarching ideas of technological optimism present among experts within the state, but also with 
the overarching ideational goals within the capacity of the state as a whole in the period after the 
second world war in France. 
6.3.3.2 Instrument: Cost – A new coalition between EDF and Ministry of Finance 
Given to clear coherence between overarching ideas of technological optimism in the CEA and the 
EDF, it is puzzling how the Ministry of Finance and the EDF eventually form a seeming alliance 
against the particular version of the nuclear programme envisioned by the CEA. All three 
organisations draw many of their employees from the grand école system mentioned above. This 
means that the general belief in promoting goals for the French nation are present throughout. 
However, there is a significant variation the EDF, CEA and the Ministry of Finance in relation to 
the share of employees that have a predominantly natural science background emphasising physics, 
chemistry or engineering and those who hail from more social disciplines like economics and 
statistics.  
These two broad differences can be retraced in the specific educational backgrounds of senior 
personnel that ultimately result in a different mixture of educational basis from which the 
organisations draw their expertise. As noted before, the CEA drew most of its personnel from the 
Polytechnique, which emphasised natural sciences and engineering and is thus predominantly 
characterised by technological optimism and the overarching goal of modernising the French 
economy. By contrast, the EDF drew a significant amount of their personnel from the ENA, which 
emphasised governance through economics, and statistics while also having a significant number of 
engineers on staff and, due to the purpose of the organisation, was very technically inclined as well. 
However, the educational basis in the EDF is more mixed between ENA and Polytechnique than 
that of CEA. This meant that the EDF leadership as well as many of their employees were more 
readily able to understand and accept some of the types of arguments and analyses also fielded by 
the Ministry of Finance who similarly drew personnel from the ENA.  
This manifested in its strongest form during the conflict between the EDF and CEA over the choice 
of reactor technology. While the specific choice of reactor technology cannot be directly related to 
educational background of the experts, the inclusion of cost models and projections in the EDF that 
was more consistent with their instrumental idea of electricity supply led them towards alternatives 
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to those preferred by the CEA. Thus, while both agreed the expansion of the nuclear programme, 
their instrumental ideas were significantly different; the CEA wanted weapons and the EDF wanted 
cheap electricity. Moreover, once the EDF invents and spreads the use of computerised 
sophisticated models of cost / kWh for different reactor types, these types of arguments are much 
more in line with the cost perspective of the Ministry of Finance than the comparative perspective 
of the CEA. The alliance between the EDF and the Ministry of Finance can thus be seen as a shared 
a devotion to economic rationality through their focus on cost. The EDF advocating modernisation 
of France through an expansion of the nuclear programme and instrumental idea of supplying low 
cost electricity and the Ministry of Finance emphasising balancing the economy through budget 
restraint. 
6.3.3.3 Setting: Cost per unit and cost as budget restraint 
Part of the reason for this difference lies in the different settings of these instrumental ideas of cost. 
The meaning ascribed to cost is simply different between the two organizations. The EDF and CEA 
draw many of their engineers from École Polytechnique. This comes with a certain level of 
technological optimism and is part of the explanation for the coherence of overarching goals 
between the CEA and the EDF. As we saw, it was instrumental ideas and their setting that separated 
them and led to eventual conflicts over reactor choice, not their technological preferences for 
nuclear energy or the belief in a strengthening of the French economy though state steered energy 
independence. The EDF carried that technological enthusiasm with them into their modelling of 
costs. In the analysis of nuclear energy compared to other forms of energy they simply took a more 
optimistic stance regarding the likely development of technology (Jasper 1990, 94). This affected 
their assumptions both in terms of the speed of that development of nuclear technologies, but in 
particular also in its ability to improve output and reduce costs. 
As was also noted earlier (section 2.3) By comparison, the Ministry of Finance draws many of their 
employees from the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA). The graduates, often referred to as 
“enarques” are trained in economic analysis and statistics (Jasper 1990, 95) more so than the focus 
on engineering, physics  and chemistry which unify the X from Polytechnique. This also affects 
how they would understand terms like cost. The ideas held by the Ministry of Finance generally 
consists in a “cost perspective” which emphasises keeping the budget in balance (Jasper 1990, 93). 
In other words, they tend to be less characterised by the technological optimism that is the case for 
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the CEA and EDF. This made the Ministry of Finance naturally sceptical of the claims for nuclear 
energy made by the EDF. However, the view of reducing cost of energy through reductions in 
kWh/centimes or cheaper reactors was not necessarily resisted by the Ministry of Finance. Instead, 
the variation in the settings of ideas held by the EDF and the Ministry of Finance in the period 
leading up to the crisis were around the degree to which the Ministry believed the expected cost 
reductions in cost per kWh generated by the nuclear reactors and the overall project costs envisaged 
by the EDF (Jasper 1990, 102–3)139. 
The formal financial constraints that the ministry of finance were able to wield over the French 
energy policy were therefore quite substantial – and indeed, they were both present and critical of 
the costs in most of the PEON commission reports. However, having structural formal power 
simply explains how a given actor may interfere with the behaviour of another actor – e.g. the EDF. 
Formal powers of finance does not explain why an actor choses to wield said power or not. For the 
EDF, their introduction of cost and “rentabilité” (Frost 1991, 132) and extensive use of models had 
allowed them to defeat the CEA in part with Ministry of Finance support for the switch to LWR 
reactors. On the other hand, this cost perspective had helped the EDF, but the conflict with Rue de 
Rivoli showed the, perhaps unrealised, technological optimism in the assumptions of their models. 
While not able to break the coalition between the EDF and the Ministry of Finance against the CEA 
on the form of the nuclear programme, this difference in the setting of the idea of cost between the 
EDF and the Ministry of Finance would become important after the crisis. 
  
                                                 
139 To this day, the actual cost of the French civil nuclear programme is debated among scholars. See (Grubler 2010). 
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After the crisis 
The Yom Kippur war and the OPEC alliance introduction of oil supply constraints changed the 
conditions for energy policy and the ideas that helped inform its trajectory. As the oil crisis hits in 
1973 the immediate reaction from the French government is one of somewhat downplaying the 
issue. Perhaps surprisingly, given their reliance of imported energy – especially within the oil sector 
– the French government did not immediately act. Instead, the French along with the United 
Kingdom maintained a pro-Arab stance in the United Nations (N. Lucas and Papaconstantinou 
1985, 39). Despite diplomatic attempts to diminish the supply constraints on oil, the price of oil 
could not be constrained in the same way. Within a couple of months the oil prices had quadrupled 
(Lindberg 1977, 130). Something had to be done. 
6.3.4 Capacity of the state  
6.3.4.1 Overarching ideas: Modernisation through expansion of nuclear 
The overarching ideas of modernising France through state-led initiatives was maintained after the 
crisis hit. On March 5th 1974, the Messmer Plan was approved by the Council of Ministers and 
became a symbol of the French state’s ability control its environment despite the crisis, this 
reinforced the existing tendencies to nuclear policy being a closed system of actors (Jasper 1990, 
148–49). The plan entailed the launch of thirteen 1000MW light water reactors (Hecht 2009, 319) 
an effective doubling of the nuclear electricity capacity EDF had in operation at the time (Jasper 
1990, 156). While only 12000MW of the planned 13000MW were completed on time, it is still a 
remarkable increase in capacity over such a short period. Moreover, it represented a doubling down 
on the LWR nuclear technology which the only operational engineering experience held by the EDF 
was with the construction of the prototype reactor at the Franco-Belgian border at Chooz (Lindberg 
1977, 132)140. How could such a large recasting of the energy sector involving the level of technical 
sophistication required for something like a nuclear reactor be chosen and executed in such a short 
time-frame?  
First, the choice to go with an expansion of the nuclear energy programme of such magnitude and 
as the primary source of solutions to the energy shortage coming from the oil embargo is consistent 
                                                 
140 More were planned, and especially the plant at Tihange was underway, but it was not operational until the end of 1974 (Lindberg 1977, 132). 
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with several aspects of institutional factors already examined. The fact that the response to the crisis 
had to come on the back of an agreement in the Conseil des ministres and the backing of central 
government emphasises the role of the strong capacity of the state in the response. The capacity of 
the state to do so was filtered through the existing intuitional channels of influence available to the 
government, which meant the PEON commission and the actors involved there. The French 
government held considerable power over several sectors of energy production in France, but 
perhaps few as directly as the control over the nuclear programme, which was funded and run by 
state-agencies who cooperated with select French industry. 
The response of expanding the nuclear energy programme also fit with the overarching idea of 
modernising France espoused by many elites in the French administration(Jasper 1990, 148). 
Combined with the technological optimism of many of the key agencies involved the choice of 
nuclear power as a grand projet over other sources of energy becomes more understandable. To 
substantiate how this overarching idea of French managerialism and technological optimism 
circumscribe the choice of nuclear energy, we can examine some hypothetical options that would 
have been available to government. 
An exercise in choosing between hypothetical choices when one knows the outcome may seem 
confusing, but it may help illustrate the influence of the technological optimism and state-
managerial ideas we saw earlier. Such hypothetical choices will necessarily be simplifications. In 
policy, it is rarely a zero-sum game between two or more solutions. For instance, while nuclear was 
the choice of on the eve of the crisis, other policy solutions were also followed later. For instance, 
conservation became a topic with the creation of Agence pour les économies d'énergie (AEE) later 
in the year of 1974. The conservation programme aimed broadly at conservation and not 
specifically at reductions in electricity consumption and half of the investments were aimed at 
industry as opposed to households – where EDF penetration through electricity use was strong (N. 
Lucas and Papaconstantinou 1985, 57). Interestingly, in early 1974 the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Science wrote a report to the cabinet of ministers about the problems of energy 
consumption in the industry. However, rather than note the potential disparity between conservation 
and increased electricity use under an energy mix driven by nuclear energy, they suggested 
immediate research into the possibility for water reactors and more resources for personnel that 
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could evaluate the effects of nuclear energy141. It thus seems, that rather than in conflict with 
conservation, nuclear energy was understood as a solution to the problem of high energy usage in a 
time of high prices and concerns over supplies of energy. Moreover, several attempts to have 
legislation approved was met with rejections in the Council of Ministers (N. Lucas and 
Papaconstantinou 1985, 57) and in 1975 Giscard D’Estaing helped establish the Delegation aux 
Energies Nouvelles (DEN) whose task was to promote the idea of renewable energy and to assist in 
defining objectives for industry (N. Lucas and Papaconstantinou 1985, 59). 
One of the conditions for the speed at which such an ambitious expansion of national industrial and 
energy policy was the pre-existing plans and institutional capacities already in place. This means 
that the actual choices made by Prime Minister Messmer were circumscribed by the winning ideas 
in existing institutions. We might even have expected different choices if we examine his 
background. We found in the analysis of the choice of nuclear reactor type before the crisis that the 
EDF skilfully employed a set of ideas involving the linking of cost with electricity supply. This was 
a persuasive argument within the PEON commission, with the Ministry of Finance and for the 
private industry which had been somewhat underwhelmed by the ability to gain knowhow and 
exports from the CEA-backed UNGG reactor programme. However, it was not before the military 
man President De Gaulle was replaced with Georges Pompidou as President that, in the words of 
former minister of foreign affairs Maurice Schuman: “the style changed” (Picard, Beltran, and 
Bungener 1985, 200).  
The nationalist pride in a French developed reactor gave way for the cost concerns raised in 
particular by EDF and Ministry of Finance. This shift in leadership can also be viewed as a shifting 
of overarching ideas. Pompidou was a banker by trade and emphasised international 
competitiveness as opposed to the national independence and glory espoused by De Gaulle (Hecht 
2009, 125). This conjecture can be strengthened by the fact that Pompidou attempted to find 
European (and outside) cooperation for the nuclear reactor programme (Bussière 2003, 251). When 
Georges Pompidou falls ill in 1973-4, it is Pierre Messmer, like De Gaulle, a former military man, 
who must take the decision of how to respond to the oil crisis. Here we might have expected him to 
potentially support a domestically developed reactor programme like the UNGG championed by 
CEA and De Gaulle few years before. Was the expansion of nuclear energy programme even the 
                                                 
141 Note sur les problemes de consommations d’energie dans l’industrie. - Comite sur l'energie - 19830369.7. Paris, 15. Fevrier . 1974. Section 4. 
Page. 3-4 
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most rational choice going forward? As mentioned above, only one LWR reactor was actually 
operational at the time and so a return to previous UNGG-designs with which the French had more 
operational experience might not seem as outlandish. Going one step further, we might think in 
terms of the hypothetical choices that existed to Prime Minister Messmer at the time beyond the 
nuclear energy option. Supplies of oil were only fundamentally threatened in the beginning months 
after the crisis(Jasper 1990, 159), and soon the problems became related to the increased prices 
rather than actual supply it was therefore the immediate trade balance issues resulting from this 
increase that faced the French Government in late 1973 and early 1974. 
6.3.4.2 Instrumental idea: Grand projet, but which one? 
After the crisis, the strong capacity of the French state is employed again in the instrumental policy 
ideas that drive the response to the oil crisis. The grand projet policy idea is utilized, but perhaps we 
should try to examine some of the choices facing the government and how different expert groups 
within nuclear energy acted. It is difficult to know exactly the type of analyses led the government 
to the nuclear programme expansion, we can however examine some options that would have been 
available to Prime Minister Messmer as President Pompidou’s health was failing.  
By comparing these options to the advice of experts and the seeming preference for strong state 
capacity in France, we can attempt to arrive at how instrumental policy idea of a grand projet 
concerning the immediate expansion of a domestic nuclear programme fit with these. One scholar 
summarizes the options available to Messmer as including: 1) paying the increased oil prices and 
hope they will eventually fall and increase exports to compensate for the trade imbalance 2) 
developed renewable energy resources 3) discouraged consumption e.g. through conservation of 
energy 4) deploy nuclear reactors (Jasper 1990, 159). The first option might have worked. As it 
turned out, the oil prices did fall again. An element of electoral candidacy might have crept in to 
sway Mesmer’s mind here. It is possible he was expecting an election following Pompidou’s failing 
health. While the second option was sound, it would have had limited potential to solve the 
immediate energy problems facing France.  
This left the choice to one between reducing energy consumption by curbing consumption through 
different forms of policy – conservation being one and the final option of expanding the nuclear 
programme. Out of these options, Messmer chose the last. It can’t have been because there was no 
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uncertainty about the nuclear programme. As we shall see, the Ministry of Finance had throughout 
the PEON-reports criticized the cost and size of the programme and its long term- as well as short 
term- financial viability and actively supported conservation efforts of the AEE (as mentioned 
above).  
In the choice between technological enthusiasm and cost, the solution of the technological 
enthusiasts, in particular the vision of the EDF, was likely more politically salient a response under 
the assumption the Messmer was thinking about a coming election. However, this is not the only 
factor. What is also worth emphasising, is that the instrumental policy idea of the EDF of “tous 
electrique, tout nucleaire” was consistent with the latter option, but in direct conflict with measures 
of energy conservation. Alongside this policy idea of extending electricity beyond other energy 
sources,  which had internally been a policy idea in the EDF since at least the early 1970s142, the 
response to the Oil crisis also entailed centralizing the responsibility for electrification of the French 
rural regions which previously had been under the control of local energy suppliers to the auspices 
of the EDF143.  
To the CEA, an EDF-dominated nuclear programme using licenced reactor technology competing 
with the CEA’s own previous designs was probably not their preferred option. However, the 
possibility to expand the nuclear programme is consistent with the technophilic idea of how to 
reinvigorate and modernise French economy and internal documents bear out this support was 
present in the early onset of the crisis during the autumn of 1973144 . This meant that the energy 
policy of France was to become primarily driven by nuclear power generation, a source of energy 
which was actively sought to displace other energy sources in the energy-mix, a line which was 
endorsed by the Government, and a further centralization of electricity supply responsibilities with 
the supplier of energy that the state held considerable influence with due to it being a public 
company. 
                                                 
142 Letter from Directeur general of EDF Marcel Boieux to Délégué Général à l'Energie Jean Blancard (19830369/11). 31. October. 1974 - Plan a 
Moyen Age EDF 1974 – 1980 – 1985.  
143 A meeting of the contract programme between the state and the public energy supplier explicitly references the decision of the Prime Minister to 
shift responsibility of electricity for rural areas with the EDF, effectively cementing the role of EDF as primarily supplier of energy for the majority of 
France as well as centralizing power over the energy policy. Reunion du 29. Novembre 1974. Contrat de Programme ETAT-E.D.F – Preparation de 
L’avant n 4 
144 Note Sur Les Programmes du C.E.A. Dans Le Domaine De l’Electronucleaire  (DgAIN,INT 73,476). 21. Sept. 1973– Energie Nucleaire - politique 
gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 (CEA – Comité interministeriel ). 
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6.3.4.3 Setting: All is electric 
After the crisis, the role of the CEA is diminished as the reactor choice driving the expansion of 
nuclear programme falls on a different design than that developed by them. The CEA still holds a 
strong expert influence on the nuclear policy, but their position is less omnipotent vis-à-vis 
especially the EDF. The capacity of the state is applied to expand the nuclear programme, but the 
setting of the policy idea of this grand projet is no longer as consistent with CEA policy goals of 
plutonium extraction and nuclear weapon development.  
The diminished role of the CEA and their policy ideas is mirrored by the increasing role of the 
EDF. The instrumental policy idea of the EDF of achieving cheap electricity to supplant other 
electricity sources is expanded with the “tout électrique, tout nucléaire”. The strong capacity of the 
state is thus wielded to extract the most electricity generation from the nuclear programme as 
possible. This has some very real effects on the types of nuclear reactors being built and the specific 
technical choices being made.  
One key difference between the period before the crisis and the one after is the shift in the roles of 
the CEA and the EDF. This has effects for the role of other actors within the area of energy policy 
broadly, and nuclear energy specifically. In particular, the resistance from the Ministry of Finance 
begins to increase on the PEON commission both through increasing number of Ministry of 
Finance personnel on the commission (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 142), but also because their formal 
powers over the EDF are stronger than those over the CEA (as described in the analysis of the 
French bureaucratic structure).  
The implication for the setting of policy idea of cheap electricity generation is that the state capacity 
to intervene in the economy becomes more multifaceted. The different actors that have influence 
attempt different policy suggestions to limit each other or alternatively aid each other’s policy ideas. 
The CEA actively reference PEON commission recommendations and the need to provide the EDF 
with the most reliable and economical techniques to produce nuclear energy145. As we will see in 
the section on negotiation style, the CEA and EDF unite around an instrumental idea of 
technological solutions against the Ministry of Finance’s instrumental policy idea of balancing the 
                                                 
145 Note Sur Les Programmes du C.E.A.  Dans Le Domaine De l’Electronucleaire – Energie Nucleaire - politique gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 – 
Subdocument name : CEA – Comité interministeriel – Document identifier : DgAIN,INT 73,476. 21. Sept. 1973. Page 2. Paragraph 3. 
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budget and jointly attempts to expand the nuclear programmes cost and scope. The institutional 
dimension of a strong capacity of state in France thus interacts in different ways with the patterns of 
actor behaviour and settings of policy ideas that are followed by the different expert groups that 
help define the energy policy response of France after the oil crisis. 
The overarching idea of a state-led intervention utilizing existing plans is consistent with the view 
that Messmer either did not care about the particulars of the reactor-debates between variations of 
the nuclear energy programme. Instead, he simply saw a potential “grand projet” which the French 
state already had expertise in implementing and which could act both as a longer term solution to 
energy supply constraints, but also as a signal to the French people that the government was doing 
something to solve the problem. The response to the crisis of choosing the nuclear programme is 
thus an example of applying a pre-existing solution to a not yet existing problem. The strong 
institutional capacity of the state was best applied in the existing form to the area of nuclear power, 
and thus the setting of the policy idea of grand projet became the expansion of the nuclear 
programme as the preferred response to the crisis.  
6.3.5 Negotiation style  
6.3.5.1 Overarching idea: Technological optimism versus cost 
To understand the more specific choices of nuclear reactors and debates over cost, we need to again 
examine the negotiation style between key actors in setting the formulated energy policy. More 
specifically pertains to the ongoing ideational battles between technological optimists and cost 
benefit ideas within different parts of the relevant actors of the public government response to the 
energy crisis. Let us turn to the former, first. The PEON reports can once again shed light on which 
ideas were dominant and what recommended policy choices were available to the Government at 
the time of the crisis. Furthermore, they allow us to indicate what ideational underpinnings 
supported the nuclear policy following the crisis. 
Negotiation of the substantive energy policy response to the energy crisis involved the same key 
actors as those that were present before the crisis. The key experts were again located in the 
powerful PEON commission were the planning of the civil nuclear energy programme was mainly a 
debate between the technological optimists in the EDF and CEA and the Ministry of Finance on the 
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other hand. These ideational fault lines were illustrated in the final PEON report before the energy 
crisis.  
In April 1973, the PEON released a report on recommendations for the nuclear policy. To achieve 
this goal of supplanting other energy sources with nuclear generated electricity, the PEON 1973 
suggested an acceleration of the 8000MWe planned construction to a 13000MWe in the five years 
between 1978-82 (Simonnot 1978, 269). Here the logic of everything nuclear (‘tout nucléaire’) 
from the EDF idea set is explicitly incorporated as a goal for energy policy. Even outside the PEON 
commission, the CEA argues with reference to the common report with EDF to argue for the 
economic soundness of nuclear expansion146. Not only should the nuclear energy programme be 
accelerated, but also it should focus on replacing other energy sources. EDF’s instrumental ideas 
had at this point become common French policy. A few months later, the oil crisis hits. This 
prompts the government to act, and they request a revised report from the PEON commission on 
how a potential acceleration of the nuclear energy programme could take place.  
As the oil price spikes to 400% of pre-crisis levels, the EDF and CEA led commission submits a 
new report to the Ministry of Industry which is released in February of 1974147. The programme 
suggested the same increase from 8000MWe from the previous report to 13000MWe, but now 
PEON suggested the construction of an additional 13000MWe no later than 1980 and that the initial 
13000MWe be installed in the period 1974-5 instead of the planned 8000MWe planned for that 
period in the previous report (Simonnot 1978, 269)148. This was February 1974. Within a very short 
span of time after this report, the government, with Pierre Messmer at the helm in the absence of the 
deathly ill Pompidou decides with the rest of the Council of Ministers on an expansion of the civil 
nuclear programme149.  
On March 5th Prime Minister, Pierre Messmer, announced the new expansion of the nuclear energy 
programme150, curtailing most of the cost concerns of critics. The relatively small group of nuclear 
                                                 
146 NOTE SUR L'EVOLUTION DE LA DIRECTION UES PRODUCTIONS p. 8CEA – Direction de Productions (424528) 24. October 1973. Energie 
Nucleaire - politique gouvermentale - 4, 24528,09 (CEA – Comité interministeriel). 
147 As Simonot, 1978 also notes, this report is indeed quite short by PEON standards, and contain no annexes of additional calculations of estimates 
beyond those in the main corpus of the report. This indicates some level of expediency might have been required in producing it. 
148 EDF repeats this increased push in a report on the effect on the price-increase on oil after the oil crisis. Estimation d’intérêt des programmes 
nucléaires 1976 et 1977. EDF: Etudes Economiques generales. 3. October 1974. Plan a Moyen age EDF 1974-80-85. - 205.4.9220. (Contrat de 
programme avenant 4 1974-1975) 
149 James Jasper speculates with reference to the former EDF director Louis Puisseux that the decision may have taken as little as three days 
consideration by the government (Jasper 1990, 157). See also, (Puiseux 1981). 
150 Reunion du 29. Novembre 1974. Contrat de Programme ETAT-E.D.F – Preparation de L’avant n 4.29. Novembre 1974 - Plan a Moyen age EDF 
1974-80-85. - 205.4.9220. (Contrat de programme avenant 4 1974-1975).  
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energy experts in the PEON commission had managed to enshrine their policy ideas into the 
recommendations into the official national response to the energy crisis. Not only had the 
technological optimists defeated the cost-perspective of the Ministry of Finance, but the EDF in 
particular, had managed to expertly insert their instrumental idea of replacing electricity from 
nuclear energy with other sources of energy. It is to this last aspect, we now turn. 
6.3.5.2 Instrumental idea: The commercial shift and substitution by electricity 
Already since the defeat of the CEA in the battle over which reactor design should be at the basis of 
the French nuclear programme had the EDF followed the objectives of expanding the reach of 
electric power use as well increasing the supply. On December 23rd 1970, the EDF had signed a 
contract with the state to allow it to actively market electricity in competition with other sources of 
energy (Jasper 1992, 88). This shifted the EDF from a provider of electricity focused on maximum 
supply, or as later, at the lowest possible cost, to also actively seeking to increase the use of 
electricity (of which nuclear would be the primary source) at the cost of other energy sources. The 
slogan for this campaign became known as “Tout électrique, tout nucléaire” (“All electric, all 
nuclear”)(Hecht 2009, 319).  
The genesis of the commercial shift of the EDF came in part from the Nora report on the 
profitability of national companies(Frost 1991, 248–49). The goal for modern national companies 
should be to pursue increased autonomy for management through “contracts” and 
“rentabilité”151(Hecht 2009, 110) which they were to pursue with minimum direct intervention by 
the rest of the state.152 Notice how specific forms of capacity of the state intersect with negotiation 
styles that are formalized around a limited number of actors. The instrumental idea of substitution 
by electricity that came to characterise the post-crisis period was a consequence of a coalitional 
battle between the policy ideas of public agencies that represented the strong capacity of the state - 
the winning of the EDF vis-à-vis the CEA in defining the specific form of the nuclear energy 
programme153. At the level of the specific instrumental idea, the idea of cost-effective energy 
                                                 
151 “Profitability” is a slightly misleading translation because public companies do not earn profits. “financial viability” is perhaps a better term, also 
preferred by Hecht, 2009. 
152 Jasper, (1990: 89) notes that Simon Nora in writing the report was inspired by some of the managerial practices already in place at EDF, therefore 
it is unlikely that the report itself was the origin of these ideas within the EDF. Indeed, as Hecht, 2009 notes, the EDF had since critique of the 
financial viability of some of its hydroelectric programmes in the mid 1950s instituted practices involving rentabilité (Hecht 2009, 87). 
153: In the autumn of 1973, the CEA makes explicit note of the criteria for the scope and focus of the nuclear programme should be the cheapest and 
most reliable way to produce cheap electricity with no mention of nuclear weapons or concerns over reactor types. See, page. 2. Paragraph  3. Note 
Sur Les Programmes du C.E.A.  Dans Le Domaine De l’Electronucleaire – Archive name and ref : Energie Nucleaire - politique gouvermentale - 4, 
24528,09 – Subdocument name : CEA – Comité interministeriel – Document identifier : DgAIN,INT 73,476. 21. Sept. 1973 
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production that could insure French economic self-sustainability in terms of domestic electricity 
production was similarly reinforcing the overarching ideational goal of the capacity of the state.  
In practice, this new instrumental idea meant the EDF could act as a commercial actor and actively 
seek to expand the use of electricity in different parts of the French economy. The commercial 
strategy that followed these new ideas of competing with other energy sources was primarily 
effective in the household sector, where the share of all-electric new constructions went from 5% in 
1970 to 50% in 1975154. The nuclear programme was a natural extension of this new idea of 
competing actively with other energy sources. It was in France’s interest to achieve economic 
growth. This would require electricity. Therefore, the more electricity the EDF could produce at a 
low cost, the better. Scaling up the nuclear energy programme was a great way to insure both the 
future importance of the EDF but also to build enormous capacity of electricity(Jasper 1990, 89). 
Furthermore, since France relied on imports for most other energy sources, the substitution of these 
sources, in particular oil following the oil crisis, with electricity from domestic nuclear power 
would only further improve the situation. The expansion of the nuclear programme pushed in the 
PEON commission is example of such attempts, but it was not until the oil crisis the ideas of 
substitution of other energy sources and drastically expanded nuclear capacity became national 
policy. Now the EDF could thus fully shift to achieve the overarching goal of modernising France 
through the instrumental idea of supplying low cost electricity – and electricity at the expense of 
other sources of energy (Jasper 1990, 90). 
Looking back across the period after the crisis, it is interesting to note how the CEA and EDF co-
exist and cooperate to push common techno-optimist ideas about nuclear energy in the period 
before the crisis. Later, even before the crisis hits, differences in ideas begin to emerge and conflicts 
arise around the instrumental ideas that are followed by these two actors. By and large, the EDF 
managed to make their ideas dominant, but in the wider perspective one has to wonder if the same 
trajectory  would have been possible without the CEA being present.  
We have seen how the institutional surroundings help determine the types of interaction that takes 
place in a given policy field. The French nuclear energy policy is a relatively closed affair, with 
                                                 
154 The link between household heating and electricity demand increases can also be identified in EDFs push for the use of electric heat pumps See, 
DEMANDES D'INFORMATIONS COMPLEMENTAIRES SUR LE " PIAN SEPTEMBRE 1974 » d'E.D.F » (p. 2). Plan a Moyen age EDF 1974-80-85 
- 205.4.9220 
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limited actors holding particular positions and expertise in regularised and formal settings. These 
conditions made it possible for the CEA and EDF to share a common front against other actors who 
attempted to curtail or limit the scale and level of ambition that could be attempted with the nuclear 
programme. To some extent, the relative protection of the CEA from these pressures due to their 
immediate proximity to the President and their separate funding, meant that control over policy 
choices through limited spending from the Ministry of Finance was limited. In that sense, it is hard 
to imagine the trajectory that eventually made the EDF able to dominate the policy formulation with 
their policy ideas without the CEA. Had the CEA not been present in the earlier period, it is not at 
all certain that the overarching ideas of technological optimism that the CEA and EDF represented 
would have won out inside the PEON commission.  
The negotiation style of the bureaucratic structure in France meant that the number of involved 
actors in policy formulation was limited to a relatively small group of experts drawn from similar 
organisations across the examined period. This seems to suggest, that while some changes in ideas 
are present before and after the crisis, especially the shift towards nuclear energy as the primary 
energy policy reaction to the oil crisis (and the acceptance that electricity generated by that 
programme should supplant other energy sources like gas, oil and coal where possible) there is 
nonetheless an indication that these different ideas are reinforcements or consistent with the ideas 
present before the crisis. Worth noting, is also, that the shift in ideas did not come from outside the 
already existing group of policy experts. Instead, the changes that takes place in the dominant ideas 
on energy policy in France are in fact coming from the same actors that were present before the 
crisis. Thus, the loci of ideational change is dependent on the institutional makeup that allows 
coalitions to form around policy ideas of experts in a given policy field. From the point of view of 
attributing analytical strength to different aspects of the theoretical framework, it does seem 
reasonable to conclude, that while ideas can and do change in times of crisis, the patterns of change 
follow existing trajectories that are in large part dependent on the institutional surroundings that 
determine how many, who, and the type of expertise they hold. 
6.3.5.3 Setting: Resistance of cost from Ministry of Finance 
The trajectories of change in energy policy ideas within the nuclear programme at the level of 
instrumental ideas emphasised the role of a limited number of actors holding formal positions. The 
technical nature of the interaction in these fora meant that arguments that contained economic and 
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technical concerns were strong. At the overarching idea level, this manifested as a debate between 
technological optimists in the CEA and EDF against primarily the Ministry of Finance. At the 
instrumental level of ideas, the substitution of other energy sources with electricity from nuclear 
power implied a stronger position for the EDF vis-à-vis the CEA goals for the nuclear programme 
(electricity production vs. plutonium). At the level of settings of these ideas, the more prevalent 
debates were between the ideas of the EDF and the Ministry of Finance. 
First, the debate was about the conditions for substitution of energy sources with nuclear electricity 
as sought by the EDF. The difference in cost understanding between Ministry of Finance and EDF 
resulted in the former attempting to restrain the expenditure on expanding the nuclear programme 
and thus the spread of electricity by means of capacity constraints and limits on the reduction in unit 
costs per kWh that the EDF was attempting to achieve. For the EDF, kWh/centime had been an 
instrumental idea that made possible the attainment of surplus energy through French technological 
advances and the general betterment of the French economy. For the Ministry of Finance, on the 
other hand, cost was the overarching policy idea that drove most of their other actions. The reason, 
for this difference lay in the dominant expertise of the overarching policy idea of the two actors. For 
the EDF the overarching goal was energy production through technological advances. Cost was an 
instrumental idea that facilitated the faster attainment of this goal, because a particular type of 
nuclear programme was preferable to another in this regard. For the Ministry of Finance, the 
overarching policy idea was the fiscal restraint of the nuclear programme as such.  
Second, the technological sophistication of the EDF arguments about costs had previously lent them 
considerable leverage in the PEON commission – and was at least partially responsible for them 
succeeding to supplant CEA ideas about plutonium extraction. Throughout the remainder of the 
1970s, the principal ideas of the Ministry of Finance were the same, but they were only partially 
successful in reducing the scope of ambition in the nuclear programme’s expansion. The cost, by 
which they meant expenditure, of the nuclear programme was high in absolute terms and associated 
with a great deal of uncertainty and they expected demand for electricity, which would finance the 
returns, would probably not continue to rise as it had in the past they argued. Finally, the Ministry 
of Finance attempted to curtail the influence of the EDF in the PEON commission in several ways. 
They attempted to obtain seats for three of its directors on the commission, which succeeded, and 
eventually the Ministry developed its own energy model to go against the optimistic forecasts of 
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cost and demand predicted by the EDF (Jasper 1990, 171–72; N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 149–54).This 
became the one of several attempts to undermine the veracity of the EDF arguments.  
In the following years following the launch of the Messmer plan, the Ministry of Finance supported 
the creation of an agency to promote electricity conservation. The AEE that was set up in 1974 to 
develop and encourage conservation of energy. A strong economic case against the use of 
electricity for space heating was built on the work of this agency (ibid). This was in direct conflict 
with EDF’s idea of expanding the use and increasing the demand for electricity. As we saw earlier, 
the commercialization strategy that followed from the idea of “tout électrique, tout nucléaire” were 
primarily effective in the household sector. The Ministry of Finance’s attempts to reduce 
consumption of electricity would thus both reduce the demand for electricity (and thus further 
expansion of the nuclear generation capacity), but also a key way in which EDF was financed. More 
crucially, perhaps, changes to the demand curve of electricity would negatively affect the modelled 
predictions of the nuclear programme cost made by the EDF. Thus, the idea of conservation ran 
counter to increasing the scope of application and capacity of electricity sought by the EDF.  
The closest the Ministry of Finance came to realising their ideas was perhaps in limiting the setting 
of the instrumental idea of electricity generation and substitution of other sources of energy by the 
EDF. In the December 1974 PEON commission recommendations, the same year Messmer 
announced his plan to respond to the energy crisis. The technological optimists in PEON were 
pushing for a 20000MWe order to be made in 1975 and for 7000MWe to begin construction every 
following year. The Ministry of Finance argued that better forecasting models were needed and 
attempted to delay the programme and instead argued for 8000MWe to be ordered in 1975 and 
begin building 5000MWe for the two following years (Jasper 1990, 173). When the PEON 
commission ended up recommending 12000MWe ordered in 1975 and 6000MWe started in 1976 
and 1977 the ministry can at least have been said to delay the most optimistic of the technological 
optimists(Simonnot 1978, 274–79).. Given that the previous Minister of Finance was now President 
(Giscard d'Estaing) it is perhaps testament to how deeply embedded these ideas were that the 
Ministry of Finance was not able to muster more resistance to the nuclear programme’s expansion. 
The mentioned compromise programme was adopted by the government on August 6th, 1975 
(Jasper 1990, 173). 
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6.3.6 Basis of Expertise  
6.3.6.1 Overarching idea: Shifting coalitions - Technological optimism redux 
As the crisis hits, the ideational trajectories of the two organisations are no longer as coherent. The 
French state decides on an expansion of the nuclear programme to increase the commonly agreed 
goal between the EDF and CEA of energy independence, the differences in instrumental ideas play 
a big role. In principle, the CEA and EDF are thus still unified in the overarching idea of furthering 
the modernisation of the French economy through state intervention in the economy. The difference 
from the period before the crisis is that the power balance is now clearly shifted towards the EDF as 
the main actor of the French energy policy. The more significant ideational conflict after the crisis 
therefore exists between the EDF and the Ministry of Finance rather than EDF and CEA. 
The common educational background between the technological background of the EDF and the 
CEA personnel is what made cooperation between the two possible and for their common support 
of the nuclear programme to dominate the energy policy discussions in the PEON commission. This 
commonality persists after the crisis as well, but the significant shift is that the EDF is now the 
dominant of the two actors. The dynamics we saw before the crisis, where the conflict was 
primarily between the CEA on one side and the EDF and Ministry of Finance on the other has thus 
shifted. Now, that the questions relating to substantive technological choices that separated CEA 
and EDF have been resolved, the conflict lines between actors shift. As the nuclear programme is 
set to expand with the Messmer Plan in early 1974, the conflict lines shift towards implementation 
costs. This conflict line is stronger between the EDF and the Ministry of Finance.  
At one level, this is because the Ministry of Finance has stronger budgetary control over the EDF 
than it does over the CEA. On the other hand, the financial control-dimension cannot explain the 
new dynamic alone, because we would have expected to see the conflict line of the EDF and 
Ministry before, rather than the cooperation they showed against the CEA on the questions 
regarding reactor technology choices. The substantive weight given to ideas of cost from the 
educational background of economics in EDF and Ministry of Finance in defining the nuclear 
programme are thus a relevant factor when understanding the conditions for cooperation between 
actors in the area of nuclear energy. The emerging conflict line between the EDF and Ministry of 
Finance emphasises the dual nature of the educational background in the EDF. On the one hand, 
224 | P a g e  
 
they generally agree with the CEA in the notion of letting the expansion of a technological solution 
to the energy crisis drive modernisation of the French state. On the other, the EDF also has an 
affinity for the types of cost-projections and economic planning that is preferred (and indeed made) 
by the Ministry of Finance. This educational flexibility is what allows the EDF the skilfully adapt 
their cooperation with either the CEA or the Ministry of Finance throughout the period. Before the 
crisis, the EDF cooperated with the Ministry of Finance on the basis of the idea of cost to push 
through their idea of modernising the French economy though cheap electricity. As the conflict 
between the Ministry and EDF becomes prominent in the period following the crisis, the 
commonality between the CEA and EDF again surface to allow the technical concerns to supersede 
economic ideas of cost as budget constraints pushed by the Ministry of Finance.  
6.3.6.2 Instrumental idea: EDF: disciplinary flexibility 
The mixed nature of the educational basis of expertise in the EDF is the condition for the coalition 
between the Ministry of Finance and the EDF against the CEA-led nuclear programme in the period 
before the crisis. The instrumental policy idea of cost that united the EDF and Ministry of Finance 
before the crisis (and was important in building an alliance against the CEA-programme) is less 
stable. First, the size and singular focus of the energy policy response to the oil crisis led the 
Ministry of Finance to criticize the programme on budget grounds alone. Beyond the attempts to 
constrain budget spending on the nuclear programme, the situation also brings into further light the 
difference between the idea of cost in the EDF and the idea of cost in the Ministry of Finance. As 
mentioned, the use of statistical modelling and computerisation of cost-projections is partially what 
had allowed the EDF to speak to the cost-perspective of the Ministry of Finance in the ideational 
conflict over the type of nuclear reactor programme155. In a sense, the EDF had utilized a non-
technical idea of cost/kWh to obtain support in the PEON commission in the technical discussion of 
nuclear reactor programmes between the EDF and the CEA. Once the EDF had become the primary 
actor in defining the nuclear programme of France, the cost-perspective became subservient to the 
idea (that they still shared with the CEA) of modernising the French economy through the 
development and expansion of a French nuclear programme.  
                                                 
155 The modelling techniques are also used to predict power demands during different seasons under different assumptions about the weather. EDF: 
PASSACE DES HIVERS 1S78/79 ET AU-DELA - COMPLEXITE.DES METHODES D'AJUSTEMENT DE LA PUISSANCE. September 28th 1977. 
Production Autonome (19830369/11). 
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The PEON 1973 report bears out this shift. Like other reports, it contains several viewpoints 
represented by the different groups in the commission. Here we can observe how the CEA and EDF 
who were in conflict over instrumental policy ideas earlier suddenly unify against the Ministry of 
Finance. They introduce a distinction between objective and subjective concerns. This terminology 
is used to differentiate those who believed in a furthering of the nuclear programme and those who 
wished to constrain it. Essentially, those who are against the expansion of the nuclear programme 
and increased market-share of nuclear energy to other energy-sources are branded as following 
subjective agendas instead of basing their arguments on objective facts (Simonnot 1978, 267–68). 
This is indicative of a complete dominance of technical expertise in the organising body of nuclear 
energy in France. It delegitimizes any policy ideas that are not consistent with expansion of the 
nuclear sector and allows the CEA and EDF to completely ignore the concerns of cost-perspectives 
from the Ministry of Finance. Cost, in the sense of budget-constraints that the ENA-inspired 
perspective of the Ministry of Finance, became much less important.  
From this, it is clear that the technical and engineering background of the EDF personnel had a 
stronger influence on the type expertise than economics and statistical background from the ENA. 
That is not to say that the latter was not significant. They were instrumental in being able to ascribe 
meaning to the trajectory of energy policy in a way that was more consistent with the ways of 
thinking in the Ministry of Finance. This allowed the EDF considerable leverage against the CEA in 
the otherwise technical debates on reactor choice. However, as the technical debate over reactor 
choice ends with a programme that favours the solutions preferred by the EDF, their technological 
optimism again become superimposed on cost-perspectives. The increasing conflict between the 
EDF and the Ministry of Finance becomes evident in a number of occasions throughout the period 
following the announcement of the Messmer plan. 
In November 1977 the Assembly Finance committee were preparing the 1978 budget, the Ministry 
of Finance voice their concerns and doubts about the economic sustainability of the French nuclear 
programme and attempts to restrain EDF spending by heavily criticizing several aspects of the 
French nuclear commitment. The committee criticized the size of the programme, its costs 
compared to other energy sources, coal in particular, the debt required to build, maintain and extend 
it and finally the composition of the PEON commission which representation heavily favoured 
technological optimists in the CEA and EDF . The broad range of critiques indicate that the 
Ministry of Finance was still not fundamentally sold on the idea of nuclear as the solution to either 
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achieving French independence or to increase the technological sophistication of French industry 
and their international competitiveness (Jasper 1990, 241).The ministry was however unable to 
change policy trajectory of the energy sector. The Council of Ministers itself decided the number of 
reactors to be ordered each year, which gave the EDF enormous leverage against the Ministry of 
Finance. Efforts to introduce energy conservation measures and thus reduce EDFs stated 
instrumental idea of economic growth through the increased supply of electricity and expanded use 
at the cost of other sources were effectively blocked at the council of ministers (Jasper 1990, 242; 
N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 152–56). So complete in fact was the dominance of the EDF vision for a 
nuclear France that many EDF officials had not even heard of the existence of the report and the 
critique of the nuclear programme that it represented (N. J. D. Lucas 1979, 105). 
6.3.6.3 Setting: Disciplinary differences setting of “cost”  
In the period before the crisis, the main constellation of actors debating the nuclear energy policy 
was the CEA, EDF and Ministry of Finance. While the period before the crisis was characterised by 
a commonality in technological optimism between the technical experts in the EDF and CEA, it was 
the alliance EDF and the Ministry of Finance made possible by a common concern for economic 
cost of the programme as well as a common language for communicating these concerns in 
statistical projections that allowed the idea of cost to dominate the debate and for the EDF to 
eventually change the reactor choice from the CEA-designed French UNGG-reactors to a licenced 
LWR reactor from Westinghouse. In this sense, it was the commonality over an economic idea that 
allowed the EDF and Ministry of Finance to shift the otherwise highly technical debates over 
nuclear reactor choice to the favour of the EDF. 
The mixed nature of educational background in the EDF is what made it possible for employees of 
the organisation to speak both the language of technological optimism, an idea more aligned with 
the CEA, as well as the language of cost, more aligned with the Ministry of Finance. The particular 
setting of cost was, however, as we saw earlier, not exactly the same between the EDF and the 
Ministry of Finance. The former utilized cost measurements to better understand how cheap 
electricity could be produced, not to limit production of said electricity, whereas the idea of cost in 
the Ministry of Finance was predominantly a question of over-all budget restraint. We might 
consider the EDF idea a question of relative cost (kWh/centime) and the Ministry of Finance a 
question of absolute cost. Moreover, the EDF refers to the cost of the output of the energy 
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programme and the Ministry to the cost of the energy programme as such. The mixed educational 
background allowed to two ideas to cohere as substantially leading to the same purpose of the 
Ministry of Finance during the ideational conflict between the CEA and the EDF.  
The CEA wanted nuclear power to produce plutonium for weapons, at the detriment of total cost 
and relative cost. While cost estimates existed, they were never a driving instrumental policy idea 
for the CEA and they never became as sophisticated as those of the EDF (Hecht 2009, 120). The 
EDF wanted nuclear power to produce cheap electricity, which happened to support arguments for 
overall cost of the nuclear programme as well (albeit somewhat questionable, as we have seen). 
This allowed a collation between the Ministry of Finance and the EDF against the CEA in the 
period leading up to the oil crisis, but after the crisis and the expansion of the nuclear programme 
became a stated government policy, the difference between the setting of cost in the cost idea of the 
Ministry and the EDF became clear. In this period, the EDF and CEA again became the 
technological optimists from before their conflict, and the Ministry of Finance attempted to restrain 
the budget cost of the nuclear programme suggested in the PEON commission (and elsewhere). 
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6.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the policy ideas of experts in the institutional context of the bureaucratic structure of 
France identified several interesting analytical findings. The analysis has emphasised how relatively 
few centralized expert actors are involved in energy policy predominantly concerned with nuclear 
energy. The different ways in which the policy ideas of these experts interact with the closed 
bureaucratic structure in France makes different coalitions possible and empower some expert 
policy ideas over others.  
The strong capacity of the state has an effect throughout the period both before and after the crisis, 
however the dynamics of policy ideas vary. The CEA and EDF have a large role to play due to their 
dominance in the PEON commission. Their overarching ideas both emphasise the modernisation of 
France and an element of French nationalism. The institutional conditions for these ideas are 
supportive, because the a strong capacity of state in managing the economy as well as having an 
active role in fostering economic growth through domestic initiatives like a nuclear energy 
programme is consistent with the technophilic overarching idea that unifies the CEA and EDF. The 
instrumental ideas that the CEA and EDF follow are however somewhat different. At the level of 
instrumental ideas, the CEA sees this ensured through nuclear energy and a “force de frappe” and 
the EDF sees this through energy independence and cheap electricity generation.  
These variations in instrumental policy ideas between the CEA and EDF can both exist within a 
strong state capacity configuration. However, which ideas win in cases of conflict cannot be 
explained alone with reference to the non-pluralistic nature of negotiations or the unity in a 
technophilic overarching idea of the future growth of the French economy and society. Ideas either 
win in closed bureaucratic structures when they have a dominant position due to their legitimacy in 
terms of the type of expertise they represent or through the preferred position they have already 
obtained from before. The key to both were coalitions that formed around different policy ideas of 
actors. The CEA was in the latter position due to being the development arm of the French state in 
nuclear energy and thus was an extension of the dirigiste capacity of the state. Even if the EDF had 
expertise within nuclear energy, it was not sufficient to affect the hierarchy of preferred policy ideas 
at this level.  
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Negotiations among experts tended to take place in commissions and tend to be highly technical in 
nature. The period before the crisis was characterised by a formalized style of negotiation between 
the EDF and CEA. The conflict that emerged between them was on a technical basis on the specific 
choices regarding the development goals of nuclear reactors. The introduction of a new 
measurement by the EDF of kWh/centimes allows them to begin fashioning reports that that involve 
comparisons and projections of costs across different technical choices for nuclear reactors and 
affiliated auxiliary technology. The technical and formalized nature of the negotiation style meant 
that debates remained at the level of instrumental ideas. After the crisis hits and the shift to a new 
instrumental policy idea of substitution of all other energy sources by electricity takes the forefront.  
The reason why one particular technical idea could suddenly shift the instrumental policies that 
dictated the energy policy is a function of a bureaucratic structure where cost-concerns could unify 
instrumental policy ideas between the Ministry of Finance and EDF. This was facilitated by the 
basis of expertise in the closed bureaucratic system of France that is characterised by similarity in 
disciplinary language between the ENA-trained parts of the Ministry of Finance and EDF. This 
allowed the technical debates, especially located in the PEON-commission, to shift towards 
concerns with electricity production which constitutes a dividing line in instrumental policy ideas 
between the CEA and EDF. The question of costs becomes the substantive debate that breaks the 
unity around an overarching idea of nuclear energy as a grand projet and shifts the dominant ideas 
toward instrumental policy ideas which the Ministry of Finance and EDF can unite around. 
The EDF allies with the Ministry of Finance over a seemingly common instrumental policy idea of 
cost. This coalition is made possible by a shared background in the basis of expertise between the 
two actors – specifically a common appreciation and use of the disciplines of statistics and 
economics. Substantively, the coherence between ENA-schooled economist and statisticians in the 
EDF and Ministry of Finance make it possible for common ground around an instrumental idea of 
cost to form between the two. This instrumental idea of cost defeats the idea of domestically 
developed reactor technology and plutonium extraction. Institutionally, we would also expect the 
coalition or conflict to form between EDF and Ministry of Finance because of the formal control 
over budgets that the Ministry has over the EDF as opposed to the CEA. 
This allows an instrumental policy idea on cost shift the balance of power in favour of the EDF to 
win support for a new reactor technology and thus shift the path French nuclear energy policy. As 
230 | P a g e  
 
the crisis hits the consequences of this ideational battle mean that the choices available to the strong 
state are defined by EDF instrumental ideas rather than those of the CEA previously. The ideational 
foundation of the alliance between the Ministry of Finance and EDF is later put into question when 
the differences in setting this idea become apparent. The EDF focuses on cost as a relative measure 
per unit of energy generated where the Ministry of Finance consider cost in relation to an absolute 
budgetary restraint of policy programmes – a view that the EDF does not share – they want to 
increase the size and scope of the nuclear energy programme. At that point, the EDF and CEA shift 
back towards a unity around the overarching ideas of technophilia and nuclear energy, but now, 
defined through technical policy choices that reflect underlying instrumental policy ideas of the 
EDF.  
Beyond the empirical findings of the analysis, a few theoretical implications may be hinted at, if not 
generalized per se. One relatively clear finding of the examination of educational basis of expertise 
is the observation that coalitions between expert actors are more likely to form if they have 
educational backgrounds that are similar enough that they communicate in a commensurate way. 
The temporary alliance between the EDF and the Ministry of Finance was made possible by their 
similar focus on cost and ability to communicate these policy ideas in a similar manner – e.g. 
statistical analyses and computerised simulations of costs and parameters of nuclear construction.  
However, as the crisis response becomes more clearly crystallised as an expansion of the nuclear 
programme, the EDF instead formed a coalition with the CEA around a common technophilic 
vision of the future of France. This may have implications for how the connection between 
institutional constraints and policy ideas are conceptualised in that not only can the specific 
substance of an idea (e.g. the dominance of a particular type of economic discipline (Ban 2016; 
Chwieroth 2007a, 2010)), but the tools by which policy ideas are formulated also matter for the 
ability of a given policy idea to gather support even in contexts of relatively few and highly 
specialised actors. Of course, this observation should not be generalized lightly, but there is 
potential that a hypothetical pattern similar to this may occur in other contexts of highly technical 
and formalized interaction of expert actors.  
Thus, the more general hypothesis this raises for other policy areas and cases could be formulated 
as: Alliances between constellations of actors is dictated by the similarity of their educational 
background of experts in the groups. When a constellation is dominated by three actors where two 
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are similar, but one is similar with another actor, that similarity becomes the significant one for 
creating conditions for alliances on policy ideas. An implication for the future study of the intersect 
between different types of institutional organisation of expertise and policy ideas should therefore 
pay more attention to the specific technical substance of the policy ideas. A fruitful way to take 
these observations further might be gleaned in work done on the policy-implications of different 
forms of economic modelling (e.g. (Mügge 2016; Mügge and Stellinga 2015)). This is because 
despite their seeming objective and technical nature, small variations may potentially result in large 
policy changes - should they be implemented.  
One way this analysis of a closed bureaucratic structure has aided these studies of how ideas matter 
is by indicating the potential for power balances to be shifted in closed bureaucratic structures. That 
is, ideas at lower levels of abstraction like the instrumental ideas of the EDF and Ministry of 
Finance can shift power balances between the policy ideas of actors even in closed institutional 
settings where less outside expertise can intervene and shift the policies in question. Moreover, the 
stability of the ideational coalitions depend in part on the coherence of the agreement of 
instrumental policy ideas at the level of settings of ideas. This has implications for classic 
typologies of policy ideas as changing in paradigmatic shifts from “above”. Rather, change in 
policy can happen from shifts in the dominance of policy ideas at lower levels of abstraction and 
high levels of technicality. 
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Chapter 7 Comparative Conclusion and Perspectives 
This chapter draws together the different insights from the chapters of the thesis and attempts to 
contextualise the findings of the analysis in a broader frame of social science research. First, it 
reflects on the broader theoretical and empirical puzzle of the thesis in relation to the stated research 
questions. Secondly, it examines the findings of the individual analyses before synthesising some 
combined findings from the analyses as a whole. Finally, these findings are put into perspective in 
terms of what they may imply for the future study in the discipline of social science, and the 
broader relevance of the thesis for other phenomena like the climate change agenda and populism 
are illustrated. 
7.1 The Broader Goals and Research Questions of the thesis 
The theoretical “puzzle” of this thesis was the way in which institutional contexts matter for the 
dynamics of policy ideas. Specifically, it examined the influence of institutions on ideas through the 
concept of open or closed bureaucratic structures, and different aspects of policy ideas 
operationalised as overarching policy ideas, instrumental policy ideas and settings of policy ideas. 
The analysis limited the focus on policy ideas to expertise within the policy field of energy policy. 
This was partly because the energy policy response was an obvious starting point for examining 
responses to the first oil crisis, but also because the technical complexity of alternative policies 
supported by different policy ideas allowed the analysis to speak to broader questions of the 
importance of experts and knowledge in advanced economies. The focus on energy policy was 
opportune in examining the dynamics of ideas because it requires focus on longer time spans, and, 
thus, this explicit temporal diachronic aspect of the analysis was designed in a way that it could pick 
up potential variations in change dynamics over time.  
The empirical question, which served as a backdrop of the investigation, was the different ways in 
which countries react to similar stimuli. More specifically, it related to the question of how the 
intersect between international crisis and domestic solutions are mediated. The focus on policy 
ideas within energy policy among expert groups in this field was examined in France and the United 
Kingdom. These cases were interesting to examine in that they represented diverse variation on the 
causal factor of institutions, which was operationalised as open or closed bureaucratic structure. 
More broadly, the examination of energy policy responses to a common crisis may potentially 
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indicate dynamics which would be relevant to take into account in more recent periods where the 
question of global climate change is tackled by states. 
The investigation was guided by a main hypothesis and two sub-hypotheses. The main hypothesis 
was:  
Differing bureaucratic structures helped shape ideational exchange and negotiation about policy 
responses to the first oil crisis in France and the United Kingdom 
The two sub-hypotheses were: 
1) Bureaucratic structures varied across the cases. 
2) The bureaucratic structures influenced the dynamic of ideational development in different 
directions. 
To answer the main hypothesis, the two subsequent research hypotheses had to be formulated. One 
relating to differing bureaucratic structures and one linking these structures with policy ideas among 
experts. The first sub-hypothesis was: Bureaucratic structures varied across the cases. 
The theoretical framework was developed, which examined the twin aspects of institutional and 
agency factors. The institutional dimension was operationalised as open or closed bureaucratic 
structure. This was considered a subset of institutions in each case, but which has relevance to the 
role of expert ideas in different ways. The three dimensions of a bureaucratic structure illustrated 
the role of weak or strong state capacity, pluralist or closed negotiation style, or technical or 
generalist educational basis of experts. These broad analytical categories were then examine for 
each country case. The United Kingdom was found to mostly resemble an open bureaucratic 
system, and the French case most similar to the characteristics associated with a closed bureaucratic 
system. The first sub-hypothesis was thus answered in the first section of each case analysis when 
the bureaucratic structure was examined.  
The second sub-hypothesis: The bureaucratic structures influenced the dynamic of ideational 
development in different directions. It had to examine the policy ideas among experts in these 
bureaucratic structures in both cases. The theoretical framework utilized the more fine-grained 
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heuristic conceptualisation of overarching policy ideas, instrumental policy ideas and settings of 
policy ideas to capture the variation in policy ideas among experts in the energy policy field across 
the time period from before the oil crisis up until the late 1970s. This allowed the analysis to 
capture the different ways in which ideas manifested among experts in the two cases across a longer 
time period and speak to the dynamics of ideational change and continuity without assuming 
punctuated shifts.  
7.2 Main analytical points and dimensions in the United Kingdom 
In the analysis of the United Kingdom, a number of interesting findings could be identified. While 
there are a few examples of increasing attempts to allow public control over some areas of the 
energy policy in the period after 1975 (domestic oil production, in particular) the general pattern of 
the capacity of the state in the United Kingdom is one of absence of intervention. That is not to say, 
that the state does nothing throughout the period, but that the ways in which state capacity manifests 
is through the utilization of existing institutional structures. We observe this in preference for 
triparty bargaining in the coal sector, or the concern for international diplomacy in the oil sector. 
Even when attempts to increase the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) might be argued as expressions 
of stronger state action, these policy ideas are reduced in intensity by international concerns and 
thus limits state capacity to set a higher PTE. 
The resultant policy idea dynamic is that experts are inclined to select ideas that are based on the 
resources of other actors rather than state capabilities. Diplomatic ties and stabilizing industrial 
relations are two such forms of policy ideas that rely on other actors’ resources for policy goals. We 
can observe this in expert debates over the policy ideas that are held to define the oil policy for the 
North Sea. Here different departments field different policy ideas. The Treasury shows a partial 
support for the PRT, but also refers to an idea of attractive investment for multinational oil 
companies in the North Sea as well as a diplomatic policy idea that other departments share vis-à-
vis the United States. These policy ideas sometimes outweigh the influence of concern for the 
ability to manipulate energy demands towards other energy types. The political dimension of coal 
unions weighs heavily, but its focus seems to decrease among experts after the labour government 
under Harold Wilson comes into power. The importance of maintaining industrial stability in the 
coal sector is, however, continued as a topic of focus among ministers within cabinet meetings. 
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The differences in policy ideas between the before and after period of the crisis is less pronounced 
in the United Kingdom compared to France. The negotiation style of a closed bureaucratic system is 
partially the explanation for these dynamics. It is characterised by interactions between many actors 
in a symmetric power relationship where no one group can dominate the views of another. This 
leads to maintenance of status-quo and difficulty in policy ideas to shift trajectory of energy policy. 
One clear illustration of this is the multitude of attempts to find consensus between otherwise 
differing policy ideas. Counter-factually, this general tendency could potentially have been 
counteracted had the Department of Energy had stronger formal institutional powers to dictate 
energy policy ideas vis-à-vis other actors. This is not the case, however, and while it is unfair to say 
the department does not do anything, its addition does not fundamentally shift the effect the 
bureaucratic structure has on policy idea dynamics. Existing patterns of coordination and consensus 
are thus reproduced. It is worth emphasising how the negotiation style and state capacity reinforce 
each other in this regard. 
In the United Kingdom, the weak capacity of state favours policy ideas that rely on multiple state-
society actors and the negotiation style in the bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom also 
invites a range of actors to contribute their own policy ideas in a context of power symmetry. The 
result is a plurality of actors and policy ideas are in play. This, in turn, is supported by the basis of 
expertise where policy ideas are not discussed in their technical detail, but rather at a general level. 
Analytically, the effect is that discussions of different policy ideas among experts operate primarily 
at the level of instrumental ideas rather than the settings of agreed upon ideas. In itself, this does not 
necessarily have to lead to stability in policy ideas. However, it reinforces status-quo outcomes, not 
necessarily due to agreement, but because every expert group has veto power, and the lowest 
common denominator, below which agreement is blocked, is at the level of overarching policy 
ideas.  
This illustrates why only examining different aspects of ideas is insufficient to understand idea 
change. Despite disagreement over instrumental policy ideas being able to shift the dominant expert 
groups and resultant policy in France, then in the United Kingdom debates can thus not proceed 
beyond the most general level of agreement. We see these types of dynamics among expert groups 
in debates about the Petroleum Revenue Tax and even in the more technically demanding debates 
on nuclear reactor choice. The latter case, in particular, shows how the basis of expertise has 
different impact on the types of arguments that are legitimate claims to authority in a policy area. 
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This is the case in the difference between the instrumental policy ideas of CPRS and Treasury on 
one side, and AEA and DTI on the other in the topic of reactor choice before the crisis. The 
common solution is to defer decision on issues that can be argued to wait, and agree on the general 
outline of those that can be agreed upon – in the latter case, the restructuring of the nuclear 
construction sector into fewer consortia. This gives the negations a certain level of inertia and bias 
towards maintaining the status quo. These technical debates on nuclear energy questions highlight 
how the negotiation style with a lack of veto-power among symmetric actors, with a political style 
of discussion that does not necessarily favour technical knowledge in the fielding of policy ideas, 
can combine to reinforce status-quo dynamics in parts of the energy policy. 
Domestically, the overarching policy goal of ensuring energy supply is maintained through coal 
mines and expectations of oil in future. Nuclear energy shifts back and forth due to politicization of 
technical choices and the aforementioned bureaucratic structure dynamics. The capacity of the state 
in nuclear policy was defined in terms of facilitating diplomatic ties that allow existing actors in the 
industry to operate more freely. The need to involve many different expert groups in the energy 
policy development means that technical discussions are not as sophisticated as otherwise could 
have been the case. Perhaps, more importantly, is that the technical expertise of some expert groups 
does not grant particular advantages in terms of the authority of policy ideas vis-à-vis other expert 
groups.  
This is a significant difference compared to the French bureaucratic structure where technical 
knowledge was widespread and imparted, on those expert groups who held it, considerable 
authority in policy ideas (although not sufficient by itself). Moreover, the structure of power 
symmetry between the expert groups leads to an emphasis on consensus in the negotiation style. 
When such agreement is not forthcoming – often quite quickly - then questions are pushed for 
debate at a later time. The negotiation style becomes one focusing on flexibility as seen in the 
nuclear policy, where choices are pushed around through a constant concern to not be left behind 
technologically and to maintain the domestic industry. The dynamic between expertise and politics 
thus becomes one of politicians having to push experts for clear recommendation for policies rather 
than experts pushing policy ideas on politicians. 
The more general training rather than specialized knowledge among most of the expert groups in 
the United Kingdom means that nuclear energy policy debates become characterised by a focus on 
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implied policy outcomes rather than evaluating policy choices on their technical merits. The 
technical choices before experts are thus rarely directly debated as technical choices, but instead in 
terms of their implications for the industry, diplomatic relations or future development possibilities. 
This reinforces the pattern of consensus-seeking both before and after the crisis.  
The CPRS explicitly notes the inability of discussing the policy ideas at a level of the technological 
choices required and this characterises the debates across time. As the meetings between expert 
groups on the different stages of nuclear policy before and after the crisis indicate, this pattern of 
non-technical debates is consistent within nuclear energy discussions when the Atomic Energy 
Agency is involved. Moreover, the department of energy following these limitations is mostly 
relegated to coordinating the different views of involved expert groups rather than controlling the 
policy direction per se. This also means that political intervention is sometimes required to break 
the indecision-dynamics in some parts of the energy policy. The strongest example of this is the 
nuclear reactor debates which go back and forth on several occasions throughout the period 
ultimately decided by ministers rather than a consistent recommendation from experts. 
This is worth expanding a little on this point, because it speaks to the role of formal politics in 
relation to the expertise that it increasingly relies on. It is of course the formal remit of the political 
incumbents of government to formulate and legislate on policy that they see fit, in this sense it may 
seem counter-intuitive that any political system can be described as weak156. A seeming counter-
factual might be the “disengagement” policy line of the conservatives in the early 1970s. It might be 
construed as an attempt to limit the role of the public in social life, which may have succeeded in 
some manner by introducing managerial practices of the private sector into parts of the public sector 
(Young and Lowe 1974, chap. 12). However, in terms of changing the open or closed nature of the 
bureaucratic structure, there was limited changes compared to the existing trend of large federal 
departments despite attempts to reduce tendencies for interdepartmental compromise (Young and 
Lowe 1974, 130–31). The fact that the framework of open bureaucratic structures applies in terms 
of weak capacity of the state across different political party governments reinforces the point that 
this is a structurally distinct tendency, not a consequence of politics per se.  
                                                 
156 Perhaps outside of descriptions of ”weak” and “strong” states in relation to some material factor in the international system of states. Here the 
reference point for the descriptor can be somewhat intuitively operationalised (if nonetheless conceptually debated as key to outcomes). 
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7.3 Main analytical points and dimensions in France. 
The analysis of expert policy ideas within the bureaucratic structure of France identified several 
analytical findings. The analysis emphasised how the expert groups of the CEA and EDF have a 
large role to play in the policy ideas within energy policy discussion due to their dominance in the 
PEON commission. The strong capacity of the state has an effect throughout the period both before 
and after the crisis through managing the economy as well as having an active role in fostering 
economic growth through domestic initiatives like a nuclear energy programme. This is consistent 
with, and supportive of, the overarching ideas of CEA and EDF who both emphasise the 
technophilic modernisation of France and an element of French nationalism.  
The instrumental ideas that the CEA and EDF follow are, however, somewhat different. At the level 
of instrumental ideas, the CEA sees the overarching policy idea of modernizing France ensured 
through nuclear energy and a military “force de frappe”. The EDF, on the other hand, sees this 
through energy independence and cheap electricity generation. These variations in instrumental 
policy ideas between the CEA and EDF can both exist within a strong state capacity configuration. 
However, which ideas win in cases of conflict cannot be explained alone with reference to the non-
pluralistic nature of negotiations or the unity in a technophilic overarching idea of the future growth 
of the French economy and society. In closed bureaucratic structures the ability of policy ideas of 
one expert group to win vis-à-vis others can be due to a number of factors. It can be due to their 
legitimacy in the expertise they hold, which both EDF and CEA held. It can be through the ability 
to create alliances with other actors to support a policy idea, or through the preferred position they 
have already obtained from previous institutional arrangements. The CEA was in the latter position 
due to being the development arm of the French state in nuclear energy and thus was an extension 
of the dirigiste capacity of the state.  
The negotiation style in the closed bureaucratic system of France was characterised by negotiations 
among experts in formal commissions and tended to be highly technical in nature. The period 
before the crisis was characterised by a formalized and amicable style of negotiation between the 
EDF and CEA. The conflict that emerged between them was on a technical basis on the specific 
choices regarding the development goals, and thus types of nuclear reactors that should define the 
energy policy in France. The technical and formalized nature of the negotiation style meant that 
debates remained at the level of instrumental ideas. It is not until the EDF begins introducing a new 
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measurement of kWh/centimes, which allows relative cost comparisons between different reactor 
technologies to be included in their reports. Especially, the ability to generate cost projections for 
different technologies allows potential alliances to be formed between other expert groups in the 
PEON commission. After the crisis hits and the shift to an instrumental policy idea of substitution 
of all other energy sources by electricity takes the forefront.  
The reason why one particular technical idea could suddenly shift the instrumental policies that 
dictated the energy policy is a function of a bureaucratic structure. In this context, the cost-concerns 
could unify instrumental policy ideas between the Ministry of Finance and EDF thus create the 
conditions for a common alliance of Ministry of Finance and EDF against the CEA. The creation of 
the kWh/centimes measurement is a key condition for this. However, another facilitating factor was 
the basis of expertise in the closed bureaucratic system of France that is characterised by similarity 
in disciplinary language between the ENA-trained parts of the Ministry of Finance and EDF. This 
alliance is made possible by a shared background in the basis of expertise between the two actors – 
specifically a common appreciation and use of the disciplines of statistics and economics.  
A coherence between ENA-schooled economists and statisticians in the EDF and Ministry of 
Finance makes it possible to form common ground around an instrumental idea of cost between the 
two. This allowed the technical debates, especially located in the PEON-commission, to shift 
towards concerns with electricity production, which constitutes a dividing line in instrumental 
policy ideas between the CEAs concern with military use of nuclear technology and the EDFs 
instrumental policy idea of generating cheap electricity. The question of cost becomes the 
substantive debate that breaks the unity around an overarching idea of nuclear energy as a grand 
project of the EDF and CEA and shifts the dominant ideas toward instrumental policy ideas to one 
of cost which the Ministry of Finance and EDF can unite around. The combination of a new 
measurement and common educational basis thus made a new alliance between expert groups 
possible, which increased the influence of policy ideas of the EDF instead of those of the CEA. 
This allows an instrumental policy idea on cost to shift the balance of power within the PEON-
commission in favour of the EDF to win support from the Ministry of Finance for a new reactor 
technology and thus shift the path of the French nuclear energy policy. As the crisis hits, the 
consequences of this ideational battle and new coalition between the Ministry of Finance and EDF 
mean that the choices available to the strong state are defined by EDF’s instrumental ideas of cheap 
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electricity generation and the substitution of other energy sources by electricity rather than the 
military-aspects highlighted by the instrumental policy ideas of the CEA, previously.  
The ideational foundation of the alliance between the Ministry of Finance and EDF is later put into 
question when the differences in setting of this idea become apparent between them. In short, the 
EDF focuses on cost as a relative measure per unit of energy generated, where the Ministry of 
Finance considers cost in relation to an absolute budgetary restraint of policy programmes. By 
contrast, the EDF seeks to increase the size and scope of the nuclear energy programme in direct 
opposition to budgetary constraints understanding of cost. At that point, the EDF and CEA shift 
back towards a unity around the overarching ideas of technophilia and nuclear energy, but now, 
defined through technical policy choices that reflect underlying instrumental policy ideas of the 
EDF. The development in the policy ideas that define French energy policy across the period of the 
oil crisis can thus be explained with reference to shifts in the coalitions that supported specific 
policy ideas among groups of experts. A key part of this story, however, is how the bureaucratic 
structural aspects of educational basis and negotiation style affected the conditions for the ideational 
coalitions for shift back and forth.   
7.4 Main findings of the two analyses 
Many dynamics and actors have been highlighted both in the analyses themselves and in the 
summary conclusions above. Therefore, it might be useful to briefly sketch the key findings of the 
analyses that become evident when comparing their ideational dynamics and differing open or 
closed bureaucratic structure which shed new light on the interaction between institutional 
structures and ideas as well as the level at which ideational change is expected to take place. This is 
not just as a general corrective to existing models (Blyth 2013b), but a specification that the 
configuration of institutional structures in which ideas operate affect the change dynamics. 
The French case illustrates that the coalitions that allow support for a particular policy idea are more 
likely to be found at the level of instrumental ideas in cases where technical debates are prevalent. 
This was because the strong state capacity reinforced the existing few expert groups in their 
formalized and technical negotiation style. Here, we saw how the EDF and CEA generally agreed 
on the technical conditions of what to debate and how, but disagreed on instrumental ideas. 
Likewise, it was the agreement on instrumental ideas on cost between the Ministry of Finance and 
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EDF that allowed a coalition to form that could supersede the instrumental idea of the CEA on 
military use of nuclear technology. It is also crucial to note, that the educational basis of the EDF 
and Ministry of Finance played a conditioning role for this ideational coalition on cost. Because the 
two organizations had similar expertise from the ENA on statistical and economic modelling and 
projection, the arguments that the introduction of kWh/centimes allowed the EDF to forward were 
consistent with a way of thinking in the Ministry of Finance. When disagreements arise about the 
setting of the instrumental idea of cost after the crisis, the EDF and CEA unify around the 
instrumental ideas of the EDF and their common overarching policy idea of developing French 
society through nuclear technology. 
The case of the United Kingdom highlighted that support for a particular policy idea requires 
unanimity or political intervention, otherwise the dynamics of ideational development favour the 
status quo. In the open bureaucratic system of the United Kingdom, the educational background 
played a different role in that the generalist background of most experts meant that the technical 
dimension of policy issues were rarely allowed to dominate discussion. This in turn meant that 
conditions for coalition-building around ideas was much more politically contentious and not driven 
by specific disciplinary similarities in arguments or ways of thinking. In the negotiation style 
characterised by an emphasis on consensus among multiple experts who act as veto-players, 
different policy-ideas can be kept in a constant deadlock of ideational battle due to institutional 
characteristics of the negotiation. The weak capacity of the state meant that shifting concerns of a 
large number of actors was allowed to influence negotiations already prone to gridlock. This shifts 
the loci of ideational battles compared to the French case. Accordingly, ideational change thus often 
comes from political intervention in the expert debates rather than from ideational battles among 
experts themselves. 
Before moving to the more general insights, contribution and perspectives of these analyses it is 
worth reflecting on the role of politics in expertise. Crucial to this study has been the role of 
institutional context for how expert ideas gain traction. This meant examining the experts and their 
interaction surrounding energy policy. These are partially analytical choices to allow the analyses to 
speak to the research questions that inform the study. However, part of the distinctive differences 
between the two cases of the open bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom and the closed 
structure in France is the role of politicians. What does this mean for the role of the elephant in the 
room of alternative explanations: was it just politics? To some extent, this answer is always partially 
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true in social sciences. Indeed, to extent, politics of yesteryear may be said to embed itself in the 
institutional setup of a given policy field. The key here is the different way that politics is activated 
in relation to policy ideas.  
In the French case, political intervention was required to decide on the ultimate direction of policy – 
but the path of a nuclear future was already debated, laid out and significant ideational conflict and 
alliance formation (with e.g. Ministry of Finance) had already taken place among technical experts 
of the CEA and EDF. Politicians were not called upon to direct the everyday decision-making of 
energy policy. The relatively closed, technically driven experts of the PEON-commission had the 
debates and the EDF route prevailed over another technical group in the CEA (ultimately, both 
somewhat against the will of the Ministry of Finance).  
In the case of the United Kingdom, the role of politicians is continually required to achieve policy 
outcomes because of characteristics relating to especially the veto power of experts and consensus-
nature of the negotiation style as well as the predominance of general knowledge among experts 
rather than technical expertise. In a sense, the political dimension is thus incorporated as an external 
push in the closed bureaucratic structure in France, and as a more continual reliance and 
incremental force in the open bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom. That being said, it 
would be interesting to expand the scope of the analysis of the openly political context 
(parliamentary debates, governmental support and shifting programmes and origin as well as 
broader political discourse). This would allow us to better gauge the intersect between politics and 
expertise in each case. 
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7.5 General insights from the analyses, contribution and perspectives for 
future research 
What have we learned from examining these two cases of response to a crisis within energy policy? 
This section indicates how insights from the thesis contribute to different aspects of social science 
research and perspectives for future research. 
7.5.1 Diachronic analysis of change in ideas 
One crucial, if perhaps somewhat evident implication is the importance of historical analysis in the 
study of ideas. This may be a somewhat intuitive point, but in the context of the findings of this 
thesis it bears repeating. Studying change (of any kind, in principle) presupposes the analytical lens 
applied has a dimension along which change, and continuity can be mapped. The solution of this 
thesis was a longer term diachronic study that examined a single crisis, but mapped several years of 
policy dynamics before and after the crisis. This is necessary to actually pick up and register such 
changes, because their manifestation may initially not look like a shift and their eventual effect can 
only be gauged over time. Therefore,  the case studies that emphasise the role of ideas have to take 
the temporal nature of ideas and policy change seriously into account. This is even more relevant in 
cases where the policy field is slow to shift and the practical implementation of policy choices may 
take many years to come to fruition (building power plants, standardising electricity systems etc.) or 
when technological choices and implications are opaque. 
7.5.2 Contribution to the understanding of ideational change 
The conclusions to the analyses of this thesis indicate that ideas do not only change due to 
fundamental shifts in paradigms, but more likely due to piecemeal undermining of a paradigm by 
second order ideas. This creates ripples through the entire policy-arena where eventually new 
paradigms become visible as alternatives to old – initially due to new instrumental ideas (e.g. 
France, EDF on cost). This is a further specification of the way through which ideas may develop 
and change over time not initially understood or at least specified by classics in the field (e.g. Hall, 
1993, variants of which still permeate the literature). 
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The analysis attempted to examine the effect of different institutional setups to policy idea 
dynamics within energy policy. It did so by focusing on three dimensions of institutional 
characteristics that were called the bureaucratic structure. The United Kingdom and France were 
examined because they seem to represent two extreme cases of bureaucratic structures where the 
former is open and the latter is a closed bureaucratic structure. The study of policy ideas among 
experts in these two different bureaucratic structures were then analysed across a number of years 
around the first oil crisis in 1973. At a more intuitive starting point, this was done on the 
assumption that crises would be the place where breaks with existing institutional patterns would be 
more likely. From a theoretical point of view, it also contributed to the understanding of the classic 
paradigmatic views of policy change, because it is during times of crisis that paradigms are often 
said to break down. The focus of the analysis of policy ideas in energy policy around a crisis thus 
served to highlight the dynamics of how this might happen. This is relevant for the study of ideas, 
because a dominant explanation relies on a concept of paradigmatic shifts, which assumes policy 
change follows as dominant zeitgeists are replaced with new ones creating a cascade of policy 
change in its wake. Studying crisis should be a critical case for such an argument, because it is 
exactly in the period of the crisis that we would expect the strongest influence of ideas to shift a 
paradigm and a new dominant idea to replace an existing one.  
The analyses, however, show that the story in the cases are not as straight forward. It is hard to 
contest that there was a paradigmatic shift in the policy trajectory of French energy policy 
immediately after the oil crisis with the introduction of the nuclear programme pushed for by Pierre 
Messmer in 1974. However, this policy did not represent a fundamentally new ideational paradigm. 
Instead, these ideas had existed for a long time (in differing forms) within public agencies of CEA 
and EDF. Moreover, it was the conflict between the ideas of these two agencies that helped define 
the trajectory of French energy policy along a nuclear path as well as the specifics of the form it 
would take. Resistance did persist from actors like the Ministry of Finance who were pushing a 
cost-perspective emphasising balancing of public finances. They were effective in some level of 
limitation to the speed and scope of the policy trajectory, but they were not able to shift the 
direction or supplant the dominant ideas that supported it - which effectively led to EDF attempting 
to supplant all other forms of energy in the French energy supply with electricity. 
In the United Kingdom, the open bureaucratic structure meant that multiple veto-actors were able to 
contribute policy ideas to the overall energy policy. This meant that a constant flux of policy ideas 
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were present, but also that deciding between them was made institutionally difficult. In a context 
where energy policy had historically been organised around several different actors and ministries, 
even attempts at centralizing decision-making and setting up the department of energy to coordinate 
policy ideas did not change the effect of the negotiation styles. They remained consensus-seeking 
and reliant on agreement or the weak capacity of the state in directing the energy policy of Britain. 
This meant that policy dynamics were more ad-hoc and shifted back and forth on key policy 
decisions like nuclear reactor technology, or agreement was reduced to the lowest common 
denominator of agreement. This resulted in talks of restructuring industries or shifting around of 
taxes on oil extraction thus relegating decisions to the discussion on policy setting of more marginal 
impact and being reduced in scope or final decisions being procrastinated. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis made these analytical insights possible through a number of 
moves. First, the analytical framework is insistent on the active incorporation of institutional and 
ideational factors into the analysis of idea dynamics and the role of expertise in politics. In research, 
these factors often interact or condition each other in different ways. Using this framework, the 
analysis is forced to examine them together and this allows the findings of the thesis to reflect 
synthesis of interactions that would otherwise have been difficult to spot. This duality in the 
framework represents an active intention to move the literature on the role of ideas in politics 
towards an explicit appreciation of the institutional contexts within which ideas matter – part of the 
contribution of the analytical framework should therefore also be seen in this light.  
Secondly, the bureaucratic structure part of the framework attempted to incorporate aspects of the 
institutional context at different levels of generality. The capacity of the state related to broader 
questions of the power of the state vis-à-vis other spheres of society. The negotiation style 
attempted to capture the institutional context in which actors (including experts) operate to achieve 
outcomes, the openness and number of actors involved including the dynamics of interaction is 
important because it helps illustrate the contours of the arena in which ideas can be fielded by 
experts. Finally, the basis of expertise attempted to touch on the type of expertise that was dominant 
in the interactions between different actors in achieving policy outcomes. This dimension was 
added to include a more substantial understanding of the types of arguments that were forwarded by 
experts. This added complexity was balanced by the additional focus it allowed on how different 
aspects of the institutional environment all play a part in conditioning the policy ideas that 
eventually receive support. It is important that they are analysed together, because as we saw when 
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comparing the United Kingdom and France, the types of expertise that become dominant varies. 
Why not assume it is simply the type of expertise that explains different policy outcomes? Well, 
partially, it was. At the surface level of comparing basis of expertise and the policy ideas of experts 
between the two countries, it is clear that significant differences exist between technically-driven 
commissions in the French case and more openly political and general specializations among 
experts in the United Kingdom. However, that is not to say that technical expertise did not exist 
among experts in the United Kingdom. Especially, when comparing the nuclear policy expertise, it 
is clear that the UKAEA holds significant technical know-how. So why did they prevail in the 
French case and not in the United Kingdom? Due to the other aspects of the bureaucratic structure 
affecting the overall dynamic of interaction among experts. When examining the capacity of the 
state in the United Kingdom, we see the greater propensity to involve multiple spheres of society. 
This openness is reiterated in the negotiation style where multiple different actors are involved on 
ad-hoc basis in policy discussions. Because these interactions are institutionally geared towards 
consensus no one group of actors can dominate the agenda, and because technical know-how is not 
characteristic of the majority, the outcomes of deliberations cannot be arrived at through technical 
merits. The dynamic of requiring explicit political intervention to solve what in France are primarily 
technically-driven problems arises from the combination of the analytical aspects that make up the 
bureaucratic structure.  
7.5.3 The role of politics in a system of experts and pre-existing institutional 
boundaries 
It is worth emphasising, that the finding that institutional characteristics can affect policy idea 
patterns is not equivalent to the role of politics being completely mitigated. What it does suggest, is 
that the role of political intervention is in part influenced by the type of open or closed bureaucratic 
structure. In the case of France, there is no denying that a strong state capacity is also corollary to a 
strong role for politicians. Indeed, part of the story why the CEA was perhaps unprepared for an 
alliance between EDF and the Ministry of Finance was that they had since their inception been 
directly responsible to the president and their finances outside the direct budgetary control of the 
Ministry of Finance. These are of course political choices. Similarly, it is the final say of the 
“Conseil de ministres" that decides to implement a particular nuclear policy as suggested by the 
PEON commission. At several steps along the way, politics matter.  
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The point is, different bureaucratic structures affect when politics matter. In the closed bureaucratic 
structure of France, politics matter in the sense of conditioning by setting up the institutions and in 
the final decision on a policy. Indeed, to argue that a strong capacity of state through dirigisme is 
not an expression of some form of historically entrenched politics, would also be an unnuanced 
reading of the historical and political record of France. That being said, it is crucial to note the 
formally insulated nature of the expert groups, their relative autonomy from ad-hoc political 
interventions and the extent to which the politicians eventually simply implemented the energy 
policies as suggested by the PEON commission.  
The nature of politics in the open bureaucratic structure of the United Kingdom was much different. 
The expert groups were of a much higher number and relied on coordination among experts who 
had formal input, but no clear dynamics of the bureaucratic structure allowed the policy ideas of 
one or the other expert group to dominate the discussion. Partially, this can be traced to the idea of 
cooperation among different actors being supported at the capacity of the state. The dynamics of the 
negotiation style similarly allowed many different actors to push different policy ideas without a 
clear way to differentiate winning from losing ideas. This results in a dynamic back-and-forth 
procrastination of different policy issues. The final decision between which often required direct 
political intervention into the expert debates, as was seen on the shifting choices on nuclear reactor 
technology through the 1970s. 
7.5.4 Empirical relevance of the 1970s oil crisis for today? 
Newer developments in energy policy are intersecting with new policy agendas. Obvious areas are 
questions of environmentalism and the problem of climate change. Many countries, not just the 
countries studied in this thesis, face these new problems, with tremendous political, economic and 
technical challenges. This thesis has attempted to tease out and examine to very different responses 
to a common problem of the oil crisis in two separate countries and emphasised the domestic 
political dimension of the actors involved and the ideas that drive them. The question of how policy 
change comes about is an age-old question in political science, but as we are faced with new 
problems, solutions, actors and interests will come into conflict, and the battleground will be fought 
over which actors should define the problem in such a way that their solutions apply to it. This 
means that solutions are not subsequent to problems, instead they may indeed be pre-existing and 
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gain prominence as new ideas rise and obtain influence. This observation makes it all the more 
crucial to examine the pre-existing institutional patterns that characterise the countries in question. 
The 1970s are often highlighted as a paradigmatic period – most notably for broad historical 
changes and the end of the Trente Glorioueses, but also theoretically as an anchor for much of the 
ideational scholarship on ideas (see chapters one and two). For energy policy, the period is likewise 
relevant. The first oil crisis and the 1970s highlight a shift in energy mixes away from imported oils 
and towards other sources. With the caveat that the world of today is not the world of the 1970s, we 
may still tease out some implications for energy policy, sustainability and climate change from what 
was examined in this thesis. The theoretical implication of this thesis is that the victory of some 
policy ideas over others, even in highly technical policy spheres like those relating to energy, rely 
on more than the content of their ideas to achieve influence. The specific institutional context in 
which the policy ideas operate matters greatly to the dynamics of interaction between experts and 
the types of ideas that come to characterise policy formulation. This means that great attention must 
be given to the existing institutional setup of expertise in the given country when attempting to 
manipulate the energy mix from highly reliant on fossil fuels to other sources. What is more, this 
requires a keen eye to the different actors involved in the process and how they are involved if 
successful transition to sustainable energy is to be achieved. This obviously is relevant to questions 
of the future and role of nuclear or oil as energy sources, which have been extensively examined in 
this thesis, but also to broader questions of alternative energy sources. 
New developments in this field and the challenges to common energy transition problems in the 
face of climate change have multiple dimensions that are different from those explicitly dealt with 
in this thesis. Primarily, this difference is the much more integrated nature of economies and 
political systems (in particular within the EU) compared to the early and late 1970s. Examining the 
dynamics of these policy trajectories in energy and how actors are dealing with the crisis of climate 
change thus requires a much more openly international and multi-level approach than was applied 
in this project. Nonetheless, there are insights gained from the results of this thesis, which may help 
us identify relevant points of interest when trying to steer a large-scale policy transition within 
energy following a crisis. In particular, the role of nationally specific institutional patterns that often 
reflect the unique historical legacy of the country in question. These specificities become embedded 
as institutional parameters that affect the operation of politics. More specifically, an application of 
the framework of this thesis would highlight the role of existing institutional structures in affording 
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specific types of expertise’s access to the policy debates. Moreover, this dimension would be 
combined with an attention to how the interaction between the different experts was structured. Is it 
a more open structure that involves a multiplicity of different experts? Is there a formally given 
hierarchy of interaction or do they field policy ideas on an equal footing? If the latter is the case, 
which mechanisms or actors exist in the system (or outside it) to alleviate gridlock in the process of 
policy formation? Such attention would allow us to specify ex ante which countries or sectors 
would be more difficult to achieve a transition to more sustainable sources of energy. A study of the 
role of ideas in any field of policy would therefore do well to incorporate an attention to 
specificities of the institutional contexts in which the effect of ideas is analysed. At a simple level, 
this should be fostered to increase the nuance of the analysis in question. A more general point is 
that the specification of relevant institutional context for the policy area and ideas in question helps 
to limit the scope and set the parameters of generalizability of the findings of the study. 
7.6 Implications of the thesis for future research 
Following the findings of the analyses in this thesis focus of future research could usefully be 
directed towards a couple of axes of interest. 
First, the often very politically-domestic dependent nature of these shifts, which means general 
predictions about reaction patterns are difficult to make, but also it necessitates a nuanced 
understanding of the different domestic political and economic contexts into which a given crisis is 
being understood. Second, the differences of where influence lies in terms of degree of political or 
bureaucratic control over the policy field will also make significant differences. In France, the 
ultimate decision of going with nuclear energy was political at the highest level, but the already 
existing expertise of national bureaucratic agencies within the field, as well as a political culture of 
state projects, made the outcome of a total reorganization of the energy supply and production 
towards a singular source – nuclear – the more conditioned by these contextually historical and 
institutional contexts. At the same time, the importance of tracing the ongoing back-and-forth of 
ideas and interests between these agencies is necessary to understand not just who, but how the 
policy shift took place as it developed over time. Third, the particular ideas that agents field to make 
sense of the problems that pertain to their policy area are of key importance in understanding these 
diachronic developments, not just their material interests as agencies, but the way in which material 
and ideational factors interact. 
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The choice of energy policy as the field of examination for the role of experts has wider appeal than 
the specifics of the choices and debates analysed in the period around and after the first oil crisis. 
Energy questions are perhaps even more relevant today than they were in the 1970s, because as the 
oil crisis represented a need to maintain energy supplies or shift to other sources as needed, the 
current debate on climate change is about more than just independence from oil in the Middle East. 
The climate agenda encompasses everything from CO2-reduction goals, phasing out of internal 
combustion vehicles by 2030s in some places (U.K., California, and France) to a greater attention to 
the underlying consumption-logic of modern capitalism and a reorientation towards recycling both 
on societal and individual levels. What all these interconnected concerns and goals have in common 
is that they are complex and will require effort and time. These questions cut across more 
dimensions than those covered in the present thesis, but nonetheless speak to the underlying 
relevance of some of the questions the thesis poses.  
A tentative hypothetical application of the framework on bureaucratic structures could be the field 
of study relating to climate change. Here, the function of bureaucratic structures in the role of 
different policy ideas of how to transition (or not) to a less carbon-intensive society would 
potentially be useful. Such an application could highlight the different aspects of state or market 
involvement in producing the conditions for or explicit solutions to the climate crisis in which more 
state-controlled action promote faster adaption. The negotiation style of experts (or broader group 
of relevant actors) in defining the solutions could highlight how the inclusion or exclusion of 
especially state institutions alter the possibilities for policy ideas to become active solutions, with 
the findings of the study pointing to a more exclusionary negotiation-style in order to support new 
solutions.  
Finally, the findings of this thesis hint at the varying dominance of different forms of epistemic 
authority would also be relevant in this field - with a focus on two pitfalls: one of generalists co-
opting technical discussions and one of specialists dictating marginal discussions and 
developments. Thus, suggesting both the necessity of specialist for negotiation in specificities but 
also outside control that can prevent the continuation of marginal discussions that at best can hinder, 
or at works delay, outcomes. Although, potentially, this dimension should not be limited to 
educational backgrounds and disciplinary variation examined in this thesis, but broader examination 
of the role of climate scepticism versus scientific knowledge might be relevant dimensions to apply 
to the framework of a new area of study. The particularities of requirements for re-specification of 
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the broader framework to new policy contexts would of course need to take into account the 
theoretical and empirical concerns of the particular research questions that are being asked. The 
thesis did not specify theoretically how epistemic authority is achieved through the developmental 
history of the given episteme itself; rather it suggested that the institutional environment makes 
some constellations of knowledge, taking the form of ideas, more powerful than others and thus 
help explain why some ideas triumph over others. By extension, the thesis did not explore how the 
institutional factors (that allowed some ideas to prevail over others) provide experts with epistemic 
authority, nor how it travels across institutional contexts or policy fields.  
This raises interesting questions for future research. For instance, is the epistemic authority of some 
experts (or broader actors) derived from educational background more decisive in energy policy 
than it is for social policy? Such analyses might take the research agenda further towards exploring 
how bureaucratic structures condition the power of ideas through epistemic authority. This also 
begs the question of the relative importance of the three factors in contributing to ideas granting 
epistemic authority in other policy contexts. This further application of the framework would go 
some way towards a more clear demarcation between the role of the different analytical aspects of 
the bureaucratic structure across policy fields and topics. For instance, is educational background 
more decisive than negotiation styles within specific ideational contexts? In this respect, the 
theoretical insights of the framework could be amended to contribute to other literatures on the role 
of information, knowledge and misinformation in understanding the policy dynamics of ideas 
(Hopkin and Rosamond 2018). Recent work on the politicization of expertise have shown how this 
has manifested in actions to discredit expertise of the more mainstream economic discipline by the 
Leave campaign surrounding Brexit (Rosamond 2020). This is an important new avenue in the 
study of the political advantage that expertise can bring which shifts the focus towards the origin 
and source of its authority.  
The dynamics of policy ideas among experts in energy questions is relevant for a substantial part of 
climate debates, and even if they are not directly applicable in the form operationalised for this 
thesis, then the general concern with the role of expertise and its varied influence in different 
settings is. What is the currency of experts? Knowledge. How is knowledge transmitted? Through 
ideas that link problems and solutions. The rise and fall of ideas is affected by the institutional 
parameters of where they operate, and so, keeping a keen eye on them when attempting to transition 
societies to a greener and more sustainable path is absolutely essential for success.  
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There is an additional relevance of the focus on expertise beyond the climate agenda and 
transitioning societies to greater sustainability. Expertise is needed both in development of policy 
solutions themselves, but also to aid politicians and policymakers to navigate in and decide between 
different policy solutions. Higher complexity of problems and greater propensity for wicked 
problems makes expertise more invaluable to societies at large, and to politics in particular. Both in 
the substantive disciplinary form that expertise takes, but also in the institutional environment that it 
operates in. Greater complexity means many things, but one implication is that there is no a priori 
agreement on what relevant field of knowledge can speak authoritatively on different policy 
problems. The result is an increased risk of politicisation of expertise. This is specifically an aspect 
that this thesis has spoken to when examining the decision-making capability of different 
negotiation styles of a bureaucratic structure and trying to map the way educational basis of 
expertise or negotiation styles interact with creating conditions for coalitions around certain policy 
ideas. A relevant follow-up question, which this thesis did not tackle directly, is what happens when 
expert disagreements spill over into other fields than their own? This is perhaps even more evident 
in discussions over the veracity of climate change as a man-made phenomenon, but it is relevant in 
other spheres of society as well. 
In recent years, we have seen a rise in the polarization of public discourse in particular in the United 
States, but also in debates over Brexit in Europe. In the context of these debates it has become clear 
that the role of expertise is a different one than modelled in classic understandings of knowledge as 
truth. Rather, these contentious political issues have shown that multiple truths seem to be in play 
and different groups pick and choose depending on ideological or political expediency. I will make 
no claim as to the causal sequence of these phenomena other than to state the seeming 
interconnectedness of things like the rise of the concept of fake-news, general mistrust of expertise 
and increasing populist tendencies among, at least some parts of, the political elites. In this context, 
a deeper appreciation for the institutional context that facilitates or dampens the support for 
particular ideas is crucial, not only in when understanding how particular policy ideas can lead to 
different economic policy, or energy policy choices, but also in understanding how ideas can 
support or maintain ideologies in the civil sphere. Alongside this increasing polarization of civil 
society, we have observed the formation of tribal logics that operate isolated from each other and 
connect and coordinate with the help of web-based technologies, social media and the like.  
253 | P a g e  
 
I should reiterate that while the framework suggested in this thesis may speak to dynamics in other 
spheres, I make no claim to its generalizability across the multitude of different actors, dynamics or 
spaces where non-state actors have a greater influence than energy policy in the 1970s. The world 
of yesterday is not the world of today. Clearly, the conceptualization of institutions as bureaucratic 
structures utilized in this thesis would probably not fit readily onto other areas of political life in a 
readymade fashion and despite similarities in the dynamics it attempts to capture would likely need 
conceptual and operational specification in these new contexts. Relevant institutional conditions in 
such examinations would have to include elements not present or defined in this thesis e.g. the role 
of different types of social media in the diffusion of information between polarized political groups, 
but also as places of power in themselves e.g. increasing visibility through algorithmic logics whose 
functioning is not transparent, or outright moderation in cases of “mis-information”. 
Thus, while the present analysis and analytical framework is not constructed to shed light on the 
role of populism, conspiracy theories, anti-waxing, climate-change denial or other discursive trends 
in modern politics, a more concerted effort to understand how ideas interact with institutional 
conditions in these areas would greatly improve our understanding of these phenomena. Hopefully, 
the examination of the role of different bureaucratic structures in the ability of policy ideas to gain 
influence among experts will have hinted at ways in which this might be done, and if not readily 
transferable to other similar fields, would point to the dynamics of coalition enforcing mechanisms 
that support winning policy ideas. If nothing else, then if this thesis has succeeded in showing how 
institutions matter for the variation in role of ideas, it will have been a success. 
In closing, this thesis has emphasised the importance of keeping an eye on how institutional 
variation in administrative traditions can affect the influence of different experts and their ideas. 
Furthermore, it illustrates that politics and knowledge are linked even in highly technical policy-
areas. Finally, in a world of increasingly complex and country-spanning problems – be they energy, 
climate, cybersecurity or otherwise - perhaps the more important point is for the thesis to act as a 
general reminder that even the most technical and complex of issues contain politics – and that 
politics is ultimately about collective choice, not necessity. 
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255 | P a g e  
 
 
Confidential letter to the Prime Minister from Lord Rothschild (Qa01401). 8th December. 1971 - 
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companies (A923). 3. October 1977 - (CAB 184/486)(Taxation and energy policy: review of North 
Sea fiscal regime). 
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23. October 1974. CAB184/165 (Central Policy Review Staff Files. Central Policy Review Staff 
Report ‘Energy 1974 and After’) 
 
Letter from F.E. Robin Butler – Nuclear Reactors. (Qd0992). 27th march. 1972 - CAB184/57 
(Central Policy Review Staff. International Oil Questions). 
 
Note for the record of a meeting at 4:15pm on Monday 9. February 1976. (Qd04597) - 
CAB184/292. (Energy policy: Fast Reactor Project 1975) 
 
Letter to Dr. Hart from Lord Hinton (Qa2876). 23. February 1976. (CAB184/292) 
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Production Combinée de Chaleur dans les centrales nucléaires (424528.09) 17. Februrary 1978. 
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